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THE

BAMPTON LECTURES

FOR M.DCCC.LXXIX.

By the same Author.

CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY,

OR

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE GOSPEL

WITH

THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN.

THE BOYLE LECTURES FOR 1874 AND 1875.

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THE

FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH

CONSIDERED IN

EIGHT SERMONS

PREACHED BEFORE

THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

IN THE YEAR M.DCCC.LXXIX

AT THE LECTURE

FOUNDED BY JOHN BAMPTON M.A.

CANON OF SALISBURY

BY

HENRY WACE M.A.

CHAPLAIN OF LINCOLN'S INN

PROFESSOR OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN KING'S COLLEGE LONDON

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London

PICKERING AND CO. 196 PICCADILLY

1880

'For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ: for it is the Power of God unto Salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.

'For therein is the Righteousness of God revealed from Faith to Faith: as it is written, The Just shall live by Faith.'—*The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans*, ch. i. vv. 16, 17.

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INSCRIBED TO

THE REV. CHARLES HOLE B.A.

LECTURER ON ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN KING'S COLLEGE LONDON

AS A TOKEN

OF GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION

EXTRACT

FROM THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF THE LATE

REV. JOHN BAMPTON,

CANON OF SALISBURY.

—— "I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to the "Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University of "Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and singular the "said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the intents and "purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, I will and "appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ox-"ford for the time being shall take and receive all the rents, "issues, and profits thereof, and (after all taxes, reparations, "and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the re-"mainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Ser-"mons, to be established for ever in the said University, and "to be performed in the manner following:

"I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in "Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads "of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoining "to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in the "morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity "Lecture Sermons, the year following, at St. Mary's in Ox-"ford, between the commencement of the last month in Lent "Term, and the end of the third week in Act Term.

"Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture "Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following Sub- "jects—to confirm and establish the Christian Faith, and to "confute all heretics and schismatics—upon the divine au- "thority of the holy Scriptures—upon the authority of the "writings of the primitive Fathers, as to the faith and prac- "tice of the primitive Church—upon the Divinity of our Lord "and Saviour Jesus Christ—upon the Divinity of the Holy "Ghost—upon the Articles of the Christian Faith, as compre- "hended in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds.

"Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lec- "ture Sermons shall be always printed, within two months "after they are preached; and one copy shall be given to the "Chancellor of the University, and one copy to the Head of "every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of "Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; "and the expense of printing them shall be paid out of the "revenue of the Land or Estates given for establishing the "Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the Preacher shall not be "paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, before they are "printed.

"Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be quali- "fied to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath "taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, in one of the "two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and that the "same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Ser- "mons twice."

PREFACE.

THERE are two general purposes towards which attempts 'to confirm and establish the Christian Faith' may be directed. The one is to show that the truths and facts it reveals are consistent with the conclusions of Reason and Science. The other is to assert the positive grounds on which our Faith rests, and to enforce its authority. The latter is the purpose which the present course of Lectures is designed to serve. It appeared to the author that such an attempt was peculiarly necessary at the present day. In consequence of the prominence of scientific habits of thought, there is grave danger of insufficient weight being allowed to the distinct and independent claims of the principle of Faith. But it is to Faith that the message of the Gospel is primarily addressed, and upon its vitality the life of the Church chiefly depends. The author has accordingly endeavoured to illustrate the necessity and supremacy of this principle of our nature, and to vindicate its operation in those successive acts of Faith by which the Christian Creed, as confessed by the Reformed Church of England, has been constructed. He has endeavoured to exhibit the chief realities of spiritual experience to which that

Creed appeals, under the conviction that in proportion as these great facts of life and history are apprehended and kept in view will the authority of our Faith be established. The present work, therefore, is not, properly speaking, of an apologetic character. It is an attempt to exhibit, in some measure, the supreme claim of the Gospel upon our allegiance; and it endeavours to show, not merely that the Christian Creed may reasonably be believed, but that we are under a paramount obligation to submit to it.

In the later Lectures the argument requires reference to sources not readily accessible to general readers, such as the writings of some of the chief Fathers of the Church and the earlier Latin works of Luther. The author has consequently endeavoured to consult the convenience of such readers by quoting, in the Notes, passages of sufficient length to justify and illustrate his statements; and with the same view he has printed English translations side by side with the original text.

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LECTURE I.

THE OFFICE OF FAITH.

HEBREWS xi. 1, 2.

Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. For by it the elders obtained a good report.

THESE words, without amounting to a definition of faith, express its most striking characteristic in practice—its power of giving a substantial reality to the objects of hope, and a verification to the invisible. It must be felt by every one with what truth and vividness they describe the spiritual life of the Jewish people, and the animating principle of the saints of the Old Testament. It was a life based on the invisible, and directed towards an obscure and improbable future. But that invisible world was more real to the elders of Israel than any of the visible things around them, and that future was more certain than that the sun and moon would fulfil their ordinary course. The course of nature, indeed, had been interfered with again and again in their behalf. For them the earth had been shaken, the sea had fled, the heavens had been darkened. To their view no physical order was unalterable,

and the external world could be moulded at any moment to the purposes of the divine will. Though flesh and heart failed them, though the earth was moved and the mountains were carried into the midst of the sea, the Lord of hosts was with them and the God of Jacob was their refuge. On Him they lavished a passion of love, of devotion, of trust, such as is only evoked by those intense affections, under which everything in the world fades and becomes insignificant in comparison with one beloved person. As the visible was thus eclipsed by the invisible, so was the present by the future. Few in number, despised, conquered, exiled, crushed, the Jews grasped with unshaken tenacity the assurance that they were reserved for a glorious destiny; and in their darkest hours they never doubted that the Messiah would appear to deliver them, and to assert His absolute sway. Their literature was prophecy, and their very history embodied the types of the future. And all this was founded on simple faith. They had received certain promises, handed down to them from the fathers of their race; and on those sacred words, few and fragile as they must have seemed to other eyes, they rested the whole edifice of their spiritual, their moral, and even of their physical life.

The history of the Christian Church has been of precisely similar character. Its foundations were laid in an exercise of the same faculty—the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.

Its expectations have been at once more distant and more near than those of the Jewish elders—more distant, because more and more disengaged, as time went on, from the hope of an immediate return of our Lord in power; more near, because illuminated from the first with a clearer vision of life and immortality beyond the grave. But the prophetical element in the New Testament is perhaps still stronger than in the Old. The parables of our Lord constitute a series of prophecies respecting the fate of the Jewish nation, and the development of His Church. They have since been marvellously verified, but in the early days of Christianity they made an immense demand on the faith of His followers. The Epistles of St. Paul are similarly instinct with prophecy. If he applies the axe to the root of the ancient Jewish polity, he is not content to fall back on simple moral and spiritual convictions, but he plants his foot on the firm assurance of the establishment of a new kingdom by Christ, and of its future revelation, and he looks forward as much as the writer of the Apocalypse to a new heaven and a new earth. Similarly the conviction of things unseen is perhaps still more striking in the Christian Church than in the Jewish. For the unseen God of the Old Testament was a God who by His very nature was invisible, and faith was the only instrument by which He could be apprehended. But the Saviour in whom Christians believe has once been seen and heard, He has worn flesh and blood like ourselves, and in that flesh

and blood He passed from earth; and we believe ourselves to be in union and communion with a human nature like our own, as well as with a divine nature. And as with the Jews so with us—this whole life of faith, which has animated apostles, martyrs, saints, has been sustained by the promises and assurances of men who, in most respects, were of like passions with ourselves. The witness of a few Apostles and Evangelists constitutes the basis on which the whole fabric of Christendom has been reared. They bear testimony to the most stupendous facts, to the vastest visions of the future. They claim from us, if the occasion should arise, the sacrifice of all that in this life men hold dear. They claim it, and the noblest souls who have lived since their time have yielded to the demand.

Such are the familiar, though marvellous, characteristics of Jewish and Christian life. But it is important to bear in mind that a characteristic the same in principle marks the life of other nations, and is at the root of other religions. In all alike we observe a similar supremacy of the faculty of faith. The most conspicuous of all examples is that of Mahometanism. There also the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen, have furnished the animating motives for a display of energy, of devotion, of valour, of policy, of contempt of life, of tenacity of purpose, which has at least constituted one of the most momentous forces in human history. At this moment, even in its decay,

the Mahometan world confronts the Christian nations with a desperate resistance; and statesmen are perplexed how to deal with its reserve of enthusiasm. All this immense force has been created by a single man—a man who had no antecedent expectations to appeal to, who called no witnesses in his support, and who made no other sacrifices for his cause than those which are repeatedly made by other great conquerors and adventurers. He started with an appeal to one great truth. On the influence thus gained he built up an elaborate system of worship, of morality, and of polity; and by virtue of his sole word and authority he has secured its acceptance, with absolute submission of body and soul, by vast numbers and successive generations of the human race. On the assurances of this one man, and on those alone, has the portentous fabric of Mahometanism been reared; and at this moment the assertion 'There is no God but God, and Mahomet is the prophet of God,' suffices as the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, to some of the most vigorous races on the earth.

Turn to the older religions of the East and you observe the like spectacle. Buddhism, which is said to command the allegiance of a larger portion of mankind than any other creed, is similarly based on absolute faith in the spiritual intuitions of a single man. Doubtless, like Mahomet, he appealed to great facts in human nature, and to great truths in the human conscience. His appreciation of those facts

and truths afforded him the credentials with which he commenced his mission. But starting from this ground, he and his followers elaborated a vast system of religious and moral philosophy, which for more than twenty centuries has governed the daily life, the future hopes, the whole physical, moral, and mental constitution of countless millions of our race. In the Buddha's teaching, confirmed by the assurances of the sages who succeeded him, myriads of souls find the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. In reliance on this faith, the whole visible world becomes simply an unreality to be escaped from, and men follow their guide enthusiastically into an existence so intangible, that there is a dispute whether it be real existence at all. The case is substantially the same with that ancient religion out of which Buddhism sprang. No matter how it arose, or how it may be adapted to certain peculiarities of the Hindoo mind, in point of fact it has for many generations rested on authority. By virtue of faith in that authority, the things not seen and the things hoped for are far more real to the mass of Hindoos than the things seen and the things possessed. Our power, our knowledge, our command of nature may be gradually making an impression on their minds, and compelling them to recognize the reality and inherent life of the world around them; but we are encountered in the first instance with the indifference of a faith convinced of its own superiority. The visible world

may belong to us, but the invisible belongs to them, and in this trust they are capable of the most resolute abandonment of all that is held precious in this life. Similar considerations would be suggested if we turned to China, where the principle of authority, which is correlative with that of faith, is perhaps more powerful than in any other human community. In this case, indeed, its sphere of action is mainly confined to the present life; but it involves none the less the same capacity for trust and for submission.

These, moreover, are but the more stupendous instances of a principle which obtains in every race and nation in which there is any organic life or moral vigour. Review the course of history from the earliest times, or survey the face of the world at the present day, and you find the same characteristics everywhere and at all times predominant — the substance which is possessed by things hoped for, the intense conviction which prevails in the reality of things not seen, and the implicit trust which has been reposed in the great teachers and leaders of mankind. At this moment it is faith which is at once the great organizing and the great dividing power in the world. Mahometanism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Confucianism — these are the governing forces of the various polities and civilizations which, in their world-wide mission, Englishmen have to encounter. It is under the sway of these creeds that vast masses of human beings are welded together like so many armies, that they offer to our faith,

our science and our arms, so firm a front, and that they remain almost impenetrable long after all physical barriers have been surmounted. Even within the pale of Christianity the variations of faith between the Roman, the Greek, and the Protestant Churches create divergences in sympathy, in tone of thought, in the objects and general order of life, which are among the most potent political influences. The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen—this, as a matter of fact, has been and still is the most powerful and universal force in the world of human nature, and in Faith has been found the mightiest influence to which men have ever appealed.

There is something profoundly touching, as well as amazing, in the spectacle thus presented to us. We behold millions of men and women, most of them struggling painfully under physical burdens, amidst moral and mental perplexities, with but a brief span of life before them, and no certain knowledge of the world beyond, yet trusting their souls and their whole present and future to the guidance of a man like themselves, whose claims to their allegiance must in great measure rest on his own word and assurance. In reliance on him they are ready to meet death and torture themselves; they are content to train their children to follow the same guidance; until the hopes and interests of countless generations have been hazarded on the promises of a single prophet or sage. There would seem to have been no limit to the trust-

fulness of human nature; and the responsibility of those who have appealed to this trust, and who in some instances have abused it, is proportionately tremendous.

Such, however, are the facts which meet our observation if we contemplate life on a large scale. The elementary principle at work is everywhere the same. Though the faith of Christians is vitally distinguished, by virtue of its objects, and by their reaction on itself, from the faith exercised in other religions, it would seem gratuitous to suppose that it employs an essentially different faculty. The description of faith by the sacred writer, that it is 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,' seems clearly to apply to all those creeds to which reference has been made, and covers the whole ground of human action in the moral and religious sphere. Upon faith, in this general sense of the word, every civilization has been based, and in proportion as such faith has been weakened has every civilization tottered to its fall. An universal instinct has taught statesmen to recognize in the maintenance of this principle the indispensable basis of the social and political organizations over which they have presided. In a word, it has been by the invisible rather than by the visible, by the future rather than by the present, by authority rather than by reason, by faith rather than by sight, that, as a matter of fact, mankind, as a whole, has been governed, has been organized, and has advanced to its

present condition. The part played by reason in this marvellous course of development has, indeed, been momentous, and has been second only to that of faith. But regarding history as a whole, the part of reason must be admitted to have been a secondary one. It is faith which has grasped whole nations and ages within its sway, and which has determined the main principles of their conduct and their destiny.

We are forced, however, at the present day, to confront a view of our position which offers a complete contrast to that suggested by this survey. The most brilliant achievements of our century have been its scientific advances. They have been so continuous, so surprising, so comprehensive, and so beneficent, that they have naturally fascinated, and almost absorbed, the attention of our generation; until the process by which they have been reached, and the temper of mind they foster, tend to assert a predominance over all others. Few things are more deserving of observation in the course of human thought, and in the development of human nature, than what may be called the lack of balance with which they have generally been accompanied. As one principle after another comes into prominence, as one faculty of man's nature after another asserts itself, it overbears all others for a time; it becomes exaggerated, and the whole mind receives a disproportionate development; until some forgotten truth reasserts itself, and then perhaps a new disproportion is created. It would be

strange indeed if, under the intellectual excitement which scientific discoveries have aroused in the present day, we had escaped a danger from which every previous age has suffered. But however this may be, there can be no doubt of the fact that the habits fostered by scientific thought have of late been acquiring a predominance which is destructive, not so much of particular doctrines of the Christian creed, as of the essential principle of faith as characterised in the text. Science, in its strict application, admits no assurance of things only hoped for, and can allow no conviction of things incapable of being tested by the senses. Its claim at every step is for verification —verification, as is constantly insisted, by plain and practical tests. All else is to be put aside—not indeed, if we allow for some glaring exceptions, with disrespect, or with intolerance—but still to be put aside. A general discredit is quietly and deliberately cast upon the whole fabric of our creed as something which, whatever may be said for it, has no adequate basis on which to rest. Much has of late years been heard of the conflict between faith and science; and however that conflict may be appeased on particular points, there remains, it is to be feared, that cardinal opposition in point of principle to which the consideration now in view directs our attention.

It is of course a commonplace to assert that there can be no real collision between the truths of religion and those of physical science; and it is equally a commonplace that there can be no real incompati-

bility between the scientific spirit and the spirit of faith. But there is nothing inconsistent with this nor anything in the least degree disrespectful to science, in urging that it is not only possible, but too common for one faculty and one mental habit to be so developed as to overbear others, and to do injustice to them. It is this, there is great reason to apprehend, which is the case at the present moment. Science, to use a familiar expression, 'is in the air'—science in the special and limited sense in which the word is now chiefly understood; and there is a tendency to judge of all things on purely scientific grounds. It is positively asserted, or tacitly assumed, that Faith, as we have contemplated it in the general course of human history, is unjustifiable as a principle of action, and that the welfare of mankind is to be pursued by rigidly restricting our beliefs within the limits of that which can be sensibly verified. There is, indeed, one famous philosophical system of modern thought, that of Positivism, which is exclusively based upon this principle. But this is only another instance of the disposition of the French genius to embody in a sharp and logical shape ideas which, in a less definite form, are moulding the thought of the age. It has been said that the business of philosophy is to answer three questions: 'What can I know?' 'What ought I to do?' 'For what may I hope?' But these three questions, as has been recently asserted by one of the most

distinguished natural philosophers of the present day[a], 'resolve themselves in the long run into the first; for rational expectation and moral action are alike based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification unless its subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as a guarantee of credibility.' In this characteristic statement of the scientific principle there is much ambiguity; but any doubt as to its practical tendency in the hands of modern philosophers must be removed by the consequences deduced from it by its author, who is led to give his assent to the sceptical conclusions of Hume respecting our belief in immortality and in God[b]. Experience shows, in fact, that such a principle, in proportion as it is rigidly applied, tends not so much to produce a direct conflict with our Christian faith, as to undermine the grounds on which we adhere to it. So far as our creed is beyond the reach of verification, so far as it rests upon the mere words and assertions of its founder, so far as it is a matter of trust and not of sight, its hold upon men's minds is liable to be shaken by the undue predominance of these habits of scientific thought.

There would seem something very astonishing in the challenge thus thrown down to that which, as

[a] Professor Huxley on Hume (Macmillan and Co., 1879), p. 48. See Note 1.

[b] See the same book, pp. 157 and 172; and the next Lecture.

we have seen, has been the predominant disposition of human nature in all ages and in all countries. But in proportion to the boldness and thoroughness of a challenge is sometimes its temporary success, and the perplexity which has been created in the present instance is in many ways apparent. One important illustration of the influence in question is conspicuous in modern theology. The extreme rationalistic school represents, of course, a deliberate predetermination to reduce every doctrine of revelation, and every element of religious life as exhibited in the Scriptures, within the limits of natural knowledge. But far short of this, there is a strong temptation among us to what may be designated as a minimising theology — a theology tending more and more to throw into the background everything which is mysterious and perplexing in our faith, and to insist solely on that moral part of it, which commends itself to the enlightened conscience of an educated society, trained and stimulated by eighteen centuries of Christian teaching and example. There is a disposition to reduce within the smallest possible limits that which is said to be essential in Christianity, so as to diminish, as much as may be, the appearance of its requiring our assent to truths beyond the range of our natural faculties.

Now it may be that this tendency, like other disproportionate developments of thought, may not be without its advantages in drawing increased

attention to the particular aspect of truth which it exaggerates, and in establishing a firmer recognition of that which may be regarded as the natural element in the Christian faith. But so far as it is an endeavour to render the demand upon faith less severe, and its conflict with the scientific spirit less striking, the attempt not only fails, but to some extent even aggravates the difficulty. For suppose a creed reduced to the single article of belief in the goodness and perfection of God. Without such a belief anything at all in the nature of a pure religion can hardly be said to exist, and the point is, of course, one which, as St. Paul asserts, is dictated to our consciences by the elementary instincts of faith. But, at the same time, when subjected to the analysis of reason, and brought into contact with a rigid scientific standard, it presents, perhaps, more momentous difficulties than any of the articles of faith which follow it. The moment the scientific reason begins to discuss it, we are confronted with the tremendous, and apparently insoluble, problem of the existence of evil. The faith which, in the full sight and consciousness of that problem, maintains its firm assent to the absolute goodness and omnipotence of God, has abandoned the ground of mere rational belief and has taken a step which justifies, in principle, any subsequent advance. It has given up, once for all, the right to measure its assent by the limits and dictates of reason alone, and has committed itself to the hands of another guide altogether.

That this is no mere speculative perplexity is demonstrated by a prolonged and pathetic experience. The persistence of this problem of evil, and its terrible pressure, are among the most conspicuous facts in the history both of human thought and of human life. In the book of Job it is depicted as the great agony of patriarchal thought; and the practical solution of it there given is that upon which we are thrown back up to the present hour—namely, that there is no rational solution for it at all, and that we must be content with the confession of our utter ignorance and weakness, and with simple submission and trust in the Almighty. 'Job answered the Lord and said, Behold, I am vile; what shall I answer Thee? I will lay mine hand upon my mouth. Once have I spoken; but I will not answer: yea twice; but I will proceed no further[c].' But a still more conspicuous proof of the enormous pressure of this elementary difficulty is furnished by the great religions of the East. Buddhism—to refer again to the most striking case—may literally be said to have been created by the problem of evil. The meditative speculation of India, brooding over the facts of life, experienced an agony like that of Job; and failing to fall back upon the faith which sustained him, has taken refuge in a system which may be described as a profound religious narcotic. Buddhism cannot solve the problem;

[c] Job xl. 3–5.

but it can numb the religious consciousness by a philosophic asceticism, and can foster the hope of escaping into an existence where the soul will no longer be conscious of the evil of life. The same problem has been recently revived by German speculation, and weighs on mere reason with as overpowering a burden as ever. Judging by experience, it would seem that the human soul cannot leave the problem alone, and insists on some support or other amidst its distress and misery. The same difficulty presents itself in a similar, but not less urgent form in the daily work of the ministers of our own faith among the poor and suffering. It is one thing to say that God is good in the shelter of an academic retirement, and a very different thing to say it, and to believe it, amidst the weakness, the sickness, and the squalor of poverty.

Now it is precisely in the most mysterious doctrines of our creed, in those which make the strongest demands on faith, and are the most remote from any possibility of scientific verification, that Christian souls find their support and refuge under these burdens of the flesh and these torments of the spirit. The message that 'God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life' —this is a message, simple as are its terms, which transcends all philosophy, all reason, all experience, nay, all capacity of comprehension; and yet it is in reliance on this message, and on other assurances of

the same kind, that Christians are delivered from all despair, and are enabled, under whatever distresses, to cling to their belief in the love of their Father in heaven. When the Christian minister can assure a suffering soul on the bed of death, in misery or pain, that whatever its agonies, the Son of God in human form endured far worse for its sake, as a pledge of the love of its Father, and in fulfilment of that love, he applies a remedy which is equal to any need. The message of the Cross, interpreted by the doctrine of the Incarnation, is thus, in moments of real trial, the support of the most elementary principle of faith. In fact, the minimising theology now in question depends for its plausibility upon a simple evasion of the real problems of philosophy, and of the practical difficulties of life. The full and explicit faith of the creeds recognizes those difficulties, and looks them in the face. It owns that they are insuperable upon any grounds of mere natural reason, and it offers supernatural realities and supernatural assurances to overcome them.

Considerations such as these may suffice to show that it would be vain to attempt any compromise with the scientific spirit by minimising the articles of our faith. As long as we retain any of them, however elementary, as more than bare speculations, we go beyond scientific grounds, and rest upon assurances which transcend the capacity of mere reason. We rise above nature, beyond the realm of sight and sense and observation, and we act on the

conviction of things not seen. In proportion, indeed, to the depth and extent of the Christian's experience is his faith transformed into knowledge. We are given 'an understanding that we may know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true[d].' But in the order of the Christian life, according to the old saying, faith comes before knowledge, and we believe in order that we may know. The scientific principle, as described in the passage previously quoted[e], is the reverse of this; in the scientific sphere knowledge precedes faith, and we learn to know in order that we may believe. But it also follows from this principle that science must know before she can deny. Accordingly, it is to be observed that the attitude of philosophy and science towards religious truth, as represented by their ablest and most authoritative exponents in modern times, is not one of negation, but of a simple confession of ignorance, or, as such an attitude has been recently termed, 'Agnosticism.' The representative writer just referred to has, indeed, of late gone so far as to say, in no intemperate spirit, that 'in respect of the existence and attributes of the soul, as of those of the Deity, logic is powerless and reason silent[f];' and if this be an extreme statement, it would at least seem beyond question that, from such a point of view, logic and reason are so hesitating and so perplexed as to afford no adequate basis for action, and no sufficient assurance for un-

[d] 1 John v. 20. [e] p. 13.

[f] Professor Huxley on Hume, p. 179.

qualified faith. Reason, indeed, when exhibited in its highest power and animated by sound moral instincts, has attained, even without the aid of revelation, to lofty anticipations, to dim apprehensions of mighty realities beyond its ken—'feeling after' the great facts of religion. But its safest employment on this subject is that which has been exemplified so forcibly by Bishop Butler—that of defence rather than of construction, of answering the difficulties raised by itself, and thus acting as its own critic.

Such, at any rate, is the attitude of scientific reason at the present day. It acknowledges its incompetence to pronounce positively against any of the great truths of our faith. It has of late, for instance, distinctly confessed, by the mouth of one of its most distinguished and authoritative representatives, that there can be no just ground, on the principles of natural philosophy, for denying the possibility of the occurrence of miracles. 'No one,' —to quote again from Professor Huxley[g]—'who wishes to keep well within the limits of that which he has a right to assert would affirm that it is impossible that the sun and moon should ever have been made to appear to stand still in the valley of Ajalon; or that the walls of a city should have fallen down at a trumpet blast; or that water was turned into wine; because such events are contrary to uniform experience and violate laws of nature. For aught he can prove to the contrary, such events may

[g] Professor Huxley on Hume, pp. 134, 136.

appear in the order of nature to-morrow.' Again: 'No event is too extraordinary to be impossible; and therefore if by the term miracle, we mean only "extremely wonderful events," there can be no just ground for denying the possibility of their occurrence.' But if there be any truth or fact of our faith on the possibility of which science might have been expected to be able to pronounce, it is on that of miracles; for they are events which, at any rate, occur within the natural realm, and are within the cognizance of the senses. If scientific principles leave this question open, it seems hard to say what questions of the Christian religion they do not leave open. Science places itself, by its own confession, out of court in the matter. Of course, if any article of faith, or any alleged fact in religion, is contradicted by an established truth of science, there is at once an end of it. To modify the memorable phrase of our great apologist, 'let Reason be kept to, and if any point in Christian belief can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the belief, in the name of God, be given up[h].' But where Science plainly confesses herself incompetent to pronounce, where she hesitates, falters, and, in the person of her frankest representatives, is silent, let it not be supposed that she has discredited truths which rest upon other grounds.

It thus appears that if at the present time the principle of faith has been weakened by the influence of the scientific spirit, this result is due to an entirely

[h] Bishop Butler, in the *Analogy*, Part II, ch. 5, sec. 7.

fallacious impression. It is not the case that the slightest valid presumption has been established against our faith. It is simply that the dazzling blaze of the greatest illumination ever opened to the natural eye has entranced the mental vision of our age, and has made other objects and other sources of illumination seem for the moment dim to men. The apprehension of Bacon has been fulfilled: 'Sensus, instar solis, globi terrestris faciem aperit, coelestis claudit et obsignat[i].' But though the impression may be fallacious and unreasonable, few can doubt that it prevails, or that it has a very considerable effect in obstructing the general influence of the Christian faith, and in weakening its grasp upon many who, on the whole, submit to it. As has always been the case in similar circumstances, the consequences are felt in other matters besides religious faith. They are perceptible in a general enfeeblement of the principle of authority, and in an indisposition to submit to restraint in thought, in speech, and in conduct. On the Continent, at all events, the prevalence of this temper is felt to menace society with very grave consequences indeed, and it would be rash to regard our own country as out of the reach of a like danger.

The revival, in short, appears to be urgently needed of the principle of faith, and with it a renovation of that just authority which holds families, societies, and nations together, and which moulds successive generations in harmony with deliberate

[i] *Praef. ad Instaur. Mag.*

and noble aims. That general operation of faith, throughout the world and through all history, with a review of which these observations were introduced, should serve to convince us of the immense moral and spiritual force which lies latent in human nature awaiting such a revival. Unless that nature is entirely changed, the hearts of men must still be susceptible of that mightiest and noblest of all emotions, which impels them to follow the leader whom they trust through doubt and through darkness, through peril and through death, to build upon his promises their expectations of things hoped for, to accept his assurances respecting things not seen, and to unite loyally with others in maintaining his kingdom and asserting his authority. If the capacity for such a spirit should be stifled amongst ourselves by a false rationalism — though how can it be stifled as long as England and the English universities furnish a generous youth to respond to its appeal?—yet, at all events, this spirit is still alive in the East. It may yet prove the spring of a new life throughout those regions from whence all faith and all civilization arose. The Christian cannot doubt that the Faith of the Gospel will thus return to its ancient home and reanimate its chosen people; and when that final triumph of the true Prophet and King of mankind is achieved, God grant that Europe may not have cause to hear in it an echo, or a reversal, of the voice once addressed to the Jews—'Behold! we turn to the Gentiles.'

If these considerations be just, it will not be inopportune to make an attempt, in humility and prayer, to consider the nature, the justification, and the present position of that principle which, as we have seen, lies so deeply at the root of human life, and on which the Christian creed and the fabric of Christian civilization repose. The object of this course of Lectures will be to offer a contribution towards strengthening the Foundations and elucidating the Elements of Faith, and thus to illustrate the character and the just limits of that Authority on which, notwithstanding the silence of science and the hesitations of reason, we build our expectations of things hoped for, our conviction of things not seen. For this purpose, an endeavour will be made to exhibit the manner in which Faith is founded in the deep convictions of the conscience, to trace the development of its lofty structure under the guidance of revelation; and finally to consider the ground on which it rests in our own Church, and at the present time. It will at least be an assistance towards appreciating what faith may be now, if we realise in some measure what it has been in the past, and if we can quicken our apprehension of the method in which it has operated in the great crises of religious history.

There remains, however, one consideration to which it may be necessary to advert in introducing this subject to your consideration. Such a review of the operation of Faith as has just been offered, and as is

further contemplated in the course of these Lectures, has sometimes been approached in a very different spirit from that which prompts the present attempt. It is obvious to point to the discordant results, to the conflicting beliefs, to the miserable divisions, even within the Christian Church, to which Faith has led, and to ask what can be the value of a principle which has hitherto produced such confusion, and which, at the present time, occasions to some of the most faithful souls such grievous perplexity. Nothing is more obvious. But nothing is more ungenerous, at least on the part of the sons of the Church; and there is nothing to which the answer seems more simple. On what ground is it to be supposed, where was it ever promised, that faith alone, of all the faculties and functions of man's nature, would operate independently of his weakness and his sin, and would not have to grow with his moral growth, strengthen with his moral strength, and be enfeebled or perverted in proportion to his moral unfaithfulness? What an indictment might not be drawn up against reason itself, for the errors, the half-truths, the controversies into which it has led mankind! What indictments have not actually been drawn up against civilization, and against the very principles of society, on the ground of the wars, the diseases, the private injuries, which they have involved! But who would be thought to be uttering anything but a paradox if on this ground, like our greatest satirist, he were to suggest the folly of being

guided by reason, or, like our most philosophical statesman, were to write a treatise in vindication of natural society[j]? The sad record of Christian divisions is but a proof that in the highest concerns of the soul we are as much in a state of conflict, of trial, of moral struggle as in all other spheres of our life; and there would be nothing unnatural if it also showed that in the loftiest regions of all the temptations were greater than elsewhere, the consequences of a fall more conspicuous and more disastrous. It is here, in fact, that the human spirit finds its ultimate trial; here and here alone, as will be seen in the sequel, in its aspirations towards things hoped for, its cravings for things not seen, its yearnings towards infinite truth, goodness, and beauty, that all its faculties, intellectual, moral, and even physical, are put to their severest test. Let us not for a moment indulge the unworthy apprehension that He who has endowed us with the supreme instinct of Faith will disappoint it. In proportion to our faithful response to the strivings of His Spirit will He gradually lead us onwards to the light, until faith at length is merged in His perfect and glorious vision.

j Burke, *A Vindication of Natural Society: or, a view of the miseries and evils arising to mankind from every species of Artificial Society.* Burke's Works, vol. i.

LECTURE II.

THE FAITH OF THE CONSCIENCE.

ROM. i. 28.

And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient.

IT is unnecessary at the outset of this enquiry to examine the various definitions of Faith. Such a discussion would in great measure relate to the meaning of words; while we are concerned with facts. Our object is to obtain a clearer conception of the nature of Faith by considering its operation in history, and, above all, in the history of the Church; and without any strict definition, we know sufficiently where to observe it, and on what main principles the structure of the Christian creed is built. The first, and so far the most momentous, of those principles is Belief in God. As was shewn in the first Lecture, this belief, when submitted to the keen scrutiny of a cultivated reason, and subjected to the severe tests of a prolonged experience,

appears to demand the support which is afforded it by the full revelation of God in Christ. The difficulties which press upon us, in proportion as the realities of life are forced upon our view, are so tremendous, they had been felt to be so overwhelming alike by Jewish prophets and by Greek philosophers, that, in another sense from that which is usually understood, we may well say 'the fulness of the time was come,' when God sent forth His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons. From the misery of Job to the despair of Habakkuk, exclaiming that 'the law is slacked and judgment doth never go forth[a],' the burden on human nature seemed to be becoming more than it could bear; and some assurance of the divine love, such as was vouchsafed in the life and death of our Lord, appeared indispensable, if the noblest thoughts and hopes of the world were not to be crushed. That assurance, once vouchsafed, became thenceforward all sufficient in itself to millions of souls, however suffering and however perplexed. It is still for the world at large the most decisive testimony to our Father in Heaven that can possibly be adduced; and we cannot well place too absolute and simple a reliance upon it. At the present time, in particular, it merits the careful consideration of those who have to deal either with heathenism abroad or with ordinary doubt and irreligion at home, whether the direct message of a living and historic Christ, recorded in the Gospels, and attested

[a] Habakkuk i. 4.

by an historic Church, does not afford a more natural and a more potent argument for faith than any formal system of evidences. 'He that hath seen Me,' said our Lord, 'hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father [b]?' In proportion as we can enable men to see Christ will they see His Father, and to this end all practical teaching should be directed.

But the course to be adopted in order to convert men in practice, and the method to be pursued in explaining the nature of faith and vindicating its action, are very different; and for our present purposes it is necessary we should enquire into the character and the validity of those primary acts of faith upon which, as a matter of fact, the whole superstructure of the Jewish and the Christian religion has been erected. Persistent efforts are now made by able and influential writers to undermine these elementary principles. Distinguished men of science write popular handbooks, in which the most sceptical philosophy of the last century is revived and justified [c]; and so far as the elementary foundations of religious faith are thus undermined, it becomes impracticable to obtain a due hearing for the full and convincing revelation of our Lord and of His Apostles. We claim faith in a divine revelation; but we are challenged at the outset to

[b] St. John xiv. 9.

[c] For example, Professor Huxley's account of Hume, already referred to.

state what justification we can have for believing in any thing which cannot be verified by natural reason and ordinary experience. It is alleged that the elementary article of belief in God is incapable of such verification, and doctrines assuming a revelation from Him are consequently treated as outside the range of practical discussion. It was shewn in the preceding Lecture how flagrantly such a challenge conflicts with the universal dictates of human nature, and what a presumption is consequently raised against it. But it is not enough to create a presumption without vindicating it; and lamentable as it must seem from one point of view to be arguing this elementary question at the present day, the considerations it suggests are of essential importance to our further argument.

Now St. Paul in the text propounds a fact in human nature, and a principle of the divine government, which appear to throw a vivid and a terrible light upon the history of this primary article of belief. The verse is somewhat inadequately translated in our version, and its instructiveness is greatly enhanced by a due appreciation of its terms. The Greek *οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει* conveys much more than that 'they did not like to retain God in their knowledge[d].' It implies that they did not duly apply themselves to that process of testing, of proving, of trying—as metals are tried in the fire—the natural revelation vouchsafed to them,

[d] Note 2, Appendix.

and that they thus incapacitated themselves from retaining a true knowledge of God. In other words, the Apostle speaks of that knowledge as being sufficiently open to them, but as not to be attained without moral effort; and the loss of it is consequently ascribed to a distinct failure of moral energy, which was justly punished by divine reprobation, and which led to deeper moral corruption. The consequence, in fact, as is usual with divine judgments, precisely corresponded to the cause. Men declined that full exertion of their moral faculties which was necessary for the maintenance of their belief in God; and those very faculties, thus deprived of their due exercise, lost their soundness and their genuineness, and became ἀδόκιμοι, base coin, unable to bear the severe tests of life. Belief in God seems thus propounded as the great touchstone of the moral vigour of mankind. Man possesses in his reason and his heart, in the world without and in the world within, arguments enough to afford him a substantial knowledge of God, and to lead him to worship and to trust. But they are not demonstrative. They are not even mere arguments of probability. In other words, they are not simply intellectual. They put a strain upon the moral nature, and the manner in which that strain is borne determines the moral condition alike of individuals and of races. Once let men take the broader and easier road of moral supineness, and they at once lose their hold upon God, and are in imminent danger of falling into an

abyss of corruption, such as that described in this chapter. But let them choose the narrower and severer path, and God becomes more and more a vivid reality to them, and they advance from strength to strength.

It would lead us into far too wide a field, and one beyond the scope of these Lectures, to examine in detail the manner in which this statement of St. Paul is justified by the facts of other religions and by the course of history. Such an enquiry would need, for its completeness, information which can only be expected from those investigations into the early history of mankind and into the origin of their various religions, which have of late received such an impulse, but in which no adequate attention seems yet to have been paid to intimations of the working of the moral sense[e]. Even if restricted in its scope within historic times, such an attempt would demand vast and varied learning, as well as profound moral insight; and the learned historian of the Romans under the empire has himself shrunk from the task of analysing that momentous revolution in which this principle was, perhaps, most fully tested—that of the dissolution of Paganism and the establishment of the Christian Church[f]. But certain broad facts, visible on the face of history, are strongly confirmatory of the Apostle's statement,

[e] Note 3, Appendix.

[f] Dean Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. viii. p. 369.

and should alone be sufficient to impose some restraint upon the wantonness of speculation now exhibited upon this subject. We observe, as a matter of fact, that every people, of whatever race, whether ancient or modern, who have acquiesced in Pantheism or Polytheism, or in any form of Agnosticism, have also, to say the very least, become deficient in moral vigour; and up to the present time such races have exhibited unmistakable signs of an accelerating moral decay. There appears, also, to be no question historically that imperfect as is the apprehension of God in Mahometanism, fatally as it is neutralized by the corruptions with which Mahomet falsified the great truth entrusted to him, the proclamation of that truth nevertheless exercised at the outset a strong moral influence. To that influence an enduring monument was erected by the arms, the philosophy, the learning, and the art which flourished under the earlier Caliphs, and in a minor degree it is still said to be observable when the faith of Islam is brought to bear upon races sunk in idolatry. It is an equally instructive, and an equally unquestionable, fact that the philosophers by whom the belief in God has been most strongly maintained—such, for instance, as Socrates and Plato among the Greeks, and Kant among the Germans—have also been those whose attention has been most concentrated upon moral considerations, and who have done the most to stimulate the moral element in human nature. The noblest moral system of the ancient world was

that of Stoicism; and the later Stoics, says Dean Merivale, as compared with their predecessors, 'had attained a clearer idea of the personality of God, with a higher conception of His goodness and His purity. They could not rest in the pantheism of an earlier age[g].' Thus, even before we consider the evidence afforded by Jewish and Christian history, in which the union between moral and religious convictions is intense and indissoluble, we find, on a broad survey of history and philosophy, that morality and a belief in God seem, as the Apostle declares, to rise or fall together.

What is the secret of this remarkable connection? It is to be found in those recesses of the conscience in which the perennial spring of moral life resides. We are told that when St. Paul reasoned before Felix and Drusilla of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix became afraid. In that incident we have an example of the universal effect of a direct appeal to moral convictions. Between Felix and ourselves nearly two thousand years are interposed, but he is completely one with us in his involuntary response to the Apostle's exhortation. In the time of Felix, as much as in the present day, Conscience, when aroused by a voice like that of the Apostle, bears witness within every human soul that its sin will be punished, and its righteousness rewarded. In the hour of temptation we all

[g] *History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. viii. p. 365.

have this distinct conviction aroused within us; and the literature of the most distant past proves that in its essence the same conviction has at all times overawed the moral consciousness. It is but a voice, to adopt the usual phrase; but it is a voice which is felt to be authoritative, and which furnishes the practical sanction to morality. Before it, when evoked by a great master like St. Paul, the human soul trembles, and anticipates with awe a judgment upon its acts from which it cannot escape.

Now even before we recognise the full force of this witness of the conscience, we must observe that, in proportion to its clearness and decisiveness, it requires an act of faith as distinct from reason. That which is here exhibited is something quite different from a simple intuition of truth. It is not merely a case of the acceptance of certain eternal principles of right and wrong. Such principles might be conceived as resting on a similar foundation to that of the great axioms of scientific truth, or the canons of beauty, and as authenticated by a primary intuition. But in such a conception the most essential element in the fact under consideration would be omitted. It is not simply that certain things are recognised as right, and certain other things as wrong. It is not even the paramount conviction that to do the right and to refuse the wrong is the duty and the highest honour of man. It is not, in fact, simply a sense of duty which is aroused by the voice of the

conscience. It is a sense, and a conviction, that there exists a sanction for that duty, and that a violation of it will be surely avenged. It is 'a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation;' an assurance that 'to them that are unrighteous and obey not the truth,' there will be a revelation of 'indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil;' and on the other hand, 'glory, honour, and peace to every man that worketh good[h].' This is not simply a vision of moral beauty, a conviction of the supreme claim of morality upon our reason and our allegiance. It is this no doubt, but it is much more. It is a conviction that in ourselves and in others this claim will be enforced. We feel that it will be enforced, moreover, in the way of judgment, and not merely in that of natural consequences. The warning of conscience is thus something distinct in kind from the conviction that fire will burn if we put our hands into it, or that if we disregard the law of gravitation we shall suffer for it. In those cases the consequence is visible and immediate; but it is the characteristic of conscience to warn a man of a future judgment even when he escapes all visible penalty. The conviction it enforces is not merely that certain consequences will follow our evil deeds, but that we deserve certain penalties, and that we must expect them to be inflicted,

[h] Heb. x. 27; Rom. ii. 10.

because we deserve them. It is a conviction, in other words, that we are responsible, and that we shall be held to our responsibility.

Now this conviction, to which every moralist, every teacher, every ruler appeals, seems in its very nature to be antecedent to all experience, and dependent for its force and vitality on a principle external to it. It appears, moreover, wholly inexplicable by any process of evolution. Without disparaging the applicability of that hypothesis to explain certain moral phenomena, it can hardly account for the existence in the earliest moral consciousness of humanity of an instinct with which visible experience was often painfully in conflict—even more flagrantly in conflict than at the present day [i]. If the Scriptures be regarded simply as very ancient records, they bear witness to the intensity with which in the very dawn of history this conviction was grasped; and similarly on the monuments of ancient Egyptian civilisation it is exhibited as exercising a predominant influence in the most remote antiquity. The natural cause which at those periods could account for such a belief, and which in all ages has rendered an appeal to it so potent a moral instrument, has yet to be stated. Reason and experience would doubtless even in early days suggest a belief that, in the course of life and history, righteousness would on the whole be rewarded, and

[i] Note 4.

vice would on the whole be punished. The tendency of history, the result of civilisation, is now seen with sufficient clearness to be in this direction. But this main tendency, this general result, seems to afford no guarantee whatever for the full assertion and vindication of the principle in relation to each conscience and to every individual. It would not enable us to rise to the universality of the Apostle's assurance, of 'indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil,' and of 'glory, honour, and peace to every man that worketh good.' So far as we accept that assurance, we pass beyond the bounds of experience, beyond the limits of that which can be verified, and we grasp the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Yet it is a conviction of this kind which is at the root of the trembling of such a man as Felix, and which shakes the soul of every man when his conscience is aroused by a preacher of righteousness.

Judging, in fact, by the present life and its daily experience, it has been felt in all ages to be impossible to discern the full vindication of the law of righteousness, and of the demands of the conscience. It is true, no doubt, that the great balance of evidence is in favour of that law, and that it is established as the cardinal law of history with all the certainty that can be expected in moral affairs. But there are also conspicuous instances of those anomalies which weighed so cruelly on the Psalmist,

of evil doers flourishing, of their living in power and opulence, leaving the rest of their substance to their children, and of no visible vengeance following upon their immorality. Such instances are not merely the perplexity of good men; they are the theme of satirists and the constant material of Cynicism. Apart from the general course of events, it is beyond a question that unrighteousness has been prosperous and successful, and that it is so even at the present day. In reference to individuals, there is certainly no complete indication to be derived from experience in favour of the assurance of conscience that every man will be rewarded according to his works. Yet that conviction remains—imperative, menacing, warning every soul in its hour of temptation, or threatening it in its moments of remorse. To put it aside, to stifle it, is consciously and deliberately to impair our moral vigour. Men cannot escape from it without forfeiting their moral health and vitality. But if they cling to this conviction in spite of experience, they are acting, even if unconsciously, on a principle of faith. They are not arguing from a present to a future experience. They are not building upon any such probability, imperfect as it has been said to be, that because the sun rises to-day it will rise to-morrow. They are not saying, as a natural philosopher might do, that a great law of which the operation is imperfectly visible will be shewn, by further investigation, to be really operative. A natural philosopher in

such a case relies upon being able, sooner or later, to exhibit in present experience the complete operation of the law in question, and to demonstrate its supremacy in the very phenomena which appeared to defy it. But any such present operation and consequent demonstration of the law of righteousness is the very thing which, in its details and in reference to individuals, is evidently and painfully lacking. Nevertheless, this ineradicable instinct of the human conscience compels men to believe that sooner or later, here or hereafter, in one way or another, the claim of righteousness will be satisfied, and that judgment will be executed. *O! Testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae*[k]*!* 'Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest[l].' Notwithstanding instances to the contrary which are flagrant and obtrusive, notwithstanding the bitter complaints of prophets, priests, poets, and historians, though the righteous perish and no man layeth it to heart, men believe in a judgment to come, and their deepest moral convictions thus involve a principle which no experience can demonstrate, and with which much bitter experience seems daily to conflict.

It seems of the more importance to insist upon this primary act of faith because it is avowedly and deliberately set aside by the philosophers who, at the present time, have most influence in weakening or

[k] Tertullian, *Apol. Adv. Gentes*, c. 17. [l] Rom. ii. 1.

denying our faith in God. Hume, for instance, still acts as one of the most powerful sceptical forces; and there is the more reason to refer to him, as his views, or at least the main arguments he puts forward, have lately been revived by Professor Huxley, and reproduced in a form, and with additions, which cannot be safely, or even respectfully, neglected[m]. Now it is most remarkable to find that, especially when thus summarised and presented in their essence, the arguments which Hume puts into the mouth of his Epicurean philosopher depend for their validity upon the flat rejection of that act of faith on the part of the conscience upon which we have been dwelling. For example, Hume argues, in opposition to the supposed necessity of belief in Divine Providence, that it is sufficient if he regulates his behaviour by his experience of past events, which he acknowledges to be on the whole in favour of virtue and discouraging to vice. But 'if,' he says, 'you affirm that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events, I here find the same fallacy which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely infer consequences from

[m] Professor Huxley on Hume, pp. 154–156; Hume's *Essays*, edited by Green and Grose, vol. ii. pp. 115, 116.

it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have antecedently not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect.' '*Are there,*' he concludes, '*any marks of a distributive justice in the world?* If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude that since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in your sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying that the justice of the gods at present exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, *at present*, exert itself.'

Such is the argument which has been recently revived, and presented to us as the philosophical reply to the arguments of Bishop Butler's Analogy. And allowing its supposition, that we are limited to the principles of scientific reason, and that these must be based on actual experience, its force is manifest. To quote from its modern expositor[n]—

[n] Professor Huxley on Hume, p. 156.

'As nature is our only measure of the attributes of the Deity in their practical manifestation, what warranty is there for supposing that such measure is anywhere transcended? That the other side of nature, if there is one, is governed on different principles from this side?' Certainly a very imperfect warranty, if nature, in the limited sense here apparently understood, be our only measure. But that is the great question. These arguments are based upon the cold and impassive denial of the validity and authority of the dictates of conscience. They raise this direct question—and it is at once the danger and the merit of Hume that he does not shrink from raising it—are you prepared to believe, not in mere speculative opinions, but in certain great practical convictions which are beyond the reach of all experience and verification? Are you prepared to say that although, within the limits of human observation, virtue is not adequately rewarded, and vice not adequately punished, yet you believe that they will be, and are you resolved to build both your acts and your thoughts on that belief, and on the consequences which follow from it? That is the real issue, and the whole force exerted by the argument of Hume depends upon the answer which each soul makes to it. If, like the Psalmists and the Prophets, you are prepared, in spite of all apparent contradictions, to believe in the absolute supremacy of right over wrong, in the blessedness of the righteous and the misery of the wicked, you have then per-

formed a momentous act of faith, which opens up to you an entirely new world, and respecting which it is hardly too much to say, in Hume's own words, that it 'subverts all the principles of the understanding, and gives a man a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience[o].' But if you deny this, you have said nothing less than that in the constitution of the universe there is no complete sanction for morality; and if, in Hume's phrase, you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, you have at least thrown over morality the blighting influence of uncertainty; you have cut one of the sinews of moral action, and you have made a great step towards realising St. Paul's conviction, that if men will not retain God in their knowledge, they will be given over to a reprobate mind.

That which has been called 'the categorical imperative' of the conscience thus amounts to an imperative requirement from us of the first great act of faith—that of belief in a righteous and omnipotent God. It has, indeed, been urged of late with much confident reiteration that considerations such as we have been reviewing are satisfied by recognising the existence of a power independent of ourselves, which enforces righteousness and truth as the paramount law of the universe. Now even this conviction, if it is to be more than a mere generality

[o] Professor Huxley on Hume, p. 141.

and is to be applied completely to individual experience, transcends, as has been shewn, all the limits of experience, and takes us at once into that region of things not seen from which it is the professed object of this paradoxical exposition to debar us. But the question, whether it is a sufficient account of the matter, depends again on the degree of vividness and thoroughness which we recognise in the dictates of the conscience. Is it simply to the supremacy of a general law of righteousness that conscience bears witness? That is the great enquiry on which it is necessary to insist; and the answer to it cannot be too rigidly scrutinized, for upon that answer mainly depend the momentous moral and religious convictions now in question. They depend upon it by virtue of this consideration—that no influence which is not itself a personal one can possibly execute a complete judgment upon the acts, the thoughts, and the impulses of a person. It may be confidently affirmed that there is no sentence ever pronounced, whether by natural or human law, in which we do not feel compelled to recognise, if not a certain injustice, at least a certain inadequacy, a lack of exact adaptation to the circumstances of the individual. In the case of almost every criminal who is punished, human law is either too harsh or not harsh enough, and it is sometimes almost as rough in its operation as the law of nature, and as irrespective of personal merits. Similar injustice must always result when personal merits or demerits

are subjected to the action of impersonal agencies, powers, or laws. According to the old principle, that like is only known by like, so like can only be judged by like; and none but a personal being, endued with our morality and intelligence, can be conceived as entering fully into the infinite variations of mind and heart and brain, on which the conduct of every human being depends.

If, in fact, in some agony of the spirit, some crisis of life, the exclamation of the Psalmist is forced from us, 'Judge me, O God,' to what do we appeal? Is it to a mere law, a force which asserts itself independently of all individual considerations, or is it to a power which, as we believe with the whole force of our souls, is capable of taking into account all the details of our personal condition, of making allowance for them, having compassion on our weaknesses and forgiving our sins? Is it to 'a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness,' or is it to a Being revealed to us with what may seem such logical inconsistency, but with such practical harmony, as 'the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty[p]'? In utterances like these the revelation of the Scriptures penetrates to depths of the human heart which are invariably left

[p] Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7.

untouched—sometimes with a characteristic complacence—by those who are content to refer us to mere laws and potencies. To the miseries of conscious sin and guilt such philosophies have nothing to say. But it is in these moral depths that faith strikes its roots. The more these convictions and demands of the conscience are realised, the more are we forced back on the necessity of redemption, and the more are we compelled to hope, and trust, and crave, for some deliverance which is beyond all natural capacity and experience. The faith on which the primary convictions of morality depend compels us to reach out towards invisible and distant realities, and to look, like the Jewish prophets, for the full revelation of One, who will execute judgment and justice on the earth. A whole vista of prophecy is suggested when we thus contrast the infinite, the subtle—in a word the personal—demands of the conscience with the rude facts of the present life; and we seem to see the possibility, or the verisimilitude, opened to us of that series of revelations, in which the Christian and Jewish Scriptures at once predicted and fulfilled these imperious moral necessities. But in proportion to the force with which this necessity of personal judgment and personal redemption is realised, is the witness which the conscience affords to the existence of God, and to His moral relation to us. If the highest impulses of life are not to be balked, if the deepest dictates of morality are not illusive, some Being there must be, who is at all events

so far personal, as to be able to deal justly with persons.

It may be worth while to observe that, so far as these considerations are just, they tend to establish, not merely the validity of our belief in a personal God, but its naturalness, and a sufficient reason for its prompt and unhesitating acceptance by the mass of men. By some modern writers [q] it has been made a ground of objection to Christian truth that its primary assumption—that of a living God in whom we live and move and have our being—requires such elaborate arguments to establish it. Now it is the peculiar characteristic of first principles that they are the most difficult of all others to prove, or even to defend in argument, but that they commend themselves instinctively to common sense, or to the general apprehension of sound minds. They correspond to experience in proportion to its simplicity and directness, and their real strength lies in their being the true interpretation of a natural instinct. This is preeminently true of the highest principle of all; and in the present day it is of great importance to bear this consideration in mind. When, indeed, arguments are elaborated in contravention of these primary truths, it is at least respectful to objectors, even if not necessary, to be elaborate in reply; and it is rather unreasonable it should be made a matter of complaint against theologians that they are willing to meet their antagonists on their own grounds, and

[q] Mr. M. Arnold, in *Literature and Dogma*, ch. x, and *passim*.

with their own weapons. But the Christian minister is not dependent on such arguments, nor is the vitality of the Christian Faith derived from their validity. If we can shew, by such considerations as have now been offered, that the primary truths of faith are in harmony with the most imperative convictions of the human conscience, we have shewn that they are natural; or, in other words, that it is natural for men, unless sophisticated by previous argument, to believe in them. When those arguments are raised, when the difficulties which reason readily suggests are pressed on us, it is necessary to confront them. Above all, if the moral consciousness of an individual or of a community has become enfeebled, and men are no longer duly sensible of the terrible heights and depths of morality, there is a barrier between them and religious truth which can only be overthrown by reviving their apprehension of those awful realities. But in proportion as the conscience is quickened, it is natural men should believe in a personal God who judges them, and who will punish and reward them. They do it without reasons, and by the instinct of nature; and it is to this instinct that the Christian pastor may always most safely appeal. We have no need as a rule to prove the existence of a personal God to a man who is duly conscious of moral evil. We may assume His existence, as we do that of the sun, and it will be acknowledged by virtue of the mere constitution of human nature.

Similar considerations, doubtless, apply to the argument from the general order of nature and from the constitution of the human intellect. The impulse to infer the existence of a personal God from them is natural; such an inference is on the whole the most in conformity with the facts of the case, and we may rest assured that, independently of formal argument, it will always commend itself to the common sense of sound minds. We cannot too strongly rely on the truth of St. Paul's statement that 'the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that men are without excuse[r].' Philosophy raises objections, and it is our business to endeavour to answer them; but nature, after all, is stronger than philosophy, and the perplexities of thought will never suppress the dictates of conscience and of simple reason. Modern philosophy, indeed, has committed something like an act of suicide in respect to this question of the existence of God. For it confesses, or rather asserts, that precisely the same difficulties apply to a belief in the substantiality of the human soul itself. The modern expositor of Hume, who revives that great sceptic's objections to the existence of God, revives also his objections to the doctrine of immortality, and says that 'having arrived at the conclusion that the conception of a soul, as a substantive thing, is a mere figment

[r] Rom. i. 20.

of the imagination, and that whether it exists or not we can by no possibility know anything about it, the enquiry as to the durability of the soul may seem superfluous[s].' Such a statement may well be regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of all these intellectual objections to the great truths of Revelation. When such arguments, candidly and severely pushed to their conclusion, come to this, that they leave us in doubt whether there is any substantiality in our own souls, it ceases, at all events, to be possible to regulate our beliefs and our conduct by them. The Christian need hardly ask more than that his belief in God should be as certain as that in his own substance and identity, and it now seems definitely admitted that it is, to say the least, not more uncertain.

It may, indeed, be permissible to observe, after thus pointing out some of the considerations which justify the first and primary act of faith, that there is really something intolerable, and revolting to good sense, in much of the philosophical argumentation with which it is now too often attempted to undermine this great belief. No word of disrespect to philosophy or science will be heard in these Lectures, for nothing could be more alien from either the intention or the sympathy which prompts them. Philosophy and Science are the children of Faith, and however they may be from time to time misrepresented, she can never doubt their loyalty to her. But it is a somewhat severe trial of patience

[s] Professor Huxley on Hume, p. 172.

that mental or physical philosophers should confine themselves to the facts they can observe within the range of their special studies or in their laboratories, and should erect the conceptions which they thus find themselves able to form respecting the existence of God into crucial tests, by virtue of which they set aside the deepest moral and spiritual experiences of mankind. Those experiences are the most momentous of all the facts in the case; and if an equal amount of scientific experience and scientific conviction were treated by a theologian with the cool indifference exhibited towards religious faith by Hume, and by some modern philosophers, he would be treated as almost beyond the pale of reasoning. Belief in God has been embedded from the earliest centuries in the deepest moral convictions of our race; and a philosophy which is content to criticize beliefs thus authenticated, instead of treating them as the most momentous premisses with which it has to deal, places itself practically out of court. On what conceivable principle of reasoning or of philosophizing are we to bid a Paul, a John, an Athanasius, an Augustine, an Anselm, a Luther, a Pascal, a Newton, to stand aside, and to be silent on the mightiest of all truths, until a modern philosopher has reconciled their convictions with his syllogisms, or a modern man of science has found material traces of them in his crucible? Nay! We must ask, with far greater amazement, on what ground a mightier Witness still is similarly set aside;

until philosophy has pronounced that His testimony is admissible. In the language and the life of our Lord the deepest apprehension of moral truth is bound up with the apprehension of God in His most personal character as a Father; and this fact affords the final practical answer to the objections which have been considered. There is, indeed, a presumptuous flippancy which deems itself capable of distinguishing between the essential and non-essential elements in His teaching, and of setting the latter aside. But no such presumption can go so far as to deny that in His mind and heart the two elements were united; and this is a fact of more weight than any amount of dubious speculation. For the purpose of illustrating the nature and limits of faith, a consideration of its foundations in the conscience has been indispensable. But the final answer to all objections against belief in God is that the Lord Jesus Christ lived in it and died in it.

One observation remains to be made, which will at once connect the argument of this Lecture with that of those which follow, and will associate it with the lessons of this season of Lent. So far as these considerations are valid, they establish the fact, not merely that there is a personal God, of all righteousness and power, but that we are in direct contact with Him, that His voice is heard within us, and that in every act and thought of our lives we are accountable to Him, and must look alike for punishment and for reward at His hands. It is no matter

of theory we have been considering, but the most vital of all living realities. The Bible reveals to us, not the mere opinions of prophets and saints respecting God, but the words He spoke to their hearts, and the responses they made to Him. Let us not content ourselves, for instance, in reading the early experiences of the patriarchs, with the bald and abstract statement, now too often to be met with, that they believed in one God, or were the assertors of Monotheism. It is not as Monotheists, or as Deists, that Abraham and the patriarchs are conspicuous; but as men who, in the depths of their nature, communed with a personal God, who, in the expressive phrase of the sacred writer, 'walked with God,' and to whom He spake face to face, or heart to heart, 'as a man speaketh unto his friend.' Such is the vital character of the primary principle of Faith. Under this guidance we are led, as we shall see, to anticipate a further revelation from the God of whom we are assured, while at the same time we are furnished with the conditions necessary for testing it. But at least we may be animated, like the patriarchs, in our daily lives by the conviction, not merely that God is, but 'that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.'

LECTURE III.

THE WITNESS TO REVELATION.

HEBREWS i. 1, 2.

God, who at sundry times, and in divers manners, spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son.

IT has been shewn in the preceding Lecture that the primary dictates of the conscience afford imperious reasons for believing in a Living God—righteous, almighty, and personal in His relations to us. If the demands of our moral nature are to be satisfied, if they are to receive a complete sanction in particular as well as in general, in respect to the individual as well as in the main course of affairs, we need not merely a Power, but a Person, who, by virtue of His personal qualities, will be able to judge us individually, alike with justice and with mercy, according to our works, our words and our thoughts, who by virtue of His omniscience will be acquainted with all our ways, and by virtue of His omnipotence will be able to execute His judgments completely either here or hereafter. That this is the natural

dictate of the conscience is, as we observed, no mere speculation. To this conviction, as a matter of fact, the most earnest moral philosophy has always pointed, and it attained its most intense and vivid form in that people upon whom, by general admission, the deepest moral and spiritual perceptions were bestowed. The 139th Psalm, for instance, embodies the convictions to which the Hebrew mind was forced by its profound apprehension of moral realities and necessities. It is a Psalm which makes no reference to any external revelation. It appeals to the innermost experiences of the soul; and it bears witness that the natural interpretation of those experiences is that the soul of man is in contact with an awful Being, from whom he cannot escape, who compasses his path and his lying down, who is acquainted with all his ways, who has beset him behind and before and laid His hand upon him. 'Search me,' the Psalmist is compelled to exclaim, 'and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts, and see if there be any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting[a].' Such is the utterance of the voice of conscience when its tones are clearest, and when the inward ear is least obstructed. The soul which realises this inward witness, and thoroughly accepts it, may be said, like the Patriarch, to walk with God. 'If I ascend into heaven,' it exclaims, 'Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold Thou art there; if I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the

[a] Psalm cxxxix. 23, 24.

uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me.' From the dawn of revelation, as recorded in the Scriptures, the apprehension of God is marked by similar characteristics. 'Noah,' says the historian, 'was a just man, and perfect in his generations, and Noah walked with God [b].'

If we are to interpret the growth of faith under the Divine guidance, and to vindicate its successive advances, it is necessary to lay the utmost stress upon this primary moral element in our apprehension of the Divine Being. It may be said to be here that, for the practical purposes of revelation, we are furnished with the idea of God, with the very notion of the Divine Name. Whenever that idea has been mainly relegated to the sphere of the intellect, when men have been chiefly concerned to apprehend a first cause, or to rise by mere mental abstraction from the phenomena of the external universe to the one Reality which is before all things, and by which all things consist, the resulting conception has of necessity been something vast, vague, and intangible. To this predominance of intellectual over moral conceptions in theosophic thought may be traced, in great measure, all schemes of philosophy which have been in opposition to Christianity, from those of the Gnostics to the Jewish and German speculations of the present century. The understanding soon loses itself in the labyrinth of its own infinite analysis,

[b] Gen. vi. 9.

and distinct apprehensions of the Being after whom it is feeling rapidly fade away. But in the Scriptures, by virtue of God's voice in the conscience, He comes home to men's hearts, He is felt to be dealing with them in the most central and permanent part of their nature, and they have a real and living apprehension of Him as a personal Being, with whom they have to do. We are in conscious relation to Him, and He is in sympathy with us. His power and wisdom, contemplated in themselves, would remove Him to an incalculable distance from us; but as a God of justice and righteousness He works for human ends, and co-operates with the most intense of human energies.

But imperiously as this belief is dictated by the deepest convictions of the conscience, one thing would seem to be requisite, sooner or later, in order to vindicate and support it, and that is that this righteous Being should visibly declare Himself. It is not indeed for us, in our ignorance, to speculate how or when, or to what extent, He should do so. But if, up to the present moment in history, through all the long struggles, the bitter sacrifices, the baffled aspirations, the keen disappointments of mankind, God's voice had not been clearly heard, God's arm had not been seen, God's love had not been visibly manifested, the strain upon faith would have been immeasurably greater than it is at present. It may well be conceived, indeed, that there must have been something heroic, and beyond the capacity of our

present mortal nature, in the faith which sustained the patriarchs and elders, in the days before Divine revelation had become historic, and had created a continuous chain of evidence to which it could appeal. There is something, for instance, profoundly pathetic in the exclamation attributed to the patriarch Job, 'But where shall wisdom be found? and where is the place of understanding[c]?' We contemplate him at the outset of all human experience, beginning to realise the profound and mysterious complexity of life. He is standing, as it were, at the parting of the broad and narrow ways. Life stretches before him like the desert with which he was surrounded, and over which he travelled, with few and rare tracks across it, and the path still uncertain which led to the most precious of all human possessions. The path thereof, he exclaims, is one 'which no fowl knoweth, and which the vulture's eye hath not seen; the lions whelps have not trodden it, nor the fierce lion passed by it.' Well might he exclaim, 'Whence then cometh wisdom, and where is the place of understanding? seeing it is hid from the eyes of all living, and kept close from the fowls of the air.' That, in such circumstances, he should have firmly grasped the conviction that 'the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding,' may well be regarded as an heroic act of faith; especially when we remember the extent to which men have wavered in this conviction, in

[c] Job xxviii. 12.

spite of far higher cultivation and longer experience. Abraham's position was not unlike that in which Job is described; and when we are told that Abraham 'believed in the Lord,' it seems only natural and just it should be added, 'and He counted it to him for righteousness[d].' Whatever Abraham's errors, that he should have believed God, that he should have recognised the Divine voice, trusted it above all things in heaven and earth, and that, in reliance on it, he should have taken the first step forwards into the new world which faith was destined to create—this, so far as is conceivable of any human act, merited the distinction it received. He 'was strong in faith, giving glory to God . . . . and therefore it was imputed to him for righteousness[e].'

From such considerations as these we are led to the next great step in the development of faith—to the belief, namely, not merely that there is a God of all righteousness and power, with whom we have to do, but that He has given us a positive revelation; that, as the text says, at sundry times, and in divers manners, He spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, and hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son[f]. This, perhaps, is a truth which at the present moment it is even more necessary to vindicate than those elementary principles we have already considered; for this, unhappily, is not unfrequently ignored, if not denied, within the

[d] Gen. xv. 6. [e] Rom. iv. 20–22. [f] Heb. i. 1.

pale of the Church itself, and in the very name of Christianity. What, for instance, is the tendency of that rationalising theology to which reference has already been made, but to eliminate from the Gospel and from the Scriptures, as not essential to their essence, the assertions they put forward of actual Divine utterances, of positive communications made to man, by an authority external to him, respecting the will of God, the present condition, and the future destiny of mankind? Its avowed intention is to explain away that which is miraculous, supernatural and mysterious, and to reduce Christianity within the limits of what is simple, intelligible, and dependent solely on the dictates of enlightened natural morality. In Germany and Holland, and in this country, there is a school of writers who appear ready to say, with the author of the work entitled *Supernatural Religion*, that 'it is singular how little there is in the supposed revelation of alleged information, however incredible, regarding that which is beyond the limits of human thought[g].' To exhibit the ignorance or carelessness implied in such a statement, and the inadequacy of such a conception of our faith as is at all analogous to it, it would be enough to mention one cardinal article of Christian belief—that which St. Paul put in the very front of his appeal to the Athenians, and which is calculated to exert such a profound moral influence on our whole nature—the belief, namely, that

[g] *Supernatural Religion*, 4th ed., vol. ii. p. 490.

the Lord Jesus Christ will be the personal judge of every soul of man. But, of course, the vitality of such an article of faith stands or falls with the belief in a positive revelation from God. No conviction, however profound, of our Lord's moral perfection can of itself justify the belief that He will hereafter personally judge us. That is a definite matter of fact, which we can only credit on His word, or on that of His Apostles; and their assurance on such a point can have no validity, unless they speak with the express authority of that supreme Being, who, as St. Paul declares, 'hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom He hath ordained[h].'

There is another point, of infinite importance to the human heart, in respect to which we are not less absolutely dependent upon positive Divine assurance. That point is the forgiveness of sins. It has been argued with terrible force by some sceptical writers that, in the regular course of nature, there is no room for remission of sin[i]. It is of the very essence of law to be inexorable, and to enforce remorselessly the consequences of its violation. In view of such considerations it is at least clear that we could have indulged no positive assurance of pardon, except on the express authority of Him who alone can forgive sins. The difficulty, indeed, has a still deeper foundation in practice than in theory; and it is not, perhaps, by sceptics that it is most

[h] Acts xvij. 31. [i] See Note 5, Appendix.

keenly felt. He who has ever stood by the bedside of a fellow-sinner, passing amidst the pangs of a remorseful repentance into the presence of the Judge of quick and dead, and who has been appealed to, with all the earnestness and directness of a soul brought face to face with eternal realities, to state whether, and why, he is sure there is forgiveness of sins, will know how utterly inadequate to the need is any answer, but that God Himself has declared it. There are only two remedies for these agonies of the conscience. The one is to administer to the soul the opiate of excuses and palliations for sin; and this is the usual resource of other religions than the Christian, and of the world at large. The other is the express assurance of the forgiveness of sins, made on the authority of God Himself.

It is strange it should be necessary thus to insist on the fact that the most precious and vital articles in our Creed are dependent upon express supernatural revelation; but a loose habit of rationalising the doctrines of the Gospel has spread far beyond avowedly sceptical circles, and produces the most injurious results in daily life. It would, for instance, be inconceivable that the profession of sceptical, and even of infidel, opinions should be regarded with so much indifference, even in nominally Christian society, and that laxity in submitting to the obligations of Christian worship should be viewed so lightly as is too often the case, were it not for the wide-spread admission among us of the original doubt of the

tempter, 'Yea, hath God said[k]?' That subtle question, which was at the root of the first temptation, is at the root of every temptation to which the soul of man is subjected. The men are rare; even if they exist, who can deliberately adopt the sentiment which Milton attributes to the devil, 'Evil, be thou my good,' and who, in the full belief that God has uttered a command, can be indifferent to it. But they doubt whether He has really spoken. It is treated all around them as matter for speculation; and they are tempted to run the risk of its not being really true.

It seems necessary, moreover, to say that there is something astonishing in the levity with which this momentous question is treated by some of the most popular religious writers of the present day. Christians, for instance, are ridiculed for assuming an undue familiarity with God, and for pretending to a knowledge of His will and of His purposes, such as they may possess respecting each other[l]. Now let it be granted that it has been one danger of theologians to assume too complete and systematic a knowledge of the Divine nature and dispensations. It is an error, indeed, which has been often prompted, not by irreverence, but by faith. It has been stimulated by that principle with which the New Testament is instinct, a principle which also lies at the basis of modern science, that there is a

[k] Gen. iii. 1.

[l] *St. Paul and Protestantism*, by Mr. M. Arnold, p. 72.

harmony between the reason of man and the reason of God; it has been encouraged by those words which perhaps, beyond all others, have elevated human thought: Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος [m]. But the Christian Church and the Christian Creed are not bound up with any of the theological systems which have been elaborated by individuals, and which by their grandeur and grasp have fascinated, from time to time, whole churches and successive generations. It is one of the commonest artifices of modern scepticism to assume that the schemes of theologians are the Creeds of the Church, and to charge our faith, for instance, with all the logical consequences of Calvinism. But deep as is the debt the Church owes, for various reasons and in various degrees, to the great Fathers and Divines who have endeavoured to penetrate into the mysteries of the revelation entrusted to her—to an Origen, an Augustine, an Anselm, a Luther, or a Calvin—she is independent of all of them, and superior to all; and it is at once a great injustice, and a great piece of ignorance, to hold her responsible for the imperfections of their systems. So far as it is simply against such systems, or their exaggerations, that the ridicule in question is directed, there is no need to discuss its applicability or good taste; it is sufficient to say that it is irrelevant to the question which is assumed to be at issue.

[m] St. John i. 1.

When, indeed, we are charged with presumption in discussing the Divine will and the Divine character, the whole basis on which we stand must have been forgotten. We assume, not that we are intruding by our own reason into the awful secrets of the Divine nature, but that God has been graciously pleased to reveal His nature and His will to us, in certain measure, and under certain limitations. If He has done so—if there be but a serious probability that He has done so—the presumptuousness surely is not on the side of those who, with whatever human errors and weaknesses, bend their minds and hearts to apprehend the revelation, to expound it, and to submit to it. It rests, on the contrary, with those who disregard it, who treat it as a subject for light literary mockery, or who exert their influence to divert from it the serious attention of the men of their age, and especially of its young men. If these elements of the Christian faith are to be called in question, let it be done with a due acknowledgment of the gravity of the issue. If our Lord be God, and if He and His Apostles have revealed to us, in any measure, the will and the nature of God, he who disparages or disregards that revelation is guilty of an offence against the human conscience and the human mind of the very highest gravity. The writers of the New Testament do not shrink from asserting the tremendous import of the claim they put forward. The writer of the Epistle from which the text is taken, for instance, proceeds immediately to

warn those whom he addresses of the consequences of neglecting the Divine revelation he announces. 'How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, which at the first began to be spoken unto us by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to His own will[n]?' The consequences which our Lord and His Apostles denounce upon disbelief are apt to sound harsh to our ears. But they are at least in full conformity with the momentous character of the truths which are proclaimed. If the Christian faith reveals the profoundest truths ever opened to human ken, those who reject such an illumination must condemn themselves to a proportionately profound darkness.

It is of the first importance, for the purposes of the present argument, to bear in mind the full gravity of these considerations; for it is only by reference to them that we can duly appreciate the evidence on which we build our faith in the authenticity of Divine revelation. When we proceed to enquire into the grounds on which we make this great step forwards in the life of faith, we are thrown back, in the first instance, upon certain testimony. Our Faith, indeed, as we shall see, rests ultimately upon an authority which is higher than that of any human witness. But it starts from the testimony of the Prophets and Apostles; and such considerations as

[n] Heb. ii. 3.

have just been noticed exclude all reasonable doubt respecting the purport of that testimony, and the full consciousness of its meaning with which it was delivered. No serious criticism can question that, as a matter of fact, the Prophets and Apostles were convinced that they had received specific revelations from God. Thus Professor Kuenen, who has bestowed immense labour and learning in order to disprove the belief that the prophets under the old dispensation spoke with any supernatural authority, frankly admits that they all claim to do so. 'The canonical prophets,' he says, 'all, without distinction, are possessed by the consciousness that they proclaim the word of Jahveh . . . the first and the last words of the collection of the Prophetical books are words of Jahveh; from the beginning to the end He is introduced as speaker by men who are persuaded that they can come forward as His interpreters [o].' If, indeed, there could be any doubt as to the meaning of such expressions, it would be dispelled by the light reflected back on them by similar statements in the New Testament. The question of the validity of testimony to a supernatural revelation may, in fact, be most conveniently considered in the case of the Apostles, as it there comes more completely within historic observation. If its validity in this instance be clearly shewn, we shall have discerned the method by which previous revelations may have been authen-

[o] *The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, by Dr. A. Kuenen. Translated by the Rev. A. Milroy, 1877, pp. 74, 75.

ticated, and the general principle will be sufficiently established.

There can, then, be no doubt whatever, as a matter of historic fact, that the Apostle Paul claimed to have received direct revelations from heaven. That he wrote the Epistle to the Galatians is unquestioned, and in the first chapter of that Epistle he bases the whole authority of his message upon an express Divine commission. He claims to be an Apostle, 'not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father, who raised Him from the dead.' He certifies the Galatians that the Gospel which was preached of him was not after man, for, he says, 'I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ.' He is so certain of that revelation that he warns them against being enticed by any apparent evidence to doubt it. 'Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we said before, so say I now again, if any man preach any other gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed.' It would be impossible to express a stronger, a more deliberate, and a more solemn conviction that St. Paul had received a supernatural communication of the will of God. The claim upon our faith asserted by our Lord must be reserved for separate discussion, as it stands upon far higher ground. The witness of the Apostles

must be vindicated independently; even to ourselves their testimony must be in great measure the foundation for our faith in Christ; and to the early Christians, before the gospels were written, that testimony was the only evidence they had of the claim of our Lord. It thus becomes necessary for us, in the first instance, to enquire what is the validity and force of the witness thus borne to facts so completely beyond the range of ordinary human experience.

Now the more the gravity of this testimony is weighed, the more apparent will be the immense responsibility which a man takes upon himself in rejecting it. In such a case everything depends upon the moral weight to be assigned to the conviction under which the testimony is delivered. If it were delivered by men who might be supposed not to appreciate the full solemnity of the words they uttered, by men, for instance, who had an imperfect appreciation of the awful majesty of the Being from whom they claimed to have received communications—if, again, it were accompanied by a weak apprehension of the moral gravity of the consequences it must involve—if it were associated with any marks of hallucination in respect to the ordinary affairs of life, or if it were connected, even remotely, with any unworthy moral or intellectual conceptions, it would justly be regarded, at the outset, with the gravest suspicions[p]. These are

[p] See a fuller discussion of this point in Note 6.

points in which, even apart from the question of miraculous authentication, all other alleged revelations fail. In this place, where the honoured memory of the late Regius Professor of Divinity is still fresh and vivid, it would be equally presumptuous and unnecessary to discuss the question of the value of miracles as the necessary guarantee of a revelation[q]. It is admitted on all hands that, without such credentials, a man cannot reasonably claim to be in possession of information beyond that open to ordinary men. But it is also admitted that the mere exertion of miraculous powers does not dispense with the necessity for strong moral evidence. We may, however, at least say that it proves the person who propounds the doctrine to possess powers, and to enjoy privileges, which are beyond the ordinary range of humanity, and which transcend our measurement. In other words, we cease to be competent judges of the full extent of such a witness's ability. He may, for ought we can judge, know things which are beyond human experience, just as he can do things which are beyond human power. But when miraculous credentials are sustained and illustrated by the most exalted moral and intellectual qualifications, the combination of testimony seems to become overwhelming.

The case may with advantage be stated in terms which are familiar to English students of theology.

[q] The reference is to the late Dr. Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles.

Bishop Pearson's analysis of the logical definition of Faith is eminently satisfactory, and is sufficient for the purpose of this argument[r]. 'Faith,' as he defines it, 'is an assent unto that which is credible, as credible'—in other words, it is an assent on the ground of testimony, as distinguished from assent produced by immediate knowledge or mediately by ratiocination. Now, as he says, there are two qualifications necessary in a witness—the one is ability, the other is integrity. But ability, in relation to this subject, must be taken in its amplest sense. It must be held to imply at once access to the necessary sources of knowledge, and the possession of the requisite capacity for duly appreciating the importance and purport of the truths or facts attested. Thus if we regard the case of a witness in a court of justice, it might be convenient to consider that three qualifications are required for his credibility. Our first enquiry would be whether he had the means of knowing that which he reported—whether, for instance, he was present at the scene of an alleged occurrence. The second would be whether he was truthful. But a third would be whether he possessed the moral or intellectual capacity for observing what he saw with due intelligence, and for appreciating its import. Now objections to the competence of the Apostles on the first point—that of the means of information open to them—may be regarded as rebutted by miracles. Of their compe-

[r] *Exposition of the Creed.* Third Ed. pp. 1–15.

tence in point of truthfulness no reasonable man doubts. There remains the third point—that of their capacity, and it is with this that we are now more immediately concerned.

But it is in this point, perhaps, that their testimony possesses its chief weight. These men were not pagans by birth and education, and accustomed like Greeks to think lightly of a Divine Being, and of communications with Him. They were Jews, who had the third commandment continually before their eyes, and for whom the very name of God possessed an awful and almost unutterable solemnity. To a Pharisee of the Pharisees like St. Paul, the idea of a communication from God must have been far more overpowering than it is to a modern sceptic. The traditions of his nation, indeed, rendered him familiar with its possibility, but at the same time enhanced its solemnity. Neither in the prophets nor in the apostles is there any other feeling than that of supreme awe and responsibility in view of the tremendous privilege conferred upon them. 'Woe is me,' exclaims Isaiah, 'for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips, for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts[8].' To quote again Professor Kuenen's acknowledgment on this point, 'We see here,' he says, 'men who can find no words sufficient to declare the might and majesty of Jahveh, who

[8] Isaiah vi. 5.

have a deep and lively feeling of their own utter nothingness before Him, and nevertheless, in spite of the distance which separates them from Him, declare emphatically that they know His counsel and speak His word[t].' St. Paul again and again seems, as it were, to lay his hand upon his mouth in presence of the supreme Majesty and unapproachableness of the God in whose name he is speaking. 'O the depth of the riches,' he exclaims, 'both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? Or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things; to whom be glory for ever, Amen[u].' It is surely difficult to conceive a mental, moral and spiritual capacity more adequate to appreciate the profound import of the testimony which the Apostle delivered.

Now are we not justified in saying that in view of such considerations the burden of proof is not, as seems often assumed, on the side of those who accept this testimony, but on that of those who reject it? Here are several witnesses, respecting the profound depth of whose moral and religious nature there can be no doubt whatever, testifying to their own

[t] Kuenen's *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, translated by Rev. A. Milroy, 1877, p. 76.

[u] Rom. xi. 33–36.

experience, in a matter which they know and feel to bear a moral and spiritual import of the most momentous character. Can it be considered reasonable, is it consistent with common prudence, to put such evidence aside on the ground that it transcends our own experience, and is beyond our power of verification? It is not too much to say that this is to a large extent a question of the exercise of intellectual and moral modesty. A man must have a very surprising confidence in his own intelligence and moral discernment who can venture summarily to dismiss such statements as St. Paul's as hallucinations; and accordingly it must be observed, as a matter of fact, that the critics who adopt such views display, as a rule, a self-confidence and a serene sense of superiority, which of itself is sufficient to disable their judgment in the matter. Some of them can treat St. Paul as a tutor would his pupil, can rearrange his thoughts, can point out to him which are important and which are unimportant, can indicate where he wanders from his subject, and where he has lost the clue to his own meaning[v]. Others, as we have seen, like the author of *Supernatural Religion*, can pronounce that, after all, there is not much beyond the range of human thought in St. Paul's alleged revelations, and that we do not really lose anything by dismissing them as illusions. It is no wonder that men, who can treat apostles and evangelists on these terms of mental and moral

[v] *St. Paul and Protestantism*, pp. 150–160.

equality, should reject their claims to supernatural information. But those who feel that, in reading the Gospels and Epistles, they are communing with moral and spiritual conceptions transcending any that are elsewhere to be met with, to whom almost every word brings home a sense of their own feebleness, sin, and ignorance, and of the moral and mental supremacy of the writers—such persons will judge very differently of the claim of the apostles to be the recipients of a Divine revelation. They will feel that the case completely fulfils the requirement of Hume — that to prove a miracle, 'the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish[w].' They will listen to such claims with awe, and they will either accept them with confidence and joy or will reject them with fear and trembling.

In point of fact, the weight and force of all testimony to a supernatural religion must greatly depend on the degree in which the witness is felt to be in harmony with our deepest moral convictions. No miracle would be adequate to convince a man that St. Paul brought a direct message from God unless he were sensible that, by means of that revelation, and in conjunction with it, the Apostle was appealing to his conscience, and pouring a new illumination upon his soul. 'If they hear not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead[x].' If a man

[w] *Essay on Miracles.* Conclusion of Part i.

[x] St. Luke xvi. 31.

be not overwhelmed by the spiritual illumination of the Scriptures, if his whole nature be not stirred to its inmost recesses by a Psalm like the 139th, if he does not tremble before the heights and depths of spiritual realities there revealed to him, even the miracle of Easter day may fail to afford a sufficient answer to his doubts. In proportion as this moral and spiritual sensibility is dormant the faith of even professed Christians is but notional and traditional, and is destitute of real life and stability. A prophet or an apostle who announces a revelation from God, and who claims our submission to it, appeals to us for trust; and that trust must depend, not merely upon the miracles he may be able to work, but also upon the moral authority he wields; while this again will depend, not only upon the witness's moral depth and insight, but upon our own also. If we are spiritually enfeebled, we shall be incapable of appreciating his authority, and shall be insensible to the force with which he appeals to us.

It will thus appear that, in respect to the second great step in faith, as in respect to the first, we are forced back on St. Paul's principle, that the real obstacle to faith is that men shrink from the severe moral strain which it requires. They do not like to retain God in their knowledge. A man's belief in the existence of a living God with whom he is personally concerned depends on the intensity and vividness of the convictions of his conscience. If he is prepared to acquiesce in an imperfect vindica-

tion of right and wrong within his own soul and in the world at large, he may feel no necessity for the recognition of a personal Judge and Lord of all. Even if he admit theoretically the existence of such a supreme Being, yet if he fail to live in the realisation of it, if his conscience be allowed to slumber, the sacred writers who are the great masters of the conscience will lose their hold on him, he will not be sensible that they speak with any overwhelming authority, and he will be prepared for attempts to explain away their testimony. As we saw at the outset, God is essentially the God of the conscience. In proportion as a message speaks to the conscience and is felt to touch its depths, will it be recognised as Divine; and in proportion as a man shrinks from the intense penetration of that touch will he cease to recognize its author.

It may, perhaps, be objected that to trace the rejection of apostolic testimony to this source is to pass an unwarranted judgment upon the moral disposition of unbelievers. Now, to a certain extent, such a judgment might be directly vindicated. There are, for instance, dangerous signs at the present day of a relaxation of moral tone in the literature of free-thinking. There is a tendency to palliate the offences of vicious characters, and to treat every sin as atoned for by intellectual brilliancy. But it is unnecessary to press this unwelcome consideration; since it would be in the highest degree unjust to throw the whole blame of his error upon every individual who may be

the victim of unbelief. We are all bound up together in this matter; and the sins, the unfaithfulness, the lack of moral energy among Christians themselves contribute, to a terrible extent, to weaken the testimony to our faith. The ministers of God's word must bear their share in this responsibility. So far as they fail to exhibit the moral truth and spiritual force of that word, so far as they harden it, or obscure it, or misrepresent it, they contribute to weaken its appeal to the hearts and consciences of their fellows, and the result is seen in many an indirect and distant injury to faith. It is the mission of the Church and its ministers to carry forward the work of the Apostles, by bearing witness to certain truths and revelations; and if that witness be in any instance unworthily delivered, the force with which the truth appeals to the soul of man is proportionately weakened. It is unnecessary, in short, for the purpose of the present argument, to determine where the blame or the weakness lies. But it is to some such moral weakness, to some such eclipse of the moral light of life, that a loss of faith in the testimony of the Apostles of Christ, and of the Prophets of old time, must be attributed; and if faith is to be revivified, it must be by an appeal to the conscience, still more than to the intellect, of man.

In short, if we push these considerations to their last stage, we shall find ourselves led to a still higher ground, on which St. Paul himself explicitly bases his testimony. If the voice of conscience is the

voice of God, then, in the last resort, it is upon the witness of God Himself that faith rests. It is His voice within us, the witness of His Spirit, which authenticates the voice without us, and affords us the final assurance that an Apostle or a Prophet brings us a message from Him. So St. Paul declares to the Corinthians, 'I brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling; and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God [y].' That demonstration of the Spirit and of power still attends the message of the Gospel, though in some respects in a less visible and miraculous form. In those words, 'not which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth [z],' there still resides that power to turn men from darkness to light, to regenerate their moral energy, and to make them new creatures, which was, after all, the mightiest miracle of even Apostolic times. The words just quoted from the Apostle are a warning to us, that no ground short of this witness of God Himself will suffice to sustain, or to preserve uninjured, the edifice of faith; and they ought to be especially borne in mind in any attempt, such as that of these Lectures, to vindi-

[y] 1 Cor. ii. 1–5. [z] 1 Cor. ii. 13.

cate our belief in Revelation. In proportion as our apprehension of His voice within our own souls is quickened, in that proportion shall we recognize the same voice in His Prophets and Apostles; we shall feel a deepening conviction that they are speaking that which they know, and are testifying that which they have seen, and we shall finally acknowledge, with gratitude and perfect trust, that in these last days He hath spoken unto us by His Son [a].

[a] See Note 7.

LECTURE IV.

THE FAITH OF THE OLD COVENANT.

ISAIAH xlii. 5, 6.

Thus saith God the Lord, He that created the heavens, and stretched them out; He that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it; He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein: I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee.

IT has been the purpose of the second and third of these Lectures to vindicate the two principles which are at the foundation of Christian faith. The first is the truth that God is, and is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him—that in Him we live and move and have our being, and above all things our moral being. The second is that He has made definite revelations to us—that, at sundry times and in divers manners, He spake in times past unto our fathers by the prophets and apostles. Starting from these principles we may now proceed to consider the successive developments of Faith under this Divine inspiration and guidance; and accordingly the subject of the present Lecture will be the character of the revelation vouchsafed to the Jews, and the nature of the faith which it elicited. It is,

however, necessary to keep this starting-point constantly in mind, as it determines the whole method of our interpretation of those Scriptures on which our subsequent arguments must be based. There is a prevalent tendency to reason upon this subject as if all we had to consider were the gradual advance of men, by force of their natural faculties, intellectual and moral, towards the knowledge of God. From this point of view, often unconsciously adopted, many modern critics appear to deem themselves perfectly capable of measuring the full meaning of the Scriptures, and justified in bringing them to the test of a purely scientific and rational standard. But the whole attitude of our minds becomes different when we once acknowledge that we are in the presence of Divine utterances, and that the Bible is not so much a record of the efforts of men to seek and find God, as a revelation of His gracious work in seeking them and guiding them. From the moment that any strong probability of this being the case is established, we are compelled to approach the Scriptures in a different spirit from that in which we deal with other writings. We are led to expect that there must be much in them, and in the revelation they contain, which is beyond the apprehension of any individual, and which, to the last, will exercise to the utmost the meditation and the experience of the Church.

This observation is one which needs to be borne in mind, not merely in respect to direct assaults

upon the Scriptures and the revelations they record, but in efforts to explain or to defend them. All schemes of sceptical or rationalistic interpretation of the Scriptures and of our Lord's life are based upon the supposition that no statements are admissible and no acts credible which cannot be brought within the range of our rational comprehension. The most frequent examples of this spirit in the present day are to be seen in the numerous attempts which have been made to bring the history of the Gospels within the compass of ordinary historic development and of rational explanation. But if we have once reason to believe that our Lord's utterances were Divine, all such attempts stand condemned beforehand. The first principle of a sound criticism must be a confession of its own incompetence to solve many of the problems which a Divine revelation must needs present. When, therefore, a commentator or a critic writes as though higher culture, or advanced criticism, had enabled him to survey the Scriptures from the vantage ground of a superior intelligence—when he thus deems himself qualified to transform the whole conception of spiritual truth expressed by the sacred writers, to present a different view of our Lord's life from that of the Evangelists and the Apostles, to exhibit 'the origins of Christianity' with scientific precision, or to discriminate between the essential and the non-essential in Apostolic teaching—in such a case it is possible he may make valuable contributions to our knowledge,

but he at once stands discredited as an interpreter. We are in presence of words, and thoughts, and purposes, which are vastly beyond our grasp. The course of past history ought to be enough to shew us that the methods and designs of God are often utterly obscure to all natural apprehension, and that the mightiest influences for the future may lie hidden under the slightest words, and in the most insignificant events. By means of faith we grasp the hand of an invisible guide, who has led His people onwards, from step to step, along paths which were often shrouded in darkness on all sides; and there is no greater danger to which we are exposed than that of setting aside, because beyond our immediate comprehension, intimations of His will and expressions of His truth.

But if, from the point of view which has been previously vindicated, these considerations involve a decisive condemnation of the rationalist, they afford no less valuable warning and advice to the apologist. In proportion to a man's belief in the supernatural character of the revelation of the Scriptures will he avoid being over-anxious or hasty in explaining or defending it. His words will always be wary and often few; and the objections which will disturb him least are that some word or deed of our Lord, or some statement of the inspired writers, is beyond the apprehension of critics. He will frequently feel it sufficient to acknowledge the imperfection of his own intelligence and experience;

and in respect to many difficulties he will feel justified in replying: 'We are not careful to answer thee in this matter[a].'

These principles afford us a broad and deep foundation on which the main edifice of faith may be erected. They justify us in resting satisfied, for the purpose of our argument, with the general testimony of the Scripture records, notwithstanding the difficulties with which they may be beset on certain points in their interpretation, or in the history of their composition. Criticism has now analysed unsparingly the whole of those records; and although some writers have reached very destructive conclusions, as was to be expected from the assumptions with which they started, the general result is to leave unshaken the chief evidence with which we have to deal. It is sufficient, for instance, to read Ewald, in order to be convinced that the substantial truth of the sacred narrative is unassailable, and that the really important questions at issue are not those of facts, but those of first principles. If a critic starts from the assumption that any interference with the course of nature, as observed in our daily life, is inconceivable, he must needs exert himself to explain away all tokens of such interference; and he may often be able to make out a very plausible account of the matter from his own point of view. There has never yet, however, been any attempt of this kind which did not, by its own confession, leave certain

[a] Dan. iii. 16.

points unexplained. The Christian interpretation of the history is, in this respect, in at least no worse a position than any other; while it has the unquestionable advantage that it takes the statements and narratives of Scripture, as a rule, in the simple meaning which they bear at first sight, and which they have always hitherto conveyed. Let it be once assumed, for the reasons previously assigned, that God has spoken to men not merely by their consciences, but by revelation from without—that His voice has been recognised and His words have been heard—and we feel ourselves at once in harmony with the interpretation which the Bible naturally suggests. Infinite care and labour will still be necessary in order to penetrate into its deeper secrets, and to elucidate the problems which it presents. But we may, without hesitation, accept it as what it professes to be—a record of Divine revelation, and of a divinely-ordered history; and, for the general purposes now in view, we may submit ourselves in simplicity and confidence to the guidance of its plain and unsophisticated meaning.

Approaching the subject in this spirit, there can be no difficulty in answering the question what, as a matter of fact, were the main elements of the faith of the Jews. If we enquire, in the first instance, into its substance, we shall be the better able to appreciate the authority on which it rested. Now it is marked by one conspicuous characteristic, respecting which there seems no room for controversy.

The people of Israel lived in the firm belief, handed down from generation to generation, that they were in actual covenant with the God of their Fathers, with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with Jehovah who appeared to Moses. On this point even such destructive criticism as that of Professor Kuenen is explicit in its admissions. 'The prophets of Jahveh,' he says, 'who laboured among the Israelites in the eighth century before our era, appeal to history to prove that Jahveh really stands in an entirely peculiar relation to that people. "Jahveh thy God from the land of Egypt:" in these words Hosea expresses a conviction which recurs in the other prophets. Although here the Exodus from Egypt is the starting-point, there are not wanting allusions to persons and events of a still earlier period from which we may infer that the bond between Jahveh and Israel had already been formed at that time. When, for instance, Micah writes: "Thou wilt perform the truth to Jacob and the mercy to Abraham, which thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old;" then, in his opinion, the covenant between Jahveh and the Israelitish nation, which he also dates from the deliverance out of the house of bondage in Egypt, must have been already prepared before [b].'

This conviction is, in fact, beyond question, the central point in the national faith and the national life. Faith in the divine promise involved in that

[b] *The Religion of Israel*, by Dr. A. Kuenen; translated by A. H. May, 1874, Vol. I, p. 101.

covenant sustained the faithful Jew through the bitter and prolonged agonies of his people, and animated him in his intense attachment to those laws and customs, in the observance of which he deemed his own part in the covenant to consist. St. Peter summed up the deepest convictions of his countrymen when he addressed them [c] as 'the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed.' That covenant was as sacred to the Apostles as to the Jews who adhered to the old faith. They appealed to it as the very warrant for the message with which they were entrusted; and St. Paul's crucial argument against the permanent obligation of the whole Mosaic law is based on the unalterable character and essential import of the original promise to Abraham [d]. From first to last, from the dawn of the sacred history to the proclamation of the Gospel, and from thence to the present day, this covenant constitutes the everlasting rock on which the edifice of Jewish faith and life is built. By an indissoluble bond, stamped upon his very flesh, every Jew was thus brought under a solemn engagement with the God of his fathers, and by an equally solemn engagement the God of his fathers became bound to him. Accordingly in the Decalogue, the brief but comprehensive summary of the principles of Israel's faith and duty, the proclamation

[c] Acts iii. 25. [d] Gal. iii. 15–18.

of this covenant is the foundation of the whole structure. 'I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me[e].' When the third commandment proceeds to declare that the Lord will not hold guiltless those who are false to engagements made in His Name, or who treat them as vain, the inviolable character of the covenant on both sides stands proclaimed as the primary law of the national life.

There appears something entirely unique, and profoundly impressive, in the testimony thus borne through long ages by an undying race to the convictions of their fathers that they had received a solemn divine promise. That conviction, it is important to observe, appears as deep and firm in the earliest known history of the nation as in its later years. The prophets appeal to it as antecedent to their authority; it is the basis of the history and not its result. It would appear very difficult to account for a conviction of this kind by any other explanation than the simple and natural one—that it was founded on a fact; that an actual divine promise had been communicated to the fathers and founders of the Jewish nation, and had been subsequently confirmed by the prophetic voice, and by miraculous signs. But to appreciate the force of this consideration, it is necessary to examine more particularly the constituent elements of the faith embodied in the

[e] Exodus xx. 2, 3.

conviction in question. Of what character was the God from whom the promise was believed to have proceeded, and what was its purport? In order to answer these questions, it is again sufficient to consider certain broad facts which are independent of current controversy. Without entering into the critical questions which have been raised as to the composition of the Pentateuch, there can be no doubt that it embodies the sum and substance of the faith of the Jews, and of the Covenant under which they lived. Their latter history and the writings of their Prophets were but applications of the facts and principles declared in those five sacred books—illustrations of them, and inspired comments upon them. They constituted specifically the Law, the original and unalterable basis of Jewish life and belief. On this foundation, as a matter of fact, the whole fabric with which we have to deal has been raised; and the primary conceptions here presented constitute the great facts for which we have to account.

What then, let us ask, is the opening revelation of the Book of the Covenant? It is conveyed in that first chapter of the book of Genesis, around which, for the last generation or two, so warm a controversy has raged, and which still seems to be regarded in some quarters as offering grave difficulties to the claims of the Scriptures. Perhaps theologians are as much responsible for some of these difficulties as men of science, but under a large and generous treatment of the subject it will not

only be seen that they disappear, but the chapter in question will be found one of the most pregnant revelations in the whole compass of the Scriptures. It displays before us a sublime vision of the creation of the heavens and the earth by the word of God. The sacred writer takes us back beyond all time, carries us in thought away from the earth on which we stand, above the height and beneath the depth, and reveals to us one Almighty God, who, by His mere will, called into being all the marvels of earth, and sea, and heaven. He passes in brief, but comprehensive, review every element of the external world—the light and the darkness, the clouds above and the water below, the dry land, the grass, the herbs, and the trees, the two great lights and the innumerable constellations of the heavens, the moving creature that hath life in the water, in the air, and on the land; and finally man, the most perfect of all creatures, and the master of them all; and as scene after scene passes before us, until the whole compass of nature has been reviewed, we hear in impressive reiteration the words, 'God said,' and 'It was so.' A heathen writer has confessed the sublimity of the simple sentence, 'God said, Let there be light, and there was light,' and it is obvious what an amazing idea of the Divine power and wisdom they convey to us. In intrinsic grandeur of conception they may well be compared with that sublime and awful chapter in the book of Job, where we read how the Lord answered Job

out of the whirlwind, and said: 'Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who hath laid the corner-stone thereof; when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy[f]?' It was a description and a demand which might well cause the patriarch, as is said, to abhor himself, to lay his hand upon his mouth, and to repent in silence, and in dust and ashes. But there is something even more full of awe in the simple declaration that all these marvellous creations were called into being by the mere word and will of God.

Such is the main effect and substantial revelation of this chapter; and it may be well to observe that, when regarded from this point of view, the course of modern discovery, so far from diminishing its instructiveness, tends vastly to enhance it. If this be the main purpose of the sacred writer, it becomes a wholly subordinate question whether the discoveries of science respecting the past history of the globe correspond exactly to his narration. That was not the matter with which he was immediately concerned. The particular order in which the phenomena of nature are reviewed is no way essential to the exhibition of the great religious truth which it is the object of the writer to impress upon us.

[f] Job xxxviii. 4–7.

This, however, renders it the more remarkable that, if the narration be taken in that broad and simple sense in which it is obviously intended, it is so far from being inconsistent with the revelations of science, that it might far more justly be regarded as a most comprehensive and expressive summary of their main result. The law of an orderly succession in creation, from lower types of nature to the higher, on which science now so urgently insists, is here conspicuously expressed. But, at all events, the more we learn in these days of the antiquity, the complexity, the infinity of nature, the more wonderful and impressive must that reiterated declaration sound to our ears, 'God said,' and 'It was so.' The astronomer revealing a universe, compared with which the globe on which we live is but an inappreciable point, the student of the microscope displaying a not less endless series of worlds within our own, the geologist unravelling the records of an almost interminable succession of life—each is but displaying a commentary which enables us the better to realize the majesty of that God, who was before all things, and by whom all things consist, who speaks and it is done, who commands and it stands fast. This opening chapter of revelation is, in short, most properly considered, not as a revelation of nature, but as a revelation of God. All the wonders of nature are reviewed and displayed so as to reflect the power and majesty of that great Being who created them. Such is the grand revelation with

which the Book of the Covenant opens; and it is in this profound realisation of God that the foundations of that Covenant were laid g.

Now with respect to the practical effect of the revelation of God thus conveyed to us, we are not left to our own speculation. We can appeal to the evidence of fact in a singularly interesting form. It was the custom in the Jewish Church to read in their synagogues selections from the prophets, illustrating the several portions of the Law. Accordingly, when the opening chapters of Genesis were read, that which we may call the second lesson of the synagogue was from the 5th verse of the 42nd chapter of Isaiah to the 10th verse of the 43rd. We there possess what was regarded by the Jews as the practical commentary on the commencement of the book of Genesis; and what is the burden of that great prophecy? It is that of the opening verses, which have been taken as the text of this Lecture. It proclaims a message from the Creator:—'Thus saith God the Lord, He that created the heavens and stretched them out, He that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it; He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein.' So far we have a summary of the first chapter of Genesis, and an application of it to the purpose just indicated —the description of God. But the prophet is commissioned to announce what this Lord, the Creator

g See Note 7 A.

of heaven and earth, saith to his Servant, and to the people of Israel so far as they were one with that Servant, and to what purpose this revelation of His infinite power and wisdom is to be applied. 'Thus,' he proceeds, 'saith God the Lord . . . I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and will give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles.' Throughout the Scriptures no grander or more marvellous utterance is to be found. If the opening revelation of the book of Genesis be overwhelming in its awful majesty, not less overpowering in its graciousness is the assurance here conveyed, that the people of Israel were in covenant with the Almighty Creator, and were privileged to appropriate all that awe, all that might and majesty, as bestowed upon themselves, for their righteousness, their support, and their protection, and that they were thus to become 'a light of the Gentiles'—the instruments as they have undoubtedly been, of an universal moral enlightenment.

Consider, for a moment, what a very different effect such a revelation as we have been contemplating might have produced. The Psalmist, in one place, describes the natural influence of such contemplations. 'When I consider Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars which Thou hast ordained; what is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that Thou visitest him[h]?' If, without any condescension

[h] Ps. viii. 3, 4.

to our weakness, God were simply to stand before us in His majesty as a Creator, 'the spirit would fail before Him, and the souls which He has made[i].' The mere facts of nature, such as earthquakes, storms, and eclipses have been, to the vast majority of mankind a source of overpowering terror, driving them to all the devices of superstition. How much more terrible would be the naked vision of Him, whose voice is the thunder, at whose look the earth trembles, at whose touch the hills smoke. The enemies of religion have sometimes denounced it as a device of priests and kings to keep men in subjection; they have alleged that it tends to make men timorous, and deprives them of independence. It is perfectly true that it has often done so, and that in some cases it does so still at the present day, especially in heathen countries. It is also true that it must of necessity have this effect, so far as God is simply represented to men in the character of an Almighty Creator. But how completely is the effect reversed, when we add to that revelation these wonderful words, 'I, the Lord, have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee.' From the moment that message is received into the heart, everything there is of awe, might, and majesty in the revelation of God becomes the source of confidence, hope, security, and dignity, in the soul of man. The power and wisdom revealed to us in the record of creation become our refuge and our

[i] Is. lvii. 16.

strength; they expel from the mind all selfish fear, they lift it out of all slavery, they bestow on it an independence not less than that of the will of God, they assure us that we are superior to heaven and earth, to death and hell, and to all created things. He who can say, 'The Lord is on my side,' must at least add, 'I will not fear what man can do unto me[k];' but he may also stand unshaken in soul amidst the shock of worlds.

We thus perceive, that in the first chapter of his work, the Hebrew lawgiver established the foundation on which he could rear the edifice of an independent, a righteous and a true, because a fearless people. He brought them a message from God, and they asked him, Who is the Lord? and he answered, 'He that created the heavens, and stretched them out, He that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it, He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein;' and 'thus' he added, in other words from the same passage[l], 'Thus saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and He that formed thee, O Israel, Fear not, for I have redeemed thee; I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine. When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee; when thou walkest through the fire, thou shalt not be burned, neither shall the flame kindle upon thee. For I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour.'

[k] Ps. cxviii. 6.

[l] Isaiah xliii. 1.

There are thus these two primary elements in the faith of the Jews—first, the belief in a God who made the heavens and the earth; and secondly, the belief that, if we submit ourselves to His will, He graciously exerts His might, wisdom, and righteousness for our salvation, and that He lifts us into fellowship with Himself. This conviction is, in fact, implied in a striking and pregnant expression in the first chapter of Genesis itself. We read that God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.' In what was that likeness to consist? It is explained as consisting in a resemblance to those very attributes which had just been so gloriously manifested. 'Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.' 'God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it, and have dominion.' What words are these to be addressed to so weak and feeble a creature, and what a source of confidence, hope, and conscious power do they not afford! How deeply this teaching entered into the spirit of the Jews is shewn by the Psalms. There is no more striking instance than the Psalm [m] which is read at the commencement of morning service. It recites how 'the Lord is a great God, and a great King above all gods,' that 'in His hand are all the corners of the earth, and the strength of

[m] Ps. xcv.

the hills is His also.' Here is the first of the two principles just mentioned; and it is indissolubly united with the second: 'let us heartily rejoice in the strength of our salvation . . . for He is the Lord our God, and we are the people of His pasture, and the sheep of His hand.' It is this combination of principles which is constantly applied to sustain the servants of God in adhering to Him, and obeying His laws, in spite of all temptations and distresses. The Lord of heaven and earth had called the Psalmists and the whole Hebrew people by their name, and they could follow His call, though earth and heaven should seem arrayed against them. When, in short, a man can begin a Psalm with the words, 'The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork,' and can end it with the words, 'O Lord, *my* strength and *my* Redeemer[n],' he has grasped the essential elements of a true faith, and is superior to all powers that can assail him.

But another momentous element in this faith must be apprehended before we can realize its full depth and grandeur. The God who was thus supreme in his infinite elevation above all created things was similarly exalted in his moral attributes, and was incapable of tolerating moral evil in his presence. The two conceptions of moral elevation and of unapproachable majesty are everywhere united. When the Prophet Isaiah saw the Lord 'sitting upon a

[n] Ps. xix.

throne, high and lifted up,' the Seraphim who stood above it cried one unto another, and said, 'Holy, Holy, Holy, is the Lord of Hosts: the whole earth is full of His glory [o].' He is 'the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy,' and He dwells 'in the high and holy place [p].' By this combination the idea of holiness is exalted to an inconceivable height, while that of majesty and power is invested with the intensest moral significance. 'The Lord is righteous in all His ways, and holy in all His works [q].' In one verse the Psalmist exclaims, 'Men shall speak of the might of thy terrible acts, and I will declare thy greatness;' in the next he says, 'They shall abundantly utter the memory of thy great goodness, and shall sing of thy righteousness [r].' The Divine laws and commands, accordingly, of whatever kind, are essentially righteous in their character and purpose, and all moral and spiritual blessedness is found in the path of them. 'Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly . . . but his delight is in the law of the Lord, and in His law doth he meditate day and night [s].' The privilege of the Jew is to have this righteousness revealed to him, and to be thus introduced into union and covenant with God. 'He sheweth His word unto Jacob, His statutes and His judgments unto Israel. He hath not dealt so with any nation, and as for His judgments they have not known them [t].'

[o] Is. vi. 1–3. [p] Is. lvii. 15. [q] Ps. cxlv. 17.
[r] Ps. cxlv. 6, 7. [s] Ps. i. 1, 2. [t] Ps. cxlvii. 19, 20.

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From this truth, in fact, no less than from that of God's creative majesty, the primary revelation of the Lawgiver starts. It has been observed by Lord Bacon in how striking a connexion the sacred historian passes from the record of the creation to a description of man's moral lapse, and how vivid and profound is the account thus given of the moral position of mankind [u]. Placed in the Garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it, man could not be content with this simple duty, but entangled himself in speculations respecting what was abstractedly good and evil, and as a natural consequence, yielded to the first temptation which suggested to him a shorter and a pleasanter path to the full enjoyment of his life. How true a picture this is of human nature let the great drama of Goethe, or the last utterances of German pessimist philosophy, in Schopenhauer or Von Hartmann, be the witness. Such reflections should at least suffice to convince us that these portions of the primeval revelation cannot, even in the present day, be too deeply pondered. But apart from these profound speculations, there must be few persons, learned or simple, who can read the narrative of the first sin without feeling that, whether history, or allegory, or both, it still affords the most vivid of all pictures of their own experience under temptation, and a clear revelation of the essential movements of moral life. The doubt first suggested respecting the

[u] *Præf. ad Inst. Mag.* at the close. See also his *Confession of Faith.*

truth, or the obligation, of a known command; the speculation about it, the subtle suggestion that we shall not surely reap the consequences which we have been told will follow on its infraction, the dwelling upon the forbidden fruit until everything is forgotten except that the tree is good for food and pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, so that we take thereof and eat, and give unto others and they eat,—all this has surely been the experience of every person in this congregation. Not less true to every-day experience of human nature is the recurrence of the voice of the Lord God when the sin has been committed, the shrinking from it, and the vain effort to hide ourselves amidst the trees of the garden—perhaps amidst the pleasures and the excitements of the world; and finally, the persistent excuses with which, in spite of a sense of guilt, we attempt to throw the blame of our fall on others; and the justice with which, in the Divine judgment, both we and they are held responsible. Whatever criticism may ultimately decide with respect to the human authorship of this narrative, its amazing practical truth would alone bespeak a more than human origin. When it is combined with the first chapter, so as to reveal God to us in His character as a God of righteousness no less than as a God of power, we have presented to us, in brief and vivid imagery, the whole substance of the subsequent history and revelation.

This conception, in fact, of a God at once all-

righteous and almighty rendered indispensable, in proportion as it was realized, the provision of some means of mediation and reconciliation between Him and His frail and sinful people. Step by step, accordingly, as the apprehension of the Divine character deepened, did the revelation of the necessity of an Atonement, and of its method, advance. When the Lord revealed himself at Sinai and embodied in the Ten Commandments the substance of His name and His will, He established also a system of sacrifices which at once prefigured and interpreted the one great Sacrifice by which the one Mediator should finally reconcile God and Man. Subsequently, in proportion as the Prophets entered more and more deeply into a knowledge of the infinite righteousness of God, did they also attain a clearer vision of the coming Mediator and of His work. For these reasons the idea of Atonement tends in an ever-increasing degree to become the centre of Jewish faith. A God of all righteousness as well as of all power could not but be a God of deliverance as well as of moral indignation and jealousy; and the problem over which seers and priests brooded was by what method these illimitable and conflicting attributes could be harmonized in the Divine dealings with men. He, in His grace and condescension, vouchsafed to enter into covenant with them. But notwithstanding this assurance, what a gulf did not their sinfulness create between themselves and Him, and how powerless were they to overpass it! Such a covenant, to endure the

terrible strain upon it, must be embodied in something stronger and more permanent than external ordinances. It must be embodied in an Eternal High Priest, who should offer one sacrifice for sins for ever, and establish the union between God and man on the unchangeable foundation of His own Divine and human life.

Now in proportion as we appreciate the transcendent grandeur of this faith, shall we also appreciate the necessity of positive Divine assurances on which it may be based. We have the evidence all around us, in those eclipses of faith against which we have to contend, of the extreme difficulty of retaining a firm grasp of such convictions as have been described; and it was, in fact, even more difficult to maintain that grasp among the Jews than among ourselves. The very substance, accordingly, of this faith constitutes of itself a momentous testimony to the fact that it was not based upon mere hopes and the conclusions of reason. No purely human philosophy has ever led men to such a height. Its attainment is consistently attributed to the express promise and interposition of God; and the awful conception entertained of the Divine character by those who bore witness to these promises, their intense conviction that they were speaking in the presence of One whose righteousness was as a consuming fire, gives an immeasurable weight to their testimony. The sacred history proceeds to record a series of miraculous utterances, all instinct

with one character—that they are the utterances of a deliverer from unrighteousness and from its ruinous consequences; and they are all accompanied with vast promises. Abraham, when struggling with the idolatry around him, combating strenuously, as Ewald describes him[v], among his nearest kindred and in his own house, with the seductions of ripening heathenism, and with men corrupted by them, is summoned, by a voice which speaks direct to his conscience, to leave his country and his kindred, and his father's house, and to go into an unknown land; and a promise is given to him, and miraculously authenticated, which becomes the starting-point of a new life to the world—that in him should 'all families of the earth be blessed.' From that moment, as is partly indicated by the meaning of the Hebrew word for faith, he and his descendants become firm and steadfast. They are the fixed centre of all the revolutions in the world around them. Everything may change, and any apparent disaster may happen, but to them and to their seed has the promise been made, and it will be assuredly fulfilled. They are in the hands of the Lord of heaven and earth, who has called them by their name and delivered them. Their life is based upon faith in this direct promise by a Divine Person; and the whole subsequent history is but the development of its meaning. St. Paul accordingly discerned the entire

[v] *The History of Israel*, by H. Ewald, edited by R. Martineau, M.A. Second Edition, 1869, vol. i. pp. 322, 323.

substance of Jewish faith in Abraham, who believed God, and to whom it was counted for righteousness. It was the mission of the Prophets from time to time to revive and deepen the faith of the people in these assurances by intensifying their apprehension of the nature and the character of God. Under this inspired guidance, the true meaning of the promises became more and more clear, until it was dimly realised that they could only be fulfilled in a Messiah and Redeemer. The holiest souls turned more and more in prayer and trust to the God of their fathers, waiting for the consolation of Israel.

The law given by Moses remains, however, the most conspicuous witness to a great deliverance from moral and physical evil, and was the abiding means of working out that deliverance in history. The Jews, like their great ancestor, were struggling against the Egyptian idolatry, and were in danger of being absolutely enslaved to it, when the Lord of heaven and earth, the Master of all the powers of nature, interposed in their behalf, and declared Himself, by mighty signs and wonders, their Deliverer. That Jehovah is the Deliverer is the preamble of the Ten Commandments, and the teaching of the whole Pentateuch. The law, moreover, contains a further assurance of deliverance in the sacrifices which are ordained for the expiation of sin, thus assuring the people, by types and figures, that the one insuperable obstacle to their communion with Jehovah would be removed. The giving of the law, as is remarked

by Ewald, is accompanied by every circumstance which could stamp on the mind of the people the fact of its proceeding from a personal Deliverer. Then first, he says[w], 'the great "I" stands decisively opposed to the "I" of men.' 'This great omnipotent "I" thus becomes manifest through the prophet,' and he and the people bow themselves before it in obedience and trust. 'I am the Lord thy God, that brought thee out of the land of Egypt. Thou shalt have none other gods but me'—here is at once a command, a promise, an assurance of future deliverance, and a direct personal appeal. Those words, read by the wise direction of our reformers Sunday after Sunday, for three centuries, in all the churches of England, serve to bring before the minds of the people, with the utmost force and vividness, those conceptions of a personal Lord, a just God and a Saviour, of His direct claim on us and of His gracious promise to us, which mere philosophy, and even some forms of morality and religion, would reject. So long as they are read —and may the day never come when they will cease to be thus forced on our attention—they will bear testimony to the truth, that faith in a personal, a righteous, and an omnipotent God, trust in Him, and obedience to Him in His personal character, is the very substance and foundation of sound morality, as well as of true religion.

In conclusion, accordingly, it will be instructive to

[w] *History of Israel*, edited by R. Martineau, vol. ii. p. 129.

observe, especially with reference to the subject we have more particularly in view, that the decay of true faith, and of a vital morality, among the Jews is historically marked by a loss of this vivid conception of God and of His communion with men. 'The whole of the internal weakness and perverseness of the hagiocracy'—to quote again from Ewald[x]—'betrays itself in the one small, but significant circumstance of its treatment of the name of God. Desirous to maintain the infinite sanctity of the venerable name of Jahveh, and fearful of degrading it, they ordained that it should never be pronounced at all, and so allowed this glorious ancient name to lie in absolute obscurity behind a perpetual veil . . . The name of the true God was now suspended at an infinite distance, high above all the present scene of existence.' Consequently, 'this God of the ancient community, though men feared His name above all things, and desired utterly to surrender themselves to Him in deepest awe, was in reality ever retiring further and further from them into a mysterious distance; and while they were restrained by their scruples from looking into His face, or calling on Him by His true name, they were really losing him more and more; so undesigned was this most significant of all the signs of Israel's last great era.' Does not this description present a startling resemblance to the efforts now so persistently made among ourselves, often in the

[x] *History of Israel*, vol. v. pp. 198, 199. See Note 8.

alleged interests of morality, of law, and even of the dignity and sanctity of the Godhead, to divert us from attempts to realise His personal character, and to enter into personal communion with Him? It was when Israel lost their apprehension of the kinship of God with their own souls, when they ceased to apprehend their Creator directly as their personal Redeemer from sin and evil, when they failed to realise that He had called them by their name and had revealed to them His own name, when the covenant thus became a formality to them, it was then that they were on the verge of that terrible blindness and hardness of heart, which issued in their final and disastrous fall. Let us be warned by such an example, and let us cling with all our souls to the faith of the Psalmist:—

'Happy is he that hath the God of Jacob for his help,
Whose hope is in the Lord his God,
Which made heaven and earth,
The sea, and all that therein is;
Which keepeth truth for ever;
Which executeth judgment for the oppressed:
Which giveth food to the hungry.
* * * *
The Lord shall reign for ever,
Even thy God, O Zion, unto all generations.
Praise ye the Lord[y].'

[y] Ps. cxlvi. 5–10.

LECTURE V.

OUR LORD'S DEMAND FOR FAITH.

ST. MATTHEW xi. 25–27.

At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father: for so it seemed good in Thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him.

HAVING considered the nature of faith under the old dispensation, its substance, and the grounds upon which it rested, it becomes our duty in the present Lecture to pass to the next great development of faith, as called forth by our Lord Jesus Christ. It is here that faith assumes at last its full proportions, and finally claims its position as the cardinal virtue of man's nature. The very word started into a sudden life in the writings of the New Testament[a]; and although St. Paul discerned the primary example of faith, and the germ of its ultimate development, in the obedience of Abraham, he speaks sometimes as though it had first sprung into full vitality under the gospel. 'Therein is the righteousness of

[a] See Note 9.

God revealed from faith to faith[b].' 'Before faith came we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed[c].' Its importance, in fact, became more fully recognised in proportion as its object was more vividly apprehended, and as the assurances on which it could rest became more firm and definite. By the coming of our Lord former promises had been fulfilled, and still larger promises were opened; and faith could start from a loftier altitude for a still bolder and a nobler flight.

The prominence which our Lord gives to faith and the supreme importance He attaches to it are still more remarkable. Faith is the virtue on which He bestows His highest praise, while it was the one thing He declared indispensable for the reception of His blessings[d]. A striking illustration of the manner in which He regarded it is afforded by those occasions on which His wonder is said to have been evoked. In Him that emotion was called forth by causes very different from those by which it is ordinarily aroused among men. That which occasioned wonder to the Jews, and to our Lord's followers, was the exhibition of His power over nature. The disciples on one occasion marvelled, and said, 'What manner of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey Him[e]!' It is still this characteristic in our Lord which chiefly excites

[b] Rom. i. 17.
[c] Gal. iii. 23.
[d] St. Mark ix. 23.
[e] St. Matt. viii. 27.

wonder, as is proved by the common use of the word *miracle*. That word is exclusively applied to deeds of physical power, as though the only thing which could affect the mass of men with astonishment were that which is visible and startling to the senses. But with our Lord it is the very reverse. He never speaks as if there were anything strange or unnatural in the miracles He performs. He refers to them, indeed, as 'mighty works,' or rather as exertions of power, and as intended to impress us with a sense alike of his power and of his goodness. But to Himself they appear perfectly natural and simple. There is a conspicuous absence of all effort about them. His wonderful cures, His raising of the dead, His miraculous appearances to His disciples, all are performed with the quietness and ease which are characteristic of an irresistible force. Any display of effort is a revelation of weakness; but our Lord 'speaks and it is done,' 'He commands and it stands fast.' It was by the phenomena of the moral world that His astonishment was occasioned—by its vast capacities on the one hand, and its terrible incapacities on the other. On the one hand, He marvelled at the faith manifested in the appeal of the Centurion, who bade Him speak the word only and his servant should be healed; and He expressed a similar admiration at a like display of faith in the Canaanitish woman[f]. On the other hand, when in His own

[f] St. Matthew viii. 10; xv. 27.

country, among His own kin, and in His own house, He found Himself without honour, so that He could not do any mighty work, save that He laid His hands on a few sick folk and healed them, we are told that 'He marvelled because of their unbeliefs.' The faith of which men are capable on the one hand, and the unbelief of which they are capable on the other—these are the only two things which are said to have evoked the wonder of the Lord Jesus. These, to His eye, were the only two real marvels exhibited during His ministry.

There was indeed something amazing in the faith which He demanded. Of all the efforts of that minimising theology to which I have more than once referred, none is more extraordinary, none more incapable of being reconciled with the elementary facts of the case, than those which would lower our Lord's claims in this respect, and reduce His work to that of a moral teacher, however eminent. The two cases just mentioned—of the Centurion and of the Canaanitish woman—may be regarded as the crucial instances of the faith He claimed. They are thus signalised by His own express description; and that which they exhibit is an absolute and unlimited trust in Himself and in His will and power to save. Of course, if the liberty be assumed, as is always done by rationalistic theologians, or by sceptics, to rearrange the Gospels according to their

[s] St. Mark vi. 6.

power of apprehending them, and to pick and choose as they please among the sayings and doings attributed to our Lord, it is very possible to represent Him as simply a moral teacher. But experience has already shewn the futility of attempts to reconstruct the history of our Lord in any other form than that in which it is presented to us. Such attempts have within the present generation been often made, and the results are so discordant as utterly to discredit each other. The interpretation, on the other hand, put upon the Gospels by the Church has from the first been one and consistent, and it is in harmony with the natural and obvious meaning of the sacred narrative. The Church alone is content to take the records as they stand, to abstain from arbitrary conjecture, and to rely on their inherent truth and harmony. The faith, at all events, which we are now concerned to justify, was originally based, and is still based, upon this simple acceptance of the message of the Gospels. If they could be shown to be historically untrustworthy, we should have to deal with an entirely different problem. But while their testimony remains in substance unshaken, as is certainly the case, what we have to consider is the reasonableness of the human actions they narrate, and in particular of the faith which our Lord demanded and elicited.

Unless, then, the sacred records are completely fallacious, our Lord must, from the very outset of His ministry, have assumed a position which made

an immense claim on faith. He not only announced like His forerunner, that the kingdom of heaven was at hand, but He preached the gospel of the kingdom; He spoke and acted as its ruler; and He promised all blessings and deliverances to those who trusted and obeyed Him. It is difficult for us to realise the momentous character of that proclamation at the time it was uttered; and more attention might perhaps, with advantage, be directed to the extraordinary prophetic power which was exhibited in our Lord and His apostles. They announced, before it occurred, an immense revolution in the moral and spiritual condition of mankind, and their predictions have been fulfilled to the letter. We look back on those days from the vantage-ground of the present. We know and feel, and see around us on all sides, what has been the power of Christ and Christ's Church. We behold a great tree, greater than all trees, with the birds of the air lodging in the branches thereof, and from thence we judge of the seed. But those who saw the seed sown had no such assistance to their judgment. Even with the support afforded by the miracles our Lord wrought, it must have needed a wonderful exercise of faith to make His promises respecting a kingdom of God the basis of a revolution in life and conduct, which placed men at variance with the whole world around them. Our Lord summoned His disciples to a career in which all visible experience would be against them, in which they would be despised, hated, and

persecuted. From the first he never disguised from them that such would be their lot in this life; and they had nothing but His word to assure them of their reward hereafter, and of the ultimate victory of their cause in the present world.

The Beatitudes, for instance, which no one doubts to be among our Lord's most characteristic utterances, are very much more than the mere commendations of certain moral and spiritual graces, which they are sometimes represented to be. They are promises and prophecies of future blessings, and they furnish 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' When our Lord said, 'Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted,' He was not merely depicting the natural consequences of a moral excellence; He was giving a pledge on which sorrowing hearts might rest. Still more evidently, when He declares, 'Blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven[h],' He uttered a promise which in after days, amidst the actual bitterness of persecution, must have demanded the deepest trust. In a word, our Lord presented Himself as the Saviour of men's bodies and souls, here and hereafter. He asked His followers to place their whole fate in His hands, and to trust Him through the depths of tribulation, agony and death.

[h] St. Matthew v. 11, 12.

'In the world,' He said plainly, 'ye shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world[i].' This was the faith on which His highest praises were bestowed. It was a faith of this nature with which He inspired His Apostles, and by which they overcame the world. We have to enquire what was its justification, and how it was produced. The enquiry will be found to exhibit, in one vivid illustration, the cardinal elements of faith, and will afford a conclusive test of the justice of the principles which, in the course of the present argument, have been hitherto vindicated.

It is to be observed, then, that our Lord's appeal starts from an intense moral illumination, and the way was prepared for Him by calls to repentance more solemn and penetrating than had ever been heard, even in the course of Jewish history. John the Baptist, who was sent to prepare the way of the Lord, is the typical preacher of repentance; and in the deep moral conditions he aroused were the paths made straight for our Lord's advance. There is something peculiarly striking and instructive in the necessity, thus recognised, of a moral preparation before even our Lord, though supported by the testimony of His miracles, could come forward to assert His claim. But when He Himself appeared He laid the foundations of His work in similar exhortations. He, like His forerunner, is a preacher of repentance; and He probes the hearts of His hearers with a depth

[i] St. John xvi. 33.

and a severity which lay bare the very recesses of the soul. It is one of the strangest, and perhaps one of the most characteristic features of rationalising writers that this aspect of the Sermon on the Mount is so little appreciated by them. They applaud its 'sublime morality,' they condescend to pronounce that, in their opinion, no teacher has ever soared to such a height, and they would fain represent its moral teaching as the sum and substance of the Gospel. But unless a man be made in some other mould than his fellows, it is wonderful that he can read the Sermon on the Mount without trembling. In proportion to the beauty and the force of the moral truths it declares, is the spiritual and moral ruin it reveals among us, and the condemnation it pronounces upon every human soul. 'Whosoever shall be angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment.' 'Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.' 'If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.' 'With what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged, and with what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again.' The laws of Sinai, denouncing sinful acts amidst thunder and lightning, and with all the sanction of the terrors of nature, are as nothing compared with this sword of the Spirit, piercing to the dividing

asunder of the soul, discerning the very thoughts and intents of the heart, and denouncing the severest judgments upon mere words, and looks, and inclinations. The loftier and more spiritual the standard, the more utter appears our own failure to approach it, and the more disastrous must seem the consequences of our sins. If this be 'the way of life,' we feel, indeed, that 'wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat;' while 'strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.' When the force of this aspect of the Sermon on the Mount is adequately brought home to a man's conscience, his only fitting utterance is that of Job: 'I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes[k].' The wrath of God is revealed from heaven in that discourse with a terrible calm, which leaves a man desperate of all resources in himself, and compels him to cry for some deliverance from the body of death and evil which encompasses him.

Let it next be observed what are the means by which this intense and penetrating moral illumination is produced. We here approach another point in which the Sermon on the Mount, considered as a typical instance of our Lord's teaching, is at the present day most strangely and flagrantly misrepresented. It is the favourite contention of those

[k] Job xlii. 5, 6.

who impugn the faith of the Church that the teaching of that sermon is purely moral and independent of theology. 'It is undeniable,' says the author of *Supernatural Religion*, with characteristic strength of assertion, 'that the earliest teaching of Jesus recorded in the Gospel which can be regarded as in any degree historical is pure morality almost, if not quite, free from theological dogmas. Morality was the essence of His system; theology was an after-thought[1].' Two pages afterwards this writer states with perfect correctness, but with complete unconsciousness of inconsistency, that Christ's system 'confined itself to two fundamental principles, love to God and love to man.' But is there no theology involved in teaching love to God? No theology in the belief that God is, and that He is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him, and that in spite of all the difficulties, perplexities, and cruelties of the world, He is worthy of the whole love and trust of our hearts! Why, this is the very theological problem which has racked the heart and brain of man from the dawn of religious thought to the present moment. On these two commandments—to which, in the curious phrase just quoted, Christ's system is said to have 'confined itself,' as though they were slight and simple—on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. They are the germ from which has sprung the whole theological thought of the Christian Church, and to which it

[1] *Supernatural Religion*, 4th ed., vol. ii. pp. 486, 487–8.

returns; and no theologian can wish to do more than to deepen his own apprehension of them, and to strengthen their hold upon others. With similar inconsistency, M. Renan declares that 'we should seek in vain for a theological proposition in the Gospel;' and yet states, elsewhere, that 'a lofty notion of the Divinity was in some sort the germ of our Lord's whole being.' 'God,' he adds, 'is in Him; He feels Himself in communion with God; and He draws from His heart that which He speaks of His Father[m].'

These are strange inconsistencies. But there is nothing, perhaps, more fitted to warn a thoughtful mind, at the threshold of sceptical speculations, of their essential shallowness, than the manner in which the vastest conceptions and the profoundest problems are thus passed over, as it were, dryshod by such writers as have just been quoted. Truths are not to be regarded as simple merely because they are simply expressed; and if, as appears to be admitted on all hands, our Lord adopted the cardinal principles of the Old Testament, and declared that the first and great commandment is 'thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength[n].' He laid the basis of His teaching in the loftiest truth of theology. In the preface to one of the most popular of recent attempts to supersede the Church's conception of our Lord's life and work, it was explained

[m] *Vie de Jésus*, pp. 462, 77, 78.

[n] St. Mark xii. 30.

that the author proposed to furnish an answer to the question, 'What was Christ's object in founding the society which is called by His name, and how is it adapted to attain that object[o]?' But the author stated at the same time, as though it involved no inconsistency, that 'No theological questions whatever are here discussed.' In other words, this writer started with the assumption that theology could be excluded alike from our Lord's object and from His method, and that it had nothing to do with the purpose and the constitution of the Christian Church. This is, in fact, the primary principle from which attempts to explain away our faith now proceed. Around the question whether, and in what manner Christ revealed God, the battle rages, and to this it continually returns.

Now we might be content to appeal for the decision of this question to the testimony of the Sermon on the Mount alone. If we ask, as has just been done, by what means the intense moral illumination of that teaching is produced, we find that it is dependent at every step upon revelations of God's character and will. It is the vision of our Father in heaven which is presented to us continuously as the lamp to our feet, and the light to our paths. 'Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.' 'Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is

[o] From the Preface to *Ecce Homo*.

perfect.' What is the reason alleged for the secret and inward pursuit of righteousness, as distinguished from mere external obedience? It is because 'our Father seeth in secret,' and all things are naked and open unto the eyes of Him with whom we have to do. Why are we to seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, instead of taking thought for the things of this life, but because our heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of all these things? Or why are we bidden to pray, but because, if we, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto our children, how much more shall our Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him? This element, in fact, in the Sermon on the Mount constitutes its most precious characteristic, and completely transforms the aspect it would bear if regarded simply as a moral exhortation. If it had been addressed to men standing alone in their natural condition, and if its censures and demands had been unsoftened by revelations of Divine grace, there might have seemed, as has just been said, something almost cruel in its terrible severity, in the relentlessness with which it exposes the fatal vice of even passing thoughts, and looks, and words, and in the narrowness and straitness of the path which it marks out. But it is not addressed to men in their natural condition. It is addressed by a Saviour to those whom he is ready to save, and to whom he is revealing that gracious gift of the Holy Spirit, of which it was His mission to win the full endowment

for mankind. Its teaching, in short, is clenched, and enforced, and rendered tolerable to our weakness by the Saviour's Evangelical promise towards its close, 'Ask, and it shall be given you' . . . For, as His assurance of 'good things' is interpreted in the parallel passage in St. Luke, 'If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him [p]?'

There is, moreover, one simple piece of evidence afforded by the Sermon on the Mount, which alone suffices to exhibit the perversity of all attempts to deprive our Lord's teaching of its theological element. It contains one short passage, which has asserted its hold over the minds of men, whatever their critical opinions, as embodying essentially the thoughts of our Lord. That passage is the Lord's Prayer. No one, probably, would dispute that in that brief form of words we possess the very substance of the mind of Christ. But in the mere conception of prayer it involves the whole principle of our personal relation to God; and its first two words imply the subsequent assurance, just referred to, that we can appeal to Him as children to a Father, and that we may look to Him for direct and special assistance in our needs. Its supplications then commence with the petition 'Hallowed be Thy Name.' If the order of the words be any guide to the meaning of a great utterance of this kind, we must assume that this petition is the

[p] St. Luke xi. 13.

most momentous that can be offered by man to God, that it is the first step in the spiritual life, that on this being granted depend all the other blessings which the prayer solicits. Where that Name is known and recognised, a complete revolution in the moral position of man ensues; a new heart is formed within him, and he lives by faith and prayer. When God's true character is thus apprehended, men submit themselves cheerfully to His rule, and become loyal subjects of His kingdom, and in proportion as His kingdom comes, His will is done. But when we pray that His will may be done, we attribute to Him a nature analogous to our own in the most distinctly personal and human of our characteristics, and at the same time express the deepest trust in his goodness and power. We are next taught to appeal to God for our simplest physical necessities, for the forgiveness of our trespasses, and for protection from temptation; while again, in the petition, 'as we forgive them that trespass against us,' the language of the Prayer expressly sanctions that so-called anthropomorphism which it is now so much the fashion to denounce. In other words, the Lord's Prayer brings a living God and His personal will into our life at every turn of it. Whether it be daily bread that we need, or deliverance from the profoundest forms of spiritual evil, it is to the good pleasure and the direct hand of God that we are instructed to look for it. If nothing else remained of our Lord's teaching but this prayer, He would still have conveyed to us

a comprehensive revelation of the existence and character of our Father in heaven, and of our relation to Him.

But this is only a single instance of that which is the main characteristic of our Lord's life. In every act and word He is revealing God, and bringing that revelation to bear upon the hearts of men. The most characteristic incident of His childhood, that which alone was thought necessary to be recorded, was that, on a visit to Jerusalem, He left His father and mother and went to the Temple, in order to sit at the feet of the Doctors; and when His mother asked Him how He could give her the anxiety of such a search for Him, He expressed surprise at her not understanding that He was sure to be found in the Temple, His Father's house[q]. Such is the glimpse vouchsafed to us of our Saviour's earliest consciousness, while He was still increasing 'in wisdom and stature.' His heavenly Father absorbed His whole soul, and drew Him away from every other influence to the house and the word of God. He is next brought before us at His Baptism, and again this relation to the Father is the prominent feature in the scene. A voice is heard saying, 'This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased[r].' We follow Him to the temptation—the critical trial of His fitness for the awful ministry to which He was destined; and in what does the temptation consist? In three successive attempts of the malignant

[q] St. Luke ii. 49. [r] St. Matthew iii. 17.

spirit to induce Him to distrust His Father. He is invited to exert His own power, to claim a glory of His own, to display His special privileges, for objects which were not those of His Father's will. He refuses; He submits himself absolutely to that will, and He comes forth from the trial to proclaim, not His own kingdom, but the kingdom of God.

After this, we find Him, during a ministry of two or three years (to quote St. Matthew's summary) 'teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease among the people[8]. He exhibited in that short time a character of mercy, love, truth, righteousness, which has rendered Him, not only among Christians, but even among those who reject His loftiest claims, the supreme ideal of all that the conscience and the heart of man demand. But in what capacity does He display these qualities and perform these acts? Is it in the capacity of a good man, acting on His convictions of what is right, and exercising His own powers? By no means. The essential character of our Saviour's life and ministry is the reverse of this. He insists continually on the fact that He is carrying out the will of another—of that Father of whom He spoke in His earliest recorded utterance; and His avowed object, on all occasions, is to reveal that will. Of this the text affords one of the most conspicuous examples. When John the Baptist sent to enquire,

[8] St. Matthew iv. 23.

'Art thou He that should come, or do we look for another?' and when He had replied by recounting His mighty works, He answered and said, 'I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in Thy sight. All things are delivered unto Me of My Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him [t].' In other words, He was able to do these works, He could display this grace and glory, because all things had been delivered unto Him of the Father. At other times He disclaims still more explicitly any capacity to act independently. His highest claims to authority are dwelt on in the greatest detail in the Gospel of St. John; but they are never claims to independent power. On the contrary, He is reported in that Gospel as declaring, 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do: for what things soever He doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise; for the Father loveth the Son and showeth Him all things that Himself doeth [u].'

The Gospel of St. John, indeed, is conclusive on the point now in question, but we need not depend on it to exhibit the paramount influence on our Saviour's mind of His devotion to His Father. The

[t] St. Matthew xi. 25–27. [u] St. John v. 19, 20.

most critical scene in His life, that in which His whole nature was stirred to its profoundest depths, and in which its essential principles were put to the most cruel test, was that of His passion. Of this we have accounts by all four Evangelists, and it is evident that the circumstances of this awful scene were regarded by the Apostles as of supreme import. What then is the chief characteristic of His mind at that time? His recorded sayings are few, but they are above all things impregnated with trust in His Father, and submission to His Father's will. In His agony in the garden He prays three times, in terrible earnestness, 'O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt. O my Father, if this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, Thy will be done[v].' At the commencement of His agony on the cross He prays, 'Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.' At the crisis of that agony, His almost despairing cry is, 'My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' And when the sacrifice is consummated, and He is able to say 'It is finished,' He utters that prayer of complete trust and submission, 'Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit.' If there is one thing certain respecting His crucifixion, it is that He submitted to it in obedience to the will of His Father in heaven, that the sense of His Father's presence was His one sustaining conviction, that His

[v] St. Matthew xxvi. 39, 42.

deepest agony was one passing apprehension that His Father had forsaken Him, and that in His last breath He resigned His soul into His Father's hands. To that Father His first and His last witness was borne during the time that He was among us as a man like ourselves, sharing our weakness, and bearing our sins. But the same characteristic is preserved after His resurrection: 'Go,' He said to Mary Magdalene when He was risen, 'Go to My brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto My Father and your Father, and to My God and your God[w];' and He commanded His disciples 'to teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' From His first words to His last He identifies His work absolutely with doing the will of His Father, and revealing the Father's will and character.

That memorable prayer, in short, which is recorded for us by St. John[x], is undoubtedly an exact summary of the spirit of His life. Its burden is to declare that the object of His work has been to reveal the name, that is to say, the nature and the will of His Father. 'Father,' He says, 'the hour is come; glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee; as Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, that He should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given Him. And this is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.' 'I have manifested Thy

[w] St. John xx. 17. [x] Ibid. xvii.

name unto the men which Thou gavest Me out of the world, . . . they have known that all things whatsoever Thou hast given Me are of Thee. For I have given unto them the words which Thou gavest Me; and they have received them, and have known surely that I came out from Thee, and they have believed that Thou didst send Me.' 'O righteous Father,' He concludes, as the sum and substance of His last desires, 'the world hath not known Thee: but I have known Thee, and these have known that Thou hast sent Me. And I have declared unto them Thy name, and will declare it, that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them.'

Now the consideration of the effect of this revelation of God in Christ must in part be reserved for the next Lecture, which will deal with the development of faith in the history of the Church, and its expression in the Creeds. We are now concerned with its bearing on our Lord's claim to our trust. But it may be worth while to observe, in passing, that we have here a conclusive answer to those difficulties which have been raised as to the possibility of regarding God as a person—a possibility essential to our exerting faith in Him, in any satisfactory sense. It is not necessary to define the meaning of the term 'person,' and, of course, as applied to God, it involves what is infinitely beyond our conceptions. But our Lord Jesus Christ was a person; and He was in a relation which was

evidently a personal relation with His Father in heaven. He could love Him as a Father, trust Him as a Father, pray to Him as a Father, commend His soul to Him as a Father. He could speak of His will, His love, His good pleasure. In a word, He attributed to Him acts and dispositions as personal as any we attribute to one another; He manifested Him as standing in a relation to Himself, and to us, similar to that which one person holds to another in this world. This is what we mean, and all we need insist upon, with respect to the personality of God. It is precisely as real, as vital, as the personality of Christ, and just in proportion as Christ's personality is realised by us, shall we realise the personality of His Father. Philosophy has striven in vain to pierce the veil which shrouds the Great Creator, but the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him. In Christ we have Him brought home to our hearts and souls in a living form and a human relationship. It has been said that if God had given a revelation, it would have been written in letters of fire in the firmament. The principle assumed in the objection is true. If God has given a revelation it must be so written that, in respect to its substance, he that runs may read it, if he will. But how could a personal Being be revealed in the mere phenomena of inanimate nature? A person can only be revealed in and through other persons, and by means of his relation to them. The Divine Revelation, accordingly, was

from the first entrusted to human hearts, and it was finally enshrined in the heart of Christ. It has been written in letters of fire in the soul of the Son of Man; it was described with tongues of fire by those who first read it there; and the Spirit by whom that sacred fire was kindled is ever present to fulfil our Lord's promise[y], 'ye shall know that I am in the Father, and ye in Me, and I in you.'

Let us, however, observe that the immediate effect of this revelation of God in Christ, and of our relation to Him, is to give the utmost conceivable intensity to the consciousness of moral good and evil. We are all conscious of the powerful influence exerted by our personal relations to one another, and by the mutual judgments passed by man on man, in awakening and deepening the moral sensitiveness. There is a school which would seek in such social influences the ultimate source of morality, and would rely solely upon them for its development. But how vast a moral power does such a school of philosophy disregard when it puts out of sight this revelation of the Divine society into which our Lord introduces us! How infinitely is this social influence elevated and intensified when we are led, by this proclamation of the Divine name, to recognise that our inmost souls are in the constant presence of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ! St. John has described the result with his characteristic simplicity and force. 'That,' he says, 'which was from the beginning,

[y] St. John xiv. 20.

which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life, that which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, : . . . this then is the message which we have heard of Him and declare unto you, that God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness, we lie and do not the truth ; but if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin[z].' Under this blaze of moral light a profound consciousness of sin is aroused, and the soul is compelled to seek for cleansing in the atoning blood of the Saviour.

But it will further be seen what momentous weight is thus added to the testimony of Christ, and to His claim upon our belief. We contemplate Him delivering His message, working His miracles, imparting His gracious promises, under what may perhaps be described as the most tremendous sense of responsibility ever realised. In a degree not approached by any prophet or apostle, He calls God to witness, at every moment, to His truth ; and He utters every word with the eye of His soul fixed upon His Father and our Father, the Father whom He reveals as all light, and in whom is no darkness at all. Just stress has been laid on the

[z] 1 St. John i. 1–7.

immense import of our Lord's self-assertion [a]; and the consideration appears to acquire great additional force in proportion as we realise the manner in which our Lord appeals to His Father in advancing such assertions, constantly declaring that they are made in absolute submission to Him. It is thus that our Saviour expressly supports the most conspicuous of those claims. 'If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true; ... the works which the Father hath given Me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of Me that the Father hath sent Me; and the Father Himself which hath sent Me, hath borne witness of Me [b].' 'I am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father that sent Me beareth witness of Me [c].'

Such, then, are the foundations on which Christ's appeal for faith was based. He begins by convincing men of their moral evil and weakness. He brings them into the presence of His Father, the God of all light and truth; and there, in the full glory of that awful presence, He declares Himself to them as their Lord and Saviour, and bids them trust themselves to Him for forgiveness, and for all spiritual life. It is a matter of trust, and not of proof. It is to His word and promise that the soul has to commit itself for time and for eternity. But when that word is heard in the very presence of God, and is felt to penetrate to the inmost depths of the

[a] See Canon Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Preface to Second Edition.

[b] St. John v. 31–37. [c] Ibid. viii. 18.

conscience, it becomes impossible to refuse it credence[d]. Such, as was shewn in a previous Lecture, has been, in substance, the ground on which all testimony to Divine revelation has rested; though in no other instance is the foundation of that testimony so deeply and firmly established as in the witness of our Lord. Such, accordingly, will always be the surest course of Christian evidence. It must start from profound convictions 'of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment.' It must proceed by the apprehension of God as the Father of all light and truth, as revealed in Jesus Christ, and faith is then capable of appreciating the witness which the Son gives to the Father, and which the Father gives to the Son.

[d] See Note 10.

LECTURE VI.

THE FAITH OF THE EARLY CHURCH.

ACTS V. 29–32.

Then Peter and the other apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God rather than men. The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree. Him hath God exalted with His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins. And we are His witnesses of these things; and so is also the Holy Ghost, whom God hath given to them that obey Him.

OUR Lord said to His disciples in His last discourses, 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do, because I go unto My Father[a].' It was a wonderful promise, but it was amply fulfilled in the history of the early Church. We considered in the last Lecture the character of the faith which our Lord claimed; and we observed the immense exercise of trust which it involved. But we saw, at the same time, the overwhelming authority which was exerted by His deeds, His words, and His solemn appeal to the Father

[a] St. John xiv. 12.

whom He revealed. Vast as was the demand He made, a feeling like that of St. Thomas may sometimes arise in our minds, and we may think that if we could but have seen Him, heard Him and touched Him, faith would have been more easily maintained. But in point of fact it has been otherwise. Faith in Him took root more generally, and grew more rapidly, under the preaching of the Apostles than under His own; and in extent, at all events, they did greater works than He in turning men from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God.

This contrast must appear the more remarkable if we consider the different circumstances under which the appeal of our Lord and that of His Apostles were made; for, to our natural judgment, it would seem as if the Apostles and the first preachers of the Gospel made a heavier claim on the faith of those whom they addressed than our Lord had made on the faith of the Jews. Full of grace and truth, He appeared among His own people, who had been prepared for His coming by a long education; and that they received Him not, condemns them of blindness and hardness of heart. His appeal was in harmony with the whole past history and the existing circumstances of the nation, and had thus an immense presumption in its favour. But his witnesses, in proclaiming his message to the Gentiles, had no similar advantages. Conceive St. Paul, on one of his missionary journeys, addressing himself

to the inhabitants of a Greek city. His bodily presence is weak, and he does not attempt to overawe them by a display of miraculous power. He appeals to their hearts and their reason, and he delivers them a message with which he is commissioned. That message was delivered to him by a Person who had died a malefactor's death, but who, as the Apostle alleged, had risen again, and who had declared Himself to be the Son of God—of that God who was the Creator of the heavens and the earth. On the faith of this assurance, to which the Apostle himself and two or three companions were the only witnesses, he claimed for the living and true God, and for Jesus Christ His Son, the sole allegiance of those whom he addressed. He called upon them to break away from the traditions, the associations, the habits of their life, to abandon both the religious observances and the social customs of their fathers, and to incur obloquy, persecution, and death. It was an immense demand, even when urged with all the moral and spiritual force of an Apostle; and that it was obeyed so widely can only be ascribed to the co-operation of that Divine Spirit whom our Lord promised to send, that He might convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment.

But the case will appear still stronger, if we imagine a Christian preacher making the same appeal at the beginning of the second century. Such a preacher would invite belief in certain facts which

he did not himself claim to have seen; and such written evidence as he could produce was at least no better than that which we now possess. On the face of it, a man must have seemed to others to have been incurring an enormous risk in hazarding his whole life, present and future, on the assurance of such a preacher, and becoming a member of a society which was despised and persecuted by the vast majority of the world. It is sometimes said that the difficulties of belief are greater in the present day than in the early days of Christianity, by virtue of the immense distance in time, and as it were in historic space, which separates us from them. But that course of time, and that historic space, have been continuously furnishing a mass of testimony to the power of the Gospel which more than counteracts any such disadvantage. It might even be maintained that, with the aid of the historical knowledge of the present day, we enjoy facilities for realising the position and the teaching of our Lord and of His apostles which are greater than those possessed by many of the early Christians. We possess written documents which, to say the very least, have in substance stood the severest tests of criticism, and the truth of the assurances and the predictions they record is attested by the accumulating witness of the Church. Above all, to be a Christian is with us not, as with a pagan of those days, to place ourselves in antagonism to the institutions around us but, on the contrary, to bring ourselves into harmony with the spirit in which they

were constructed, and from which they derived their main strength. We have an illustration, perhaps, though only an approximate one, of the difficulties with which the early preachers of Christianity must have had to contend, in the work of missionaries among the Hindoos; and we know how arduous are the obstacles which the Gospel there encounters. When, in short, all allowance has been made for the long preparation which had resulted in the fulness of time, the faith of the early Church and its victory over the world remain, perhaps, the most conspicuous miracles of Christianity, and the most vivid evidence of the operation of the Holy Spirit.

In considering the nature and the foundation of this faith, we have to encounter in the present day misapprehensions, and, we must needs say, misrepresentations, for which it is difficult to account. The idea has been industriously spread that there is some inconsistency between the teaching of our Lord and that of His Apostles, and still more between the teaching of the Apostles and the ultimate result of the teaching of the Church, as represented in the Creeds. To take one of the last instances of this misrepresentation, we are told by the author of *Supernatural Religion*[b] that 'we may look in vain in the Synoptic Gospels for the doctrines elaborated in the Pauline Epistles and the Gospel of Ephesus.' 'It is not difficult,' says this writer, 'to follow the gradual development of the Creeds of the Church, and it is

[b] Vol. ii. pp. 486, 487, 4th edition.

certainly most instructive to observe the progressive boldness with which its dogmas were expanded by pious enthusiasm.' . . . 'The disciples,' he continues, 'who had so often misunderstood the teaching of Jesus during His life, piously distorted it after His death. His simple lessons of meekness and humility were soon forgotten. With lamentable rapidity the elaborate structure of ecclesiastical Christianity, following stereotyped lines of human superstition, and deeply coloured by Alexandrian philosophy, displaced the simple morality of Jesus.' Now it is not easy, and perhaps it is hardly fitting, to treat without indignation such a distortion of the history and character of the early Church. If the charge were not echoed, in various forms, in modern sceptical literature, it would be unworthy of notice; but it would seem as if no task were more necessary in the present day than that of reviving and presenting to the world the picture of the early Church, as it appeared in the freshness and fulness of its life, 'Fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners.' Enough, however, is readily accessible, especially to a writer who pretends to so much learning as this author, to justify us in denouncing such statements as an inexcusable calumny. They are contrary to facts established by the most impartial evidence, and they belie the most conspicuous features of early Christian life.

The history of the early Church, in fact, might almost be summed up in words like those of the

inspired writer, used with a reference to our Lord, They 'resisted unto blood, striving against sin[c].' His life, it is acknowledged, was one persistent warfare against sin in all forms, and it was pursued at the cost of all warfare, that of blood. Manifold as are the spiritual aspects of our Lord's sacrifice, this is the description of its actual history; and His early followers, at all events, trod faithfully in His footsteps. From the moment He rose from the dead, and assured His Apostles of His triumph, the Christian Church organised a similar warfare against sin. Its members were formed into a perpetual society, 'having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are His, and Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity[d].' St. Peter opened that long war on the day of Pentecost, in words which, like those of his Lord, pricked his hearers to the heart, exhorting them to 'repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins[e].' Some seventy years afterwards the veil is lifted, by the hand of a Roman statesman, from the comparative obscurity of the Christian Church, and discloses an army of soldiers of the cross, whose bond of union is still stamped conspicuously with the Apostolic seal. At the commencement of the second century, Pliny reports to Trajan, as the result of what he could extort from the Christians in his province, 'that this was the sum of their fault or error, that they were wont to meet together on a

[c] Heb. xii. 4. [d] 2 Tim. ii. 19. [e] Acts ii. 38.

stated day before sunrise, and sing a hymn to Christ as God, and bind themselves by a *Sacramentum* that they would not commit theft or robbery or adultery, that they would not break faith, nor repudiate a trust[f].' A memorable record! honourable to the Roman to whose impartial accuracy it is due, as well as to the Church whose clear and simple character it reflects, and more precious, alike in its historical and in its practical instruction, than many a famous volume.

Under this standard, and bound by this oath, the army of the Saints maintained a stern, though patient, war against the sin which was embodied in the life, and in the very institutions, of the society of their day. They won at length a great victory, and it was achieved, like that of their Lord, by resistance unto blood. That which has been described as 'the strong antipathy of good to bad' aroused the equally strong antipathy of bad to good. A corrupt society felt instinctively that a Church which was at war with iniquity was at war with itself, and it appealed to the final arbitrament of bloodshed. When we realise the deadly nature of this struggle, when we think of the blood that has been shed in it, from that Precious Blood to which in the recent season we have done special homage, to the outpouring of the life of innumerable humbler souls, the deepest emotions of our souls are stirred; and it is not easy

[f] See Note 11.

to be as patient as we should otherwise wish to be with such misrepresentations of the Church's early history as have just been quoted.

But it may be that the controversies which have, of late years, raged around certain points of Church history have obscured its main course and character. While men are disputing about the alleged inconsistency between Petrine and Pauline Christianity, or enquiring into the development of the Roman claims to supremacy, they are in danger of forgetting the main course and current of Christian life, and of subordinating its essential to its accidental features. The extent to which such a distortion of vision can go is forcibly illustrated by another statement made by the writer already quoted, with a recklessness characteristic of his school. 'Had we been dependent,' he says, 'on St. Paul, Christ's noble morality would have remained unknown, and His lessons of rare spiritual excellence would have been lost to the world[g].' It is to be presumed that such a writer is aware of St. Paul's description of charity, of his constant exhortations to 'love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,' of his description of 'the mind that was in Christ Jesus.' But if so, that he can have made such an assertion affords a measure by which we may reasonably judge of his capacity, and of the capacity of the class of critics whom he represents, for apprehending the real facts of Christian life and thought.

[g] *Supernatural Religion*, vol. iii. p. 567. Ed. 1879.

There is, however, a momentous truth, of which such objections may possibly be a travesty, however strange. Even thoughtful believers seem sometimes perplexed by certain differences which undoubtedly exist between the teaching of our Lord, as recorded in the Gospels, and that of the Apostles, as recorded in the book of the Acts and in the Epistles. But on the very suppositions of our faith, such a difference is inevitable. Between the ministry of our Lord and the teaching of the Apostles the most momentous of all events in the spiritual history of mankind had occurred. Our Lord had died on the Cross, had risen from the dead, had ascended into heaven, and had bestowed upon His Church the gift of the Holy Spirit. On the supposition that those events are of the character which the faith of the Church assigns to them, it is inevitable that there should be a difference, and even a vast difference, between the point of view of those who lived before them and that of those who lived after them; and the distinctive character of the Epistles is thus so far from being a ground of objection, that it is a most conspicuous instance of the harmony of Christian truth. Of course, if a man ignores the belief of the Apostles that our Lord made an atonement for the sins of the world on the Cross, if he denies His Resurrection, and deems His Ascension to sit on the right hand of God a myth, he cannot understand why there should be any distinction between His teaching and that of those who preached in His name. But if the relation of God to man and of

man to God was vitally affected by the sacrifice on the Cross, if, by virtue of His resurrection and ascension our Lord assumed a new authority, and established among men a new influence, His Apostles cannot speak simply as He spoke. They have new truths to communicate, new facts to assert, new realities in the spiritual and moral world to enforce. When our Lord spoke, as is said in the Gospel of St. John, 'The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified [h].' When the Apostles wrote, the most prominent and visible characteristic of Christians was to have received the Holy Spirit, and to exhibit His influence in their lives. Our Lord announced that the kingdom of God was at hand. When the Epistles were written, the kingdom of God had come, and a new world had been created. 'If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature, old things are passed away; behold all things are become new [i].' The whole teaching of the Christian Church is founded on the supposition that a special revelation was entrusted to the Apostles respecting our Lord's mediatorial work, and that new spiritual powers were bestowed on those who believed on Him. There is nothing essentially inconsistent in an argument which disputes the facts thus alleged, and the validity of the testimony thus offered; but there is something strangely unreasonable in a criticism which make it a complaint against such testimony that it is consistent with

[h] St. John vii. 39.

[i] 2 Cor. v. 17.

itself, and that it is the natural and necessary consequence of the facts to which it bears witness.

The evidence that this new spiritual power had been introduced into the world is conspicuous in the records of the early Church, and is especially to be discerned in one marked characteristic of Christian life. That characteristic is the intense joy, hope, and enthusiasm by which it is animated. In the aspirations of men after righteousness at other times, there is present a certain feeling of desperation, an oppressive sense of guilt and weakness, a consciousness of straining after an unattainable ideal. But in the lives of the Fathers and of the early Christians, instead of this painful sense of failure and guilt we find an unfailing apprehension of peace and victory. Our Saviour's pledge, 'your heart shall rejoice and your joy no man taketh from you[k],' has its fulfilment recorded in every page of early Church history. It was a pledge, indeed, which, as our Lord warned His disciples, was strangely contrasted with the visible circumstances of their lives. Never, surely, was any body of men exposed to greater adversities, sufferings, and distresses, and even apparent failures. But the Epistles alone would be a sufficient witness that the pledge was fulfilled. Certainly there is a grave and saddened tone about them, a tone as that of men who appreciate the evil and misery of life, and know how hard a thing it is to remedy it; but there is not less certainly a deeper joy in

[k] St. John xvi. 22.

them than in any other human writings. The grace and peace with which the Apostle Paul begins and ends his Epistles are no mere familiar salutations, but express the spirit which breathes throughout them; and St. John similarly declares that his object is to bring his readers into fellowship with himself, a fellowship in which their joy may be full[1]. The beloved disciple who, at the Saviour's side, had heard this promise, 'your heart shall rejoice and your joy no man taketh from you,' thus testifies, at the close of his long and troubled Apostleship, that his joy had been full.

Similarly, as one peruses the accounts of the martyrs, or the writings of the early Christian Fathers, this is perhaps the feature which stands out most vividly. All around us is a disappointed world—a world of disappointed valour, disappointed justice, disappointed virtue, a world in which suicide had come to be looked upon as a natural and reasonable resource. But in the midst of it the martyrs and confessors, the humblest Christians and the most distinguished alike, display all the energy of hope, of love, and of the complete satisfaction of their hearts. It is not ecstasy, it is the calmest and most peaceful assurance. They have found true joys, their hearts are fixed on them; and amidst the sundry and manifold changes of that stormy time, they bear witness to the truth of the Apostolic promise that their joy should be full. This, undoubtedly, was one of the

[1] 1 St. John i. 4.

chief causes which gave such an intense energy and movement to the history of the early Christian Church. There, and there alone, was it felt that joy could be found, and energy exercised without restraint; and as the old world more and more proved its uncertainty and fallaciousness, men and women took refuge in this blessed fellowship. It has been a commonplace of worldly writers to compare—as one of their modern representatives has expressed it—'the languors of virtue' with 'the raptures of vice,' and it is possible that moralists have sometimes given occasion for the comparison. But the great truth of Christian morals is that the contrast must be exactly reversed; and as a matter of history, especially in the first three centuries, it was so reversed. In that period, the languors are all on the side of vice, and the raptures all on the side of virtue. They are so still, in the experience of every one who surrenders himself to the full influence of the Gospel; but the sudden and overwhelming force with which this experience is displayed in Christian life, after our Lord's ascension, is one of the keys to Church history. Perfect love has cast out fear. The Christian soul breathes in an atmosphere of light, and grace, and peace, and truth. It is not merely hoping for ultimate salvation. It is living in the light; all things have become new to it in the spirit, and it is assured that they will hereafter become new to it in the body. Read the records of the Church without an eye to controversy, and

with a simple desire to apprehend their main characteristics, and you will find them summed up in this description of Christian life by St. Paul:—'Therefore being justified by faith we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, ... and rejoice in hope of the glory of God. And not only so, but we glory in tribulations also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope; and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us [m].'

Now to what is all this marvellous display of moral energy, hope, and endurance ascribed by those who exhibited it? Their witness is the best evidence of their motives, and of the power on which they relied, and it is perfectly uniform. As with the Jews, and as in the Sermon on the Mount, the life of the Saints starts from the vision of our Father in Heaven, the Creator of heaven and earth, the Lord of the spirits of all flesh, the God of all righteousness, power, and love. It starts from this vision; but it proceeds to the conviction that the perfect image of God is revealed in Jesus Christ, and that union with Him, through faith, is union with God, and conveys to us all the blessings of perfect fellowship with the Father. 'This is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath life; and he that hath not the

[m] Rom. v. 1–5.

Son of God hath not life[n].' 'We have seen, and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world. Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him and he in God[o].' The two ideas are never separated; and the theological conception is always the strength and life of the moral. As St. Paul at Athens begins by declaring 'the unknown God,' so the life of Christians and the confessions of the martyrs start from the belief that their fellowship is with the Father. The confession of St. Polycarp at the stake is the earliest of these solemn testimonies; and it is at once the loftiest and the most characteristic of all: —'He looked up to heaven and said, "O Lord God Almighty, the Father of Thy beloved and blessed Son Jesus Christ, by whom we have received the knowledge of Thee, the God of angels and powers, and of every creature, and of the whole race of the righteous who live before Thee, I give Thee thanks that Thou hast counted me worthy of this day and this hour, that I should have a part in the number of Thy martyrs, in the cup of Thy Christ, to the resurrection of eternal life, both of soul and body, through the incorruption imparted by the Holy Ghost. Among whom may I be accepted before Thee this day as a rich and acceptable sacrifice, according as Thou, the faithful and true God, hast fore-ordained, hast revealed beforehand, and hast now fulfilled. Wherefore also I praise Thee for all

[n] 1 St. John v. 11, 12. [o] St. John iv. 14, 15.

things, I bless Thee, I glorify Thee, along with the everlasting and heavenly Jesus Christ, Thy beloved Son, through Whom to Thee, with Him and the Holy Ghost, be glory both now and to all ages. Amen [p]."' It would be difficult to quote from any post-apostolic source a more complete summary of the Christian faith, alike in its dogmatic contents and in its moral inspiration.

But a peculiarly striking illustration of this spirit of Christian thought has been afforded by the recent discovery of the portion which had been previously missing of the first Epistle of St. Clement of Rome. It contains a prayer, which may be regarded as the first known germ of a Christian liturgy, and which exhibits to us the spirit of the early Roman Church expressed in its most intense and deliberate form. The whole Epistle, says the present Bishop of Durham [q], may be said to lead up to a 'long prayer or litany, if we may so call it, which forms a fit close to its lessons of forbearance and love.' 'We will ask,' says St. Clement [r], 'with instancy of prayer and supplication, that the Creator of the universe may guard intact unto the end His elect throughout the whole world, through His beloved Son Jesus Christ, through whom He called us from darkness to light, from ignorance to the full knowledge of the glory of

[p] *The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp*, ch. xiv. See Note 12.

[q] Dr. Lightfoot's *St. Clement of Rome; An Appendix*, p. 269.

[r] *St. Clement of Rome; An Appendix*, pp. 376–378. See Note 13.

His name. Grant unto us, Lord, that we may set our hope on Thy Name which is the primal source of all creation; and open the eyes of our hearts, that we may know Thee, who alone *abidest Highest in the highest, Holy in the holy,* who *layest low the insolence of the proud,* who *scatterest the imaginings of nations;* who *settest the lowly on high,* and *bringest the lofty low,* who *makest rich and makest poor;* who *killest and makest alive;* who alone art the Benefactor of spirits and the God of all flesh, who *lookest into the abysses,* who scannest the works of man; the Succour of them that are in peril; the *Saviour of them that are in despair;* the Creator and overseer of every spirit; who multipliest the nations upon earth, and hast chosen out from all men those that love Thee through Jesus Christ, Thy beloved Son, through whom Thou didst instruct us, didst sanctify us, didst honour us. We beseech Thee, Lord and Master, to be our help and succour. Save those among us who are in tribulation; have mercy on the lowly; lift up the fallen; show Thyself unto the needy; heal the ungodly; convert the wanderers of Thy people; feed the hungry; release our prisoners; raise up the weak; comfort the fainthearted. Let all the Gentiles know that *Thou art God alone,* and Jesus Christ is Thy Son, and *we are Thy people and the sheep of Thy pasture.* Thou through Thine operations didst make manifest the everlasting fabric of the world. Thou, Lord, didst create the earth. Thou that are faithful throughout all generations,

righteous in Thy judgments, marvellous in strength and excellence, Thou that art wise in creating and prudent in establishing that which Thou hast made, that art good in the things which are seen and faithful with them that trust on Thee, pitiful and compassionate, forgive us our iniquities, and our unrighteousnesses, and our transgressions, and short-comings. Lay not to our account every sin of Thy servants and thine handmaids, but cleanse us with the cleansing of Thy truth, and guide our steps to walk in holiness, and righteousness, and singleness of heart, and to do such things as are good and well-pleasing in Thy sight and in the sight of our rulers. Yea, Lord, make Thy face to shine upon us in peace for our good, that we may be sheltered by Thy mighty hand and delivered from every sin by Thine uplifted arm. And deliver us from them that hate us wrongfully. Give concord and peace to us and to all that dwell on the earth, as Thou gavest to our fathers, when they called on Thee in faith and truth with holiness, that we may be saved, while we render obedience to Thine Almighty and most excellent Name, and to our rulers and governors upon the earth.'

This mention of the rulers of the State is a peculiarly touching and sublime example of the Christian spirit when we remember that it proceeds from the midst of the furnace of persecution; and before the Prayer concludes, a special supplication for them is added: 'Thou, Lord and Master, hast given

them the power of sovereignty through Thine excellent and unspeakable might, that we knowing the glory and honour which Thou hast given them, may submit ourselves unto them, in nothing resisting Thy will. Grant unto them, therefore, O Lord, health, peace, concord, stability, that they may administer the government which Thou hast given them without failure. For Thou, O heavenly Master, King of the ages, givest to the sons of men glory and honour and power over all things that are upon the earth. Do Thou, Lord, direct their counsel according to that which is good and well pleasing in Thy sight, that administering in peace and gentleness with godliness the power which Thou hast given them, they may obtain Thy favour. O Thou, who alone art able to do these things and things far more exceeding good than these for us, we praise Thee through the High-priest and guardian of our souls, Jesus Christ, through whom be the glory and the majesty unto Thee both now and for all generations and for ever and ever. Amen.'

Such was the prayer of the Christians of Rome in the age of Domitian; and it deserves to be quoted in its entirety as a singularly comprehensive and authoritative exposition of the spirit by which they were animated. We may observe, in passing, the commentary which it affords on the allegation that the dogmas of the Church have been expanded by the 'progressive boldness of pious enthusiasm.' The bidding prayer read at the commencement of these Lectures is but an echo of this ancient supplication;

and in the prayer for the Church Militant which precedes our most sacred act of worship we do not rise to a greater height, or assume any other essential theological truth. But the point with which we are concerned, for the immediate purpose of this argument, is that the intense elevation and hope of early Christian morality is here seen to be wholly inspired and sustained by the vision of God in Jesus Christ, and by the faith, assured through His death and resurrection, of the possibility of fellowship with the Divine nature. God is loved in Him, and He is loved in God; and communion with perfect glory, light and truth is thus opened to the soul by means of the most simple, most human, most natural relationship.

Now it is from this point of view that the Creeds of the Church are to be approached; and when they are placed in this light, all the appearance of mere speculative dogmatism, which is attributed to them by scepticism, at once melts away, and seems scarcely to need refutation. They are not mere abstract statements respecting the nature of God. They embody the most moral, the most human, the most touching and affecting conceptions which can stir the depths of the heart. If the Creeds are the distinctive characteristic of the Christian Church, it is not because Alexandrian metaphysics, or any mere theological speculations, had elaborated theories about the Divine nature. That was the work of the Gnostics, of the Arians, and of similar heretics. It was because, as a matter

of certain apprehension and most blessed fact, our Lord Jesus Christ, fulfilling in His life and death and resurrection the promises of the Old Testament, had revealed to men the image of a God of infinite love and light, had brought that God home to them in their very flesh and blood, had assured them of reconciliation and union with Him, had offered Himself as a propitiation for their sins, and in answer to their prayers had bestowed on them a grace and power, which they felt in daily experience to be the first-fruits of redemption. It is the whole of Christian life, the whole of that intense moral and spiritual illumination we have been contemplating, which constitutes the background of the creeds, and bestows on them their vital force and reality. The revelation of God, as we have seen in previous Lectures, was the life of faith from its earliest dawn—the strength of Abraham, the hope of the Prophets, the sum and substance of the life of our Lord. In Him, His life, His death, His resurrection, His ascension, it had become the daily food of Christian souls; and when, in Arianism, the last and most subtle attempt was made to divide Him from God, and thus to prevent us from feeling that, in union with Him, we were in union with God, it was not the Christian intellect, so much as the Christian heart, that revolted. It was this impulse which animated St. Athanasius. The spirit which really moved him may be perceived in his treatise *De Incarnatione Verbi*, written before the controversial period of his life, and of which the

central idea is the recovery, through Jesus Christ, of the glorious image of God which the human soul had lost. It was probably to the intense devotion of St. Antony to God and Christ, as much as to the schools of Alexandria, that he owed his inspiration [s].

But an equally striking testimony to this character of the Christian creeds may be quoted from a great Western Father of the same age—St. Hilary of Poitiers. He has been called the Athanasius of the West, but his witness cannot be supposed to be sophisticated by Alexandrian speculation. He has himself described most vividly the process of his conversion and of his acceptance of the Christian faith, and his testimony is the more remarkable, as it describes an experience which passes through all the stages of faith we have contemplated in the course of these Lectures [t]. He commenced by dissatisfaction with the pleasures of mere worldly life, and by a repulsion from the absurdities of Paganism. He aspired to know that God from whom he received all the benefits of existence—a God to whom he could entirely devote himself, in whom he could place all his hopes, and in whom he could rest, as in a sure harbour, against all the storms of the present life. To understand or to recognise this God, his soul was inflamed with an ardent intensity. While thus meditating, he came upon the books of Moses, where he read, 'I am that I am,' *ego sum qui sum*; and he was

[s] See Note 14. [t] See Note 15.

at once carried away by the grandeur and simplicity of this description of God. He became absorbed in the delight of contemplating the eternity, the infinity, and the perfect beauty of the Divine Nature. But how were these contemplations to be reconciled with the infirmity and shortness of human life? 'It would be of little avail to have a right belief about God, if death would destroy all apprehension of Him, or some failure of nature would abolish it.' Hilary's soul was harassed by anxiety, partly for itself, partly for the body. It was in this state of mind that he came upon the statement of St. John, 'The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.' 'Here,' he exclaims, 'my trembling and anxious soul found more hope than it was looking for . . . I learned that God was made flesh, that by means of the Word, thus made flesh, the flesh might grow up to God the Word.' This assurance of union with God in Christ at once removed from him the fear of death and all weariness of existence. The present life became to him like learning to a child, or medicine to the sick, or training to the youth. All present things were endurable to one who was advancing through them to the reward of a blessed immortality.

Such were the simple, but intense, moral convictions which inspired the profound devotion of the early Church to Christ and to the truth of His Divinity. When that truth was once established as the greatest and most powerful of practical beliefs, it was inevitable

that it should be discussed by philosophy, and that, for certain purposes, it should be cast into a scientific form. It is a characteristic of all sciences, that the practical principles from which they start are as simple as the development and the intellectual justification of those principles are complex. The primary truths, for instance, on which mathematical or mechanical science is based are few, and when stated obvious; but there is no limit to the complexity which their scientific expression involves. The practical maxims, both of law and of morality, are very simple; and the Ten Commandments are for ordinary men a sufficient working rule. But what immense mental labour, and what subtle intelligence have been expended, and doubtless necessarily expended, in presenting them in a scientific form, and harmonising them intellectually with other truths and facts! What elaborate systems of ethics and codes of law has not the world seen, and what continued elaboration is even now expended upon the same practical subjects! Why should that be a reproach to theology which is none to law or to morality? The more momentous, in fact, the truth, and the greater its practical import, the less can we be satisfied till we have examined it by the tests of our various faculties, and reconciled it with our intellect as well as with our conscience. This is simply what was done in the theological controversies which raged around the Creeds. But, on the whole, that which is most remarkable about the Creed which

is really 'The Creed of St. Athanasius'—namely, the Creed of Nicæa—is the simplicity and reserve of its statements, and what might be called its intense realism. There are one or two philosophical phrases introduced for the purpose of combating a false philosophy. But, for the most part, it speaks in the language of ordinary life, and brings us into contact with God, as St. Hilary says, through flesh and blood. It is not, indeed, Christians who are the most open to the charge of introducing metaphysics into religion and moral philosophy. Such a charge might more fitly be brought against those who would substitute for the eternal realities which in Christ we see, and hear, and handle, abstractions like Humanity or the Unknowable. The Apostles spoke of that which they had seen and heard, and the Church from age to age repeats their witness, as verified by her own experience.

Such is the origin and such the character of the Faith of the Christian Church; and, when thus apprehended, it must surely, at the least, appear the noblest and most beautiful vision of moral and spiritual truth that ever dawned on the heart of man. One of the reproaches most frequently addressed to ourselves in these days was also cast upon the early Christians. They were charged with being too eager to accept the revelation offered to them. They were taunted with exhorting men to believe without waiting to investigate too curiously[u].

[u] See Note 16.

Even if they had been unable to justify this exhortation on other grounds, would it not, at least, have been a generous error? Such a revelation, and such a vision as we have been contemplating, may well seem to carry their own evidence with them, and at the very least to be worth an earnest and sincere trial. It is, however, a sufficient answer to all such reproaches, and especially to those which in the present day are advanced in the name of experimental science, that the appeal of the Christian teacher has always been made to a living experience. It should constantly be borne in mind, and will be our best application of these considerations to ourselves, that the Church has always been able to offer the most conclusive justification of her appeal to any who are led to follow it. She has ever been able to address men in the language of St. Paul, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved[v]' —saved not only hereafter, but in this present life, saved from the tyranny of sin, endued with the grace of God's Holy Spirit, given an actual and present participation in that life of moral and spiritual perfection which the New Testament reveals. She has ever been ready to stake the truth of her message on its verification in each believer's own experience; and in all the long generations of Christianity it is not recorded that any one trusted to her witness, and was disappointed.

[v] Acts xvi. 31.

LECTURE VII.

THE FAITH OF THE REFORMATION.

ROM. VIII. 15.

For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.

IN the course of these Lectures we have now considered the general nature of Faith, and its specific development and character under the Jewish dispensation, under the teaching of our Lord, and in the early Church. Under the impulse finally communicated by the gift of the Holy Spirit, Faith entered on a long period of victory and supremacy. In a temporal as well as in a spiritual sense it overcame the world. It conquered, first in the spiritual sphere, and then in the temporal, an imperial civilization; it then brought under its sway, one by one, a mass of wild barbarian tribes; and at length it accomplished the grand achievement of completely organizing a new civilization, of welding together in one harmonious form the old world and the new, and of uniting a swarm of struggling races and nationalities, under the dominion of the Church, as parts of the one

monarchy of the Pope. The centuries in which this great work was achieved have been called, not unjustly, 'the ages of faith.' Though gross abuses and fatal perversions of the truth were admitted in the course of them, they nevertheless present, in the main, a noble exhibition of the power of Faith. The whole of life was built up in accordance with one grand conception; and the elements of that conception were furnished by the Christian creed. The men of the middle ages were great architects—architects in thought, in society, in politics, in ecclesiastical organization, no less than in stone and marble. In every department of human life they laid deep foundations; and they reared mighty structures, under which, to this hour, our religion is sheltered, our learning fostered, our social life controlled, and to which even the framework of our political institutions is in great measure due. The Fathers and Doctors of the Church, the Bishops, the Popes, the Monks, built for all time; and having planned their great edifices, in the main, on the enduring laws of revealed truth, and based them on the divinely organized constitution of the Church, they could trust the generations which followed them to carry forward their work. A great institution such as this University grew, like a mighty tree, from age to age, under the impulse of one enduring principle of life; and in age after age, with harmonious instinct, men endowed Colleges, as they built Churches, in the confidence—a confidence, surely,

which cannot be in substance disappointed—that they would ever remain under the guiding influence of Christ's Church, and that in them 'whatever might conduce to true religion and useful learning would for ever flourish and abound.' The noble structures which adorn this city, and the grand foundations which constitute this University, are the products, not merely of genius, but of faith, and of that large and prophetic vision which communion with the central source of truth alone supplies.

But the principle that the best things, when corrupted, become the worst has, as might have been expected, received its most conspicuous illustration in the history of religion, and above all of true religion. All great gifts and privileges bring proportionate temptations, and if these be yielded to, blessings may become almost transformed into curses. To none is this risk so terrible as to men who are entrusted with great spiritual powers; and the danger to which such men are exposed may perhaps be in some measure discerned in the temptation to which our Lord was subjected. There comes an hour when the evil spirit takes them up into a high mountain, and shows them the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, and says unto them, 'all these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me[a].' The vision of universal influence, and perhaps dominion, dawns upon the mind. It may be a legitimate vision, destined in

[a] St. Matthew iv. 9.

some way to be realised; but the Devil suggests that it may be realised at once, and that it may be grasped with certainty, by some service to him—by some untruthfulness, some convenient falsehood, some unscrupulous act of violence or craft. To such a temptation it may well be that Mahomet succumbed. Entrusted with a great truth, and discerning its power over men's spirits, he saw the opportunity of turning it to account more profitably by some measure of falsehood, craft, or violence; and he became a false prophet, instead of remaining, as he might have remained, a true one.

A similar temptation assailed the hierarchy of the Christian Church, when faith had won its first great triumph, and when the dominion of the Church over human life had begun to be consolidated. By exaggerating legitimate powers, by accepting convenient forgeries, by admitting the aid of opportune violence, by using the weapons and the agents of worldly craft and cunning, the way seemed open and plain to the possession of all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. To be just to the Popes and to their servants, it must be admitted that the temptation was tremendous—all the more so because it was gradual and subtle, and could appeal in its support to some great facts and verities. To be conscious of having just claims to a certain royalty over the souls of men, and yet solely and simply to bear witness unto the truth—this is the severest trial of human nature. But, for that very

reason, to fail in it involves a terrible fall, and may entail spiritual ruin. When bishops, priests, and monks were unable to say to the tempter, 'Get thee hence, Satan, for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve,' they entered into possession of the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them, but they lost the kingdom of God. When power instead of truth became the object of the dominant hierarchy, faith had been falsified at its source. The vision of the God to whom they had thus been faithless became eclipsed, and a huge and portentous system of error and superstition developed, as by a natural law, from the first original untruth. The 'ages of faith' became transformed into the ages of superstition; and when the revival of learning brought men into communion with the wisdom and the beauty of the ancient world, it was no wonder if more attractions were often found in a refined Paganism than in a corrupted Christianity. But at this critical moment, the most critical, perhaps, through which the Church ever passed, a potent voice was heard which recalled the elementary principles of the Gospel. The description of that Gospel, given by St. Paul, that 'therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith,' was suddenly revived, and all Christendom was stirred to its depths by the intensity with which the truth was re-asserted that 'The just shall live by faith.'

The experience and the teaching of the Reforma-

tion furnish, in fact, crucial tests of the nature and the function of Faith. In interpreting great historical crises, it is always safe to take, as a guide, the general impression which has been established respecting their main character, and the principles which were at stake in them; and in the case of the Reformation no doubt can exist on these points. Faith is the cardinal word of the Reformation. It then re-assumes an importance it had long ceased to possess. The doctrine of Justification by Faith is the truth around which the struggle of that period turns, and on which the energies of the Reformers were concentrated. The history of the Church is, in great part, the history of the manner in which truths which had been tacitly assumed, and principles which had been silently at work, start into new vitality, are recognized as among the central elements of Christian life, and receive their final and permanent vindication. It is thus that the doctrine of our Lord's perfect Divinity, always the faith of the Church, was reasserted, and brought into full light, in the course of the Arian controversy; and that the doctrine of Grace was explained and justified in opposition to the Pelagian heresy. In a similar manner, the principle of Faith was brought out into fuller consciousness and distinctness during the struggles of the Reformation than at any previous period. The fact that those struggles have determined the present condition of Western Christendom invests them with a supreme interest and instruction

for us. The Reformation, and the principles it vindicated, lie at the foundation of modern religious life, and in proportion as we grasp those principles shall we be able to meet the difficulties which confront us.

Now the Reformed confessions are unanimous respecting the main points which they were intended to vindicate. They differ in the manner in which the truths thus reasserted were applied, and very grave practical consequences depended on these varying applications and developments of the primary principles of the Reformation. But the principles themselves may be distinguished from the special forms they assumed, whether in Lutheranism, or Calvinism, or in our own Church; and they possessed a unity and vitality which are independent of such forms. The cardinal point in them all is a revived apprehension of our direct personal relation with God. In two grand instances it has been shewn by experience that the maintenance of this consciousness is the primary element alike in religion and in morality, and that the loss of it is at the root of all other corruptions. Those two instances are afforded by the history of the Jewish, and by that of the Christian, Church. Among the Jews, at the time of our Lord, a system was in full operation which, to all outward appearance, was intensely religious. The name of God was held in the most awful reverence; the services at the Temple of Jerusalem were more magnificent than any religious

worship ever seen. But, with all this, the practical apprehension of God, in His direct personal relation to the soul, had become obscured; and with the loss of that apprehension, the moral perceptions of the people had lost their vitality, and the conscience was deadened. The parable of the Pharisee and the Publican exhibits in the most vivid form the spirit which had supplanted a living faith. The Pharisee, coming into the presence of God, does not appear sensible of any imperfection. That awful presence in no way humiliates him. It does not bring into full light any consciousness of his own sin and feebleness. He only thanks God that he is not as other men are. The Publican, on the other hand, is overwhelmed by the sense of the Divine holiness. He stands afar off, and will not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smites upon his breast, saying, 'God be merciful to me a sinner.' The name of God was used by the Pharisee as the sanction for a system of ceremonial observances, which brought the human soul under a complete slavery. But he had at the same time utterly lost the sense of his relation to God Himself, and the spirit of combined humility and faith which it involves. A precisely similar perversion had taken possession of the Christian Church at the time of the Reformation. The name of God was everywhere. His worship was never more splendid and ceremonious; Churches were never more numerous or more beautiful. But, nevertheless, a formalism, not less intense than that which strangled

true faith among the Jews, had taken possession of the Christian world; and the vital sense of the relation of men to God had been lost. For the mass of men, religion has become a vague apprehension of unseen terrors; the Church, which by ancient prescription and tradition holds the secrets of the unseen world, is regarded mainly as the possessor of mysterious powers, alike of punishment and of deliverance, and men have surrendered themselves into nothing less than a bondage to its authority. The dread of the possible consequences of sin remains; but its essential character is lost sight of on the one side, while the real deliverance from it is lost sight of on the other. Repentance and faith —'repentance towards God and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ[b]'—which are the two central principles of religious life, are fatally enfeebled.

Now the manner in which the Reformation met this corruption was twofold. In the first place, it intensified the sense of sin by bringing the soul in its inmost recesses into direct relation with God; and at the same time it gave men a new confidence and peace, by assuring them of an equally direct relation to their Saviour, and of their right to trust themselves absolutely, and without any human intervention, to His promises of forgiveness and deliverance. The controversies which have arisen out of the Reformation have had an unfortunate effect in obscuring its real principles; but if we follow its

[b] Acts xx. 21.

actual history, those principles become unmistakable. They are best traced, perhaps, in the life of the great German Reformer, from whose intense perception of certain central truths the movement of the sixteenth century received its main impulse. Unfortunately he is too exclusively known by the controversial works which were produced in the later period of his life, instead of by his great utterances in the critical moments of his career. Never, perhaps, since early times, has so great a force been felt in Christendom as that which was exerted by Luther's first writings. With the capacity given only to great genius, or rather to the deepest spiritual insight, he grasped at once the real difficulties of the Church in his day, and insisted on the truth which was their solution. His influence was greater, and more immediate, than in the present day we can readily imagine; for notwithstanding our increased means of intercourse, there was in his time a more close and rapid interchange of thought between the great nations of Europe than now exists. In the days—the happy days—when Latin was the tongue, not merely of the learned, but of the reading world, a work published in Germany gained attention in England, and its impulse was communicated to Europe, far more rapidly than at present. Consequently, long before the influence of Calvin arose, and before the internal controversies of the Reformation distracted its adherents, the cardinal principles which Luther revived were working actively in men's minds, and were reani-

mating the whole life of the Church and of society. They are stamped deeply on the history of our own Church, though they have been applied with that moderation and balance which are among the choicest gifts of the English mind.

But in the ninety-five Theses nailed on the door of the church at Wittenberg, and in the explanation of them soon afterwards published; in the short treatises 'On Christian Liberty,' 'On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church,' and in the Address 'To the Christian nobility of the German nation concerning the Reformation of the Christian estate,' we have the germinal ideas which, with more or less wisdom, were subsequently developed in the political and ecclesiastical history of the sixteenth century. Now, from what do they start? In conformity with the principles which have governed every other great religious movement, they spring from a profound apprehension of the necessity of repentance, and of the depth of that evil in human nature which the Gospel proposes to remedy. The first of the ninety-five Theses was an utterance well-fitted to arouse the conscience of Christendom. 'Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, when he said "repent," intended the whole life of Christians to be repentance.' '*Dominus et Magister Noster Jesus Christus, dicendo,* Poenitentiam agite, *omnem vitam fidelium poenitentiam esse voluit.*' Memorable words! worthy to initiate a great spiritual, moral, and mental renovation. The theses then proceed, in the most trenchant though sometimes

technical forms, to expose the inadequacy of any judgment on the one hand, or of any absolution on the other, which does not penetrate beyond all external obligations, and which fails to bring the soul into harmony with absolutely perfect and spiritual righteousness. The soul of the Reformer is seen struggling between an intense sense of his own evil, and a not less profound conviction that the message of the Gospel assures a complete deliverance from it. But these two convictions, which correspond, as we have seen, to the elementary dictates of the human conscience, rest upon the intensity of his apprehension of God, first, as the righteous Judge, by whom every thought and intent of his heart is discerned, and secondly, as his Saviour, by whose gracious promises he is assured of his forgiveness and deliverance.

It is in virtue of this vivid apprehension of his relation to God that the word *Justification* acquires so vivid a meaning to him. God to him was all in all. He cared for nothing in heaven or earth if he could only know, or certainly believe, that God forgave him his sins, received him, in spite of his inherent evil, into His love and favour, would purify him from his iniquity, and uphold him by His right hand. The question is of a personal relation between two persons—the one the pure and Almighty God, whose awful footsteps Luther perceived without him in the earthquake and the storm, and within in the implacable murmurs of his conscience; the other, himself, a feeble creature, conscious of innu-

merable sins, and sensible of numberless miseries in himself and in the world around him. If this God were his God, and he were assured of it, all would be well. He would be certain of final deliverance; and meanwhile no sufferings, wants, or distresses, could mar his peace. The more intensely the momentous and supreme character of this relation was apprehended, the more did it reduce into complete subordination all forms, ceremonies, and authorities, except so far as they brought the soul into direct communion with this God of infinite judgment and infinite salvation. An indulgence, or an absolution, which only released the soul from certain penalties, was not merely valueless; it was worse than nothing. It tended to obscure the vital conviction, that harmony with the will of God, at whatever cost, through whatever punishments, by whatever means, was the one necessity of the soul of man.

But the establishment of that harmony must needs be a long and painful process; and by what means was the soul to be assured that it would be ultimately attained? It was certain that it could only be attained by the gracious operation of God Himself, by His forgiveness and His consequent assistance. But how is that assurance of reconciliation and of ultimate deliverance from evil to be gained? Not, certainly, by experience. That would too generally lead to a very different conclusion. The first vision of Divine holiness tends to appal the soul, and to make confidence seem unattainable; and in

one respect this apprehension increases with the growth of the spiritual life. The holier a man becomes, the deeper is the witness of his experience that he is a sinner, the more marvellous does it seem to him that he should be absolutely forgiven, and finally restored to perfect unity with God. On what then can we rely? On nothing but the word of Christ, who promises us the forgiveness and the grace of God. Faith in that word is the only possible means for obtaining true peace of soul. When a man's conscience accuses him, and by that very accusation would make him afraid of God, and drive him from the Divine presence, when his own sufferings and the sufferings he sees about him seem to be so many signs and evidences of the wrath of God, he turns to the blessed word of reconciliation—a word confirmed by the sacrifice of life, and written in the blood of the new covenant; on that word of Christ he rests His soul, and on the faith of it he possesses, through all temptations, an unwavering peace.

In short, once let the thought be fully apprehended that God is a God of perfect righteousness, and that the life of the human soul consists in union with Him; and faith in deliverance by Him becomes the indispensable condition of existence. The sense of temporal misery, which gives rise to pessimism, is slight and trivial, compared with that which possesses the soul when this vision of its spiritual destiny, and of its inherent evil, dawns upon it; and the longing for some Divine assurance

of forgiveness and salvation becomes its deepest passion. It is a longing which nothing can satisfy but the word and promise of God Himself. That Word is Christ. The life and the words of Christ embody the word of God. There, and there alone, it is that the plain and definite promise is revealed on which a man may build his faith, and by virtue of which he may enter into the conscious and assured joy of reconciliation and of ultimate salvation. God is revealed in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself. He can nowhere else be seen in that gracious capacity. He may be perceived elsewhere ruling and judging the world; but nowhere else can He be perceived reconciling it. Accordingly, in proportion as a man enters with full sympathy into the sins, the sufferings and the deaths of the men and women around him, he will find that none but a suffering and a dying God—nay, a God who Himself bears our sins—gives sufficient witness that He is a reconciling God. But that witness, as it is the last that can be given, is also sufficient, and there is no sin or suffering for which the Cross is not an adequate consolation[c].

Such were the cardinal principles of the Reformation, as represented in its most characteristic utterances, and they will be recognised as essentially identical with the main elements of faith in every previous stage of its development. The vision of God produces an intense sense of evil and repentance;

[c] See Note 17.

that sense of evil creates a corresponding craving for deliverance; the soul which, in the first instance, is appalled and terrified by its apprehension of God, is attracted by His word and promise; and, as it realizes this gracious assurance, it is forced by its very misery and helplessness to throw itself back on Him, and to believe that His salvation is as infinite as His justice. These are the two characteristics which are combined in our Lord—on the one hand, His revelation of judgment, as in the Sermon on the Mount; on the other, His revelation of salvation, supremely displayed in His death on the Cross and in His resurrection, and in the gracious promises He builds upon them. It has been said of late that Protestantism 'has been pounding away for three centuries at St. Paul's wrong words, and missing his essential doctrine[d].' It will be seen, if these considerations be just, that the main elements of Protestantism are written in the cardinal dictates of the human conscience, illuminated and reasserted by the promises of the Gospel. They may be expressed in various intellectual forms; they may be associated with metaphysical theories which are indefensible. But, everywhere, they tend to bring the soul of man into intimate relation with God, and thus at the same time to deepen its sense of sin, and to quicken its faith in forgiveness and deliverance.

The lack of this sense of relation to God was recognised, two centuries before the Reformation, as the

[d] Mr. Matthew Arnold's *St. Paul and Protestantism*, p. 1.

great danger of the Church, by a Schoolman who was one of the famous worthies of Oxford, and whose teaching probably influenced Wicliffe. Bradwardine, *Doctor Profundus*, and for a brief time Archbishop of Canterbury, addressed *Ad suos Mertonenses*, in 1344, three books *De Causâ Dei contrà Pelagium*, in the Preface to which he declared that 'almost the whole world had gone away after Pelagius into error[e].' The formal principles of the Roman theology tended, in fact, more and more to favour that separation between God and man which it was the practical tendency of the Pelagian error to foster. Pelagianism is the grand heresy of the Western Church, as Arianism is of the Eastern; and they are closely allied in their tendency to remove God to a distance from us, and to obscure the intimate character of our relation to Him. In the formal theology of the Schoolmen, the loss of the Divine communion was not regarded as so fatal to the power of healthy action in human nature as to render man incapable of 'turning and preparing himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God[f].' In opposition to this view, the Reformed Churches revived the truth, that faith in God, with the conscious relationship to Him which faith implies, is the primary and essential law of man's nature, so that without it he has lost the characteristic which mainly distinguishes him as man. Neither reason nor will are so indis-

[e] See Note 18. [f] See Note 19.

putably the special distinction of man as his capacity and his need of living in conscious union and communion with an unseen Being, his Maker, his Judge, and his Saviour. His relation to God might be compared with that of a plant to the sun. The plant has its roots in the ground, and from thence, and from the air around, it mainly derives the nutriment from which its structure is built up. But the indispensable condition for extracting and assimilating that nutriment, the requisite without which the plant inevitably deteriorates, loses its virtue, and fails to display its beauty, is the light of the sun. But God is 'the Sun of righteousness;' and thus 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,' and, with wisdom, of every quality specially distinctive and honourable to man. Let him lose this conscious relationship, let him become more sensitive to external laws and formal obligations than to that Being of infinite holiness and power who speaks to him in his conscience, and the light is gone out of His life, and corruption must inevitably ensue. The process of deterioration may, indeed, be a prolonged one, as is the case in all natural processes; and many of the beauties and graces of a happier condition may long remain. But the soul has ceased to be in communion with the Life of man, and nothing less than a sentence of death has passed upon it.

To restore this communion was the great work of our Fathers at the Reformation, and it was done by

the great doctrines with which that movement of thought and life is identified. That which they proclaimed was not, as seems too often supposed, a mere formal, metaphysical doctrine of justification by faith, depending upon an abstruse theory of imputation. Such theories were doubtless elaborated in the course of the struggle, and sometimes had mischievous influences. But in substance the work of the Reformation was to lay fast hold of the main promises of the Gospel. Our Lord proclaimed that all who put faith in Him were safe in His hands for life and death, for time and for eternity. If men would trust Him, and, as that trust implies, obey Him, serve Him, and love Him, so far as their mortal weakness allowed them, He would be true to them, co-operate with all their efforts to keep His commandments and grow like Him, and would thus gradually remedy the corruption of their nature. This was His promise, His direct promise, to every soul; and the great Reformer taught that it could be accepted, and ought to be accepted, immediately, unhesitatingly, and without reserve. Not merely was it true that a man might believe it; but he was bound to believe it—bound to believe a Saviour whose words and deeds, whose life and death, asserted an inalienable claim upon his heart and conscience. Thus believing, he was at once delivered out of all fear, all condemnation, all servitude, and endowed with the freedom of a son of God. Once possessed of this spirit of sonship, men valued all the ordinances

and ministries of the Church as means for bringing them into direct communion with their God and their Saviour, not as instruments for interposing between themselves and Him. Their forgiveness for the past and their deliverance in the future were alike ensured by His sacrifice and by His union with them; and in this faith they rose above all human terrors. They dared once more to look in the face an almost omnipotent hierarchy, supported by imperial power, to fear nothing so much as the condemnation of their own consciences, and to live and die the free children of God, over whom no human authority had any permanent control. One common taunt against religion is sufficiently answered by the history of the Reformation. Priests were then the means, and religion was then the instrument, by which men were delivered from servitude. It was the spirit of freedom and of fearlessness which reasserted itself in the utterances of the great German Reformer; and its echoes have shaken the spirit of bondage throughout Christendom.

The first effect, in short, of this grand principle was, in the Reformer's view, to establish Christian liberty on a basis which could not be shaken. It asserted that, in the last resort, the soul of man could abandon everything but the word and promise of God, and it consequently set men absolutely free from subserviency to any visible power. At the same time, as the soul derived this independence from its obedience to Christ, it submitted itself, like him, to

all subsisting authority, so far as was compatible with its supreme allegiance. When the Pope proceeded to assert claims which were fatal to these cardinal truths of the gospel; when he placed himself, and the priesthood of which he was the head, between the soul and God, and made the absolving ministry of the priest 'generally necessary' for salvation; when, in short, he asserted an inalienable claim over the conscience, his authority was of necessity repudiated. Some consequences of that overthrow of the existing system of authority must be considered in my next and last Lecture. But where no such undue claim was made, the effect of thus arousing in men the sense of direct responsibility to God, and of direct dependence upon Him, was to re-invigorate and re-establish all natural authorities. Fathers acquired a new sense of responsibility for their government of their families. Kings and nations re-entered into the possession of their due independence; and the proclamation of the royal supremacy in England was the counterpart of the proclamation of Christian liberty in Germany g.

It seems now sometimes supposed that the principles of liberty, and that spirit of hope and confidence by which the life of the better part of Europe has been characterised during the last three centuries, can henceforth stand by themselves, and are independent of any support from the great truths which the Reformation proclaimed. There is at present no

g See Note 20.

experience to justify such a belief. Half Europe is still, in great measure, under bondage to the spirit of superstition and fear, and the larger part of the world is the victim of cruel idolatries or delusions. The power which originally emancipated men from that servitude may safely be relied on to effect a similar deliverance; but no other weapon has yet been successful. At all events, here alone shall we find the means of combining an unlimited apprehension of our own evil with a not less unlimited assurance of deliverance from it. Here alone, too, shall we find an adequate answer to some of the difficulties we contemplated at the outset of these Lectures. The most effectual, if not the only effectual remedy for that pessimism which seems now to weigh so heavily on the mind of Germany, and which finds its sad echoes in England, is to be found in the doctrine of the Cross, apprehended by faith, and as presented in passages like the following from the great Reformer:—

'The theologian of the Cross—he, that is, who speaks of a crucified and hidden God—teaches that punishments, crosses, and death are the most precious of all treasures, and the most sacred of all relics, which the Lord Himself of this theology consecrated and blessed, not only by the touch of His most holy flesh, but also by the embrace of His supremely holy and divine will, and left them here to be truly kissed, sought, and embraced. Happy, indeed, and blessed is he whom God may deem

worthy to have bestowed on him these treasures of the relics of Christ—or, rather, who understands that they are bestowed on him. For to whom are they not offered? As St. James says, "My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations;" for it is not for every one to have the grace and glory to accept these treasures, but only for the most elect of the sons of God.

'Many make pilgrimages to Rome and other holy places, to see the coat of Christ, the bones of the martyrs, the homes and the footsteps of the saints. I do not condemn them. But I grieve that we should be so ignorant of the true relics—namely, the passions and crosses which have sanctified the bones and relics of the martyrs, and have made them worthy of such veneration. Not only do we fail to accept them when offered to us at home, but we repulse them with all our might, and chase them away from place to place; whereas we ought to demand of God, with the utmost thirst, and with perennial tears, that He would give us such precious relics of Christ, the most sacred of all, as being the gift of the elect sons of God. So sacred are these relics, so precious are such treasures, that whereas others can be preserved in earth, or when most honoured, in gold, silver, jewels, silk, these can only be preserved in heavenly, living, reasonable, immortal, pure, holy receptacles, that is in the hearts of the faithful, inestimably more precious than all the gold and jewels in the world[h].'

[h] See Note 21.

These meditations accordingly may be appropriately concluded by the closing propositions of the Reformer's great disputation. They afford a vivid illustration of the spirit in which the faith of the Reformation found its impulse and its strength :—

'Away with all those prophets who say to the people of Christ, Peace, peace, and there is no peace.

'Blessed be all those prophets who say to the people of Christ, the Cross, the Cross, and there is no Cross.

'Christians must be exhorted that they strive to follow Christ, their Head, through punishments, deaths, and hell;

'And thus trust to enter heaven rather through many tribulations than through a tranquil security[i].'

[i] See Note 22.

LECTURE VIII.

THE FAITH OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

EPH. IV. 13–15.

Till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ; that we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; but speaking the truth in love, may grow up into Him in all things, which is the head, even Christ: from whom the whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.

IN the course of the Lectures of which the present sermon is the conclusion, we have mainly been engaged in considering the primary principles and grand outlines of Faith, and in elucidating and vindicating the foundations on which they rest. Whether, in the absence of verified knowledge, faith can afford us 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen;' what are the reasons which render belief in God, and trust in Him, a matter of moral obligation; what is the authority of

the testimony we possess to a direct supernatural revelation from Him; what have been the essential characteristics of the faith thus produced, first, in the case of Abraham and the Jews, secondly, by the life and teaching of our Lord, thirdly, by the gift of the Holy Spirit in the early Church; and lastly, how these essential characteristics of true faith were revived at the Reformation—such has been the course of our enquiry. But there remains a question to which a brief reference was made at the outset[a], and which demands a more complete answer than was then practicable—the question, namely, which is presented by the divisions in the Christian world, and by the disappearance of that unity, with its corresponding authority, which was in great measure possessed in the early Church—an unity of which so imposing a semblance existed in the Church of the middle ages, and which has been the ideal of Christians of every age. It was our Lord's prayer that all that believed on Him might be one, as He and the Father were one[b]; and the text speaks of its being a principal object of the dispensation of the Gospel that we might all come 'unto the unity of the faith[c].'

A strange and sad contrast to these hopes is exhibited by the present state of Christendom. It is a contrast which has been more visible and more painful since the Reformation; but it existed long before that

[a] Lect. I, pp. 24, 25. [b] St. John xvii. 20–23.

[c] Not '*in* the unity,' but *εἰς τὴν ἑνότητα*.

great movement. Those cardinal truths we have hitherto been considering touched the deepest elements in the spiritual, moral, and intellectual nature of man; and when they came to be tested by experience and reflection, they provoked questions of the greatest difficulty. Our Lord and His Apostles raised, of necessity, difficulties of this character. Their words pierced 'to the dividing asunder of the soul and spirit,' and of 'the joints and marrow' of the inner man [d]. Our Lord instituted Sacraments, and His Apostles instituted an organization of His Church, which involved the practical application, through all time, of principles which went to the root of the moral constitution of human nature, and which in their dividing and testing influence have proved 'sharper than any two-edged sword.' The early adherents of Christianity, indeed, were chiefly divided upon points which concerned the central revelation of the Gospel, such as the real Divinity of our Lord. In later times, such controversies have, for the most part, been waged by those who stand outside the Church; and the divisions by which, in later centuries, we have been perplexed, baffled, and disappointed have mainly concerned questions which can be debated without ostensibly impugning the truths and facts asserted in the Apostles' Creed. They have arisen upon such points as the relation of the human will to Divine grace, the operation of the Sacraments, the nature and efficacy of Faith, the

[d] Heb. iv. 12.

inspiration of the Scriptures, the authority of the Church, and the organization necessary for its full vitality. It is chiefly upon points of this kind that Christendom is now divided. There are, indeed, flagrant symptoms of a partial recurrence within the Church itself to the vital controversies of early times. But if the Apostles' Creed alone were in question, there would be visible throughout Christendom a vast and preponderant unity of belief. Although, however, our difficulties may thus for the most part relate to subjects which, from one point of view, may be called secondary, they are not the less real and lamentable. They mar the oneness of the faith, and the unity of the Church; they lead some minds to doubt whether a revelation so divergently interpreted can be a supernatural revelation at all; and they tempt others to submit, in a kind of desperation, to the authority of that great Church which asserts so persistently the plausible claim to be the one infallible and accessible guide, through all these labyrinths of error or of doubt.

Now, in meeting this difficulty, recourse is often had at the present day to a method which is marked by an error akin to one previously noticed in relation to the primary doctrines of the Faith. It would in some measure disparage the importance of these controversies, and would promote unity by dwelling on the comparative insignificance of our points of difference, as compared with our points of union. It is a line of argument which lends itself with great

facility to the service of a generous and warm-hearted eloquence; and exhortations conceived in this spirit are undoubtedly of great usefulness in their proper place. To borrow a phrase from Lord Bacon, we certainly are tempted by our passions and by our partial knowledge to so consider ourselves as members of particular churches, communities or parties, as to forget that we are Christians[e]; and it is well to have continually sounding in our ears eloquent voices reminding us of our common relation to our one Lord. But the reproaches so frequently cast on the Christian Church, on account of the intensity with which dogmatic and disciplinary questions have been contested within it, are sufficiently refuted by the very facts on which they are based. No condemnation, indeed, can well be too strong for the unchristian tempers which have been displayed by some of the chief actors in those contests. They are sins which cannot be too clearly marked with reprobation. Yet history proves that, if greater passion has been displayed in theological than in other controversies, these controversies have also exerted a more important influence than any others upon the spiritual, the moral, and even the political development of human life. It is indeed a safe general rule to regard with suspicion any judgment which pronounces mistaken the methods of action instinctively adopted by the great majority of mankind, and especially of civilised mankind. Those methods may be wrongly applied, and may produce

[e] Essay *Of Unity in Religion.*

disastrous results, but it is as perilous to repudiate the methods and tendencies themselves as to denounce syllogistic arguments or inductive reasoning. When we observe that in every age, without exception, theological controversies have aroused more heat, more excitement, more energy than any others, it is only wise to presume that there is some other than a bad reason for it.

The tendency, in fact, of some modern historians to undervalue the influence upon human nature of variations in religious and moral principles is strangely at variance with the evidence before them. It may be that the comparative stability of the social and moral order established among us renders it difficult for us to realize the possibility of any social system being undermined by the mere force of religious ideas. Yet the history of the world would appear to be, in great measure, a history of the manner in which religious ideas, often of an apparently abstract and subtle character, can determine the future of whole races, and of vast regions of the earth. Students of ecclesiastical history, for instance, are often perplexed at the large place occupied in the early Church by the controversies with Gnosticism; and are inclined to wonder that such strange speculations should have had so much attraction for some minds, and should have excited so much alarm among the Christian Fathers. But the late Dean Mansel, in his Lectures on that subject delivered in this University, shewed how close an affinity those

speculations possess with some of the German philosophy which has so largely influenced the thought and character of modern times[f]; and, perhaps, a still more forcible illustration of the importance of the Gnostic controversies is furnished by the spectacle forced upon our attention in India. In Brahmanism and Buddhism we may observe the practical result of theories akin to Gnosticism, carried out on a large scale, and applied generally to human nature. The fascination which can be exerted by such dreams, and their disastrous consequences, are there exhibited in a portentous experience[g].

But illustrations may be found nearer home. There were of course periods in the history of the Western Church, when ideas and practices which have since culminated in the full Roman Catholic system were for the first time being introduced. In many of the men to whom the earliest definite intimation of such ideas was due, few can fail to recognize Christian teachers and leaders who, both for their personal character and for the services they rendered to the Church of their day, deserve, in the main, our warm admiration and our sincere sympathy. It would have required great discernment—a discernment given only to an Athanasius or an Augustine—to perceive in the first intimations of the idea of transubstantiation the introduction of

[f] *The Gnostic Heresies of the First and Second Centuries*, pp. 14, 15, 147, 165.

[g] See Mansel's *Gnostic Heresies*, pp. 29–32.

a principle which would modify the whole of Christian worship, or in certain expressions and assertions of the Popes the germ of a doctrine which was destined to develop into Papal infallibility, and gradually to subvert the whole constitution of the Western Church. Yet these consequences were latent in those assumptions and in those forms of expression. A similar lesson may be drawn from the history of the Protestant churches. They have, as by some internal law, allied themselves with special political and social dispositions, and they have severally tended to develop peculiar aspects of character and phases of thought.

The fact may in great measure be explained by a consideration which, in the present day, is urgently insisted upon in most other departments of life, but which is strangely forgotten in respect to theological truths. It is fully recognized in other matters how the aggregation of men in society, together with the accumulation of influences in successive generations, tends to magnify special tendencies, and, by exaggerating the degree in which they act, almost to transform them in kind. It would, for instance, be harsh and unjust, and contrary to the example of Athanasius himself, to pronounce that every bishop who favoured for a time the Arian or Semi-Arian party was himself consciously untrue to the Christian faith. But apart from the question of the orthodoxy of individuals, the danger was that what would sometimes appear but a slight error in an individual, might,

if it had been perpetuated, still more, if it had been formulated, have tended to establish a school and mode of thought in which the distinctive truths of Christianity would have been obliterated. Human societies are organisms, subject to laws which resemble those of other organic bodies. Under a sufficiently powerful microscope, our bodies, which to an ordinary eye seem to consist of continuous matter, would be seen really to consist of a vast number of distinct atoms. Distinct as they are, they nevertheless combine under special laws, and form one organism, which, in its turn, reacts on the atoms themselves, and compels them, as it were, to move and act in ways not their own. Similarly, let us suppose a sufficiently distant observer, and we might conceive him viewing one of our human societies as a single body, continuous, not disunited, and compelling the individuals of which it is composed to move in ways they would never have chosen of themselves. To pursue the analogy a little further—just as a slight morbid process in the mutual relations of the atoms of our bodies may develop into a disease which involves the whole organism, so a slight error of doctrine or a fault of discipline, in relation to a few members of the Christian Church, may in course of time develop into a dangerous and fatal disease. The question is not as to the importance of the error, or of the morbid process, in relation to the particular atoms in which it arises, but as to its importance in relation to the whole organism. It is thus that the

whole Papal system has grown out of errors and assumptions which it was extremely difficult to combat with sufficient vigour as they arose, and that the character and future of other Churches has been damaged by their unfortunate disregard of certain elements of Church doctrine and discipline. Ecclesiastical history, in short, is a record of the manner in which under various temptations and influences, often operating almost unconsciously, forms of Christian life and thought have been developed, which, like the Roman Catholic system, or the Calvinistic system, or the system of the Greek Church, have moulded, and have sometimes perverted, the character, the habits, and the tone of thought of whole races, and of many generations.

The facts of history thus afford conclusive evidence that the instinct of the Christian world, or rather the instinct of mankind, has not been mistaken in attributing extreme importance to those variations in faith, even on points apparently secondary, by which Christendom has been, and is still, so grievously divided. This being the case, the question presses on us with much urgency by what means we are to seek a solution of the problems presented by these divergences, and what is to be our guide in practically applying that revelation which has been committed to the Church, and which is recorded in the Scriptures. In dealing with this problem we have first to consider the solution of it which is offered by the Roman Catholic Church, namely, that

she—or rather, as the claim now stands, the Pope—is endued with an infallible authority to decide all such uncertainties, and that it is our duty to submit ourselves absolutely to his judgment, abjuring reliance, in the ultimate resort, upon our own reason, or upon the dictates of our own conscience. This has now become the paramount doctrine of that Church, and the first thing she demands of all who come to her is absolute submission to her authority. She represents that submission as the necessary complement of a true belief, and she seems often regarded, by those who reject the principle of faith, as simply adding one article more to the creed of believers.

In view of this claim, let us consider the position to which we have been brought by our previous enquiries. We have been lifted to an immense height above the merely moral and natural level from which we started. Recognizing that our souls are in communion with God, and that the voice of our consciences is His voice, we have been led by that voice to acknowledge His revelation, vouchsafed in successive utterances, until at length He spoke to us by His Son, in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. We believe that our Lord, after His ascension, gave a further revelation to His Apostles, bestowed the gift of the Holy Spirit on those who believed on Him, assured all who were faithful of final salvation, and gave them the earnest of it in ever increasing deliverance from sin, and in growth in grace. We are in direct communion with Christ. His Spirit speaks

in our hearts, and is our ever present guide. Now let it be observed by what means a Christian has reached these heights of faith, and has been raised to a communion so vastly beyond the condition of man apart from Christ. Has it been by reliance on any such external and infallible authority as that of a visible Church? On the contrary. At the commencement of this grand ascent, the word Church could have no vital meaning for him. The authority of the Church is insisted on by Roman Catholic divines as the authority of a society founded by the Son of God incarnate; and a man must believe that the Son of God was really incarnate before he has any reason at all to believe in the authority of a society founded by Him. It cannot seriously be supposed that a society like the Roman Church, or a person like the Pope, can claim our belief by virtue of a bare assertion that they are the depositaries of all truth, without reference to any prior principles or facts as evidence in support of their claim. If the Roman Church is to have any valid claim on us, we must already, on grounds prior to her authority, have accepted belief in God, belief in the fact of His having revealed His will to us by Prophets and Apostles, and belief in His incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ. These immense acts of faith must have been made before the Roman Catholic claims have so much as an intelligible foundation on which to rest. A man must believe in the first article of the Creed before he believes in the second; and he

must believe in the second before he believes in the third, or in any alleged development from it. A man must be a believer in God before he is a believer in Christ as the Son of God, and he must be a believer in Christ before he is a Roman Catholic.

If, then, we are capable of arriving at these momentous conclusions on their own evidence, and by virtue of the inherent claim they assert over our conscience and our reason, does it not seem a very improbable supposition that their application and development in detail, whether in point of truth or of practice, should imperatively need a miraculous interposition in the form of a visible authority which was not necessary in order to enable us to reach them? Vastly important as the developments of Christian doctrine and practice have been shewn to be, they cannot be compared in importance to the primary truth that God was incarnate in Jesus Christ. But that truth must be accepted before the question of the character or the infallibility of the Church He founded becomes a practical one. What sufficient reason is there for supposing that the secondary principles of truth and practice need a support wholly different from that required by the original principles on which they rest? The assumption, in fact, incessantly reiterated by Roman Catholic controversialists, that revelation is valueless without a living and infallible guide, is at all events liable to the objection that it is contrary to the whole analogy of faith up to the point at which the assumption

becomes intelligible. We are brought to faith in God, to faith in Christ, and to faith in the Holy Spirit, to belief in our Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, on one set of grounds; and then we are suddenly told that we are helpless creatures, and cannot see our way for a single moment without having an infallible authority at our side. Such an utter annihilation of our independence, at the very moment when it has carried us to so lofty a height, may be conceivable; but it is certainly in the highest degree improbable.

If, indeed, we recall more specifically the method by which we reach the grand primary conclusions of faith, this fatal vice of the Roman Catholic argument may be placed in a still stronger light. It rests upon the assumption, more or less clearly acknowledged, of a certain untrustworthiness and incapacity in the conscience and reason of the individual, even when seeking divine guidance, in relation to spiritual truths. But on what is our whole belief in God and in Christ founded? On nothing but the imperative dictates of that conscience and that reason, dealing with the personal and historic facts presented to us. The primary elements of the Christian argument are necessarily common to Roman Catholics and to other Christians; and they involve an appeal to the moral obligation of obeying the imperative dictates of the conscience. It has been shewn, in the course of these Lectures, that scepticism with respect to the existence of God ultimately

implies scepticism with respect to 'the categorical imperative' of the conscience [h]. It involves a doubt—an avowed doubt—whether right be really supreme over wrong in the universe, whether there be a Judge of all the earth, who will execute judgment and righteousness in respect to all our acts, words, and thoughts. If the dictates of conscience affirming the reality of that judgment be uncertain, everything is uncertain. We may speculate about the existence of a First Cause; we may come to a theological opinion that such a Cause exists. But we cease to be imperatively bound to believe in a personal God who claims the whole allegiance of our souls. We are no longer in intimate and vital relation to Him. It is upon the intensity and the paramount obligation of this dictate of the conscience that the whole vitality of religion depends, and when a man begins to doubt the primary truths of faith, the main effort of the Christian must be to force him back relentlessly upon the witness of his conscience, to insist upon its imperious authority, and to ask if he can either dispute the meaning of its utterances, or dare refuse obedience to them. The conscience and the reason—these are the two faculties to which we must in the last resort appeal in order to sustain belief in God and in Christ; and just in proportion to the intensity with which their witness is apprehended and obeyed is the reality of that belief. But the corner-stone of religion having thus been based upon the unreserved appeal to these

[h] See Lect. II, p. 44.

two faculties, the Roman Catholic system suddenly calls upon us to abandon all confidence in them, and to assume that they are valueless without an infallible interpreter. After they have served to lead us to the most momentous of all possible conclusions, the Roman Church suddenly cuts the ground from under our feet, and warns us not to advance a step further upon such insecure footing. If this warning be justified, every step that has been taken beyond the evidence of mere sense has been unjustifiable; and faith ceases to have a valid starting-point. Conscience says, with respect to belief in God and in Christ, 'it must be, and I ought to accept it.' But the moment it says this respecting the secondary points in question in this Lecture, the Roman Catholic Church exclaims, 'you are an untrustworthy guide and must submit to my superior authority.' Such an argument is an act of religious suicide; and it is accordingly not surprising that, in the countries where it prevails, men are driven either into blind superstition or into Agnosticism, if not Atheism. Some men and women, under the influence of fear or habit, trust themselves to the Church on her mere assertion. The rest yield to the compulsion of their reason and their conscience so far as to reject her claims; but they have learnt the lesson of distrust in those faculties too thoroughly to base a reasonable faith upon them.

To take a definite illustration from recent facts, consider the case of the distinguished ecclesiastical

historian who refused to accept the Vatican decree affirming the Pope's Infallibility. He declares that, according to his convictions, facts are against it, and that his historical conscience forbids his acceptance of it. How is he answered? Not, in the last resort, by a reply to his arguments, but by a simple demand for submission[i]. The Church has spoken—*Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas.* But if Dr. Döllinger is incompetent to decide whether, as a matter of fact, the Popes have been infallible, how can he be competent to judge of the great historical facts on which the whole authority of the Scriptures reposes, and of the truth of the evidence on which the Christian religion is based? There must be some fact or truth from which even the Roman Catholic system started, and which is prior to it; and if our capacity for judging a subsequent fact or theological dogma be denied, we must abandon confidence in our capacity to judge of prior facts and dogmas.

Accordingly, in rejecting the claims of the Roman Catholic Church, we are not simply refusing to add one article of faith the more to those which we have already accepted. On the contrary, we are refusing to admit a principle which would be fatal to all faith whatever. There is a terrible truth in the saying of an English divine, that a consistent Roman Catholic is a man 'who has had the backbone of his conscience broken;' and to break the backbone of the

[i] See Note 23.

conscience is to break the backbone of faith. It is thus that the primary principles of what is called Protestantism involve a revival of the essential conditions of vital faith. Like many designations which seem to arise by accident, that word is the key to the principles reasserted at the Reformation. It implies the right and the duty of the human conscience to say *No*—to say *No* to assumptions and to claims which are inconsistent with its clear and imperative dictates, to protest against abuses, usurpations, and falsehoods, however sanctioned. It is this general right to say *No*, as distinct from opposition to particular errors, which is denied by the Roman Catholic Church in such cases as those of Dr. Döllinger, and in her elementary assumption of infallible authority. But the right to say *No* is correlative with the right to say *Yes*. The duty of saying *No* involves the duty of saying *Yes;* and it is precisely because the conscience and the reason have this important prerogative that they are bound, under penalty of such terrible consequences, to exercise it, and to exercise it aright. When Luther declared at Worms—'It is neither safe nor honest for a man to act against his conscience—here I stand, I can do no otherwise,' he was not merely protesting against particular errors; he was vindicating the principle from which faith originally arose, and to which it must perpetually return for its reinvigoration.

If, then, a Roman Catholic should ask us why, having advanced so far in faith as to accept the

revelation of the Creeds and of the Scriptures, we refuse to advance further, and to accept the infallible authority of the Church, our answer may be at once very simple and very decisive. We advance in faith so far as reason and conscience are allowed to accompany us, but no further. Neither the prophets of the Old Testament, nor our Lord, nor His Apostles, ask us, for one moment, to silence our reason or our conscience. They ask us, indeed, to go beyond the evidence of reason, on their authority, and to trust them further than we can see. But they claim to commend themselves 'to every man's conscience in the sight of God;' and they never require us to close our eyes to the dictates of moral or intellectual conviction. It is because the Roman Church does make that request, because her first requirement of all who approach her is to submit their highest faculties to her authority, that we repudiate her. In a word, it is not merely because we protest against particular doctrines that we accept the honourable designation of Protestants. But we enter a solemn protest on behalf of conscience, on behalf of reason, on behalf of science; and we confine our allegiance to those divinely inspired authorities, and to those sacred Scriptures, which base their whole appeal upon these elementary voices of God within the soul and in the visible world. In a word, there are two extremes in this question of faith—Rationalism and Romanism. Rationalism consists in denying that there is any supernatural authority or supernatural revelation

whatever; Romanism consists in denying that any coordinate and independent authority can be exercised by the conscience and the reason. True faith consists in asserting that there are supernatural authorities, but that no supernatural authority can require us to silence the voice of reason and conscience.

But it is objected, that, in this case, every Christian is left to his private judgment in respect to those secondary points of faith and practice which have been referred to. Such an objection leaves out of sight that which is in several respects the most important privilege of Christians, and which is the cardinal fact in relation to the point under discussion. That fact is the presence with Christians, in proportion to their faithfulness, of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth. 'It is expedient for you,' our Lord said to His disciples, 'that I go away; for if I go not away the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart I will send Him unto you;' and 'when He, the Spirit of Truth is come, He will guide you into all truth[k].' No more ample promise could be recorded. According to the whole tenour of those gracious discourses, it applies to all faithful Christians; and it does but express in more direct and touching language that assurance of the gift of the Spirit which is recognised throughout the New Testament as the characteristic blessing of the present dispensation. St. Paul accordingly describes it as the especial office of the Spirit to preserve the unity of Christians

[k] St. John xvi. 7, 13.

by bringing into harmony the exercise of all their various gifts. 'There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal. For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit. To another faith, by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing, by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles, to another prophecy, to another discerning of spirits, to another divers kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues. But all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will. For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free, and have all been made to drink into one Spirit[1].'

Such is St. Paul's view of the true source of Christian unity. As members of the body of Christ, we are animated by the life of one personal Spirit; we are guided by His teaching, and controlled by His will. Here is the one sufficient reply to the Roman Catholic argument, that we need an infallible authority to direct us in the interpretation of the Scriptures

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 4–13.

and in the perplexities of moral duty. Whatever apparent force such an argument may carry is due to a disregard of the truth on which we have been dwelling. The answer is that though we cannot appeal to any visible and infallible Authority, we do possess an unerring Guidance; and that we possess it, moreover, not merely in the ambiguous, distant, and tardy utterances of a human oracle, but in the voice of a Divine Spirit ever present with us, and helping us in all our infirmities. In truth, the Roman assertion of the necessity of a human and external authority amounts to a denial of this internal and Divine guidance, and to a high offence against it. The claim of the Pope to overrule every individual conscience in matters of faith and morals involves, if our Lord's promise and its interpretation by St. Paul be true, a claim to overrule the voice of the Holy Spirit; and he who submits to the Pope renounces the guidance of the only Authority who can be really infallible. The apprehension, indeed, of moral and spiritual truth is necessarily a moral and spiritual, and not a merely intellectual act, and consequently it can never be maintained by any formal dictation. It will be true and living in proportion as the heart and conscience, as well as the intellect, are quickened, and this spiritual life can only be assured by that Holy Spirit who is present with every soul in proportion to its faith in Him. The errors and sins of Christians, and of the Church as a whole, are only too well explained by their failure to submit them-

selves in all things to His direction and inspiration. Intellectual truth in spiritual things is ultimately inseparable from moral truth; and there is something actually immoral in the attempt to establish an infallible dogmatic authority independent of a corresponding security for the moral condition of those who are subjected to it. The Spirit of God acts by the opposite method. He works in the hearts of Christ's people to purify their conscience and their will, and in proportion as they yield to this influence are they qualified to 'know of the doctrine[m],' and to become united in the truth.

It will further be seen that this principle provides a safeguard in itself against the undue assertion of private opinions. It follows from it that it is the bounden duty of every Christian, it is implied in the charter of his admission as a member of the Church, to maintain, as far as possible, union with his fellow Christians, and to act and think in harmony with them. This duty has a natural foundation; but it is elevated to an unprecedented and unsurpassable height by the doctrine of our Lord's relation to those who believe in Him. Every Christian, by virtue of his faith, is in union with Christ, and by means of Christ's Spirit is under His continual influence. The inevitable consequence is, that any Christian who fails to cultivate, so far as he can, communion with another, fails, in some measure, to cultivate communion with His Master

[m] St. John vii. 17.

and his Master's Spirit. Communion with Christ, subjection to His gracious influences, the gradual discernment of His will and His character, the increasing apprehension of His grace and truth—these are the essential elements in the Christian life, and in proportion as they are realised in individuals is the Church, as a whole, in a position to deal successfully with the problems now under our consideration. 'Abide in Me,' says the Saviour, 'and I in you.' But the Christian is mistaken who thinks that this communion with Christ, and this influence of His Spirit, is only to be obtained in secret, spiritual intercourse. Christ, according to His saying, is to be discerned, in His various characteristics and graces, in His members. Accordingly, whatever Christian soul we meet, no matter in how humble or how lofty a station, no matter whether it be strong or weak, learned or simple, there, in proportion to its faith, is Christ by His Spirit working, and there may we discern glimpses of His grace and rays of His truth. The vast and infinite variety of human souls appears thus to furnish, as it were, an infinite number of reflecting surfaces,, from each of which some gleams of the Saviour's glory and truth are displayed. It is this which renders respect to others such an essential element in the Christian character. In every Christian we meet a man in whom the Saviour is present, and we are bound to treat him with some of that reverence which is due to his Master and to our own. It is thus that, in the teaching of St. Paul,

the principle of charity is inculcated in indissoluble connection with the truth that we constitute the body of Christ and are His members in particular [n]; and the same truth is illustrated in the memorable tradition, that St. John was incessantly reiterating at the close of his life, 'Little children, love one another.'

It is instructive to observe, that the very first utterances of the Christian Fathers bespeak their sense of the paramount importance of this principle, and of its correlative duty. The few remains we have of St. Ignatius are pregnant with an anxiety for the maintenance of unity among his followers, scarcely less deep than that of the beloved and loving Apostle. He is celebrated for the strong expressions he utters—whatever recension of his Epistles may be accepted—in support of the authority of Bishops. But without entering on the controversial side of those expressions, one thing is patent—that his practical purpose is to ensure the maintenance of unity among his flock [o]. The Bishop is to him the symbol and instrument of unity, and it is with a view to this result that St. Ignatius is more immediately concerned to maintain episcopal authority. To the steady adherence of the early Christian Church to this principle seems due, in great measure, its firm adhesion to the cardinal truths of the faith. In the first centuries, as in subsequent ones, it is very observable

[n] 1 Cor. xii, xiii.

[o] See Robertson's *History of the Christian Church*, vol. i. p. 24.

how national and individual peculiarities led Churches and Teachers to lay undue stress on particular truths and aspects of truth, until the analogy of the faith became distorted, and grave practical heresies tended to arise. But in the primitive Church such dangers were then averted by the check which never failed to be afforded by some other community, perhaps in a distant part of the world, which apprehended the truth from another side, and was not liable to the same temptation. It does not seem too much to say, that so long as the whole Church remained in free and charitable intercommunion, heresies, whether doctrinal or practical, were sure to find their check and their correction. To offer one illustration, it is an interesting historical circumstance, and explains many of the facts on which Roman controversialists build their arguments, that Rome being the capital of the Empire, all impulses and theories found their way thither, checked and balanced each other, and thus produced a kind of equilibrium at the centre of the Christian world; much as political or social theories which are exaggerated in the provinces are soon reduced to their true proportions when they are brought to London.

But, on these principles, it is a cardinal rule for safety, alike in thought and in action, to bear in mind that neither as individuals, nor as churches, still less as particular parties within a church, is it possible for us to possess all gifts, or to perceive all the bearings of truth. To attain the full Christian

character and to acquire a comprehensive appreciation of Christian truth a man must diligently cultivate communion with other Christians, must believe that they all have some message for him, and can display to him some gleams of his Master's truth and grace. In this spirit, in daily life, he will at once submit himself to teachers and learn from those he rules; in this spirit he will visit the poor, and will listen for his Master's voice by the bedside of the sick and from the mouths of babes. In respect to matters of controversy within the Church, he will feel that, at all events, no judgment can be relied on, which is out of harmony with the tradition and conviction of the Church in its purer times, and in its deeper current. The maxim, *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, may be somewhat rhetorical in form; but as implying that every Christian, and every community of Christians, ought to be in harmony with the permanent, the general, and the essential convictions of the Church from the earliest times, it is but an expression of St. Paul's principle that we are all members of one body. It is a principle so essential to the character of the Christian Church that we cannot despair of its being visibly asserted. If the poet could look forward to a time when

> 'The battle flags were furled
> In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world,'

how can we be so faint-hearted as not to anticipate a time when Christian controversies will be sub-

mitted to a Parliament of Christians, a Federation of the Church?

But however this may be, these considerations seem sufficient to show that, subject to the obligations of Christian communion, and, above all, of unity and harmony with the primitive Church, we may well be content to seek the gradual solution of the theological and moral problems presented by the state of Christendom in the patient application of the same principles which have led us to acceptance of the Christian faith itself, and in reliance on the same Divine aid which has guided us so far. That aid is to be sought in the exercise and cooperation of all our various gifts—spiritual, moral, and intellectual, and in all the spheres of our action, whether ecclesiastical or political or social. In all we are acting as members of one body, and contributing to our mutual edification. In the natural sphere this process and the result towards which it tends are more and more recognised. The controversies and divisions of the Christian Church are urged as a reason for distrust in its claims by men who see no difficulty in recognizing the gradual education of the world at large, and who are confident of the steady solution of social and political problems. Why should not Christians have at least as much faith as philosophers? The history of our disunion is the history of our lack of faith and of our sin; and in proportion as we submit our whole hearts and minds, alike in life and in thought, in study and

in action, in theology, in philosophy, and in science, to the influence of that Spirit who is the source of all unity, will He harmonize our conflicting impulses and our various views of truth, 'till we all come unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.'

Such a faith, such a grasp of the whole course of the Christian Church, and such a vision of the future, ought to be the special prerogative of Englishmen. It was exemplified at the crisis of the Reformation, when such questions were even more distressing than they are now, by the great theologian to whom we owe that work on *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, which is on all hands recognised as a characteristic expression of the mind of the English Church. The force with which the problems we have been considering was then presented to the minds of our Fathers was overwhelming, alike in its suddenness and in its vehemence. Audacious as was the claim of the Roman Church of that day to represent an undivided Christendom, it had nevertheless imposed on the minds of men to a degree which cannot now be appreciated. Theoretically to divines, and practically to men in general, the Pope was the ultimate source of all spiritual and moral authority; he was the centre of the world, and his annihilation was like the annihilation of the sphere itself. It forcibly illustrates the tremendous weight of that

authority to reflect that nothing was adequate to its overthrow but an appeal to the word of God Himself. Satirists and humanists might countermine it; but it was not until the Scriptures were brought home to the people at large, not until they felt that they could appeal to a diviner authority than that of the Pope, that a real reformation was practicable. But when this vast, though usurped, authority had been overthrown by means of the Bible, men felt a craving for something which could visibly and adequately supply its place; the Napoleonic genius of Calvin erected the Scriptures into a similar authority, and the principle arose that the law contained in them ought to serve, like that of the Pope, for our direction in all things, without exception[p]. Such a theory possessed an immense attraction in an age which was sensible of struggling, through a period of anarchy, from an old order into a new one. We have not yet emerged from that period, but our difficulties, heavy as they are, are not so severe as those which pressed upon our Fathers.

Now, amidst this turmoil, when the Papal party on the one side, and the Puritan party on the other, were clamouring for the assertion of only one law of existence, an English divine, a 'mild and humble'

[p] Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity, The Second Book.* 'Concerning their first position who urge Reformation in the Church of England: namely, that Scripture is the only rule of all things which in this life may be done by men.'

man, as he is described, a country clergyman, and deriving, perhaps, some of his calm wisdom from that meditative life, had the courage to say to these disputants, in a voice which commanded attention, that instead of there being only one law to determine their actions and their thoughts, there were an indefinite number; and that the wisdom of life consisted in striking a just balance between them, and applying them all in their various places and degrees. 'There are in men,' said Hooker[q], 'operations, some natural, some rational, some supernatural, some politic, some finally ecclesiastical; which if we measure not each by his own proper law, whereas the things themselves are so different, there will be in our understanding and judgment of them confusion.' The first book of his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, from which these words are quoted, contains the sum and substance of his argument; and it may well be regarded as the most characteristic expression of the English mind on these great controversies. Its comprehensive review of the whole constitution of human nature has for its practical purpose to prove, that 'to measure by any one kind of law all the actions of men were to confound the admirable order, wherein God hath disposed all laws, each as in nature, so in degree, distinct from other[r].' A vivid apprehension, indeed, of this truth is the virtue of an Englishman as much in religion and in theology as in politics. English divines have ever been too sensible of the

[q] *Eccl. Polity*, Book I. ch. xvi. 5. [r] *Eccl. Polity*, I. xvi. 7.

vastness and complexity of human nature to deal with it by system and rule. They have striven to allow every element of life its place and its authority. Reason, conscience, science, politics—all have been gathered within their view; and Faith, though superior to them all, has none the less been maintained in harmony with them, and in sympathy with their just claims. Failures and errors in such an attempt have been inevitable; but no grander effort has ever been made—none more deeply rooted in faith in God, who is the 'Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.'

It is, indeed, a habit of mind easily misrepresented, and perhaps vulgarised. A distinguished writer, who is also an eminent statesman, has recently said that 'Luther, . . . the Huguenots, the Puritans—these, among them, have taken up the imaginative sides of the great reforming movement. They exhibit,' he says, 'all its poetry. Anglicanism shows little but the prose of compromise and the *Via Media*[s].' But is poetry thus to be confined to one-sided systems, moulded like the Roman Catholic, or the Calvinistic, after the model of a human imagination, and corresponding to a human ideal? If so, Plato and Bacon were right in banishing poetry from their Utopias. But the English Church system has a large poetry—a poetry like that of Shakspeare—indifferent to apparent unities of time

[s] Mr. Gladstone in an article entitled, *The Sixteenth Century arraigned before the Nineteenth*, contained in *Gleanings of Past Years*, vol. iii. p. 224.

and place, chiefly careful to seize the grand truths and facts, whether of faith, or reason, or history, which are encountered in the great drama of the world, and to bring them together just so far as to enable them to produce their natural and awful impression upon the soul. Similarly its Articles are like the Aphorisms of its great Philosopher—no arbitrary anticipations of a final theological system, but the modest interpretations of observed facts and truths, waiting to be harmonized by a fuller light, and a deeper experience. While reserving that ultimate right of protestation which has just been vindicated, and appealing to the Scriptures as the sole ultimate authority, the greatest English divines have been unanimous in the desire to submit themselves first to their own Church, and then to the Church universal [t], and have shrunk, as from a fatal vice, from any positive assertion of their own theories or systems.

Such is the lofty and comprehensive, but at the same time modest, creed which a Bampton Lecturer on the subject of Faith is concerned to defend. It is summed up in the motto of this University, *Dominus illuminatio mea*:—God the light of the soul in the conscience, the light of man in His Son Jesus Christ, who lived and died and rose again for us and ascended into heaven, the light of His Church in holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by His Spirit, the light of reason in history and science, and in all the manifestations of His wondrous works,

[t] See Note 24.

and finally, the light of all who put their trust in Him, by the blessed assistance of that Spirit who was bestowed on us, as at this season, to guide us to a right judgment in all things. Such are the principles it has been the object of these Lectures to vindicate. That neither Faith may be sacrificed to Science as by Rationalism, nor Science and Reason to Faith as by Roman Catholicism, nor both to a system as in sectarian schemes, but that Faith and Science, Conscience and Reason, may each have their own, and that God in Jesus Christ may be all in all—such is the design of the Christian culture of this venerable University, and such the spirit which it is its mission to revive in this perilous but noble age.

VITA ANIMAE DEUS EST; HAEC CORPORIS. HÂC FUGIENTE, SOLVITUR HOC; PERIT HAEC, DESTITUENTE DEO.

(Quoted by JOHN of SALISBURY from *modernorum quidam* in *De nugis Curialium*, p. 127, ed. Lugd.)

APPENDIX

CONTAINING

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE 1, p. 13.

THE following is the passage from Professor Huxley's monograph on Hume, to which reference is made in the text:—

'Kant has said that the business of philosophy is to answer three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and For what may I hope? But it is pretty plain that these three resolve themselves, in the long run, into the first. For rational expectation and moral action are alike based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification, unless its subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as the guarantee of credibility.

'Fundamentally, then, philosophy is the answer to the question, What can I know? and it is by applying itself to this problem, that philosophy is properly distinguished as a special department of scientific research. What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or biological, consists of the answers which mankind have been able to give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of the mental operations which constitute thinking, while philosophy, in the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the first principles which those operations assume or imply.

'But though, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy,

its distinctness from other branches of scientific investigation may be properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of the subject-matter, it is intimately, and, indeed, inseparably, connected with one branch of science. For it is obviously impossible to answer the question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear understanding as to what is meant by knowledge; and, having settled this point, the next step is to inquire how we came by that which we allow to be knowledge; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the knowable or not. While, finally, inasmuch as What can I know? not only refers to truest knowledge of the past or of the present, but to the confident expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to ask, further, What justification can be alleged for trusting to the guidance of our expectations in practical conduct?

'It surely needs no argumentation to show that the first problem cannot be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and the determination of how much of these contents may be called knowledge. Nor can the second problem be dealt with in any other fashion; for it is only by the observation of the growth of knowledge that we can rationally hope to discover how knowledge grows. But the solution of the third problem simply involves the discussion of the data obtained by the investigation of the foregoing two.

'Thus, in order to answer three out of the four subordinate questions into which What can I know? breaks up, we must have recourse to that investigation of mental phenomena, the results of which are embodied in the science of psychology.'—*Hume*, by Professor Huxley, 1879; Part II, ch. i. p. 48.

NOTE 2, p. 30.

The word δοκιμάζω appears uniformly employed to express careful examination, testing and putting to the proof. Thus St. Peter applies it (1 Pet. i. 7) to the trial of gold by fire. In the Septuagint it is similarly used for the refining of silver. So St. Paul employs it when he says (1 Cor. iii. 13) that the fire shall try every man's work. It is hence applied to express the use of severe moral and intellectual tests. When St. Paul says (1 Cor. xi. 28), 'Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup,' the word is δοκιμαζέτω ἑαυτόν. A still more characteristic use of the word, perhaps, is to be found in the quotation from the LXX. in Heb. iii. 9: 'When your fathers tempted me, proved me (ἐδοκίμασάν με) and saw my works forty years.' To quote another forcible instance, when St. Paul says, 1 Thess. ii. 4, 'As we were allowed of God to be put in trust with the Gospel, even so we speak, not as pleasing men, but God, which trieth our hearts,' the Greek for 'allowed' and for 'trieth' is the word now under consideration. God had not merely allowed St. Paul to be put in trust with the Gospel. He had approved him after severe trial; and St. Paul accordingly spoke not as pleasing men, but as pleasing the God who continually tries and examines our hearts. Thus St. Paul does not treat the knowledge of God as something to be taken up or laid down by that simple exercise of volition which we associate with liking and disliking. It was a matter which required testing, proving, examining, by the same kind of patient and diligent process as we apply to test the character of the precious metals; and the fault of the heathen was that they shrank from the effort involved in this process. This interpretation of the expression is further confirmed by the character of the word which the Apostle uses for knowledge, ἐπίγνωσις, which is properly applied to express exact and accurate knowledge.

The accusation, in fact, which St. Paul makes against the Greeks and Romans is that although the nature of God, His eternal power and Godhead, were to a great extent discernible

by them, provided they sought that knowledge with due earnestness and sincerity, they did not deem it worth while to bestow sufficient exertion upon this high aim. They did not bend their whole moral and intellectual energies to the search after God, and the knowledge of Him consequently escaped them. The Apostle's words, thus understood, seem to correspond very justly with the course of Greek and Roman thought and life. His statement that 'that which may be known of God is manifest in them,' and that 'the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead,' appears to be justified on the whole by the course of Greek philosophy. It has been doubted whether any absolutely valid demonstration of the existence and character of God has yet been offered. But if we look at the facts, it is unquestionable that the highest thought of Greece, with its combination of moral and intellectual considerations, led to a deep conviction that the world was in the hands of one God, and that a righteous God. It was this combination of moral and intellectual considerations which chiefly distinguished Platonic thought; and it was in that school of philosophy that these conceptions were brought to the highest point they have attained without the aid of revelation. There was indeed something in the Socratic and Platonic method which is very aptly described by the word we have been considering. The Platonic dialectic was an elaborate analysis of the various conceptions which were presented to it, trying them as it were by fire, until only the pure gold remained. It is of the utmost importance to remember that this process of trial and examination did, as a matter of fact, conduct the human mind to the very threshold of revealed truth. The Christian revelation appeared in the fulness of time to guide it into the recesses of the sacred temple.

NOTE 3, p. 32.

Thus Professor Max Müller, in his Hibbert Lectures for the year 1878, says (pp. 171–2)—'All that remains to us now is to advance, and to see how far we shall succeed in accounting for the origin of religious ideas, without taking refuge in the admission either of a primeval revelation or of a religious instinct. We have our five senses, and we have the world before us, such as it is, vouched for by the evidence of the senses. The question is, how do we arrive at a world beyond? or rather, how did our Aryan forefathers arrive there?' Without enquiring whether Professor Max Müller is justified in treating the religious instinct as a mere phrase, it would seem strange that all reference to the moral sense or conscience should be omitted in this enumeration of the possible sources of religion. Even if it were due to evolution, so, on the same hypothesis, are our five senses themselves, and it has a similar claim to be regarded as an element in the case. A sense of the difference between right and wrong can hardly be regarded as included within 'our five senses,' or 'the world before us, such as it is, vouched by the evidence of the senses.' But, in some measure, it has always been a force in the world; and a discussion of the origin of religion which fails to give it a prominent place would seem extremely imperfect.

A similar enquiry is suggested when Professor Max Müller says (p. 204) that the first prayer in the Veda 'that sounds really strange to us' is when divine beings 'are implored to keep us from guilt. This,' he proceeds, 'is clearly a later thought.' Why? Has any state of society been yet brought to light in which human beings had no conscience?

A little further, at p. 231, Professor Max Müller says, 'These two ideas—darkness and sin—which seem to us far apart, are closely connected with each other in the minds of the early Aryans.' How can such ideas seem far apart to those who are familiar with such words as 'Everyone that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light,' or with the declaration, 'This then is the message that we have heard of

Him, and declare unto you, that God is light and in Him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth. But if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin'? The connection which Professor Max Müller deems so strange has been at the very root of Christian thought; and it is difficult to understand whom he can have had in view when he says that the ideas of darkness and sin seem far apart '*to us.*'

In connection with this subject, the following collection of testimonies from classical authors on the subject of the conscience may be interesting. The author is indebted for it to the kindness of Dr. Watson, of St. John's College, Oxford.

Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum coelum suspeximus, coelestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, quo haec regantur? . . . Quod qui dubitet, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, Sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius?—CICERO, *De Nat. Deor.* lib. ii. cap. 2.

Ita dico, Lucili: Sacer intra nos Spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Bonus vir sine Deo nemo est.—SENECA, *Epist.* 41.

Bona conscientia prodire vult et conspici. Ipsas nequitia tenebras timet. Eleganter itaque ab Epicuro dictum puto: Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latenti fides non potest . . . Ita est! tuta scelera esse possunt, secura non possunt . . . Nec ullum scelus, licet illud fortuna exornet muneribus suis, licet tueatur ac vindicet, impunitum est, quoniam sceleris in scelere supplicium est.—SENECA, *Epist.* 97.

Magna vis est conscientiae, et magna in utramque partem: ut neque timeant, qui nihil commiserint, et poenam semper ante oculos versari putent, qui peccarint.—CICERO, *Pro Milone.*

Magna vis est conscientiae, quam qui negligent, cum me violare volent, . . . se ipsi indicabunt.—CICERO, *Cat.* iii. cap. 12.

Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna: quae vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat: quae tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius: nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una Lex, et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium DEUS. Ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator: cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur: hocque ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si caetera supplicia, quae putantur effugerit.—CICERO, *Fragm.* lib. iii. *de Repub.*

Nolite enim putare, quemadmodum in fabulis saepenumero videtis, eos, qui aliquid impie sceleratequeque commiserint, agitari et perterreri Furiarium taedis ardentibus: sua quemque fraus, et suus terror maxime vexat: suum quemque scelus agitat, amentiaque afficit: suae malae cogitationes conscientiaeque animi terrent. Hae sunt impiis assiduae domesticaeque Furiae.—CICERO, *Pro Roscio*, cap. 24.

Vis ad recte facta vocandi et a peccatis avocandi non modo senior est quam aetas populorum et civitatum, sed aequalis illius coelum atque terras tuentis et regentis DEI.—CICERO, *De Legib.* ii. 4.

Omnia enim benefacta in luce se collocari volunt.—CICERO, *Tuscul.* ii. 26.

Miraris hominem ad deos ire? DEUS ad homines venit; imo (quod propius est) in homines venit. Nulla sine DEO mens bona est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quae si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt, et paria his, ex quibus orta sunt, surgunt; si malus, non aliter quam humus sterilis ac palustris, necat, ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus.—SENECA, *Epist.* 73.

Circumretit enim vis, atque injuria, quemque;
Atque, unde exorta est, ad eum plerumque revortit.
Nec facile est placidam, ac pacatam degere vitam,
Qui violat factis communia foedera pacis.
Et si fallit enim Divom genus humanumque,
Perpetuo tamen id fore clam diffidere debet:
Quippe ubi se multei, per somnia saepe loquentes,
Aut morbo delirantes, protrâxe ferantur;
Et celata diu in medium peccata dedisse.

LUCRET. lib. v. 1151.

Hic consentiamus, mala facinora conscientiâ flagellari, et plurimum illi tormentorum esse, eo quod perpetua illam sollicitudo urget ac verberat . . . Multos fortuna liberat poena, metu neminem.—SENECA, *Epist.* 97.

NOTE 4, p. 37.

It has been much discussed of late whether morality would lose if Christian influences were superseded by some form of purely natural culture; and such an enquiry bears closely on the question whether the application of the doctrine of evolution to ethics would weaken the vitality of moral convictions. It seems strange that from a Christian point of view such questions should be deemed so much as open to discussion. One of the three great articles of the Christian faith is a belief in God the Holy Spirit, who, in answer to prayer, bestows upon us His supernatural guidance and assistance. Assuming this to be true, there remains no room for comparison between the two influences; and in any remarks on the subject, it seems desirable to mention this at the outset, lest, in arguing upon other grounds, this momentous power in Christian Faith should appear to be overlooked. It is, indeed, impossible to avoid introducing into our field of view some of the supernatural elements in Christian Faith, and so far there must remain a complete disparity between the terms of the comparison. But our faith operates by natural influences as well

as by supernatural; and even its supernatural truths and realities have in some respects a natural action upon us. Thus the person of our Lord Jesus Christ is divine, but it is also human; and He acts upon us not only by supernatural grace, but by natural personal relations. We may here perhaps find a fairly common ground for contrasting the operation of our faith with that of unbelieving culture. Let us mainly ask what is the natural effect on our minds of Christian faith as contrasted with the natural effects of Sceptical Culture.

Such culture takes various forms in different schools of thought, such as that of the Positivists, or that of Mr. Herbert Spencer. But, in all, its essential idea is that of the gradual improvement of life by the operation of social forces; for physical forces may, for the purposes of argument, be regarded as involved in these. The mutual action of human beings upon each other, their relative wants, instincts, passions, and affections, are regarded as exerting, on the whole, a steady upward pressure upon individuals; and by a skilful use of the arts of education, organization, and government, life, it is urged, may be indefinitely elevated. By philosophers, who look at the subject from the point of view of physical science, the process is regarded as analogous to the evolution supposed to prevail in the animal world, by which, under the pressure of the necessities of existence, higher qualities are progressively developed in the species. Now it is to be observed, in the first place, that there is nothing in the least inconsistent with Christian belief in attributing to the operation of these natural influences of organized human society an extremely high value. It may, indeed, as will be presently seen, well be doubted whether their ultimate effects could be relied on if Christianity were not, as it were, perpetually renewing the raw material of human nature on which they work. But that they are among the most potent means of human elevation is unquestionable. Christians, indeed, are the very last persons who should undervalue them; for the conviction of the unity of men, of the intimate dependence

of every member of the human family upon the rest, and of human development depending upon the maintenance of that union—these convictions are so essentially Christian, that the Gospel might well be maintained to be the real source of those modern ideas of social culture which would fain dispense with it. St. Paul's language might almost be that of a philosopher of the present day, when, in images drawn from the intimate union of the members of the human body, he describes the almost physical interdependence of the members of the Christian organism. Accordingly, as a matter of fact, the social influence of the Church as a whole upon its members, by means of that discipline of which the abeyance is lamented in our Commination Service, was in the early Church one of the most powerful influences for maintaining the standard of Christian life. The Church, in fact, whatever its other characteristics, was from the first eminently a society for the culture of all righteousness and graciousness among its members. That which first of all struck the impartial eye of the Roman statesman, who observed it in its early vigour, was that its members bound themselves by an oath and a mutual pledge to renounce all vices. To Pliny's eye, the Church was a society visibly stamped with the 'seal' of St. Paul—'Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity.' The Church was the first example of an association for this mutual culture of its members in righteousness; and the existence of such a society constitutes, perhaps, the most vital distinction between the Christian and the pre-Christian world, even when contemplated from a purely natural point of view. If, therefore, in any degree, Christianity appears at a disadvantage at the present time in respect to its employment of social forces for the purposes of moral culture, this can be due only to the Church having fallen short of her ideal and of her earliest and purest form. How to recover that form and approach nearer to that ideal, amidst the complex forces of modern life, is a most difficult problem. But now, not less than at the time of our Reformers, such a restoration of primitive Christian culture is 'much to be wished.'

Our faith, therefore, is so far from disparaging those methods of social culture upon which non-Christian systems rely, that in principle it claims to be their parent, and it would fain receive them back into the Christian household. But there remains one point, at any rate, in which it would seem, to say the least, extremely desirable that the influence of any such form of social culture should be supplemented. For permanent moral ends, indeed, it may appear as we proceed that such a supplement is essential; but very simple considerations may suffice to indicate its immense importance. It would seem obvious that the social forces which a society, as a whole, can exert upon its members are the resultants of the forces contributed by the individual members themselves, and must therefore vary, both in their potency and in their direction, in proportion to the character and the vigour of the individuals. The process of evolution or development, in whatever degree it may operate, depends upon the acquirement of special excellences by individuals, and it is in the cumulative effect of these individual excellences that the elevation of the race consists. It is not of material importance to what these individual excellences may be due—whether they are mere modifications produced by the pressure of external circumstances, or, as would seem in some instances, the result of forces inherent in the stock, but previously latent. In any case, the improvement of the individual cannot fail to enhance the value of the social force he contributes to the community. Now, if this be the case, it would seem to follow that, under certain circumstances, social influences, without being either disparaged or neglected, may become of less practical importance than influences dealing in the first instance with individuals. Let it be granted, for the sake of argument, that in any human society, the influence of the whole body upon its members will gradually tend to improve them. Nevertheless, if we can directly improve the members individually, by raising them towards their ideal, we shall, in the first place, anticipate in great measure the effect of the social process, while we shall also enhance the efficacy of that

process itself. Consequently, the first question which should be asked by an advocate of social culture is whether there exist means for raising individuals, by independent and immediate action, above the level already attained by them. Is it possible for him to sharpen and perfect his tools one by one, before he combines them in his great social machine?

Now, it is on this critical point that all systems of sceptical and purely social culture appear to fall short of the Christian faith. They fall short, moreover, of necessity, and by the very law of their existence. On their hypothesis, the individual is, and ought to be, the product of society. He is its child, determined by it, and to be judged primarily, if not solely, by the tests it supplies. To attempt, therefore, to raise an individual, by direct influence, above the level of the existing social standard, is, to say the least, to incur a great risk of misdirecting his development. It is impossible to be sure that he is being properly trained and developed unless that training and development are in harmony with the whole society of which he is a part; and it would seem certainly safer to leave the society, as a whole, to determine what that harmony dictates than to attempt to anticipate its judgment by private experiment. The same consideration may be put in another form, by observing that it is in the nature of the case impossible that any system of purely social culture should recognize a fixed and definite standard of individual excellence. It is impossible, for the simple reason that the society is, by the hypothesis, engaged in working out this standard. The more true such a system is to its principle the more does the famous description of the Baconian method apply to it. It is a system 'which never rests; its law is progress. A point which yesterday was invisible is its goal to-day, and will be its starting post to-morrow.' Evolution, by its very nature, is evolution towards an unknown goal; and to attempt to fix that goal is to assume a prophetic vision. Various methods may, indeed, be laid down for determining the true path of progress—that of utility, for instance, or that of happiness; but they are only methods for determining the

immediate direction of the path we are pursuing, and they cannot tell us whither it will ultimately lead. But it follows that if these systems of sceptical culture offer no absolute standard of individual excellence, it must be impracticable, or at least inconsistent, to attempt the immediate elevation of individuals to a high standard by individual influences. It would not even seem safe to inculcate on a man that he should aim at the standard actually recognized at a given time by the society to which he belongs; for, on the hypothesis, a deviation on his part might be a first step in a better direction, and the question whether it were or were not could only be decided by the experience of the society. In a word, conceive men, if possible, deprived of any guide to their actions but such as their nature supplies, and in theory, the whole of morals is, by virtue of the hypothesis, reduced to a state of flux; and individuals, instead of being moulded in accordance with a definite standard, must be left to be fashioned in accordance with the forces operating upon them from moment to moment.

Accordingly, the great philosopher who stemmed the tide of a similar moral flux in ancient Greece sought for visions of divine ideals as the only solid ground on which he could plant his feet. He felt after them, if haply he might find them; and they proved in many instances to be not very far from him. But the full revelation of that after which Plato groped is the cardinal truth of the Christian faith. In the person of our Lord Jesus Christ we recognize the ideal perfection of man—a perfection not less absolute and eternal than that divine nature which is indissolubly united with it. Here is a fixed and unalterable standard to the test of which every individual through all future ages may bring his conscience and his heart, and which may be applied to him, nor merely through the influence of Christian social forces, but immediately and personally. It should be observed that such a revelation furnishes the only conceivable standard for personal beings. If there be a standard at all for different things of the same kind, it must be something of the same kind

as the things themselves. By rules and laws we may, indeed, approximate indefinitely to the description of a perfect standard, but the standard itself must be of the same nature as that of which it is to be the test. The only perfect standard of a horse would be a perfect horse. Perhaps in no living organism but man is there such a standard. If there be no fixity in species there certainly is none. But at all events the only conceivable standard for a person is a person, and the only possible standard for a man must be a man. If such a man does not exist, or is not known, there is no fixed moral standard for the human race. There may be certain rules and laws, more or less fixed; but there can be no permanent ideal at which every one may aim. Moreover such a standard though a fixed, is far from being a rigid one; for the character, revealed by the acts and words of a person, is by no means limited to circumstances similar to those within which such acts and words operated. It is discerned behind them, in infinite elasticity of application, and its impalpable spiritual influence can impress itself upon every moral nature. There is no influence which more steadily grows in delicacy and sureness of touch than that of sympathy with a person; and even if we had to rely upon the purely natural effect of the revelation of the Lord Jesus Christ, that revelation would mould into more and more sympathy with itself all characters which, with due reverence and affection, submitted themselves to its influence. But we have not to rely upon merely natural influences; and in order to do justice to our Faith, even in this single point of contrast between it and sceptical systems, it becomes necessary once more to pass for a moment into the shrine of the deeper verities of our creed. Mr. Mill has acknowledged the supreme excellence of this Divine Ideal, and has said that it would be no unsatisfactory guide for a man's life to endeavour always so to act that Christ might be supposed to approve his actions. What, then, should be the influence of such an ideal upon one who believes that he has to act, not merely so that Christ would approve his actions, if He saw them, but that he is living now in the presence of

Christ, that he will hereafter stand face to face with Him, and that upon his direct personal relation towards that Person the whole of his destiny depends? Professor Tyndall, in no friendly spirit to our creed, said the other day that—'Facts rather than dogmas have been the ministers of the power that has moulded us—hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, sympathy, shame, pride, love, hate, terror, awe—such were the forces' which wove the web of man's physical, intellectual, and moral nature. It is precisely such forces as these that the direct relation of the human soul to one who is perfect man and perfect God is fitted to evoke, and to evoke in a strength compared with which all other forms of the same forces are insignificant. The Christian dogmas, which are often treated as something abstract and apart from life, had their origin, and have now their essential importance, in the fact that they are the necessary conditions of an intelligent faith in this permanent relation of a personal soul with the person of the Lord Jesus Christ. Their value consists in the fact that they alone enable us rationally to believe that in Him, perfect God and perfect Man, we possess the eternal Lord and Master and Ideal of men, whom it is possible for reasonable human beings to love and to follow, 'with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength.'

Such, then, in a few essential points, appear to be some of the relative bearings of Christian faith and the moral culture contemplated by adherents of the evolution hypothesis. They may be summed up by saying that Christian faith, even when regarded without reference to some of its supernatural and most characteristic powers, contains within itself all the good influences which sceptical culture offers; but that it supplies a cardinal necessity in which they are deficient. It recognizes in the highest degree the importance of social influences. It believes that only by keeping the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, only by the union of the various gifts bestowed upon various men, can we 'all come to a perfect man, to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.' But it also

believes, and the history of the Church abundantly confirms the belief, that by the direct personal influence of our Lord Jesus Christ individuals can be directly and immediately endowed with a new spiritual life, and can thus be perpetually contributing new spiritual forces to the social action of Christians upon each other. In a word, the Church provides that supreme ideal which no other religion and no other philosophy has been able to furnish; she brings individual souls into union with it; and she is thus perpetually regenerating the primary and constituent forces of human life. —*From a paper read by the author at the Church Congress, Croydon, in* 1877.

NOTE 5, p. 62.

See the author's Boyle Lectures on *Christianity and Morality;* Lect. VIII., First Course, pp. 162–164. Fourth Edition.

NOTE 6, p. 70.

Professor Clifford's Essay on *The Ethics of Belief*, republished in his *Lectures and Essays*, vol. ii. p. 177, expresses very effectively a tone of thought which is peculiarly characteristic of an influential school of scientific scepticism. It is distinguished, indeed, from the extravagant Paper which follows it, on the *Ethics of Religion*, by containing little which directly impugns the faith of Christians, though there are a good many oblique insinuations against it; and as will appear in the sequel, I venture to think that the tests of belief the article lays down are, on the whole, strongly confirmatory of the validity of Christian evidences, as generally received.

The following observations on this Essay were drawn up by the author at the time of its publication, and were read at the Victoria Institute. Their chief purpose is to call attention to an essential difference in principle between the spirit of Christian thought and the disposition of mind which the article in

question represents. The difference is frequently disguised, or reluctantly recognised, on both sides; and it is the more desirable it should be distinctly acknowledged, and that the practical issue it involves should be fairly faced.

To state this difference concisely, it is whether in matters of religion and morals we are to build upon grounds of Faith or upon grounds of Science. In stating the issue in this form, it is not, of course, implied for a moment that there can be any conflict between the legitimate and ultimate results of the two principles. Their essential harmony is, and has always been, a primary axiom with the greatest Christian teachers, and to avow belief in it ought to be a superfluous precaution. The spirit of the following observations would again be wholly misunderstood if they were supposed to be prompted by any lack of sympathy with Science. But the best things, as a rule, have their special provinces and spheres of action, and it by no means follows, because the scientific spirit is admirable in itself, that it ought to be allowed to determine our religious thought and our moral conduct. Such, however, is the tacit assumption, not merely of Professor Clifford's article, but of a large proportion of modern argument on this subject, alike on the part of the advocates as on that of the impugners of the Christian Faith. Christianity seems too frequently regarded as a sort of scientific system, composed of a number of propositions on very mysterious subjects; and the question assumed to be at issue is the possibility or impossibility of verifying such propositions. Now, there may be some truth in this assumption with respect to the primary verities of religion, though the general reception even of these is probably to a great extent dependent on the testimony borne to them by those who exert most authority over men's consciences, rather than on the direct arguments in their favour. It is obvious also that there can be no absolute division between the two spheres in question. The scientific man will, in practice, often act on Belief, while the religious man will check the dictates of his faith by the aid of Reason and Science. But, never-

theless, there is this broad distinction to be drawn—that the object in moral matters is to act, not only to act rightly, but to act promptly, and to act earnestly, while the object in matters of Science is to know, and to know accurately, and for that purpose to reserve a decision for as long a time as may be necessary. The consequence is that for the purposes of the former province the habit to be acquired is that of forming a rapid and positive judgment upon mere probabilities—those being, by the nature of the case, the only materials for judgment accessible; and the men who have the greatest weight with their fellows in practical life, and who become their natural leaders, are those who form such judgments the most boldly, and follow them with the least hesitation. But in the province of Science the habit to be acquired is that of not forming decided judgments upon mere probabilities; but, on the contrary, of suspecting all appearances, and of demanding the most rigid demonstration before laying down a scientific truth as a sure basis for action. Our whole attitude towards religious and moral controversies must, it would seem, depend on our recognizing at the outset the existence, as a matter of fact, of these distinct provinces of human life, together with the distinctness of the habits they respectively require, and determining to which of the two such controversies belong. According as we relegate them to one or the other, we shall approach them with different mental and moral dispositions, and the 'Ethics' we apply to them will proportionately vary.

Now, in the article in question, this distinction has been so much overlooked that the special meaning of the word 'belief' has been entirely left out of sight. It is a word of which the employment is somewhat vague in popular usage, but which will be generally recognized as possessing a fairly definite meaning for the purposes of such a discussion as the present. It is, at all events, very surprising to find that the distinction is not observed between belief and opinion—scarcely even between belief and knowledge. 'Belief,' for instance, 'that sacred faculty,' is described as being 'rightly used on truths which have been established by long experience

and waiting toil, and which have stood in the fierce light of free and fearless questioning.' But what occasion is there for the exercise of this sacred faculty on truths of this kind? They are simple matters of knowledge, if knowledge can be predicated of any mental condition. It would be incorrect to speak of believing the law of gravitation; we have a scientific knowledge of it. Belief is properly applied only to truths which are neither evident of themselves, like mathematical axioms, nor scientifically established, like the law of gravitation, but which are simply probable. Nor does it in strictness apply to all of these. Where the probability arises from argument and from the nature of the case, our assent is not belief, but opinion. Faith or belief properly arises when our ground for accepting a statement is the testimony given in its favour. In the excellent definition of Bishop Pearson, 'Belief is an assent to that which is credible, as credible'—not, that is, so far as it is probable, still less so far as it is demonstrable, but simply so far as it is supported by the evidence of credible witnesses. If we admit the testimony of Conscience as that of a kind of independent authority, bearing its witness within each individual soul, we may bring under this definition those primary religious and moral truths, to which, as Kant observed, our assent has the character of faith rather than of opinion. We can hardly expect a very accurate discussion of the Ethics of Belief when belief is thus confounded with another mental operation; and it is similarly impracticable to form a just estimate of the claims of the Christian Faith when it is treated not as that which is credible, but as that which is knowable.

Accordingly it may be described as the main doctrine of the article under discussion that the principles of scientific inquiry ought to be predominant not merely within the sphere of knowledge, but within the whole sphere covered by this vague extension of the word Belief. It commences by insisting on the duty of inquiry, and it treats this duty as always and everywhere incumbent upon us. 'No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of

questioning all that we believe.' Now this may be a very good rule within the domain of science, and may be a very proper attitude of mind for a scientific man; though it may be surmised with some confidence that Professor Clifford would not listen with much patience to any of those ingenious persons who exercise this universal duty by questioning the roundness of the earth, or the Newtonian system, or the impossibility of squaring the circle. But it may be safely said that, as applied to the practical business of life, such a principle is not only impracticable, but morally wrong. The daily course of life and the organization of society are made up of relations between man and man. Upon what are those relations founded? They are based, as a matter of fact, upon a general habit of mutual trust and faith. The child's first necessity is to believe what is told it, and to believe this in respect to matters which it has no power whatever of investigating for itself. Its instinct, the first dictate of its nature, is to believe everything, to receive and to assimilate all that it hears and reads. If it be replied that it has sufficient evidence upon which to rest this habit in its experience of its father's and mother's trustworthiness, I would ask what parents would not be distressed to suppose that a child's confidence was based upon a mere calculating estimate of this kind? The essence of the filial relation involves a moral confidence antecedent to experience, and capable, in fact, of sustaining severe apparent contradictions to that experience.

The case, however, of trust between adults is perhaps a still stronger instance of this principle. Life would be impracticable unless it were the primary rule to believe what is told us. There is not a single relation in adult life in which we are not compelled to depend upon the word of another—of a husband, a wife, a friend, an agent. We believe certain things respecting them—in their honour, their chastity, their affection, their faithfulness. To what kind of condition would life be reduced if we were to apply to these matters 'the universal duty of questioning all that we believe?' In some, at all

events, of these relations, it may be observed, it is in the nature of the case impossible that we should have 'sufficient evidence' for our belief. It is an unquestionable fact that many a man who has been trusted, and who has for years borne an unexceptionable character, has proved faithless; and it is quite impossible I can be sure upon grounds of evidence respecting any particular man that he is incapable of this baseness. But the first condition of a genuine and honourable friendship is to believe this, to refuse to entertain a doubt of it, and, if need be, to uphold a friend's honour until he is absolutely proved dishonourable. With respect to trust exercised in commercial relations, it might perhaps be said that it is a mere application of the principle of probabilities. As a matter of experience, if customers are trusted, the majority of them will fulfil their engagements. It may be doubted whether tradesmen really do act in practice on this mere calculation of probabilities; but at all events the principle does not apply to the other relations of life just referred to. It would be an insult to a friend to say that you trusted and loved him because you thought it more probable he was true than that he was false. He expects from you, as the primary condition of true friendship, that you believe firmly concerning him that of which you cannot possibly have certain evidence.

This habit of mutual faith is, in fact, the necessary correlative of the primary duty of men. That duty is the observation of the Third Commandment—to speak the truth. But if it is the duty of my neighbour to speak the truth, it is equally my duty to believe that he does speak it. I have no right to suspect him of violating this obligation; and to do so is, in practice, to suggest the idea of falsehood to him, and to sow the seeds of it. A corrupt society is above all things marked by two characteristics—'a universal' habit 'of questioning' all that is said, and an equally universal habit of saying what is not true. On the contrary, in a healthy society, like that of England, habits of trust and of truth mutually support each other; and it has now become, for instance, a principle

of education that the best way to cultivate truthfulness in boys is uniformly to assume that they are speaking the truth, and always to give them the benefit of a doubt, even when appearances are against them. In place, therefore, of Professor Clifford's assertion that 'the credulous man is father to the liar and the cheat; he lives in the bosom of this his family, and it is no marvel if he should become even as they are,' we should be much nearer the experience of practical life if we alleged this of the suspicious man. At all events, it may be safely said that the trustful man is father to the truth-speaking and the honest man; he lives in the bosom of this his family, and it is natural he should become even as they are. 'With what measure ye mete withal, it shall be measured to you again;' and no more forcible appeal can be made to a man's conscience than by placing trust in him.

Accordingly this principle, applied in its highest degree, has been the most powerful instrument of moral elevation and the indispensable means of all great achievements. In proportion as men have become as little children in this respect have they entered into the kingdoms both of heaven and of earth. It is an essential element in the power of great men, of those saints or men of genius who lift their race to a higher level, that they command the allegiance of numbers who are quite incompetent to judge whether there is sufficient evidence for the principles they assert. They throw the spell of personal influence over their followers, and induce them to act, with all the earnestness of intense belief, upon assumptions which it is impossible for them to verify. I will not insist on the well-worn example of Columbus and his followers, though it would be a somewhat harsh judgment to condemn them for having acted upon insufficient evidence in making the most momentous of geographical discoveries. But let us take the case, adduced by Professor Clifford, of the founders of those great religions, which, with whatever errors and corruptions they have been associated, have still been, beyond question, advances in the elevation of the human race. Let us con-

sider their influence, moreover, within the sphere in which it is admitted to have been legitimate—that of morality and of human experience. Has the chief instrument of these advances been, as a matter of fact, the exercise of the duty of inquiry by the prophet's followers? It is very well, and, doubtless, very necessary, to lay down rules after the event as to the limits within which a prophet's authority may be accepted. But it is not by means of any such rules that the religion is established and the new morality enforced. It is by faith; by personal submission to the personal influence of the prophet, and by childlike obedience to him.

In matters of morality, in fact, this must always be the case, for moral habits can never to those who first adopt them be matters of experiment. If they are to be real, they must be adopted 'with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength.' This, at all events, is the ideal to be aimed at; it expresses the spirit in which the most characteristic points of Christian morality were accepted, and it is utterly inconsistent with a doubting habit of mind. Professor Clifford admits that 'there are many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the evidence is such as not to justify present belief; because it is precisely by such action, and by observation of its fruits, that evidence is got which may justify future belief. So that we have no reason to fear lest a habit of conscientious inquiry should paralyze the actions of our daily life.' But if the observations just offered are valid, we have great reason to fear such a result from a habit of subordinating the duty of faith to the duty of inquiry. To repeat a question I have asked elsewhere[a], what would be now the position of our race if the first Christians had confined themselves to tentative experiments on the relative advantages of monogamy and polygamy, instead of adopting the former in faith, in reliance on the testimony of the Apostles, and resolutely turning their backs upon the innumerable influences to the contrary which the heathen

[a] The Boyle Lectures for 1875. I. *The Province of Faith.*

society of the day brought to bear upon them? In a word, if we are to be guided by the experience of mankind, Faith and not Science must determine the practical order of life. The Just, according to Professor Clifford, shall live by Doubt. But the lesson alike of ordinary life and of the Scriptures is that the Just shall live by Faith.

Whereas, therefore, the first principle laid down in the article under discussion as belonging to the Ethics of Belief is 'the duty of inquiry,' it would be more true to nature to substitute 'the duty of faith.' Distinguishing Belief both from Opinion and from Knowledge, and restricting it, substantially, to the field of testimony, it may be laid down as the first principle of the subject that all testimony has a *primâ facie* claim to be believed, and that the *onus probandi* always lies upon those who question it. Such, perhaps, is in great measure the force of that appeal to authority in matters of opinion which has lately been discussed by two eminent writers. It seems too narrow an interpretation to say, as Sir James Stephen does, that 'authority is only another name for the evidence of experts.' In practice it is much more than this; the consentient belief of a large mass of mankind, even though the experts among them be comparatively few, having a distinct influence of its own. How far this influence may amount, as Mr. Gladstone has been understood to imply, to substantial evidence in favour of an impugned doctrine, would seem mainly to depend upon the character of the particular doctrine in question. The testimony of Christians to the fact that in their personal experience they have found the promises of the Gospel fulfilled must carry, for instance, and does carry, the greatest possible weight; but it can only afford indirect support to the truths beyond their experience which are alleged in the Creeds. It cannot, however, reasonably be denied that such general testimony constitutes a *primâ facie* claim in favour of a doctrine, and casts the burden of proof on those who question it. Our instinct—an instinct no less just than natural—is to believe what comes to us with such testimony, and from this instinct we must start.

But of course Faith, like all other instincts of nature, requires to be checked by the exercise of reason. It is like an appetite, a hunger or a thirst, which will insist on asserting itself, but which must nevertheless be controlled. To say, indeed, that a man who has no time to make himself a competent judge of disputable questions 'should have no time to believe,' is like saying that a man who has no time to study medicine should have no time to eat. A man must believe, whether he will or no. He must act every day of his life on the basis of certain moral and political—nay, religious assumptions, of which few men can be competent judges, and all that can be asked of him is that he should give as thorough a consideration as his circumstances will allow to objections which are raised respecting them. It is perfectly easy, indeed, to imagine circumstances in which it is his clear duty to commit that 'sin against mankind,' as Professor Clifford designates it, of 'keeping down and pushing away doubts which may arise in his mind.' A naval officer who has once accepted a commission, and is in charge of a man-of-war, has no business to let himself be distracted in the enforcement of discipline by doubts respecting the justice of the Mutiny Act. When, moreover, a man has once fairly weighed the existing evidence for and against a certain truth, it is simply a mark of a weak and vacillating mind to be easily induced to re-open the inquiry. When, after full deliberation, we have taken one of two divergent roads, it is childish to be harking back at every difficulty and trying another track. Life was not made for men of science, but for men of action; and no man of action is good for anything if he cannot sometimes form a belief on insufficient evidence, and take a leap in the dark.

Nothing, however, is more certain than that it is the indispensable condition of progress to regulate by reason the action of even the most healthy instincts. Let the presumption only be established in favour of faith, as against scepticism, and there is nothing which is more desirable in the interests of a true faith than that the conditions under which

it is accepted should be rigidly scrutinized. We may hope in this way to attain to some scientific as well as moral test for distinguishing true from false religious beliefs. Moreover, to every man who is capable of reasoning, the moment may come when he is confronted with some objection which imposes on him the duty of pausing in his course, and maturely judging of his position; while in proportion as opportunities allow him, he will be thankful to investigate anew the grounds of his faith, and to qualify himself to explain its reasonableness to inquirers or objectors. Accordingly, we may proceed with pleasure to inquire, with Professor Clifford, into the criteria to be adopted. In this part of his article he restricts himself with more accuracy to the proper meaning of belief, and simply investigates the conditions under which it is lawful to believe on the testimony of others. There appears to me, as I said at the outset, no reason to take material exception to the principles he here lays down. They are substantially those of Bishop Pearson—namely, that the credibility of testimony depends upon two conditions—first, the integrity, and secondly the ability of the witness. It is not enough to have a firm conviction of his honesty; we must also have ground for supposing that he has had the means of knowing the subject respecting which he testifies.

So far there is no difficulty. But our critic does not stop here. There can be no ground, we are told, for supposing that a man knows that which we, without ceasing to be men, could not be supposed to verify. This is, perhaps, a somewhat extreme and inconvenient mode of expression; but it seems reasonable to admit that the testimony of a man with no other than human powers cannot be accepted in evidence of a fact beyond all natural capacity of human experience. It is clear, for instance, to take one cardinal point of our faith, that no mere human testimony can be adequate evidence, or any evidence at all, in support of the assurance that the Lord Jesus Christ will hereafter judge all men. But it may here be pointed out that this observation does but illustrate the coherence of Christian evidence. It

is not upon mere human testimony that the assurance just mentioned is based. At this point the argument from miracles comes in, and by approaching it in this way its legitimate force may perhaps be more easily stated with accuracy. It seems overstating the case to say, as has been sometimes done, that the miracle is the proof of the doctrine. But this must at least be said, that it proves the person who propounds the doctrine to possess powers and to enjoy privileges which are beyond the ordinary range of humanity, and which transcend our measurement. In other words, we cease to be competent judges of such a witness's ability. He may, for aught we can judge, know things which are beyond human experience, just as he can do things which are beyond human powers. We are, therefore, thrown back upon the sole test of his integrity. Shall we, or shall we not, believe his testimony on his own unverified and unverifiable assurance?

To this question I will return shortly; but I would interpose one observation on a further principle laid down by Mr. Clifford, which might at first be supposed to render any belief in a miracle inadmissible. To believe a miracle is to believe something entirely beyond our experience; and on what ground, it is asked, may we go beyond our experience in forming our beliefs? The answer given is that we may do so when that which we believe is like that which we know, or, in other words, when it assumes a uniformity in Nature. I am not concerned to inquire whether this rule be adequate or admissible without qualification. It is sufficient to observe that whatever may be its validity, Christianity complies with it by virtue of that analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the constitution and course of Nature, which is the subject of Bishop Butler's great work. Butler, following Origen, has met by anticipation any argument against supernatural revelation derived from the necessary unity and harmony—for 'uniformity' is a very questionable word—of all divine operations. If, indeed, the word Nature be restricted to physical Nature, the harmony

of miracles with its constitution and course is easily contested. But such a limitation simply begs the question, which is whether the moral and spiritual forces of human nature do not necessitate, under certain circumstances, a supersession of mere physical consequences. It is a matter of evidence whether instances of such supersession have occurred, and in considering the value of this evidence we are brought back to the question from which we started on this short digression.

That question is whether we can accept the testimony of persons whose competence as witnesses transcends our means of judgment on the sole assurance of their word. If the previous arguments of this paper have been valid, they will at least have advanced us one important step in considering this question. They will have shown that we must approach it from the moral rather than from the scientific point of view, and that we must consider it in relation to action, and not to speculation. The primary question is not, what are we to think? but what are we to do? These men —St. Paul, St. John, St. Peter—for reverential reasons I abstain from directly introducing into this discussion the Name which should be the most decisive of all—invite us to accept their guidance in life and their comfort in death, and to trust ourselves, body and soul, to the belief of their assurances. The function of the Christian Church and of its ministry is to bring that invitation home to every man's conscience, and as long as the Church performs its duty the appeal cannot be evaded. Shall we accept it, or shall we go elsewhere, to some modern guide, who will pronounce upon our duties and our destinies by the light of scientific forecast and legal evidence? The answer to that question can only be given individually, and its nature will depend, in the first instance, partly on the degree in which we retain that child-like habit of faith, of mutual trust between person and person, which I have endeavoured to vindicate as our normal and healthy disposition; and partly on the force with which the moral and spiritual power of such Saints lays hold of our

souls. There are those to whom that force is overwhelming, and to whom it appears idle to compare it with the moral force of other religious leaders. It touches at once the strongest and the tenderest fibres of the heart. It controls the fiercest passions and supports the gentlest. It is associated, in a manner which no similar influence has approached, with whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report. To those who are sufficiently sensible of this intense moral illumination, the supposition that it is associated with false testimony on matters of supreme moment is inconceivable. The case completely fulfils Hume's condition that, to establish a miracle, 'the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.' It seems idle to draw 'psychological parallels,' as has recently been attempted, between a moral giant like St. Paul and a worthy gentleman like Sir Matthew Hale, and still worse to compare the dark and confused morality of other Eastern religions with the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ. His Apostles appeal to my whole being, to every moral sense of which I am conscious, to my weakness and my strength, my sin and my repentance, my intellect and my heart, and evoke towards themselves, and still more to One beyond themselves, that complete allegiance of the whole man which is designated Faith [b]. I do not pretend to

[b] There could hardly be a better illustration of the claim of the Apostles in this respect than is afforded by the two following parables, which I take the liberty of extracting from Sir James Stephen's article on Authority in the April number of the *Nineteenth Century*, 1877. He appears to suggest their application to the claims of modern religious authorities. Whether or not those authorities would have occasion to shrink from such a test, there is nothing they would more desire than that it should be applied to the Apostles. Perhaps the strongest claim of Christ and His Apostles is that 'they have proved themselves to be our superiors by appealing to the faculties'—above all the moral faculties—'which we have in common':—

A blind man and a seeing man were once discussing the existence of sight. The seeing man told the blind man that he had a faculty by which he could perceive innumerable things which he could neither hear, touch, smell, nor taste, and which were at a great distance from him. The blind man chal-

have a scientific knowledge of divine things, or to rest my convictions upon a scientific demonstration; but I can venture to say that 'I know in Whom I have believed.' Such a belief will be supported by collateral evidence, acquiring from age to age a cumulative and converging force; but its essential virtue will in all ages be derived from the vital sources of personal love and trust.

Such, I would suggest, are in substance the Ethics of Belief, as contra-distinguished from the Ethics of Science. Their essential peculiarity is that they are concerned in the first instance with our relation to certain persons, rather than to certain truths. They thus bring into play those obligations of trust and loyalty on which all social life is founded, and they render our religious convictions a matter of personal allegiance instead of mere opinion. The first question a Christian is asked is not whether he believes certain truths, but whether he believes in certain Persons; and he is a member of a perpetual society whose fundamental law is allegiance to its Head. The vitality of our religion and its influence for good have always been in proportion to the distinctness with which this characteristic element in it has been realized. In the early ages of Christianity, as Dr.

lenged the seein man to prove his assertions. 'That,' said the seeing man, 'is easily done. Hold me by the hand. You perceive that I am standing by you. I affirm that if you will walk fifty steps along the side of this wall, which you can touch with your hand, so as to be sure that you are moving straight on, you will find such and such objects, which I specifically describe, and as to the existence of which you can satisfy yourself by your own fingers.'

The blind man readily admitted that the seeing man had proved his assertion.

Of two men with eyes, A. and B., A. declared that he could see what went on in the sun, moon, and fixed stars, and that when he said 'see' he meant not exactly common seeing, but a superior kind of seeing, very hard to describe to any one who did not possess it, which he called 'intuing.' B. (who had a good pair of eyes of his own of the common kind) challenged A. to read the *Times* newspaper at a distance at which B. could not read it. A. failed to do so. 'Why,' said B., 'should I believe that you can "intue" things in Sirius, when you cannot read small print on the other side of the room? If you want me to believe that you possess faculties of which I am destitute, you must prove yourself to be my superior by appealing to the faculties which we have in common.'

Newman has shown, this personal devotion was predominant over all other influences, and constituted the supreme motive power of the Gospel. The great achievement of the Reformation was to revivify it, and to substitute a personal faith, involving trust in a person and self-surrender to Him, for mere habits of assent and formal obedience. The effect, wherever the Reformed teaching took root, was to revive at the same time the faculty of faith between man and man, and thus to reinvigorate society. Possibly a similar revival is equally desirable at the present day in order to hold in check the disintegrating forces now at work amongst us. We cannot, at all events, be too careful not to be driven from this ground in upholding or in propagating our religious belief. The question at issue in the first instance is not whether we think certain opinions on theological questions more tenable than others, but whether we believe certain men more worthy to be followed and trusted than others. Could their testimony be shown to be incompatible with truth scientifically established, of course their authority would be proportionally weakened, if not overthrown. But until this has been done the faith we have once pledged to them imposes on us obligations of trust and loyalty similar to those involved in other personal relations, and we can no more be always questioning their authority than we can be always investigating the faithfulness of a friend, a wife, or a husband. We are willing to entertain such an inquiry upon good cause shown; but our whole presumption is in favour of faith and not in favour of doubt. Of the two errors, it is safer in matters of practice, both for the individual and for society, to err on the side of belief and trust than on the side of doubt and hesitation.

Such considerations, it may be added, seem to have an important bearing on the question now under discussion as to the influence upon morality of a decline in religious belief. As the Dean of St. Paul's has observed, the question cannot be properly discussed unless it is understood definitely what belief and what morality are intended. But one thing

is evident, that a decline in Christian belief involves a decline in the personal influence exerted by our Lord and by His Apostles. It is impossible that men who feel themselves competent, like most sceptical authors, to criticize the statements of St. John or St. Paul with as much freedom as those of any other teachers should submit themselves to their moral and spiritual influence as completely as Christians, who accept such Saints as supreme authorities, and believe them to have been in possession of truths far beyond our natural ken. The great personages of the New Testament must cease to be, in anything like the same degree as before, the personal guides and leaders of our moral and spiritual life. Whether morality in the abstract would lose in authority may be a matter for argument. But it seems scarcely questionable that Christian morality would in practice lose one of the most potent forces which sustain it. If we would avert such a misfortune, we must adhere to the old, and it is to be feared too much forgotten, Ethics of Belief.

NOTE 7, p. 81.

In illustration of this argument the author takes the liberty of quoting the following admirable passage from the sixth volume of the Sermons of M. Bersier, of Paris, a volume which he cannot too earnestly recommend to the attention of all who are seriously interested in this great controversy. The subject of the discourse is *Le Témoignage des Apôtres*:—

'Arrêtons-nous devant ce mot de témoins, pour mieux saisir l'idée qu'il exprime, et pour en apprécier la portée.

'Toute société repose sur le témoignage; il n'est pas une science, pas une entreprise collective qui puisse se fonder et se soutenir sans la confiance accordée à la parole humaine. Chose digne de remarque! Tous les jours l'homme trompe l'homme, et malgré cela l'homme ne peut se passer ni se lasser de croire à l'homme. Voyez, par exemple, le monde de l'industrie. A chaque heure des sommes gigantesques se

risquent sur une simple signature, et même sur quelques mots échangés." Voyez le monde de la science. . . . Le nombre des affirmations que nous acceptons sur l'autorité d'autrui est infiniment plus grand que nous ne le pensons tout d'abord. Ces axiomes scientifiques que nous répétons continuellement, et qui forment le fond de toute éducation sérieuse, combien y en a-t-il dont nous puissions rendre un compte personnel et que nous fussions capables de prouver d'une manière rigoureuse s'il prenait à quelqu'un la fantaisie de nous sommer de le faire? La foi d'autorité existe dans le camp de la libre pensée comme ailleurs. Beaucoup de jeunes gens (et plût à Dieu qu'il n'y en eût que des jeunes) croient avoir tout dit quand ils ont invoqué la critique. Ils disent "la critique a prononcé" avec le même accent confiant et tranquille que d'autres emploient en disant: "l'Église a décidé." Ils croient faire acte de jugement personnel au moment même où ils jurent *in verba magistri*, sur la foi qu'ils accordent à leur maître. C'est qu'on ne changera pas la nature des choses; or Dieu a voulu que, nul ne devant vivre pour soi-même, nul ne pût se suffire à soi-même.

'Si cette loi divine est vraie, si elle est universelle, il faut nous attendre à la retrouver aussi dans la manifestation de la vérité religieuse. Dieu aurait pu illuminer directement tout homme; sans doute il l'a fait dans une certaine mesure, en imprimant sur toute conscience les ineffaçables caractères de la loi naturelle, il peut le faire encore en répandant dans une âme la clarté d'une grâce surnaturelle, mais c'est là l'exception; dans la règle, Dieu a voulu que la vérité révélée parvînt à l'homme par le moyen de l'homme; il lui a plu que l'Église fût fondée sur un témoignage, il lui a plu qu'elle n'échappât point aux conditions de toute société humaine, qu'elle fût exposée aux doutes, aux discussions, aux attaques, aux luttes de toute nature; et, de même qu'il a permis que son Fils, pure et parfaite expression de la divinité, pût être "en butte à la contradiction" (Luc ii. 34), abandonné, livré aux mépris injurieux, aux soufflets et aux crachats des Scribes et de la populace, il a permis que, dans son incarnation prolongée dans la langue et

dans l'histoire des hommes, la vérité religieuse fût soumise à toutes les chances extérieures, à toutes les fatalités apparentes, à toutes les défaites temporaires, et qu'elle poursuivît ainsi à travers les siècles sa marche douloureuse, se relevant de toutes ses chutes, survivant à toutes les défaillances, à toutes les infidélités de ses défenseurs, renaissant de la mort même, pour s'imposer à la conscience humaine, pour l'agiter, la tourmenter et lui arracher le cri que les possédés adressaient autrefois au Christ: "Qu'y a-t-il donc entre toi et moi"?

'Mais en livrant ainsi en apparence la vérité révélée à tous les hasards de l'histoire, Dieu a pris soin de la conserver pure, inaltérée, authentique, tellement qu'elle puisse être la même dans tous les siècles et s'offrir à tous ceux qui la cherchent dans la sincérité de leur cœur. Il ne se pouvait faire en effet que la personne de Jésus, que sa parole, que son œuvre, que tout ce qui constitue le fond primordial et l'essence du christianisme pût être livré aux conjectures et toujours remis en question, et c'est à cela que le témoignage apostolique a pourvu. Des hommes ont été choisis qui ont suivi le Christ depuis le jour où le Précurseur le leur désigna sur le bord du Jourdain, jusqu'au jour où il quitta la terre; ces hommes ont été avec lui chaque jour et chaque heure pendant son ministère; ils l'ont vu sur les collines, ou sur le bord des lacs de la Galilée, sur les places publiques ou dans le temple de Jérusalem, comme dans les jardins retirés de Béthanie, dans la campagne de Césarée ou dans le pays de Sidon; ils l'ont entendu haranguant les foules ou leur parlant à eux-mêmes dans l'intimité de la chambre haute; ils étaient là quand la multitude lui criait hosannah, et quand des cris de mort lui annonçaient son prochain supplice; ils l'ont contemplé dans la splendeur du mont de la transfiguration et dans l'horrible agonie de Gethsémané; ils l'ont vu subissant le baiser du traître et emmené par des brigands; l'un d'eux l'a suivi de loin et l'a renié trois fois; un autre a assisté à son supplice; il a reçu de lui sa mère comme un legs sacré; puis tous ils ont été les témoins de sa résurrection; ils n'y voulaient pas croire, et ils y ont cru. Ils l'ont vu, ils l'ont entendu converser avec

eux ; ils ont recueilli de la bouche du ressuscité des paroles qui ne s'inventent pas ; Pierre et Thomas ont échangé avec lui deux dialogues d'un caractère sublime ; Thomas a mis ses mains dans ses plaies, et n'a voulu croire qu'après avoir vu. Ils l'ont accompagné jusque sur la montagne des Oliviers ; de ses lèvres ils ont reçu l'ordre d'aller conquérir le monde, et sur cet ordre ils sont partis. Comprenez-vous maintenant, mes frères, le sens et la valeur de l'apostolat ? Certes s'il y eut jamais un siècle où son rôle parût nécessaire, c'est bien celui-ci. A quoi ont tendu, en effet, à quoi tendent encore tous les efforts de la critique contemporaine, si ce n'est à reléguer la figure du Christ dans la région des légendes, à la placer au premier rang dans le cortège sublime des créations qu'enfanta le génie des peuples, à en faire la plus pure et la plus splendide des apparitions qui visitèrent l'imagination des hommes, pourvu qu'en retour nous concédions que cette vie ne fut qu'une trame merveilleuse de paraboles sous lesquelles il faut renoncer à trouver le sol ferme et résistant de l'histoire, pourvu que les miracles du Christ ne soient plus que de brillants symboles, sa résurrection et son ascension que les mythes poétiques de sa victoire morale, pourvu que l'Évangile renonce à prendre place au rang des faits et à troubler avec son caractère surnaturel les lois immuables de la réalité ? Comprenez-vous ce que vaut pour nous le témoignage de ces Galiléens qui, devant ces assertions spécieuses, se lèvent et répondent : Ce Christ, nous l'avons vu, ces paroles divines, elles ont frappé nos oreilles, ce visage, nous l'avons contemplé dans le rayonnement du Thabor et sous la sueur de sang du jardin des Olives ; ce mort, il est sorti du sépulcre, et il a marché devant nous, et ce que nos yeux ont vu, ce que nos oreilles ont entendu, ce que nos mains ont touché, voilà ce que nous vous annonçons. Mes frères, il faut choisir entre la critique qui nous dit que l'Évangile est le plus sublime des rêves, et l'apostolat qui nous dit qu'il est le plus vrai des faits. Telle est bien la question, et je n'en sais pas de plus actuelle, de plus saisissante : c'est l'existence même du christianisme dont il s'agit ici.

III.

'La nécessité du témoignage apostolique nous apparaît maintenant avec évidence. Faisons un pas de plus, et demandons-nous si ce témoignage est vraiment digne de foi. C'est là, nous l'avons dit, le second point que nous avons à traiter.

'Je ne me placerai pas, pour le résoudre, sur le terrain de la science; ce n'est pas que je craigne le moins du monde de voir le débat s'y engager: je crois, au contraire, qu'une recherche scientifique sérieuse portant sur ce point est tout à notre avantage, et je redoute beaucoup plus, en ces matières, le parti pris si répandu aujourd'hui de trancher ces questions d'une façon sommaire et superficielle. Si je n'entre pas ici dans un débat scientifique, c'est parce que l'Église n'est pas et ne doit pas être une école. D'ailleurs je suis certain que, lorsqu'il s'agit d'apprécier la valeur générale d'un témoignage, la science n'est pas nécessaire et que le simple bon sens y suffit. Cela est si vrai que toutes les législations modernes l'ont reconnu. Tandis que lorsqu'il s'agit d'appliquer la loi, elles exigent des juges la connaissance précise et spéciale des textes, lorsqu'il s'agit d'apprécier des faits, elles forment un jury composé d'hommes de toute classe et de toute culture qui laissent là leurs études, leur comptoir, leur ferme, leur industrie, pour formuler un arrêt d'où dépendent l'honneur, la liberté, la vie peut-être d'un de leurs semblables. Plusieurs de ceux qui m'écoutent ont siégé sans doute comme jurés dans des causes importantes; d'autres y ont assisté comme spectateurs; tous y ont pris part de loin avec une curiosité passionnée. Eh bien! voici devant nous un tribunal; à sa barre voici les apôtres. Ils portent témoignage en faveur de Jésus de Nazareth; ils disent de lui ce que vous savez tous, ils racontent cette histoire qui, lorsqu'elle a été crue, a transformé le monde. Ces témoins sont-ils dignes de foi? Pour nous en convaincre, voyons d'abord s'ils sont sincères. Et comme la sincérité ne suffit pas ici, comme elle peut ne pas

empêcher les égarements de l'esprit, nous verrons ensuite ce qu'il faut penser de leur intelligence.

' Sur leur sincérité, le doute est difficile, et je cherche vainement ce qu'alléguerait ici un sceptique endurci. La simplicité de leur accent a quelque chose d'unique devant lequel tombe toute prévention ; c'est évidemment sur leur témoignage qu'ont été écrits les évangiles. Connaissez-vous dans la langue des hommes des récits moins apprêtés, plus absolument dénués de toute recherche, de toute prétention à l'effet ? C'est le plus naïf des livres tout en en étant le plus sublime. S'il est de règle qu'un témoin est d'autant plus digne de foi qu'il est moins habile, moins capable d'une combinaison artificielle et d'un plan bien agencé, quelle confiance ne doivent pas inspirer ceux qui ont été les premiers biographes de Jésus de Nazareth ? Si l'on surprenait chez eux la moindre habileté calculée, la défiance s'éveillerait aussitôt, mais il y a dans la candeur je ne sais quelle force invincible qui déconcerte la critique et qui triomphe des préventions les plus acharnées. On a écrit de nos jours dans l'intérêt de la défense du christianisme plusieurs *Vies de Jésus*, rédigées à un point de vue rigoureusement historique, où l'on s'est efforcé de faire disparaître les contradictions apparentes des évangiles et de montrer l'authenticité de tous les faits et de tous les discours du Christ. J'admire ces travaux dont quelques-uns sont des œuvres éminentes, mais, l'avouerai-je, l'impression que produit un plaidoyer, si habile, si ingénieux, si convaincant qu'il soit, ne vaudra jamais, pour me persuader, celle que je ressens devant l'absolue ingénuité des évangiles ; ce sont eux qui défendent leurs avocats plus que leurs avocats ne les défendent ; ce qu'ils ont d'inachevé, d'incomplet, de défectueux même, est ce qui me touche et me convainc le plus de la vérité de leur témoignage. A cette première considération déjà si puissante vient s'ajouter un fait : c'est ce qu'on peut appeler l'héroïque franchise des apôtres. Y avez-vous jamais réfléchi ? En racontant la vie de leur Maître, les apôtres ont raconté leur propre vie, ils ont rédigé leur propre confession. Ici encore il suffit du simple bon sens

pour en apprécier la nature. Notre siècle a été celui des mémoires personnels et des autobiographies. Jamais le besoin de se raconter soi-même n'a été plus répandu qu'aujourd'hui. Des personnages sans importance dont les noms ont eu la célébrité éphémère du boulevard, des hommes qui avaient tout intérêt à se faire oublier, ont rédigé leurs vies. Plutôt que de consentir au silence, ils ont décrit jusqu'à leurs égarements et leurs chutes. Eh bien! on peut faire à ce propos une remarque. L'homme confesse naturellement ce qu'il a fait de bon, il le confesse même avec excès; parfois il consent à avouer ses fautes, mais parmi ses fautes il sait choisir; voyez avec quel art inconscient il raconte de préférence les entraînements que la passion justifie, ou qu'elle poétise du moins si elle ne les absout pas. Mais il y a deux choses qu'on ne dit jamais à personne: ce sont les bévues ridicules de son intelligence, et ce sont les côtés lâches et honteux de sa vie. Or, y avez-vous songé? Ces traits sont précisément ceux que les apôtres n'ont eu garde d'oublier en parlant d'eux-mêmes. Ils avouent que pendant trois ans, placés à l'école de leur Maître, ils ont constamment méconnu sa pensée, ils l'ont interprétée de la manière la plus grossière et la plus charnelle, ils ont répondu par l'intelligence la plus stupide à ses épanchements les plus élevés, ils ont jusqu'au bout caressé les rêves les plus intéressés de leur ambition tout égoïste et mesquine. Ils avouent que, la veille de la mort de Jésus-Christ, ils se disputaient la première place dans son royaume; ils confessent qu'ils ont été étroits, envieux les uns des autres, pleins de préjugés et de fanatisme. Dans les récits les plus touchants des évangiles, qu'il s'agisse de la bénédiction des petits enfants, de la guérison de la fille de la Cananéenne, de Marie lavant les pieds de leur Maître ou de l'agonie de Jésus en Gethsémané, ils s'attribuent un rôle qui est parfois odieux; ils sont sans pitié devant le cri d'une mère désespérée; ils calculent le prix du parfum répandu sur les pieds de Jésus; ils dorment à l'heure où leur Maître répand sa sueur de sang. C'est sous ces traits qu'ils se présentent avec une naïveté sans égale; pas une réserve en leur faveur, pas un adoucissement,

pas un essai d'apologie. On sent que c'est ainsi que les faits se sont passés. Il y a plus, ils se confessent d'une défaillance morale que nul homme n'a jamais avouée. Massillon disait que dans sa longue carrière de prêtre jamais personne ne s'était devant lui confessé d'avarice. Mes frères, il n'est pas besoin d'être évêque pour savoir que jamais personne ne s'est confessé de lâcheté. S'il y a quelque vieux soldat dans cette assemblée, il en tombera d'accord avec moi. Or les apôtres ont cette franchise de dire qu'ils ont tremblé à l'heure suprême, tremblé comme des enfants et des lâches; ils avouent que lorsque leur Maître, qui n'avait cessé de les aimer et de les bénir avec une tendresse toute divine, a été trahi par l'un des leurs et conduit devant ses juges, eux, ils se sont enfuis, qu'ils l'ont tous abandonné, et que celui d'entre eux qui avait juré de lui rester fidèle l'a renié trois fois devant l'interpellation d'une servante. Sans s'inquiéter du scandale qu'allait produire une telle histoire, ils la racontent avec détail et n'en omettent pas un mot, et lorsqu'ils vont annoncer dans le monde la croix de Jésus-Christ, et diriger sur elle les regards de ceux qu'elle doit sauver, ils osent dire qu'à l'heure où cette croix fut dressée, ils l'ont lâchement désertée, laissant à de faibles femmes l'honneur d'assister leur Maître agonisant, laissant à un brigand l'honneur de proclamer le premier l'éternelle royauté du Crucifié, comme ils ont laissé trois jours plus tard à une ancienne possédée l'honneur de proclamer la première le triomphe du Christ ressuscité. Voilà quel a été sur tous ces points leur témoignage, et j'ai le droit de dire que, si un tel aveu est vraiment héroïque, ceux qui l'ont fait méritent d'être crus.

IV.

'Mais on nous arrête, on nous dit: "Leur sincérité est hors de doute, mais on peut se tromper en étant sincère; l'enthousiasme est le propre des âmes naïves, et l'honnêteté des apôtres ne nous garantit pas qu'ils aient vu leur Maître transfiguré, ressuscité..."

'J'en conviens, et tout à l'heure je vais vous répondre ; mais avouez du moins que, si tout ce que nous avons dit est fondé, il faut absolument renoncer à la théorie d'après laquelle les récits évangéliques ne se seraient formés que peu à peu dans l'imagination du peuple chrétien. Si les faits que nous avons rappelés ne sont pas vrais, rien n'est vrai. S'ils sont vrais, l'hypothèse que je signale est à jamais détruite et le témoignage sincère des apôtres nous conduit sur le terrain ferme, inébranlable de l'histoire. Telle est ma première conclusion, et nul esprit sérieux ne pourra la mettre en doute. Cela dit, j'aborde l'objection que je viens de rappeler.

'Si des hommes qui ont vu de si près Jésus, qui nous ont raconté sa vie avec un accent si naturel et si vrai, ont été victimes de leur imagination surexcitée, au point de prêter sans cesse à leur Maître des actes qu'il n'aurait jamais accomplis, au point de ne plus même le reconnaître et de se laisser imposer à son sujet les inventions les plus fantastiques, cela ne peut s'expliquer que par une aberration étrange et périodique de leur intelligence. Nous avouons que l'histoire religieuse est pleine de récits d'hallucinations ; sans aller bien loin, on en a vu fréquemment à notre époque, et puisqu'on a osé de nos jours rapprocher la Salette et Lourdes de Bethléem et du Calvaire, il faut dire, en passant, ce que nous pensons d'un si monstrueux parallèle.

'Les hallucinés parlent en hallucinés. Que ce soient des bergers, des enfants, des religieuses ou des moines, ils sont les échos plus ou moins naïfs des rêveries dont on les a bercés ; ils croient voir un jour apparaître la figure qui tant de fois frappa leur imagination, et ils lui attribuent des paroles dont leur mémoire est hantée, exactement comme les adeptes du spiritisme moderne font parler à Pascal, à Bossuet ou à Shakespeare un langage dont la platitude trahit assez l'origine. Cela est si vrai que, de toutes ces légendes dont l'histoire de la superstition contemporaine est pleine, il n'est pas resté une parole, je dis une seule, digne d'être conservée, pas un mot qui rappelle de loin la sublime simplicité de nos Évangiles. L'incohérence est le caractère propre de l'hallu-

cination. Or, si les apôtres ont été des hallucinés, par quel prodige ont-ils pu nous retracer la figure de Jésus-Christ, telle que l'Évangile nous l'a conservée? Quelque opinion que l'on ait sur le côté surnaturel de l'Évangile, il est un point sur lequel tout le monde est d'accord, c'est que jamais figure n'a réalisé mieux que celle du Christ l'idée de la perfection morale. Dans cette peinture sublime, on voit se fondre en un harmonieux ensemble toutes les lignes qui ailleurs nous apparaissent dispersées et brisées; les vertus qui semblent opposées se réunissent ici; les traits qui chez les autres hommes s'excluent et se limitent se rencontrent pour former un tout achevé. Le calme auguste et l'activité infatigable, la grandeur et l'humilité, l'autorité souveraine et l'obéissance, la majesté et la condescendance, la sainteté la plus absolue et l'absence de tout rigorisme, la spiritualité la plus complète et les plus tendres sympathies humaines, l'horreur du mal et la compassion infinie pour ceux qui le commettent, voilà ce qui nous apparaît partout dans la vie de Jésus. Et dans ce tableau, pas un trait faux, dans cette harmonie pas une note dissonante. Songez à l'effet que produirait sur nous un seul penchant mauvais, une seule faiblesse, une seule imperfection, je dis moins, un seul trait vulgaire attribué à Jésus. On n'en a pas découvert encore, on n'en découvrira jamais. Et remarquez que cette attitude du Christ est toujours la même, soit qu'il se meuve dans la vie que nous appelons naturelle, soit qu'il accomplisse des actes surnaturels. C'est à propos de ses miracles qu'il prononce beaucoup de ses paroles les plus authentiques, dont nous sentons bien qu'elles n'ont pu être inventées, et qu'il déploie cette dignité souveraine et sans faste qui n'appartient qu'à lui. Et l'on voudrait nous faire croire que cette sainte figure a été tracée par des esprits faibles, par de pauvres égarés, dont l'imagination exaltée en aurait entrevu dans les incohérences de la fièvre les traits merveilleux! Plutôt que de convenir qu'ils ont vu le Christ tel qu'ils le dépeignent, on veut nous faire admettre qu'ils l'ont inventé, et que de ce sombre milieu de fanatisme, de préjugés opiniâtres, de haines

nationales, de formalisme et d'hypocrisie où se mouvait alors Israël, est sorti, par je ne sais quelle évolution bizarre, l'idéal même de la perfection morale, cet être dont le plus illustre incrédule de notre temps a pu dire que désormais la conscience humaine ne distinguerait plus entre Dieu et lui! Étrange supposition, bien digne d'une époque qui prétend expliquer le monde par la rencontre fortuite des atomes tourbillonnant dans l'espace, et faire sortir du mouvement de cette poussière inanimée la loi, l'ordre, la vie, l'intelligence, la conscience et la moralité. Eh bien! c'est au nom de ma raison, que moi, croyant, je m'insurge contre cette révoltante hypothèse, plus miraculeuse mille fois que les miracles dont on ne veut pas, c'est au nom de ma raison que j'affirme que l'égarement de quelques Galiléens n'a pas pu enfanter l'harmonie morale, que la folie n'a pas pu créer la raison la plus haute, que l'hallucination n'a pas inventé Jésus de Nazareth!'—Bersier's *Sermons*, t. vi. pp. 37–57.

NOTE 7 A, p. 95.

Comparatively few persons are competent to discuss, or even to consider, the intricate questions which have been raised by critics of the present day respecting the structure of the early books of the Bible; and if the profitable study of these books by men of average capacity and ordinary opportunities depended on their being able to satisfy themselves entirely upon such points, the inspired volume would cease to have much practical value for them. It is to be feared, indeed, that to some minds this has been the effect of our modern discussions, and that in respect to the early chapters of Genesis, for instance, a mist of antiquarian and historical criticism has served unduly to distract and absorb the attention. But happily there is another point of view from which those chapters may be and ought to be considered, and this is independent of any such perplexities. The Book of Genesis is in the form of a history. On the face of it, that book offers us an account of the actual position of man upon the earth, and of that general course of affairs which led to the selection

by God of one man and one family to be the founders of a spiritual organization, or Church, which should ultimately react upon the natural order of human society, and in which, through its great Head, all nations of the earth should be blessed. In other words, it offers to fulfil that which is the essential function of all true history—that is, to put men and things in their right places, to exhibit their true relations, and to give us therefore a sound and just view of life. For this purpose, it may for the moment be treated as a matter of subordinate importance from what particular sources the narrative may have been immediately derived. The Book of Genesis, if only as a venerable record of antiquity, is priceless; but as revealing to us likewise facts and realities in the constitution of the world which affect our present condition, it has a value of another kind.

We here refer more particularly to the opening chapters. None have occasioned more perplexity in details to many eager disputants. Yet if they are interpreted by a mind able to seize principles and open to the comprehension of a large sphere of facts, those early records, besides the elementary revelation which they communicate on the surface, are seen to be pregnant likewise with profound instruction for thinking men. On this point it is hardly necessary to appeal to argument, for the observation is confirmed by a very striking experience. It would seem to many, perhaps, a paradox to say that the dominant and germinal idea of modern practical science was suggested by the first chapter of Genesis, and received its earliest definite expression in language quoted from it. Yet this is the simple fact. That chapter has, in this respect, experienced a most singular fate. No portion, perhaps, of the Bible is more utterly abandoned by certain votaries of science in the present day; while, on the contrary, none was more dear to the great father of the experimental philosophy. The language of Lord Bacon is saturated, so to speak, with thoughts derived from this narrative. He discerns in it types of the whole order of the divine operations, whether in nature or in grace—types, consequently, of the work and

the nature of that being who was made in the divine image. Some of his references may be ascribed to his exuberant fancy; but no thoughtful mind will thus dismiss that noble imagery with which he concludes the introduction to the *Instauratio Magna*, and in which he invokes the divine blessing upon his labours. It is a prayer in which theology, philosophy, and experience combine in one luminous and solemn meditation.

'Thou therefore, O Father,' he exclaims, 'who gavest the visible light as the first-born of Thy creatures, and didst pour into man the intellectual light, as the top and consummation of Thy workmanship, be pleased to protect and govern this work, which, coming from Thy goodness, returneth to Thy glory. Thou, after Thou hadst reviewed the works which Thy hand had made, beheldest that everything was very good, and didst rest with complacency in them. But man reflecting on the works which he had made, saw that all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and could by no means acquiesce in them. Wherefore, if we labour in Thy works with the sweat of our brows, Thou wilt make us partakers of Thy vision and Thy sabbath. We humbly beg that this mind may be stedfastly in us, and that Thou by our hands and also by the hands of others on whom Thou shalt bestow the same spirit, wilt please to convey a largesse of new alms to the family of mankind.'

This meditative summary, as it were, of the first three chapters of Genesis would alone be sufficiently instructive; but it is not even here that the full depth of Bacon's meditation on such passages is to be discerned. That which has been referred to above as the dominant idea of his philosophy is still more conspicuously associated with such reflections. As the title of his great work the *Novum Organum*, stand the words '*Aphorismi de interpretatione naturae et regno hominis*'—'Aphorisms concerning the interpretation of nature and the dominion of man.' That is, Bacon discerned a revelation of the true function of man upon the earth in the emphatic commission given him to 'replenish the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon

the earth.' Those words were apprehended by Bacon not as a mere description of man's dignity, but as a comprehensive designation of his true position, and as marking out the main work which on earth it was at once his destiny and his duty to fulfil. He proceeds in the first aphorism to indicate the character and limits of this dominion in words which are the best description of all right dominion, of whatever kind. 'Man,' he says, 'is the minister and interpreter of nature.' It need hardly be observed how deeply those words have penetrated the thought of the modern world, or how intimately they are intertwined with the whole spirit of the Baconian philosophy. They are incessantly repeated as the very burden of Bacon's teaching; and we see them year by year more amply fulfilled. But their full significance is to be appreciated only by associating them with the sacred imagery which, as we have seen, was so constantly present to the philosopher's mind, and by regarding them as a commentary upon the scriptural revelation. From that point of view, what a light do they not throw upon the condition and the history of mankind! Nature, with all its marvellous endowments, is depicted to us, before the creation of man, as a kingdom without a king, an estate without an owner or minister to develope it, a beautiful vision without a painter or an interpreter. Forces of the utmost subtlety or the most stupendous power, infinite possibilities of combination and variation of elements, harmonies of form and colour needing a reasonable hand and eye to detect and depict them, lay hid in that vast and complex creation upon which God looked when he declared that it was very good. But a mirror was needed in which the whole mystery and marvel should be reflected, and in which, if the expression may be adapted from the sacred writer, God Himself should behold the full beauty of His own work. When the human eye and the human reason were created, a new universe was created with them, the universe of science, of art, and of all the higher developments of the animal instincts. Perhaps from this point of view we may be permitted to discern an adumbration of a

great truth in the statement that 'out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.' To give names to things is to classify them, to observe their resemblances, to abstract and generalise, to exert the reason and the imagination; and what else, in substance, is the work of science at the present day but that of giving names to every creature? Viewing man as called into existence by the Creator for the further display of the marvels of creation, we may regard God as at this moment bringing all the varied elements of nature before us to see what we will call them, to behold how very good are those reasonable and moral faculties which He designed to be the mirror of His created works.

Thus under this simple language, but, though simple, far more accurate than the definitions of any philosopher however distinguished, did the great founder of modern scientific progress discern a revelation of the cardinal facts of man's position on the earth. Not, of course, that this is a revelation of his ultimate destiny. That is a question which is answered elsewhere, and which is entirely independent of the particular work we have to perform in this sphere of existence. We all recognise in the case of individuals that they may be the heirs of the highest spiritual blessings and honours, though appointed in this life to the most humble occupations. There can, indeed, in the nature of the case, be nothing in the slightest degree unworthy of the loftiest minds in accepting the function just described—that of co-operating with the Creator Himself in the full exhibition of His creative power. But it is doubtless true that the soul of man has capacities which can never be satisfied by even the highest display of the glories of the visible creation, and that it is only in the spiritual sphere that our spirits will find their full rest, and their complete career. Those only, however, can expect to be thus made rulers over many things who have faithfully ruled over the comparatively few things committed to them in this life.

Yet men have struggled with a strange persistency against this unavoidable task; and once more in the narrative of the sacred historian did Bacon discern the nature of this perversity. Placed in the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it, man could not be content with this simple duty, but entangled himself in speculations respecting what was abstractedly good and evil, and yielded to the first temptation which suggested to him a shorter and a pleasanter path to the full enjoyment of his life. Subsequently, through ages of weary debate and speculation men sought continually to attain the *summum bonum*—their ultimate aim and perfection—by all manner of mental, moral, and physical disciplines; each school of philosophers, each sect of theologians, each order of Christian or of heathen monks, deeming that they had found some new tree of the knowledge of good and evil which would introduce them to the fruit of the tree of life. But all these, from whatever quarter they approached, encountered a mysterious sword which kept the way of the tree of life, and which sent them back baffled into their wilderness. At length, in an age of moral and mental regeneration, under the light of a revived and reformed religious intelligence, a vast and patient genius was arrested by the words of the ancient record, and recognised in them that still small voice which might reveal, to quote his own image, 'the clue to the labyrinth.' He saw the key of all philosophy and of all life in the statement that the Lord God had sent man forth from the garden of Eden 'to till the ground from whence he was taken.' While the mass of men shrank in fear, as some are still apt to shrink, from the blaze of the new knowledge which was bursting on them, he pointed to this chapter in order to remind them that it was not mere knowledge, not the natural knowledge of the world in which we live which led to man's fall, but a presumptuous attempt to intrude into the hidden mysteries of moral and spiritual truth, and attempts to seek elsewhere than in the revealed will of God for the ultimate principles of good and evil. From that moment, in proportion as men have accepted the task of labouring, according to Bacon's favourite language,

'to produce fruit,' in proportion as they have humbly endeavoured to assert their dominion over nature—a dominion only to be asserted by obedience—have they made advances in all departments of life greater than were ever achieved before. In greater or less degree, history has steadily borne witness to the truth of this description of human nature. In proportion as nations, instead of desolating and subduing, have accepted the function of replenishing and subduing, the earth have they been great, prosperous, and happy. It is an humble method, one needing in fact moral qualities of the highest kind—qualities which Christianity alone brought to sufficient perfection for the purpose in view. But it is the only method; and no schemes of spiritual or moral purification have ever been effectual which have not recognised this primary duty of labour, and of labour bestowed in developing the resources of this earth. Even the liberal professions are handmaids to the great creative function here discharged by mankind, and are never in a healthy condition unless recognising this duty—a consideration which, if duly weighed, would perhaps reconcile us to many a labour of which we are at times inclined to complain that it seems of such purely material and temporal interest.

But it is not only for the purposes of the apologist, nor merely as throwing an interesting light upon some great questions, that an endeavour has thus been made to illustrate the bearing of some of those statements in the early chapters of Genesis which have provoked modern criticism; it is rather that we may derive encouragement towards a more simple and patient habit of reading and reflecting on the Scriptures. These instances may serve to illustrate what fruitful truths may be suggested to us, not only by the minute study which is the province of the professed theologian, but also by that quiet meditation on the English text which is practicable for every one, and which, if we mistake not, has been the chief source of English wisdom. 'To know wisdom and instruction, to receive the words of understanding, to receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, judgment, and equity,' to obtain those

large and just views of life which to every one are of primary necessity—for these ends the most unlearned need only betake himself assiduously to those Scriptures which are able to make him wise unto salvation—alike in this world and in the next.—*From a paper by the Author in the Christian Observer, March* 1877.

NOTE 8, p. 109.

'There are, moreover, certain signs which never fail to reveal, even involuntarily, the real condition of an individual or of a nation, though no eye may see it: thus the whole of the internal weakness and perversity of the hagiocracy already betrays itself in the one small but significant circumstance of its treatment of the name of God. Desirous to maintain the infinite sanctity of the venerable name *Jahveh*, and fearful of desecrating it, it ordained that it should never be pronounced at all, and so allowed this glorious ancient name to lie in absolute obscurity behind a perpetual veil. No doubt this practice was only introduced very gradually at first; and unless the name had always been treated with a reverence quite peculiar to itself ever since the formation of the community, no such custom of abstaining out of reverence from pronouncing it at all could ever have arisen. But it was only the growing scrupulousness of later days which could conclude from the third injunction of the Decalogue that for fear of running the risk of misusing the name when taking an oath, or on any other occasion, and thereby exciting the wrath as it were of an avenging Lord, it would be better never to utter it at all. It now became common to use instead the general name *Elohim*, i. e. God; until at last the custom was established of reading the next highest name of *Adonai*, which corresponded to it most nearly, even in those passages of Scripture where it was found written, or where, as in the books of history, it had to be written then: and, in the same way, men afterwards came to prefer saying *Heaven* instead of God, in ordinary speech.

The substitution of *Adonai* was already customary towards the end of the Persian era, as we see from many indications; and from that time it maintained itself amongst the Judeans for all succeeding ages, through a constant succession of departures from the free and straightforward course. The Samaritans alone never gave in to the practice. The name of the true God was now suspended at an infinite distance, high above all the present scene of existence; and the further notion was soon conceived that it would only be revealed again in the whole of its wondrous significance and power in the fulness of things, at the end of all time. In the same way, the heathen had their mysterious names of deities, and the Chinese emperor's original name is suspended over all his subjects, inviolable and unapproachable during his reign, while he is designated by some other appellation. But this God of the ancient community, though men feared his name above all things, and desired utterly to surrender themselves to him in deepest awe, was in reality ever retiring further and further from them, into a mysterious distance; and while they were restrained by their scruples from looking into his face or calling upon him by his true name, they were really losing him more and more, so undesigned was this most significant of all the signs of Israel's last great era! As the name of the people changes with each of the three great stages of its history, and each name may serve as a brief symbol of the whole essence of the special era to which it belongs, so it is to a still greater extent with the name of God; and nothing is more significant than that the simple but sublime *Jahveh* should be succeeded by the splendid *Jahveh of Hosts*, together with the very free use of Jahveh, and this, again, finally by a blank. But this practice of avoiding the highest conceivable name of the true religion, when it had acquired the force of law, gradually fostered the most artificial ways of thinking and speaking of God, as though it were impossible, at least for human language, to find any name fully worthy of being used as an adequate designation of the Unspeakable. Nor was this all, it also produced many kinds

of superstition, especially the prevalent belief that it was possible to work miracles by the bold utterance of the mysterious heavenly name, the probable sound of which it would still be easy to imitate. These tendencies, no doubt, only reached their further development in the following centuries, but their ultimate source lies hidden here.'—Ewald, *History of Israel*, vol. v. pp. 198, 199, translated by J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A., 1874.

NOTE 9, p. 111.

Dr. Lightfoot says, in a Note to his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, pp. 156, 157, second edition:—

'From the investigation just concluded it appears that the term "Faith" can scarcely be said to occur at all in the Hebrew Scriptures of the Old Testament. It is indeed a characteristic token of the difference between the two covenants, that under the Law the "*fear* of the Lord" holds very much the same place as "*faith* in God," "*faith* in Christ," under the Gospel. *Awe* is the prominent idea in the earlier dispensation, *trust* in the later. At the same time, though the word itself is not found in the Old Testament, the idea is not absent; for indeed a trust in the Infinite and Unseen, subordinating thereto all interests that are finite and transitory, is the very essence of the higher spiritual life.

In Abraham, the father of the chosen race, this attitude of trustfulness was most marked. By faith he left home and kindred, and settled in a strange land; by faith he acted upon God's promise of a race and an inheritance, though it seemed at variance with all human experience; by faith he offered up his only son, in whom alone that promise could be fulfilled. Thus this one word "faith" sums up the lesson of his whole life. And when, during the long silence of prophecy which separated the close of the Jewish from the birth of the Christian Scriptures, the Hebrews were led to reflect and

comment on the records of their race, this feature of their great forefather's character did not escape notice. The two languages, which having supplanted the Hebrew had now become the vehicles of theological teaching, both supplied words to express their meaning. In the Greek πίστις, in the Aramaic הימנותא, the hitherto missing term was first found.'

NOTE 10, p. 137.

This subject is forcibly and beautifully illustrated in the following Extract from a Sermon in M. Bersier's sixth volume, on *Les Vérités Morales et les Vérités Révélées*, pp. 300–311 :—

'Nous arrivons ainsi à la seconde partie de mon texte. Jésus-Christ, qui a, c'est notre conclusion première, le droit d'être cru comme prédicateur de la loi morale, réclame la même foi comme révélateur religieux. C'est ce point que nous allons maintenant examiner.

'Jésus n'est pas seulement un maître de morale, il ne parle pas seulement des choses terrestres ; il se donne comme étant venu d'en haut. "Personne," dit-il, "n'est monté au ciel que celui qui est descendu du ciel, savoir le Fils de l'homme." Il parle avec autorité de choses qui dépassent absolument nos horizons humains. Il nous révèle Dieu et parle de lui comme un Fils parle de son Père, il nous enseigne quel est le gouvernement de Dieu, quelle est sa providence envers ses créatures, quels sont les desseins de sa miséricorde pour le salut de l'humanité, il annonce d'avance sa mort et enseigne explicitement qu'il s'offrira pour le salut du monde. Dans l'entretien même d'où j'ai tiré les paroles que nous méditons, il expose en quelques mots admirables tout le plan de la rédemption. "Dieu a tellement aimé le monde qu'il a donné son Fils unique, afin que quiconque croit en lui ne périsse point, mais qu'il ait la vie éternelle." Il sait que cette mort doit attirer tous les hommes à lui ; il annonce également sa résurrection et son triomphe. Il parle de sa personne comme étant la manifestation vivante de Dieu ; il se propose aux

âmes comme Celui en qui il faut croire, qu'il faut aimer par-dessus toutes choses, en qui le monde devra trouver sa vie; il annonce le jugement à venir et dit comment ce jugement se fera.

'En face de ces affirmations, notre situation est tout autre qu'en face de son enseignement moral. Tant qu'il s'agissait de celui-ci, nous pouvions le juger, car nous trouvions dans notre propre conscience un sûr critère pour en apprécier la vérité. Chaque précepte du sermon sur la montagne, chaque parabole éveillait en nous un écho. Ce témoignage intérieur suffisait pour nous convaincre de la vérité des paroles du Christ, et il est à remarquer que plus notre conscience était droite, et notre cœur ouvert aux affections pures, plus cette conviction s'affermissait en nous.

'Ici, au contraire, tout change. Nous entendons des déclarations souveraines qu'il nous est impossible de contrôler. Rien en nous à première vue n'y peut rendre témoignage. Rien ne nous prouve absolument qu'elles soient vraies. Nous sommes réduits à croire le Christ sur parole. Jusque-là nous avions marché en le suivant sur le terrain ferme de l'expérience, ici nous nous lançons après lui sur une mer profonde aux horizons sans fin. Nous faisons acte de foi. Deux questions se posent ici devant nous : avons-nous le droit de faire cet acte de foi? Jésus-Christ doit-il être cru?

'A la première de ces questions la réponse est aisée. Supposons que nous écartions d'avance et systématiquement la foi comme moyen d'accès à la vérité religieuse, aucune autre voie ne nous restera pour y parvenir. Sur toutes les questions relatives à notre origine et à notre destinée, sur la douleur, sur le mal, sur le pardon, sur nos relations avec Dieu, sur la vie future, la science n'a rien à nous apprendre. Jamais peut-être elle ne l'a confessé plus franchement qu'aujourd'hui. Il me serait facile de citer ici ses aveux si nombreux et si péremptoires. Je ne discute pas l'attitude qu'elle prend vis-à-vis de tous ces problèmes; pour tout dire, je crois sa réserve exagérée, il me semble qu'elle pourrait, à l'aide de ses simples ressources naturelles, pénétrer dans ces questions plus avant qu'elle ne le

fait. Je constate simplement ce fait que la science pure est radicalement incapable de calmer les remords de la conscience, de donner au cœur un amour digne de lui, de consoler nos douleurs, de nous apporter quelque certitude sur notre destinée éternelle. Une telle impuissance, aussi clairement constatée dans le siècle même où la science a d'ailleurs remporté ses plus éclatants triomphes, est un phénomène qui doit frapper tout esprit droit.

'Cela étant reconnu, que faire? Renoncer à soulever le voile de notre destinée, nous enfermer dans la vie présente, comme les épicuriens pour jouir, comme les stoïciens pour obéir à la loi du devoir, sans rien savoir d'au delà, sans oser rien affirmer, ni rien espérer sur Dieu, sur le grand inconnu qui nous attend peut-être? On l'essaie, on l'a tenté mille fois, on n'y parvient jamais. L'humanité est religieuse par essence. Le positivisme pourra plaire à une ou deux générations qui passent; il ne sera jamais la doctrine de l'humanité.

'C'est ici que Jésus-Christ nous apparaît avec l'autorité qui n'appartient qu'à lui. Il se donne comme un révélateur venu de la part de Dieu, et sur tous les points obscurs de notre destinée, il répand la lumière; il ne cherche pas, il ne raisonne pas, il ne discute pas, il affirme, et quand les Juifs lui reprochent de se rendre témoignage à soi-même, c'est-à-dire, en langage moderne, d'affirmer sans preuves, il répond par cette parole: "Mon témoignage est véritable, car je sais d'où je suis venu, et je sais où je vais." (Jean viii. 14.)

'Et voici le fait qui s'est produit: quelques hommes ont cru à cette affirmation de Jésus, puis d'autres y ont cru sur leur témoignage, et cette croyance est devenue aujourd'hui celle de la partie la plus éclairée et la meilleure de l'humanité. Nous-mêmes nous sommes chrétiens; cela veut dire que ce que nous savons de certain sur Dieu, sur la providence, sur le pardon, sur la vie éternelle, nous le tenons de Jésus-Christ. Nous avons cru en Jésus-Christ "parlant des choses célestes," en Jésus-Christ révélateur de la vérité religieuse. Avons-nous eu raison de le faire? Jésus-Christ est-il un témoin digne de foi?

'Je remarque, en premier lieu, que l'accent même avec lequel ses affirmations se produisent a quelque chose qui est de nature à nous faire réfléchir. Personne n'a jamais parlé avec une autorité égale à la sienne. Personne n'a jamais dit comme lui: "Je suis d'en haut, et vous êtes d'en bas; je sais d'où je suis venu et où je vais; je suis le chemin, la vérité, la vie; je suis la lumière du monde; celui qui m'a vu a vu le Père." On ne se défait pas de telles affirmations, on n'a pas le droit d'en atténuer la portée. Elles trahissent ou un prodigieux égarement ou une inspiration véritable. Entre ces deux explications il faut choisir. Il n'y en a pas une troisième, et il semble que la critique antichrétienne le reconnaisse clairement aujourd'hui. Elle ne craint pas de dire que Jésus-Christ est le plus sublime des hallucinés.

'Ce n'est pas nous qui nous plaindrons de la netteté de ces déclarations, si douloureuses qu'elles soient à notre cœur. Nous avons tout à gagner à voir disparaître ici toute équivoque.

'Nous croyons, nous, aux affirmations de Jésus-Christ. Pour me servir des paroles de mon texte, nous croyons en lui quand il nous parle des choses célestes, parce qu'il nous a toujours dit vrai quand il nous a parlé des choses terrestres. Ceci est une présomption, rien de plus, je le sais, mais cette présomption nous suffit. Voici un Être dont on nous dit qu'il a entraîné l'humanité dans la plus fantastique des illusions, et cet Être, dans toutes ses déclarations portant sur des sujets que nous pouvons contrôler, a dit vrai, absolument vrai; il n'a partagé aucun des préjugés, aucune des erreurs morales de son temps ni de son peuple; il a dépeint l'humanité telle qu'elle est, il a donné à la justice, au devoir, à la miséricorde, leur formule éternelle; sur tous ces points son enseignement n'a pu être ni réfuté, ni dépassé. En l'écoutant, non seulement nous sentons qu'il dit vrai, mais nous sentons que la vérité qu'il a formulée nous domine, qu'elle se dresse devant nous comme un idéal qui nous oblige, nous attire et nous condamne à la fois. A travers les siècles la puissance de cette parole est telle qu'elle exerce sur des

millions d'hommes, et sur les meilleurs, un irrésistible ascendant.

'Cette seule considération suffirait à prouver que nous ne croyons pas à la légère lorsque nous acceptons ce que Jésus-Christ nous dit du monde invisible qui nous dépasse. Songez-y bien. Toute société humaine repose sur la confiance mutuelle. Le nombre de vérités que nous acceptons sur le témoignage d'autrui est immense; si nous devions tout contrôler, nous ferions à peine un pas en avant et le travail de l'humanité devrait recommencer avec chaque individu. Or, quand notre confiance a-t-elle été mieux placée que lorsque nous avons cru à Celui dont la parole a été l'incarnation même de la vérité morale? Si nous ne le croyons pas, qui croirons-nous?

'Mais il y a plus, et nous touchons ici au vrai nœud de la question. Si nous croyons aux vérités religieuses révélées par Jésus-Christ, ce n'est pas seulement parce que, nous ayant dit vrai dans toutes les choses morales, il mérite notre confiance, ce n'est pas seulement parce qu'il est à nos yeux le Saint et le Juste, c'est encore et surtout parce que ces vérités religieuses sont le complément et le couronnement nécessaire des vérités morales auxquelles notre conscience nous oblige de croire, tellement qu'acceptant les unes, nous sommes conduits par une logique invincible à accepter les autres. Il n'est pas une vérité morale de l'Évangile qui ne se prolonge et ne s'épanouisse en une vérité religieuse. Voilà (pour le dire en passant) la raison qui ne nous permettra jamais d'accepter un moment la théorie de la morale indépendante, car aux yeux de tout chrétien la morale et la doctrine sont étroitement et indissolublement unies. Qu'est-ce que la doctrine en effet, si ce n'est l'affirmation des relations qui doivent exister entre Dieu et nous, et qu'est-ce que la morale, si ce n'est la conséquence pratique de ces relations? Si tout à l'heure j'ai dû distinguer entre Jésus-Christ révélateur de la loi morale et Jésus-Christ révélateur de la vérité religieuse, vous avez tous senti d'instinct que ce n'était là qu'une distinction temporaire, qui ne correspondait à rien de réel, et que la personnalité de Jésus-Christ est absolument une et indivisible.

'Prenez, en effet, les traits principaux de l'enseignement moral de Jésus-Christ. Il recommande à ses disciples la paix intérieure, le calme et cette douceur victorieuse qui n'ont rien de commun, ni avec la résignation fataliste du bouddhiste, ni avec la fermeté guindée du stoïcien. Mais comment cette disposition intérieure est-elle possible sans la foi au Dieu juste, au Dieu qui sait tout, qui voit tout et sans la permission duquel rien n'arrive? Il affirme que, sous le désordre apparent des choses, il y a un ordre profond, que pas un iota de la loi morale ne peut être anéanti, que l'homme moissonnera ce qu'il a semé. Mais ces affirmations reçoivent chaque jour dans la réalité de l'histoire le démenti le plus insolent, elles sont misérablement dérisoires si nous ne croyons pas au Dieu qui sanctionne la loi qu'il a faite et qui jugera le monde avec justice. Il annonce aux âmes les plus souillées un relèvement possible, une restauration complète, un avenir de joie et de pureté. Mais comment ce fait pourra-t-il se réaliser sans que les droits de la justice divine aient été pleinement reconnus, sans qu'une expiation ait été acceptée et subie, sans que la rédemption ait été accomplie? Il annonce le triomphe du royaume de Dieu dans la justice et la vérité, non pas seulement comme un idéal auquel l'humanité arrivera peut-être dans vingt ou cinquante siècles, mais comme une réalité dont chaque conscience sera le témoin. Mais cela ne suppose-t-il pas la vie future et la réparation de toutes les iniquités d'ici-bas? Il enseigne à voir dans la douleur une épreuve sanctifiante, à tressaillir de joie au milieu des larmes. Mais cela aura-t-il un sens si l'amour de Dieu n'est pas le refuge de nos cœurs déçus et brisés par le monde? J'ai donc le droit de dire que le Christ révélateur de la loi morale conduit au Christ rédempteur et sauveur, que le sermon sur la montagne appelle et fait pressentir la croix du Calvaire, que tout se tient dans l'Évangile et que l'homme ne peut pas séparer ce que Dieu a uni.

'Mes frères, vous avez souvent répété avec sincérité, mais avec angoisse, la prière des disciples: "Seigneur, augmente

notre foi!" Vous nous avez souvent demandé comment cette foi peut être fortifiée. Un génie égaré qui fut jusqu'à la fin un déiste sincère a écrit cette parole profonde: "Si tu veux croire en Dieu, vis de telle manière que tu aies toujours besoin que Dieu existe." Cette parole de Rousseau n'était que le commentaire de cette déclaration du Maître des maîtres: "Si quelqu'un veut faire la volonté de Dieu, il connaîtra que ma doctrine est de Dieu." Croyez-vous au Christ révélateur de la loi morale? Croyez-vous à la nécessité inflexible du devoir, croyez-vous à la sainteté intérieure, croyez-vous au droit éternel pour tous, croyez-vous à la réparation nécessaire de toutes les injustices, à la consolation de toutes les douleurs, croyez-vous enfin au règne de Dieu? Il faut choisir entre cela et les doctrines fatalistes qui, de tous les côtés, étendent sur le monde leurs ombres épaisses. Si Jésus-Christ est votre Maître, si vous savez qu'il vous dit vrai quand il vous parle des "choses terrestres," vous l'écouterez et vous croirez en lui quand il vous annoncera "les célestes." Après l'avoir suivi sur la montagne des béatitudes où il a donné au monde la charte du royaume des cieux, vous le suivrez sur le Calvaire où il a fondé ce royaume par la vertu de son sacrifice rédempteur; après lui avoir dit comme Pierre: "Seigneur, tu as les paroles de la vie éternelle," vous ajouterez comme lui: "Nous avons cru et nous avons connu que tu es le Christ, le Fils du Dieu vivant." *Amen!*'

NOTE 11, p. 145.

The text of this letter (xcvi. al. xcvii., ed. Keil, 1876) is subjoined, with the translation of Mr. J. D. Lewis:—

'C. Plinius Trajano Imperatori.

'Sollemne est mihi, domine, omnia de quibus dubito ad te referre. Quis enim potest melius vel cunctationem meam regere vel ignorantiam extruere? Cognitionibus de Christianis interfui numquam; ideo nescio quid et quatenus aut puniri soleat aut quaeri. Nec mediocriter haesitavi sitne

aliquod discrimen aetatum an quamlibet teneri nihil a robustioribus differant, detur paenitentiae venia an ei qui omnino Christianus fuit desisse non prosit, nomen ipsum, si flagitiis careat, an flagitia cohaerentia nomini puniantur. Interim *in* iis qui ad me tamquam Christiani deferebantur hunc sum secutus modum. Interrogavi ipsos an essent Christiani. Confitentes iterum ac tertio interrogavi, supplicium minatus: perseverantes duci jussi. Neque enim dubitabam, qualecumque esset quod faterentur, pertinaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri. Fuerunt alii similis amentiae quos, quia cives Romani erant, adnotavi in urbem remittendos. Mox ipso tractatu, ut fieri solet, diffundente se crimine plures species inciderunt. Propositus est libellus sine auctore multorum nomina continens. Qui negabant esse se Christianos aut fuisse, cum praeeunte me deos appellarent et imagini tuae, quam propter hoc jusseram cum simulacris numinum adferri, ture ac vino supplicarent, praeterea male dicerent Christo, quorum nihil posse cogi dicuntur qui sunt re vera Christiani, dimittendos esse putavi. Alii ab indice nominati esse se Christianos dixerunt et mox negaverunt; fuisse quidem sed desisse, quidam ante plures annos, non nemo etiam ante viginti quoque. Omnes et imaginem tuam deorumque simulacra venerati sunt [ii] et Christo male dixerunt. Adfirmabant autem hanc fuisse summam vel culpae suae vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem, seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent: quibus peractis morem sibi discedendi fuisse, rursusque ad capiendum cibum, promiscuum tamen et innoxium; quod ipsum facere desisse post edictum meum, quo secundum mandata tua hetaerias esse vetueram. Quo magis necessarium credidi ex duabus ancillis, quae ministrae dicebantur, quod esset veri et per tormenta quaerere. Nihil aliud inveni quam superstitionem pravam immodicam. Ideo dilata cognitione ad consulendum te decucurri. Visa est

enim mihi res digna consultatione, maxime propter periclitantium numerum. Multi enim omnis aetatis, omnis ordinis, utriusque sexus etiam, vocantur in periculum et vocabuntur. Neque civitates tantum sed vicos etiam atque agros superstitionis istius contagio pervagata est; quae videtur sisti et corrigi posse. Certe satis constat prope jam desolata templa coepisse celebrari et sacra sollemnia diu intermissa repeti pastumque venire victimarum, cujus adhuc rarissimus emptor inveniebatur. Ex quo facile est opinari quae turba hominum emendari possit, si sit paenitentiae locus.'

'PLINY TO TRAJAN.

'It is with me, Sir, an established custom to refer to you all matters on which I am in doubt. Who, indeed, is better able, either to direct my scruples or instruct my ignorance?

'I have never been present at trials of Christians, and consequently do not know for what reasons, or how far, punishment is usually inflicted or inquiry made in their case. Nor have my hesitations been slight: as to whether any distinction of age should be made, or persons however tender in years should be viewed as differing in no respect from the full-grown; whether pardon should be accorded to repentance, or he who has once been a Christian should gain nothing by having ceased to be one: whether the very profession itself if unattended by crime, or else the crimes necessarily attaching to the profession, should be made the subject of punishment.

'Meanwhile, in the case of those who have been brought before me in the character of Christians, my course has been as follows:—I put it to themselves whether they were or were not Christians. To such as professed that they were, I put the inquiry a second and a third time, threatening them with the supreme penalty. Those who persisted I ordered to execution. For, indeed, I could not doubt, whatever might be the nature of that which they professed, that their pertinacity, at any rate, and inflexible obstinacy, ought to be punished. There were others afflicted with like

madness, with regard to whom, as they were Roman citizens, I made a memorandum that they were to be sent for judgment to Rome. Soon, the very handling of this matter causing, as often happens, the area of the charge to spread, many fresh examples occurred. An anonymous paper was put forth containing the names of many persons. Those who denied that they either were or had been Christians, upon their calling on the gods after me, and upon their offering wine and incense before your statue, which for this purpose I had ordered to be introduced in company with the images of the gods, moreover upon their reviling Christ—none of which things it is said can such as are really and truly Christians be compelled to do—these I deemed it proper to dismiss. Others named by the informer admitted that they were Christians, and then shortly afterwards denied it, adding that they had been Christians, but had ceased to be so, some three years, some many years, more than one of them as much as twenty years, before. All these, too, not only honoured your image and the effigies of the gods, but also reviled Christ. They affirmed, however, that this had been the sum, whether of their crime or their delusion; they had been in the habit of meeting together on a stated day, before sunrise, and of offering in turns a form of invocation to Christ, as to a god; also of binding themselves by an oath, *not* for any guilty purpose, but not to commit thefts, or robberies, or adulteries, not to break their word, not to repudiate deposits when called upon; these ceremonies having been gone through, they had been in the habit of separating, and again meeting together for the purpose of taking food—food, that is, of an ordinary and innocent kind. They had, however, ceased from doing even this, after my edict, in which, following your orders, I had forbidden the existence of fraternities. This made me think it all the more necessary to inquire, even by torture, of two maid-servants, who were styled deaconesses, what the truth was. I could discover nothing else than a vicious and extravagant superstition; consequently having adjourned the inquiry, I have had recourse to your counsels.

Indeed the matter seemed to me a proper one for consultation, chiefly on account of the number of persons imperilled. For many of all ages and all ranks, ay, and of both sexes, are being called, and will be called, into danger. Nor are cities only permeated by the contagion of this superstition, but villages and country parts as well; yet it seems possible to stop it and cure it. It is in truth sufficiently evident that the temples, which were almost entirely deserted, have begun to be frequented, that the customary religious rites which had long been interrupted are being resumed, and that there is a sale for the food of sacrificial beasts, for which hitherto very few buyers indeed could be found. From all this it is easy to form an opinion as to the great number of persons who may be reclaimed, if only room be granted for penitence.'—*The Letters of the Younger Pliny literally translated*, by John Delaware Lewis, M.A., 1879.

Some objections which have been raised against the genuineness of this letter are conclusively answered by M. Boissier in the *Revue Archéologique* for Feb., 1876, p. 114. They are also overruled by M. Renan, who says in a note to *Les Évangiles*, p. 476: '*Les objections qu'on a faites contre l'authenticité de cette lettre ne sauraient prévaloir contre les arguments tirés du style, et surtout de la place que la pièce occupe dans la correspondance administrative de Pline et de Trajan.*'

NOTE 12, p. 154.

Ἀναβλέψας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶπε· Κύριε ὁ θεὸς, ὁ παντοκράτωρ, ὁ τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ καὶ εὐλογητοῦ παιδός σου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ πατὴρ, δι' οὗ τὴν περὶ σοῦ ἐπίγνωσιν εἰλήφαμεν, ὁ θεὸς ἀγγέλων καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ πάσης κτίσεως παντός τε τοῦ γένους τῶν δικαίων, οἳ ζῶσιν ἐνώπιόν σου· εὐλογῶ σε, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ ὥρας ταύτης, τοῦ λαβεῖν μέρος ἐν ἀριθμῷ τῶν μαρτύρων ἐν τῷ ποτηρίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ σου εἰς ἀνάστασιν ζωῆς αἰωνίου ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ πνεύματος ἁγίου· ἐν

οἷς προσδεχθείην ἐνώπιόν σου σήμερον ἐν θυσίᾳ πίονι καὶ προσδεκτῇ, καθὼς προητοίμασας καὶ προεφανέρωσας καὶ ἐπλήρωσας, ὁ ἀψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεός. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ πάντων σε αἰνῶ, σε εὐλογῶ, σε δοξάζω διὰ τοῦ αἰωνίου καὶ ἐπουρανίου ἀρχιερέως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀγαπητοῦ σου παιδός, δι' οὗ σοι σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ δόξα καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς τοὺς μέλλοντας αἰῶνας. ἀμήν.'—*Martyrium Polycarpi*, cap. xiv. ed. Zahn, 1876.

NOTE 13, p. 154.

The following is the original passage in St. Clement's Epistle of which Dr. Lightfoot's translation is given in the text:—

Καὶ αἰτησόμεθα, ἐκτενῆ τὴν δέησιν καὶ ἱκεσίαν ποιούμενοι, ὅπως τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν κατηριθμημένον τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ διαφυλάξῃ ἄθραυστον ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἁπάντων διὰ τοῦ ἠγαπημένου παιδὸς αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι' οὗ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ σκότους εἰς φῶς, ἀπὸ ἀγνωσίας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν δόξης ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ. [Δὸς ἡμῖν, Κύριε], ἐλπίζειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεγόνον πάσης κτίσεως ὄνομά σου, ἀνοίξας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ γινώσκειν σε, τὸν μόνον 'ὕψιστον ἐν ὑψηλοῖς ἅγιον ἐν ἁγίοις ἀναπαγόμενον, τὸν ταπεινοῦντα ὕβριν ὑπερηφάνων, τὸν διαλύοντα λογισμοὺς ἐθνῶν, τὸν ποιοῦντα ταπεινοὺς εἰς ὕψους καὶ τοὺς ὑψηλοὺς ταπεινοῦντα, τὸν πλουτίζοντα καὶ πτωχίζοντα, τὸν ἀποκτείνοντα καὶ ζῆν ποιοῦντα,' μόνον εὐεργέτην πνευμάτων καὶ Θεὸν πάσης σαρκός, τὸν 'ἐπιβλέποντα ἐν ταῖς ἀβύσσοις' τὸν ἐπόπτην ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων, τὸν τῶν κινδευόντων βοηθὸν, τὸν τῶν 'ἀπηλπισμένων σωτῆρα,' τὸν παντὸς πνεύματος κτίστην καὶ ἐπίσκοπον, τὸν πληθύνοντα ἔθνη ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐκλεξάμενον τοὺς ἀγαπῶντάς σε διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ ἠγαπημένου παιδός σου, δι' οὗ ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσας ἡγίασας, ἐτίμησας. Ἀξιοῦμέν σὲ, δέσποτα, 'βοηθὸν' γενέσθαι 'καὶ ἀντιλήπτορα' ἡμῶν. τοὺς ἐν θλίψει ἡμῶν σῶσον· τοὺς ταπεινοὺς ἐλέησον· τοὺς πεπτωκότας ἔγειρον· τοῖς δεομένοις ἐπιφάνηθι· τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἴασαι· τοὺς πλανωμένους τοῦ λαοῦ σου ἐπίστρεψον· Χόρτασον τοὺς πεινῶντας· λύτρωσαι τοὺς δεσμίους ἡμῶν· ἐξανάστησον τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας· παρακάλεσον τοὺς ὀλιγοψυχοῦντας· 'γνωτώσαν' ἅπαντα 'τὰ ἔθνη,' ὅτι 'σὺ εἶ ὁ

Θεὸς μόνος,' καὶ 'Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ παῖς σου, καὶ 'ἡμεῖς λαός σου καὶ πρόβατα τῆς νομῆς σοῦ.'

LX. Σὺ τὴν ἀέναον τοῦ κόσμου σύστασιν διὰ τῶν ἐνεργουμένων ἐφανεροποίησας· σὺ, Κύριε, τὴν οἰκουμένην ἔκτισας, ὁ πιστὸς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς γενεαῖς, δίκαιος ἐν τοῖς κρίμασιν, θαυμαστὸς ἐν ἰσχύϊ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ, ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ κτίζειν καὶ συνετὸς ἐν τῷ τὰ γενόμενα ἑδράσαι, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις καὶ πιστὸς ἐν τοῖς πεποιθόσιν ἐπὶ σὲ, 'ἐλεῆμον καὶ οἰκτίρμον,' ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰς ἀνομίας ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς ἀδικίας καὶ τὰ παραπτώματα καὶ πλημμελείας. μὴ λογίσῃ πᾶσαν ἁμαρτίαν δούλων σου καὶ παιδισκῶν, ἀλλὰ καθάρισον ἡμᾶς τὸν καθαρισμὸν τῆς σῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ 'κατεύθυνον τὰ διαβήματα' ἡμῶν 'ἐν ὁσιότητι' καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἁπλότητι 'καρδίας πορεύεσθαι' καὶ 'ποιεῖν τὰ καλὰ καὶ εὐάρεστα ἐνώπιόν' σου καὶ ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀρχόντων ἡμῶν. ναὶ, δέσποτα, 'ἐπίφανον τὸ πρόσωπόν σου ἐφ' ἡμᾶς εἰς ἀγαθὰ ἐν εἰρήνῃ, εἰς τὸ σκεπασθῆναι ἡμᾶς 'τῇ χειρί σου τῇ κραταιᾷ' καὶ ῥυσθῆναι ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας τῷ 'βραχίονί σου τῷ ὑψηλῷ' καὶ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν μισούντων ἡμᾶς ἀδίκως· δὸς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην ἡμῖν τε καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν τὴν γῆν, καθὼς ἔδωκας τοῖς πατράσιν ἡμῶν, 'ἐπικαλουμένων' σε αὐτῶν ὁσίως 'ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ,' [ὥστε σώζεσθαι ἡμᾶς] ὑπηκόους γινομένους τῷ παντοκράτορι καὶ παναρέτῳ ὀνόματί σου, τοῖς τε ἄρχουσιν καὶ ἡγουμένοις ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.

LXI. Σὺ, δέσποτα, ἔδωκας τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς καὶ ἀνεκδιηγήτου κράτους σου, εἰς τὸ γινώσκοντας ἡμᾶς τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ αὐτοῖς δεδομένην δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ὑποτάσσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένους τῷ θελήματί σου· οἷς δὸς, Κύριε, ὑγιείαν, εἰρήνην, ὁμόνοιαν, εὐστάθειαν, εἰς τὸ διέπειν αὐτοὺς τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ δεδομένην αὐτοῖς ἡγεμονίαν ἀπροσκόπως. σὺ γὰρ, δέσποτα ἐπουράνιε, βασιλεῦ τῶν αἰώνων, δίδως τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπαρχόντων· σὺ, Κύριε, διεύθυνον τὴν βουλὴν αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον ἐνώπιόν σου, ὅπως διέποντες ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ πραΰτητι εὐσεβῶς τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ αὐτοῖς δεδομένην ἐξουσίαν ἵλεώ σου τυγχάνωσιν. Ὁ μόνος δυνατὸς ποιῆσαι ταῦτα καὶ περισσότερα ἀγαθὰ μεθ' ἡμῶν, σοὶ ἐξομολογούμεθα διὰ τοῦ ἀρχιερέως καὶ προστάτου τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι' οὗ σοι ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ μεγαλωσύνη καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς γενεὰν γενεῶν καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων.

ἀμήν.—*St. Clement of Rome, an Appendix.* By J. B. Lightfoot, D.D., 1877.

NOTE 14, p. 160.

The subjoined extracts from Athanasius's Treatise '*De Incarnatione Verbi*,' will illustrate the statement in the text. The accompanying translation is that published by Whiston, in 1713:—

11. Ὁ Θεὸς ὁ πάντων ἔχων τὸ κράτος, ὅτε τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου ὄγου ἐποίει, κατιδὼν πάλιν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὴ εἴη ἐξ ἑαυτῆς γνῶναι τὸν Δημιουργὸν, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν Θεοῦ, τῷ τὸν μὲν εἶναι ἀγένητον, τὰ δὲ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀσώματον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους κάτω που σώματι πεπλάσθαι, καὶ ὅλως πολλὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν γενητῶν ἔλλειψιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πεποιηκότος κατάληψιν καὶ γνῶσιν· ἐλεήσας πάλιν τὸ γένος τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, ἅτε δὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν, οὐκ ἀφῆκεν αὐτοὺς ἐρήμους τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώσεως, ἵνα μὴ ἀνόνητον ἔχωσι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. Ποία γὰρ ὄνησις τοῖς πεποιημένοις μὴ γινώσκουσι τὸν ἑαυτῶν ποιητήν; Ἢ πῶς ἂν εἶεν λογικοὶ μὴ γινώσκοντες τὸν

11. God that has the power over all things, when He made mankind by His own Word, considered withal the weakness of their nature, that it was not sufficient of itself to know their Creator, or indeed to have almost any notion of Him at all, because the One was unbegotten and the other was made out of nothing; as also because the One was incorporeal, and men were, as to their inferior part, formed of a body; and because, upon the whole, there was a mighty defect in things that were made with regard to the comprehension and knowledge of Him that made them. He also out of His goodness had compassion on mankind; and accordingly He did not leave them destitute of the knowledge of Himself, that their being might not be to them unprofitable. For what advantage would existence be

τοῦ Πατρὸς λόγον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ γεγόνασιν; Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀλόγων διαφέρειν ἔμελλον, εἰ πλέον οὐδὲν τῶν περιγείων ἐπεγίνωσκον. Τί δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἐποίει τούτους, ἀφ' ὧν οὐκ ἠθέλησε γινώσκεσθαι; Ὅθεν ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο γένηται, ἀγαθὸς ὢν, τῆς ἰδίας εἰκόνος αὐτοῖς τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μεταδίδωσι, καὶ ποιεῖ τούτους κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν· ἵνα διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης χάριτος τὴν εἰκόνα νοοῦντες, λέγω δὴ τὸν τοῦ Πατρὸς Λόγον, δυνηθῶσιν ἔννοιαν δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πατρὸς λαβεῖν, καὶ γινώσκοντες τὸν ποιητὴν ζῶσι τὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ μακάριον ὄντως βίον. Ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι πάλιν παράφρονες, κατολιγωρήσαντες καὶ οὕτω τῆς δοθείσης αὐτοῖς χάριτος, τοσοῦτον ἀπεστράφησαν τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐθόλωσαν ἑαυτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς μὴ μόνον ἐπιλαθέσθαι τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ ἐννοίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθ' ἑτέρων ἑαυτοῖς ἀναπλάσασθαι. Εἴδωλά τε γὰρ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἑαυτοῖς ἀνετυ-

to those beings that were made, if they did not know their Maker? Or how could they be reasonable creatures if they did not know the Word (or Reason) of the Father, by whom they were made? For they would not at all differ from the irrational creatures if they had no notions but of earthly things. And why did God make such creatures by which He had no mind to be known? Indeed, to prevent this ignorance He out of His goodness made them partakers of His own image, our Lord Jesus Christ, and *made them according to His own image and likeness*, that by such grace bestowed on them they might reflect on that image, I mean the Word of the Father; and so might obtain by Him the knowledge of the Father; and that when they knew their Maker they might live a really happy and blessed life. But men grew foolish again, and despised even this grace which was bestowed upon them, and did so far reject God, and so far pollute their own souls, as not only to forget the notions of God, but to frame for themselves one thing for another. For

πώσαντο, καὶ τὰ οὐκ ὄντα τοῦ ὄντος Θεοῦ προετίμησαν, τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα λατρεύοντες, καὶ τό γε χείριστον, ὅτι καὶ εἰς ξύλα καὶ εἰς λίθους, καὶ εἰς πᾶσαν ὕλην καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ τιμὴν μετετίθουν, καὶ πλείονα τούτων ποιοῦντες ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται. Τοσοῦτον δὲ ἠσέβουν, ὅτι καὶ δαίμονας ἐθρήσκευον λοιπὸν καὶ θεοὺς ἀνηγόρευον, τὰς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν ἀποπληροῦντες. Θυσίας τε γὰρ ζώων ἀλόγων καὶ ἀνθρώπων σφαγὰς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, εἰς τὸ ἐκείνων καθῆκον ἐπετέλουν, πλεῖον ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς ἐκείνων οἰστρήμασι καταδεσμεύοντες. Διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ μαγεῖαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐδιδάσκοντο, καὶ μαντεῖα κατὰ τόπον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπλάνα, καὶ πάντες τὰ γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἑαυτῶν τὰ αἴτια τοῖς ἄστροις καὶ τοῖς κατ' οὐρανὸν πᾶσιν ἀνετίθουν, μηδὲν πλέον τῶν φαινομένων λογιζόμενοι. Καὶ ὅλως πάντα ἦν ἀσεβείας καὶ παρανομίας μεστὰ, καὶ μόνος ὁ Θεὸς οὐδὲ ὁ τούτου Λόγος ἐπεγινώσκετο, καί-

they formed to themselves idols instead of the truth, and preferred what had no being to the real God, *serving the creature more than the Creator;* and, what was still worse, they transferred the honour of God unto wood, and stone, and all sorts of matter, and to men; nay, they did what was still worse than all this, as we have already shewed. Indeed they came to that degree of impiety that they at last worshipped demons and called them gods, and filled up the measure of their lusts; for they offered, as we have before discoursed, the sacrifices of brute creatures, and performed the oblation of human victims, in a way agreeable to such idolatrous superstitions, rendering themselves still more and more obnoxious to their furious emotions. And by this means magic arts were taught by them, and predictions in every place deceived men, and all people ascribed the causes of their nativity and of their being to the stars, and to all the heavenly bodies, dreaming of nothing besides what was seen; and, in short, all the world was full of impiety and wickedness; God only and

τοι οὐκ ἀφανῆ ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπικρύψας, οὐδὲ ἁπλῆν τὴν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ γνῶσιν αὐτοῖς δεδωκὼς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποικίλως καὶ διὰ πολλῶν αὐτὴν αὐτοῖς ἐφαπλώσας.

12. Αὐτάρκης μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡ κατ' εἰκόνα χάρις γνωρίζειν τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν Πατέρα· εἰδὼς δὲ ὁ Θεὸς τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, προενοήσατο καὶ τῆς ἀμελείας τούτων, ἵν' ἐὰν ἀμελήσαιεν δι' ἑαυτῶν τὸν Θεὸν ἐπιγνῶναι, ἔχωσι διὰ τῶν τῆς κτίσεως ἔργων τὸν Δημιουργὸν μὴ ἀγνοεῖν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ἀνθρώπων ἀμέλεια ἐπὶ τὰ χείρονα κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπικαταβαίνει, προενοήσατο πάλιν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτῶν ἀσθενείας, νόμον καὶ προφήτας τοὺς αὐτοῖς γνωρίμους ἀποστείλας, ἵν', ἐὰν καὶ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ὀκνήσωσιν ἀναβλέψαι καὶ γνῶναι τὸν ποιητὴν, ἔχωσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς τὴν διδασκαλίαν. Ἄνθρωποι γὰρ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ἐγγυτέρω δύνανται μαθεῖν περὶ

His word were not known; although He had not concealed Himself from men, nor indeed had merely afforded them one means of knowing of Himself, but had redoubled them in diverse manners and by various ways.

12. For that grace which was afforded them, *after the image of God*, was sufficient to make known God the Word, and by Him the Father, to them. But God, who knew the weakness of men, made provision even for their carelessness, that if they were negligent as to the knowledge of God from themselves, they might have means to avoid being ignorant of their Creator from the works of the creation. And whereas the carelessness of men did by degrees grow still worse and worse, God did farther make provision for even this weakness of theirs also, by sending them laws and prophets from among themselves; that when they would not take pains so much as to lift up their eyes to heaven to know their Maker, they might have other readier means at hand to instruct them. For men do most naturally learn from other

τῶν κρειττόνων. Ἐξὸν οὖν ἦν, ἀναβλέψαντας αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ κατανοήσαντας τὴν τῆς κτίσεως ἁρμονίαν, γνῶναι τὸν ταύτης ἡγεμόνα τὸν τοῦ Πατρὸς Λόγόν, τὸν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ εἰς πάντα προνοίᾳ γνωρίζοντα πᾶσι τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ὅλα κινοῦντα, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ πάντες γινώσκωσι τὸν Θεόν. Ἡ εἰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἦν ὀκνηρὸν, κἂν τοῖς ἁγίοις δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτοὺς συντυγχάνειν, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν μαθεῖν τὸν τῶν πάντων δημιουργὸν Θεὸν, τὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ Πατέρα· καὶ ὅτι τῶν εἰδώλων ἡ θρησκεία ἀθεότης ἐστὶ καὶ πάσης ἀσεβείας μεστή. Ἐξὸν δὲ ἦν αὐτοὺς, καὶ τὸν νόμον ἐγνωκότας, παύσασθαι πάσης παρανομίας, καὶ τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆσαι βίον. Οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ Ἰουδαίους μόνους ὁ νόμος ἦν, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτοὺς μόνους οἱ προφῆται ἐπέμποντο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Ἰουδαίους μὲν ἐπέμποντο, καὶ παρὰ Ἰουδαίων ἐδιώκοντο· πάσης δὲ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἦσαν διδασκάλιον

men what is most for their advantage. It was therefore in their power to look up to the magnitude of heaven, and by the contemplation of the harmony of the creation to know Him that is the ruler thereof, the Word of the Father, who by His providence over all things makes known the Father to all, and for this reason moves the universe, that all by Him may know God. Or if this method was too troublesome for them, at least it was in their power to converse with holy men, and by their means to arrive at the knowledge of God the Creator of all things, the Father of Christ, and might discover that the worship of idols was an instance of atheism and a thing full of all impiety. It was also in their power, by the knowledge of the law, to leave off all kinds of transgression, and to lead a life by the rules of virtue. For the law was not given only on account of the Jews, nor were the prophets sent only out of regard to them; but while they were indeed sent to the Jews, and were by them persecuted, they were a foundation of sacred instruc-

ἱερὸν τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ γνώσεως, καὶ τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν πολιτείας. Τοσαύτης οὖν οὔσης τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγαθότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, ὅμως οἱ ἄνθρωποι, νικώμενοι ταῖς παραυτίκα ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ταῖς παρὰ δαιμόνων φαντασίαις καὶ ἀπάταις, οὐκ ἀνένευσαν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοὺς πλείοσι κακοῖς καὶ ἁμαρτήμασιν ἐνεφόρησαν, ὡς μηκέτι δοκεῖν αὐτοὺς λογικοὺς, ἀλλὰ ἀλόγους ἐκ τῶν τρόπων νομίζεσθαι.

tion to all the world, in divine knowledge and in spiritual conversation. Now although the goodness and lovingkindness of God were so great, yet were men so subdued by present pleasures and those imaginations and deceptions which were derived from demons, that they did not attempt to arrive at truth, but indulged themselves in greater evils and instances of wickedness, till they seemed no longer to be rational creatures, but rather deserved from their conduct to be esteemed brute beasts.

13. Οὕτω τοίνυν ἀλογωθέντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὕτω τῆς δαιμονικῆς πλάνης ἐπισκιαζούσης τὰ πανταχοῦ, καὶ κρυπτούσης τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ Θεοῦ γνῶσιν, τί τὸν Θεὸν ἔδει ποιεῖν; Σιωπῆσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον καὶ ἀφεῖναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ δαιμόνων πλανᾶσθαι, καὶ μὴ γινώσκειν αὐτοὺς τὸν Θεόν; Καὶ τίς ἡ χρεία τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον; Ἔδει γὰρ αὐτὸν ἁπλῶς ὡς ἄλογον

13. Wherefore when men were thus become brutes, and demoniacal errors enveloped every part of the universe, and took away the means of knowing what concerned the true God, what was it fit for God to do? To keep silence in so important a case, and to suffer men to be deceived by demons and to be without the knowledge of God? If so, what occasion was there that man should first have been made after the image of God? For he ought either to have been made barely an irrational creature, or when he was made

γενέσθαι, ἢ γενόμενον λογικὸν τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων ζωὴν μὴ βιοῦν. Τίς δὲ ὅλως ἦν χρεία ἐννοίας αὐτὸν λαβεῖν περὶ Θεοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς; εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἄξιός ἐστι λαβεῖν, ἔδει μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ δοθῆναι. Τί δὲ καὶ ὄφελος τῷ πεποιηκότι Θεῷ, ἢ ποία δόξα αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, εἰ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι οὐ προσκυνοῦσιν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους εἶναι τοὺς πεποιηκότας αὐτοὺς νομίζουσιν; Εὑρίσκεται γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἑτέροις καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ τούτους δημιουργήσας. Εἶτα βασιλεὺς μὲν, ἄνθρωπος ὢν, τὰς ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ κτισθείσας χώρας οὐκ ἀφίησιν ἐκδότους ἑτέροις δουλεύειν, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλους καταφεύγειν. ἀλλὰ γράμμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπομιμνήσκει, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ διὰ φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιστέλλει, εἰ δὲ καὶ χρεία γένηται, αὐτὸς παραγίνεται, τῇ παρουσίᾳ λοιπὸν αὐτοὺς δυσωπῶν μόνον ἵνα μὴ ἑτέροις δουλεύσωσι, καὶ ἀργὸν αὐτοῦ τὸ ἔργον γένηται. Οὐ πολλῷ πλέον ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ

rational not to live the life of brutes. And besides, in this case what occasion was there for him at first to be endued with notions of God? For if he be not now worthy of them, it was not necessary that they should have been implanted in him at first. Farther, what advantage could this be to God that made him; or what glory could redound to Him hereby; if those men that were made by Him do not worship Him, but imagine that other beings were their makers? Since upon this supposition it appears that God created them for others and not for Himself. Moreover, if there be but an earthly king, he does not suffer that those places which himself has built should be delivered up to serve any others, or should revolt to others, but he warns them by letters, nay frequently sends to them by his friends, and even, if need be, he comes at length himself and shames them; and all this that they may not serve others, and so his own workmanship be to no purpose. Is it not then much more reasonable that God should have regard to His own creatures, that they

κτισμάτων φείσεται πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλανηθῆναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς οὐκ οὖσι δουλεύειν, μάλιστα ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη ἀπωλείας αὐτοῖς αἰτία καὶ ἀφανισμοῦ γίνεται; οὐκ ἔδει δὲ τὰ ἅπαξ κοινωνήσαντα τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκόνος ἀπολέσθαι. Τί οὖν ἔδει ποιεῖν τὸν Θεόν; Ἢ τί ἔδει γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα πάλιν ἀνανεῶσαι, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ πάλιν αὐτὸν γνῶναι δυνηθῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι; Τοῦτο δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐγεγόνει, εἰ μὴ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκόνος παραγενομένης τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; Δι' ἀνθρώπων μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ κατ' εἰκόνα γεγόνασιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀγγέλων. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ αὐτοί εἰσιν εἰκόνες. Ὅθεν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος δι' ἑαυτοῦ παρεγένετο, ἵν' ὡς εἰκὼν ὢν τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸν κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπον ἀνακτίσαι δυνηθῇ. Ἄλλως δὲ πάλιν οὐκ ἂν ἐγεγόνει, εἰ μὴ ὁ θάνατος ἦν καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ἐξαφανισθεῖσα, ὅθεν εἰκότως ἔλαβε σῶμα θνητὸν,

may not wander from Him and serve what has no existence, especially when such errors must turn to their destruction and perdition? It was not therefore fit for beings which had once been partakers of the image of God to perish. What was then fit for God to do, or what else was fit to be done but to provide again for the renovation of what was made after His image, that so thereby men might be able again to know Him? Now how could this be done but by the coming of the image of God itself, our Saviour Jesus Christ? For by men this thing could not be done, since themselves were made according to the image; nor indeed by angels, since even they are not the images of God. Whence it was that the Word of God came of Himself, that He as being the image of the Father, might be able to create man again who had once been created after that image. Nay even then this had not been done unless death had been, and mortality was to be abolished. Whence He, as it was but reasonable, took a mortal body, that so for the time to come death

ἵνα καὶ ὁ θάνατος ἐν αὐτῷ λοιπὸν ἐξαφανισθῆναι δυνηθῇ, καὶ οἱ κατ' εἰκόνα πάλιν ἀνακαινισθῶσιν ἄνθρωποι. Οὐκοῦν ἑτέρου πρὸς ταύτην τὴν χρείαν οὐκ ἦν εἰ μὴ τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ Πατρός.

might by Him be abolished, and men that were made after that image might again be renewed. Wherefore no one was capable of this attempt but the Image of the Father.

14. Ὡς γὰρ τῆς γραφείσης ἐν ξύλῳ μορφῆς παραφανισθείσης ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν ῥύπων, πάλιν χρεία τοῦτον παραγενέσθαι, οὗ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μορφὴ, ἵνα ἀνακαινισθῆναι ἡ εἰκὼν δυνηθῇ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ὕλῃ· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐκείνου γραφὴν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ὕλη ἐν ᾗ καὶ γέγραπται, οὐκ ἐκβάλλεται, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνατυποῦται. Κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ πανάγιος τοῦ Πατρὸς Υἱὸς, εἰκὼν ὢν τοῦ Πατρὸς, παρεγένετο ἐπὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους τόπους, ἵνα τὸν κατ' αὐτὸν πεποιημένον ἄνθρωπον ἀνακαινίσῃ, καὶ ὡς ἀπολόμενον εὕρῃ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἀφέσεως, ᾗ φησι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς Εὐαγγελίοις· Ἦλθον τὸ ἀπολόμενον εὑρεῖν καὶ σῶσαι. Ὅθεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαίους ἔλεγεν· Ἐὰν μή τις ἀναγεν-

14. For it is here as with the shape of a man engraven in wood but disfigured by external filth; there is occasion for the presence of that man himself again whose statue it is, that so the image may be renewed in the same piece of wood again. For the wood itself wherein the figure is therefore not cast away, because of its bearing the man's figure; but the figure is engraved over again. In the same manner did that most Holy Son of the Father, who is His very image, come into the places where we live, that he might renew man again who was made after Him, and that He might find him as one that had been lost, by the remission of sins, agreeably to what He says Himself in the Gospels, *I came to find and to save that which was lost.* Whence it was also that He said to the Jews, *Except a man be begotten again;* not

νηθῇ· οὐ τὴν ἐκ γυναικῶν γέννησιν σημαίνων, ὥσπερ ὑπενόουν ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀναγεννωμένην καὶ ἀνακτιζομένην ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα δηλῶν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ εἰδωλομανία καὶ ἀθεότης κατεῖχε τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ ἡ περὶ Θεοῦ γνῶσις ἐπέκρυπτο· τίνος ἦν διδάξαι τὴν οἰκουμένην περὶ Πατρός; Ἀνθρώπου φαίη τις ἄν; Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ἀνθρώπων ἑνὸν τὴν ὑφήλιον πᾶσαν ὑπελθεῖν, οὔτε τῇ φύσει τοσοῦτον ἰσχυόντων δραμεῖν, οὔτε ἀξιοπίστων περὶ τούτου δυναμένων γενέσθαι, οὔτε πρὸς τὴν τῶν δαιμόνων ἀπάτην καὶ φαντασίαν ἱκανῶν δι' ἑαυτῶν ἀντιστῆναι. Πάντων γὰρ κατὰ ψυχὴν πληγέντων καὶ ταραχθέντων παρὰ τῆς δαιμονικῆς ἀπάτης, καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων ματαιότητος, πῶς οἷόν τε ἦν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπων νοῦν μεταπεῖσαι, ὅπου γε οὐδὲ ὁρᾷν αὐτοὺς δύνανται; ὃ δὲ μὴ ὁρᾷ τις, πῶς δύνανται μεταπαιδεῦσαι; Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄν τις εἴποι τὴν κτίσιν ἀρκεῖσθαι.

meaning the generation according to the flesh, as they supposed, but declaring that new generation and new creation of the soul which is made according to His image. Now seeing that the madness of idolatry and atheistical notions overspread the whole world, and divine knowledge was hidden from men, to whom did it belong to instruct the world concerning the Father? Some body perhaps may say it belonged to a man. But men are not capable of travelling over all the earth, as not of a nature strong enough for that purpose, nor of sufficient credit for the same, nor able of themselves to oppose the deceits and delusions of demons. For when the souls of all men were affected and disordered by the deceits of demons and the vanity of idols, how was it possible for them to persuade the souls of men and the minds of men to reform, when they were not able so much as to see the men themselves? Now if anyone does not see a person, how can he persuade him to reform? But perhaps some will say, that the creation is sufficient for that

Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ κτίσις ἤρκει, οὐκ ἂν ἐγεγόνει τὰ τηλικαῦτα κακά. Ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἡ κτίσις· καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περὶ Θεοῦ πλάνῃ ἐκυλίοντο. Τίνος οὖν ἦν πάλιν χρεία ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου τοῦ καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ὁρῶντος, τοῦ καὶ τὰ ὅλα ἐν τῇ κτίσει κινοῦντος, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν γνωρίζοντος τὸν Πατέρα; Τοῦ γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας προνοίας καὶ διακοσμήσεως τῶν ὅλων διδάσκοντος περὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς, αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν διδασκαλίαν ἀνανεῶσαι. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἐγεγόνει τοῦτο; Ἴσως ἄν τις εἴποι, ὅτι ἐξὸν ἦν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὥστε πάλιν διὰ τῶν τῆς κτίσεως ἔργων τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεῖξαι. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι τοῦτο. Οὐχί γε· παρεῖδον γὰρ τοῦτο πρότερον οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι μὲν ἄνω, κάτω δὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐσχήκασιν. Ὅθεν εἰκότως, ἀνθρώπους θέλων ὠφελῆσαι, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐπιδημεῖ, λαμβάνων ἑαυτῷ σῶμα ὅμοιον ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἐκ τῶν κάτω· λέγω δὴ διὰ τῶν

purpose. But if the creation had proved sufficient, such great evils had not been in the world. For the creation has existed all along, and yet men have nevertheless wallowed in the same error concerning God. Who then was it that was wanting but God the Word, Who sees the very soul and the mind, and Who moved the universe at the creation, and thereby discovered the Father. For He that instructed men concerning the Father by His own providence and disposal of the universe was the proper person to renew the instruction. How then was this to be done? Perhaps some may say it might be done by the same means as before, and that He might shew them God again by the works of creation. But this was not now to be done to any sure effect; by no means. For men had overlooked that before, and did no longer cast their eyes upwards, but downward. Whereupon with good reason it was, that when He was desirous to do good to men, he sojourned among them as a man, by taking to Himself a body like one of

τοῦ σώματος ἔργων· ἵνα οἱ μὴ θελήσαντες αὐτὸν γνῶναι ἐκ τῆς εἰς τὰ ὅλα προνοίας καὶ ἡγεμονίας αὐτοῦ κἂν ἐκ τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἔργων γνώσωνται τὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν Πατέρα.

15. Ὡς γὰρ ἀγαθὸς διδάσκαλος κηδόμενος τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μαθητῶν, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους ἐκ τῶν μειζόνων ὠφεληθῆναι, πάντως διὰ τῶν εὐτελεστέρων συγκαταβαίνων αὐτοὺς παιδεύει, οὕτως καὶ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Παῦλός φησιν· Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔγνω ὁ κόσμος διὰ τῆς σοφίας τὸν Θεὸν, εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεὸς διὰ τῆς μωρίας τοῦ κηρύγματος σῶσαι τοὺς πιστεύοντας. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀποστραφέντες τὴν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν θεωρίαν, καὶ ὡς ἐν βυθῷ βυθισθέντες κάτω τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες, ἐν γενέσει καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸν Θεὸν ἀναζήτουν, ἀνθρώπους θνητοὺς

theirs, and from things on earth (I mean by bodily operations) that so those that would not know Him from His providence and superintendence over all, might at least know the Word of God when He was in a body, from the bodily operations which He thereby performed, and so by His means might know the Father.

15. For as a good master, who is really careful of his scholars, will for certain condescend to them and teach them by meaner ways, when they can receive no advantage by higher methods of instruction; so does the Word of God do in this case, as Paul also says: *For since through the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe.* For seeing men turned themselves away from the contemplation of God, and like men drowned in the deep fixed their eyes downwards, and sought God in the things that were made and that were sensible, forming to themselves dead men and demons for their gods; for that

καὶ δαίμονας ἑαυτοῖς θεοὺς ἀνατυπούμενοι· τούτου ἕνεκα ὁ φιλάνθρωπος καὶ κοινὸς πάντων Σωτὴρ, ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος λαμβάνει ἑαυτῷ σῶμα, καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναστρέφεται, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις πάντων προσλαμβάνει, ἵνα οἱ ἐν σωματικοῖς νοοῦντες εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν, ἀφ' ὧν ὁ Κύριος ἐργάζεται διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἀπ' αὐτῶν νοήσωσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν Πατέρα λογίσωνται. Ἄνθρωποι δὲ ὄντες καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα νοοῦντες, οἷς ἐὰν ἐπέβαλον τὰς ἑαυτῶν αἰσθήσεις, ἐν τούτοις προσλαμβανομένους ἑαυτοὺς ἑώρων, καὶ πανταχόθεν διδασκομένους τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Εἴτε γὰρ εἰς τὴν κτίσιν ἐπτόητο, ἀλλ' ἑώρων αὐτὴν ὁμολογοῦσαν τὸν Χριστὸν Κύριον· εἴτε εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια προληφθεῖσα, ὥστε τούτους θεοὺς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῦ Σωτῆρος, συγκρινόντων τε ἐκείνων, ἐφαίνετο ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνος ὁ Σῶτηρ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς, οὐκ ὄντων παρ' ἐκείνοις τοιούτων ὁποῖα παρὰ

cause the Lover of men and common Saviour of all, the Word of God, takes to Himself a body and converses among men as a man, and takes upon Him the sensations of all men; that so those who imagined the deity to belong to bodily things, might discover the truth from those very things that the Lord performed by bodily operations, and by Him might come to the knowledge of the Father; and that as they were men and had all the notions of men in them, they, which way soever they turned their understanding, might thereby find themselves caught, and taught the truth on every side. For if they were surprised at the creation, they might see that that creation owned Christ the Lord; or if their mind was already preengaged about the affairs of men and supposed them to be gods, they might still, by the comparison of our Saviour's works with theirs, discover that He is the only person among men who is the Saviour, the Son of God, by observing that those never did such works as were done by God the Word; or if they

τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου γέγονεν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ εἰς δαίμονας ἦσαν προληφθέντες, ἀλλὰ ὁρῶντες αὐτοὺς διωκομένους ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου, ἐγίνωσκον μόνον εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον, καὶ οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς τοὺς δαίμονας. Εἰ δὲ καὶ εἰς νεκροὺς ἤδη τούτων ἦν ὁ νοῦς κατασχεθείς, ὥστε θρησκεύειν ἥρωας, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεούς· ἀλλ' ὁρῶντες τὴν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἀνάστασιν, ὡμολόγουν ἐκείνους εἶναι ψευδεῖς, καὶ μόνον τὸν Κύριον ἀληθινὸν τὸν τοῦ Πατρὸς Λόγον, τὸν καὶ τοῦ θανάτου κυριεύοντα. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ γεγένηται, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐφάνη, καὶ ἀπέθανε, καὶ ἀνέστη, ἀμβλύνας καὶ ἐπισκιάσας τὰ τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων, ἵνα ὅπου δ' ἂν ὦσι προληφθέντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖθεν αὐτοὺς ἀναγάγῃ, καὶ διδάξῃ τὸν ἀληθινὸν αὐτοῦ Πατέρα, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτός φησιν· Ἦλθον σῶσαι καὶ εὑρεῖν τὸ ἀπολωλός.

were possessed in favour of demons, yet might they, by observing how they were driven away by the Lord, discover that this person alone was the Word of God, and that the demons were not gods. Nay, in case their minds were so entangled with regard to the dead as to worship the heroes and those whom the poets call gods, they might however, by seeing the resurrection of our Saviour, acknowledge that they were falsities and that the Lord alone was the true Word of the Father, who is Lord over death itself also. On this account was it that He was begotten, and appeared as a man, and died, and rose again, that He might diminish and obscure the actions of all men that ever were by His own works; that what prepossessions soever men were engaged in, He might free them from the same, and might teach them His true Father. As Himself says, *I came to save and to find that which was lost.*

16. Ἅπαξ γὰρ εἰς αἰσθητὰ πεσούσης τῆς διανοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὑπέβαλεν ἑαυτὸν διὰ

16. For seeing men's understandings were already fallen among sensible objects, the

σώματος φανῆναι ὁ Λόγος, ἵνα μετενέγκῃ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἄνθρωπος τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποκλίνῃ, καὶ λοιπὸν ἐκείνους ὡς ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ὁρῶντας, δι' ὧν ἐργάζεται ἔργων, πείσῃ μὴ εἶναι ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεὸν καὶ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ Λόγον καὶ σοφίαν. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ὁ Παῦλος βουλόμενος σημᾶναί φησιν· Ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἐρριζώμενοι καὶ τεθεμελιωμένοι, ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε καταλαβέσθαι σὺν πᾶσι τοῖς ἁγίοις, τί τὸ πλάτος, καὶ μῆκος, καὶ ὕψος, καὶ βάθος, γνῶναί τε τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῆς γνώσεως ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ τοῦ Λόγου ἑαυτὸν ἁπλώσαντος, καὶ ἄνω, καὶ κάτω, καὶ εἰς τὸ βάθος, καὶ εἰς τὸ πλάτος· ἄνω μὲν εἰς τὴν κτίσιν, κάτω δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν, εἰς βάθος δὲ εἰς τὸν ᾅδην, εἰς πλάτος δὲ εἰς τὸν κόσμον· τὰ πάντα τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ γνώσεως πεπλήρωται. Διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ παραυτὰ παραγενόμενος τὴν θυ-

Word submitted Himself, to appear by a body; that as if He were a man, He might transfer men to Himself, and might bring their affections unto Himself, and might besides induce them to believe by what He did that He whom they saw as a man was not a mere man but also God, and the Word and Wisdom of the true God. This it was which Paul would be understood to mean when he said, *That being rooted and grounded in love, ye may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled with all the fulness of God.* Accordingly does the Word shew Himself every way, above, and below, and in the depth, and in the breadth. Above by the creation; below by the Incarnation; in the depth, in the invisible world; in the breadth, of the wide world, by replenishing all regions with the knowledge of God. And on this account it was that even when He came and offered a sacrifice for all, by delivering His body to death

σίαν τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἐπετέλει, παραδιδοὺς τὸ σῶμα τῷ θανάτῳ, καὶ ἀνιστῶν αὐτὸ, ἀφανῆ ἑαυτὸν διὰ τουτοῦ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμφανῆ ἑαυτὸν διὰ τούτου καθίστη διαμένων ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τοιαῦτα τελῶν ἔργα καὶ σημεῖα διδοὺς, ἃ μηκέτι ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ Θεὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν ἐγνώριζον. Ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἐφιλανθρωπεύετο ὁ Σωτὴρ διὰ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως, ὅτι καὶ τὸν θάνατον ἐξ ἡμῶν ἠφάνιζε, καὶ ἀνεκαίνιζεν ἡμᾶς. καὶ ὅτι, ἀφανὴς ὢν καὶ ἀόρατος, διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐνέφαινε, καὶ ἐγνώριζεν ἑαυτὸν εἶναι τον Λόγον τοῦ Πατρὸς, τὸν τοῦ πάντος ἡγεμόνα καὶ βασιλέα . . .

20. Τὴν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τῆς σωματικῆς ἐπιφανείας αὐτοῦ, ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν, ἐκ μέρους καὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς ἠδυνήθημεν νοῆσαι, προείπομεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου ἦν τὸ φθαρτὸν εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν μεταβαλεῖν, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Σωτῆρος τοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων πεποιηκότος τὰ ὅλα· καὶ οὐκ ἄλλου ἦν τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα πάλιν ἀνακτίσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ μὴ τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ Πατρός· καὶ

and raising it up again, He did not hide Himself in obscurity thereby, but thereby made Himself conspicuous, abiding in Him, and performing such works, and shewing such signs, as declared Him to be no longer a man but God the Word. For our Saviour shewed His love to mankind two ways; both by His Incarnation, whereby He took away death from us and renewed us; and also that being concealed and invisible He manifested Himself by His works, and shewed Himself to be the Word of the Father, the Ruler and King of the universe . . .

20. We indeed have already in part discoursed about the occasion of His bodily appearance; that is, as far as was convenient, and so far as we have, according to our ability, been able to apprehend of that matter; that it was not possible for anyone else to change corruption to incorruption, but for the Saviour Himself, who made all things of nothing; nor for anyone else to create that part of man again which was made after God's

οὐκ ἄλλου ἦν τὸ θνητὸν ἀθάνατον παραστῆσαι, εἰ μὴ τῆς αὐτοζωῆς οὔσης τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· καὶ οὐκ ἄλλου ἦν περὶ Πατρὸς διδάξαι, καὶ τὴν εἰδώλων καθαιρῆσαι θρησκείαν, εἰ μὴ τοῦ τὰ πάντα διακοσμοῦντος Λόγου καὶ μόνου τοῦ Πατρὸς ὄντος Υἱοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀληθινοῦ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον παρὰ πάντων ἔδει λοιπὸν ἀποδοθῆναι· ὠφείλετο καὶ πάντας, ὡς προεῖπον, ἀποθανεῖν, δι' ὃ μάλιστα καὶ ἐπεδήμησε· τούτου ἕνεκεν μετὰ τὰς περὶ τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀποδείξεις, ἤδη λοιπὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων τὴν θυσίαν ἀνέφερεν, ἀντὶ πάντων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν εἰς θάνατον παραδιδοὺς, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν πάντας ἀνυπευθύνους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τῆς ἀρχαίας παραβάσεως ποιήσῃ· δείξῃ δὲ ἑαυτὸν καὶ θανάτου κρείττονα, ἀπάρχην τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀναστάσεως τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἄφθαρτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος.

image, but for that Image of the Father; nor for any one else to raise the mortal body immortal, but for Him that was Life itself, our Lord Jesus Christ: nor for any one else to teach men of the Father, and to pull down the worship of idols, but for that Word that disposed of all things, who was the only, and only-begotten, and true Son of the Father. But then, since the debt which all men owed was at length to be paid; for He was obliged on all accounts, as we have shewed already, to die; for which cause principally it was that He came amongst us; for this cause, I say, it was now proper that, after He had given those demonstrations of His divinity by His works, He should offer Himself a sacrifice for all, and deliver up His temple to death for all, that so He might render all unobnoxious and free from the original transgression, and might shew that He was superior to death, by constituting His own body as incorruptible, and the first-fruits of the general resurrection.

NOTE 15, p. 160.

The following is St. Hilary's account of his conversion, at the commencement of his work *De Trinitate*. For the translation the author is indebted to the Rev. R. S. Grignon :—

1. *In otio et opulentia non est nisi beluina felicitas.*—Circumspicienti mihi proprium humanae vitae ac religiosum officium, quod vel a natura manans, vel a prudentum studiis profectum, dignum aliquid hoc concesso sibi ad intelligentiam divino munere obtineret, multa quidem aderant quae opinione communi efficere utilem atque optandam vitam videbantur, maximeque ea quae et nunc et semper antea potissima inter mortales habentur, otium simul atque opulentia, quod aliud sine altero mali potius materies, quam boni esset occasio; quia et quies inops prope quoddam vitae ipsius intelligatur esse exsilium, et opulens inquietudo tanto plus calamitatis afferat, quanto majore indignitate his caretur, quae maxime et optata et quaesita sunt ad utendum. Atque haec quidem quamquam

1. *That happiness which consists in ease and abundance is but of a brutish kind.*

As I looked round for some employment of human life, proper to it and religious, either proceeding from nature, or derived from the studies of wise men, which should contain in itself something worthy of the divine gift of reason granted to man, I saw many things which, in common belief, seemed to make life useful and desirable, and most of all those things which are and ever have been held among men to be the most important, ease combined with plenty. Either of these, without the other, would be a source of evil, rather than an occasion of good; for rest without resources is felt to be a kind of exile from life itself, and wealth with disquietude brings with it so much the more of misfortune, the more reluctant men are to go without those things, the enjoyment of which has been the most desired and

in se summa atque optima vitae blandimenta contineant, tamen non multum videntur a consuetudine esse beluinae oblectationis aliena: quibus in saltuosa loca ac maxime pabulis laeta evagantibus, adsit et securitas a labore, et satietas ex pascuis. Nam si hic optimus et absolutissimus vitae humanae usus existimabitur, quiescere et abundare: necesse est hunc eumdem, secundum sui cujusque generis sensum, nobis atque universis rationis expertibus beluis esse communem; quibus omnibus, natura ipsa in summa rerum copia et securitate famulante, sine cura habendi copia redundat utendi.

sought for. And though these things contain in themselves the highest and best charms of life, still they seem not to differ much from the accustomed delights of the brutes, which, as they wander about the woods and in places abounding with pasture, possess at once freedom from labour and ample sufficiency of food. For if we are to consider the best and most complete employment of human life to consist in being at rest and having plenty, we must necessarily have this in common with all the irrational brutes, according in each case to the susceptibilities of the species. For they, being supplied by nature herself with the utmost plenty and freedom from care, have abundant facilities for enjoyment without the trouble of acquisition.

2. *Ad alia natos se senserunt plerique homines.*—Ac mihi plerique mortalium non ob aliam quidem causam hanc ineptae ac beluinae vitae consuetudinem et respuisse a se, et coarguisse in aliis videntur, quam quod, natura ipsa auctore impulsi, indignum ho-

2. *Mankind in general have felt themselves born for other objects.*

The reason why most men have rejected for themselves, and blamed in others, this senseless and brutish mode of life, seems to me to be that, under the guidance of nature herself, they have considered

mine esse existimaverunt, in officium se ventris tantum et inertiae natos arbitrari; et in hanc vitam non ob aliqua praeclari facinoris aut bonae artis studia esse deductos, aut hanc ipsam vitam non ad aliquem profectum esse aeternitatis indultam quam profecto non ambigeretur munus Dei non esse reputandum, cum tantis afflictata angoribus, et tot molestiis impedita, sese ipsa atque intra se a pueritiae ignoratione usque ad senectutis deliramenta consumeret: et idcirco ad aliquas se patientiae et continentiae et placabilitatis virtutes et doctrina et opere transtulisse, quod bene agere atque intelligere, id demum bene vivere esse opinabantur: vitam autem non ad mortem tantum ab immortali Deo tribui existimandam: cum boni largitoris non esse intelligeretur, vivendi jucundissimum sensum ad tristissimum metum tribuisse moriendi.

it a thing unworthy of human nature to look on themselves as born only for the service of the belly and of sloth, and not brought into this life for the pursuit of noble doing or high acquirement; or to think that this life itself had been granted them without any profit as regards eternity. For there could certainly be no question that life ought not to be considered a gift of God, if, harassed as it is with so many troubles, and beset with so many vexations, it were to wear itself away within itself from ignorant boyhood to doting old age. And they seem to have applied themselves, both in teaching and in practice, to certain virtues of patience, and continence, and placability, for this reason, that they held a good life to consist in good actions and right understanding; and thought that life was not to be regarded as given us by the immortal God only that it might end in death. For they saw that it was not the act of a liberal benefactor, to have imparted to us the delightful sensation of living, only with a view to the grievous fear of dying.

3. *In Dei cognitionem ardet Hilarius.*—Et quamquam non ineptam hanc eorum esse sententiam, atque inutilem existimarem, conscientiam ab omni culpa liberam conservare, et omnes humanae vitae molestias vel providere prudenter, vel vitare consulte, vel ferre patienter; tamen hi ipsi non satis mihi idonei ad bene beateque vivendum auctores videbantur, communia tantum et convenientia humano sensui doctrinarum praecepta statuentes: quae cum non intelligere beluinum esset, intellecta tamen non agere, ultra beluinae immanitatis esse rabiem videretur. Festinabat autem animus, non haec tantummodo agere, quae non egisse, et criminum esset plenum et dolorum: sed hunc tanti muneris Deum parentemque cognoscere, cui se totum ipse deberet, cui famulans nobilitandum se existimabat, ad quem omnem spei suae opinionem referret, in cujus bonitate inter tantas praesentium negotiorum cala-

3. *Hilarius burns for the knowledge of God.*

While I considered this teaching of theirs as neither foolish nor useless—to keep the conscience free from all fault, and either to obviate by foresight, or avoid with judgment, or bear with patience all the ills of human life, still these men did not appear to me sufficiently capable guides to a good and happy life. For they laid down only ordinary precepts, and such as agreed with the common sense of mankind; such as it were brutish not to understand; while to understand them and yet not act upon them, would be beyond the highest degree of brutish senselessness. But my soul felt the impulse, not only to do those things, the not doing of which would be full at once of reproach and of suffering, but to learn to know that most bountiful God and father, to whom it owed its own whole being, in serving whom it believed that it would be exalted, to whom it referred every thought of hope, in whose goodness it could rest, as in a most safe and friendly harbour, among all

mitates, tanquam tutissimo sibi portu familiarique requiesceret. Ad hunc igitur vel intelligendum vel cognoscendum studio flagrantissimo animus accendebatur.

4. *Variae antiquorum de Deo opiniones. Hilario non probantur, pro certo habenti Deum non esse nisi unum.*—Namque plures eorum numerosas incertorum deorum familias introducebant: et virilem et muliebrem sexum in divinis naturis agere existimantes, ortus ac successiones ex diis deorum asserebant. Alii majores ac minores et differentes pro potestate deos praedicabant. Nonnulli nullum omnino Deum esse affirmantes, eam tantum quae fortuitis motibus atque concursibus in aliquid existeret, naturam venerabantur. Plerique vero Deum quidem esse opinione publica loquebantur, sed hunc eumdem incuriosum rerum humanarum ac negligentem pronunciabant. Aliqui autem ipsas illas creaturarum corporeas conspicabilesque formas

the great troubles of the present state of things. My soul then was inflamed with the most burning desire either to understand, or to attain the knowledge of, this God.

4. *Various opinions of the ancients concerning God. Hilarius does not approve of them, holding for certain that there is no God but one.*

For many of them brought in numerous families of uncertain gods, and, thinking that sex, male and female, could act in divine natures, asserted the origin and succession of gods from gods. Others taught of the gods as greater and lesser, and of different degrees of power. Some, affirming that there was no God at all, adored only that nature which came forth into some form by fortuitous movements and combinations. Most of them however, in accordance with the general opinion, spoke indeed of God as existing, but pronounced Him to be careless and indifferent about human affairs. Some too adored the bodily and visible forms themselves of creatures, in the earthly and celestial elements. Lastly,

in elementis terrenis et coelestibus adorabant. Postremo quidam in simulacris hominum, pecudum, ferarum, volucrum, serpentum, deos suos collocabant, et universitatis Dominum atque infinitatis parentem intra angustias metallorum et lapidum et stipitum coartabant. Dignumque jam non erat, auctores eos veritatis existere, qui ridicula et foeda et irreligiosa sectantes, ipsis illis inanissimarum sententiarum suarum opinionibus dissiderent. Sed inter haec animus sollicitus, utili ac necessaria ad cognitionem Domini sui via nitens, cum neque incuriam Deo rerum a se conditarum dignam esse arbitraretur, neque naturae potenti atque incorruptae competere sexus deorum, et successiones satorum atque ortorum intelligeret: porro autem divinum et aeternum nihil nisi unum esse et indifferens pro certo habebat, quia id quod sibi ad id quod esset auctor esset, nihil necesse est extra se quod sui esset praestantius reliquisset;

some placed their gods in the likenesses of men, of cattle, of wild beasts, of birds, or of serpents, and confined the Lord of the universe and the father of infinity within the narrow limits of metals, stones, and stocks. And it was not worthy of belief, that men could be authorities respecting truth, who, while following ridiculous and degraded and impious ideas, even disagreed among themselves in the very conclusions of their senseless opinions. My soul, troubled amid these thoughts, and striving after the way useful and necessary for attaining the knowledge of its Lord—while it judged it unworthy of God to be careless about the things created by himself, and while it perceived that sex in gods and successions of parents and offspring were discordant with a powerful and imperishable nature—further held it for certain that the Divine and Eternal could not but be one and undivided; since that, which was the author of its own being, could necessarily have left without it nothing more excellent than itself; and thus that omnipotence and eternity could

atque ita omnipotentiam aeternitatemque non nisi penes unum esse; quia neque in omnipotentia validius infirmiusque, neque in aeternitate posterius anteriusve congrueret: in Deo autem nihil nisi aeternum potensque esse venerandum.

5. *E Scripturis discit quid sit Deus: quod aeternus.*— Haec igitur, multaque alia ejusmodi cum animo reputans, incidi in eos libros quos a Moyse atque a prophetis scriptos esse Hebraeorum religio tradebat: in quibus ipso creatore Deo testante de se, haec ita continebantur: *Ego sum qui sum* (*Exod.* iii. 14); et rursum: *Haec dices filiis Israel. Misit me ad vos is qui est* (*Ibidem*). Admiratus sum plane tam absolutam de Deo significationem, quae naturae divinae incomprehensibilem cognitionem aptissimo ad intelligentiam humanam sermone loqueretur. Non enim aliud proprium magis Deo, quam esse, intelligitur; quia id ipsum quod est, neque deonly be the properties of One, since the terms of 'stronger' and 'weaker' were inconsistent with omnipotence, and those of 'latter' and 'former' with eternity, while in God nothing was to be adored but that which was all-powerful and eternal.

5. *He learns from the Scriptures what God is: that He is eternal.*

While I was thinking over these and many other like things, I fell in with those books which the religion of the Hebrews has handed down as written by Moses and the prophets. In these were contained the following words, God the Creator himself bearing witness of himself:— 'I am that I am;' and again, 'Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you' (Exod. iii. 14). I greatly marvelled at so complete a definition of God, which spoke of the incomprehensible knowledge of the Divine nature in terms most suitable to human intelligence. For we perceive that there is no more special property of God than to be; since this very fact, that He

sinentis est aliquando, neque coepti; sed id quod cum incorruptae beatitudinis potestate perpetuum est non potuit aut poterit aliquando non esse; quia divinum omne neque abolitione neque exordio obnoxium est. Et cum in nullo a se Dei desit aeternitas; digne hoc solum, quod esset, ad protestationem incorruptae suae aeternitatis ostendit.

is, is the characteristic of one who will neither ever come to an end, nor has ever had a beginning; but that, which is everlasting with the power of imperishable blessedness, never has been able, and never will be able, not to be; since all that is divine is subject neither to destruction nor to beginning. And, since the eternity of God is in nothing wanting to itself, He worthily puts forth this fact, that He is, in order to bear witness of His own imperishable eternity.

6. *Deus infinitus; mente capi nequit.*—Et ad hanc quidem infinitatis significationem satisfecisse sermo dicentis: *Ego sum qui sum*, videbatur: sed magnificentiae et virtutis suae erat a nobis opus intelligendum. Namque cum esse ei proprium esset, qui manens semper non etiam aliquando coepisset: aeterni et incorrupti Dei dignus de se hic rursum auditus est sermo: *Qui tenet coelum palma, et terram pugillo.* (*Esa.* xl. 12); et rursum: *Coelum mihi thronus est, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum.*

6. *God is infinite; He cannot be comprehended by the mind.*

As far as regards this declaration of the eternity of God, His words, when He says, 'I am that I am,' appeared to suffice; but the work of His greatness and power required to be understood by me. For while to be was the property of Him who, ever abiding, had also never had a beginning, I heard again this worthy saying of the eternal and imperishable God concerning himself:—'Who hath meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of

Quam domum mihi aedificabitis, aut quis locus erit requietionis meae? Nonne manus mea fecit haec? (*Esa.* lxvi. 1. et 2.) Universitas coeli palma Dei tenetur, et universitas terrae pugillo concluditur. Sermo autem Dei, etiamsi ad opinionem religiosae intelligentiae proficit plus, tamen significationis introspectus sensu continet, quam exceptus auditu (*Vide Augustin. epist.* cxxxvii. *ad Volusian.*, n. 3). Nam conclusum palma coelum rursum Deo thronus est; et terra, quae pugillo continetur, eadem et scabellum pedum ejus est: ne in throno et scabello, secundum habitum considentis, protensio speciei corporeae possit intelligi, cum id quod sibi thronus et scabellum est, rursum ipsa illa infinitàs potens palma ac pugillo apprehendente concluderet; sed ut in his cunctis originibus creaturarum Deus intra extraque, et supereminens et internus, id est, circumfusus et infusus in omnia nosceretur, cum et palma pugillusque continens

the earth in a measure;' and again, 'The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool: where is the house that ye build unto me? and where is the place of my rest? For all those things hath my hand made.' The whole heaven is held in the span of God, and the whole earth is comprehended in His measure. Now while this saying of God is profitable to the contemplation of religious intelligence, still it contains more meaning, when looked into by the understanding, than when only received by the hearing. For heaven, which is meted out with the span of God, is again His throne, and the earth, which is comprehended in His measure, is also His footstool; not that we should understand that there was the putting forth of any bodily form on the throne and footstool, after the fashion of one sitting, since that infinite Power encloses in its span and measure that very thing which, on the other hand, is its throne and footstool; but that in all these examples of created things God should be recognised as being within and

potestatem naturae exterioris ostenderet; ac thronus et scabellum substrata esse ut interno exteriora monstraret, cum exteriora sua interior insidens, ipse rursum exterior interna concluderet; atque ita totus ipse intra extraque se continens (*supple.* cuncta), neque infinitus abesset a cunctis, neque cuncta ei qui infinitus est non inessent. His igitur religiosissimis de Deo opinionibus veri studio detentus animus delectabatur. Neque enim aliud quid dignum esse Deo arbitrabatur, quam ita eum ultra intelligentias rerum esse, ut in quantum se ad aliquem praesumptae licet opinionis modum mens infinita protenderet, in tantum omnem persequentis se naturae infinitatem infinitas immoderatae aeternitatis excederet. Quod cum a nobis pie intelligeretur, tamen a propheta haec ita dicente manifeste confirmabatur: *Quo abibo a spiritu tuo, aut a facie tua quo fugiam? Si adscendero in coelum, tu illic es; si*

without, both extending beyond and dwelling within, that is, spread around all things and infused into all things; while at the same time the span and the measure, which contain, declare His power over external nature, and by the throne and footstool it is shewn that external things are spread under Him, as being within them; so that, sitting upon outward things, as if within them, He himself again encloses internal things, as if outside of them; and thus, containing in His whole being all things within and outside of himself, He, the infinite one, is present in all things, while all things are in Him who is infinite. My soul then, taken hold of by an earnest desire for the truth, was delighting itself with these most pious ideas concerning God; and it judged no other view of God to be a worthy one, than that He so entirely surpasses all comprehension, that, as far as the infinite Mind extends itself to any measure even of arbitrary acceptation, so far does the infinity of a measureless eternity exceed all infinity of

descendero in infernum, et ibi ades. Si sumpsero pennas meas ante lucem et habitavero in postremis maris, etenim illuc manus tua deducet me, et tenebit me dextera tua (*Psal.* cxxxviii. 7. *et seqq.*). Nullus sine Deo, neque ullus non in Deo locus est. In coelis est, in inferno est, ultra maria est. Inest interior, excedit exterior. Ita cum habet atque habetur; neque in aliquo ipse, neque non in omnibus est.

any nature which seeks to attain to it. While I piously perceived this truth, it was yet more clearly confirmed by the following words of the prophet:—'Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me' (Ps. cxxxix. 7–10). There is no place without God, nor any place that is not in God. He is in heaven; He is in hell; He is beyond the sea. He is in them, as being within; He goes beyond them, as being without. Thus, while He possesses, He is also possessed, and is neither himself in anything, nor otherwise than in all things.

7. *Deus pulcherrimus. Quia caeterarum rerum speciem si non verbo certe sensu assequimur; Dei autem speciem neutro modo.*—Quamquam igitur optimae hujus atque inexplicabilis intelligentiae sensu animus gauderet, quod hanc

7. *God is most beautiful. For the beauty of all other things we can reach to, if not in word, yet certainly in mind, but the beauty of God in neither way.*

Although then my soul was rejoicing in the perception of this excellent and inexplicable

in parente suo et creatore immensae aeternitatis infinitatem veneraretur; tamen studio adhuc intentiore ipsam illam infiniti et aeterni Domini sui speciem quaerebat, ut incircumscriptam immensitatem in aliquo pulchrae intelligentiae esse opinaretur ornatu. In quibus cum religiosa mens intra imbecillitatis suae concluderetur errorem, hunc de Deo pulcherrimae sententiae modum propheticis vocibus apprehendit: *De magnitudine enim operum et pulchritudine creaturarum, consequenter generationum conditor conspicitur* (*Sap.* xiii. 5, sec. LXX.). Magnorum creator in maximis est, et pulcherrimorum conditor in pulcherrimis est. Et cum sensum ipsum egrediatur operatio, omnem tamen sensum longe necesse est excedat operator. Pulchrum itaque coelum, aether, terra, maria, et universitas omnis est, quae ex ornatu suo, ut etiam Graecis placet, digne κόσμος, id est mundus nuncupari videtur.

view that it adored in its father and creator the infinity of an unmeasured eternity, still it was seeking with yet more earnest zeal the very form of its infinite and eternal Lord, as believing that boundless infinity was to be found in some attire of fair intelligence. While thus my piously disposed mind was shut up in the wanderings of its own weakness, it laid hold of an admirable statement concerning God in the following form in the words of the prophet:—'For by the greatness and beauty of the creatures proportionably the maker of them is seen' (Wisdom xiii. 5). The creator of great things is among the greatest, and the maker of beautiful things is among the most beautiful. And since the work goes beyond the limits of our understanding, the worker must necessarily far exceed all understanding. Thus the heavens are beautiful, the sky, the earth, the seas, and the whole universe, which, on account of its adornment, is properly called, as the Greeks say, κόσμος, that is, the Order of things. But if this very beauty of

Sed si hanc ipsam rerum pulchritudinem ita sensus naturali metitur instinctu, ut etiam in quarumdam volucrum ac pecudum accidit specie, ut dum infra sententiam sermo est, sensus tamen id ipsum intelligens non eloquatur; quod tamen rursum, dum sermo omnis ex sensu est, sensus sibi ipse loquatur intelligens: nonne hujus ipsius pulchritudinis Dominum necesse est totius pulchritudinis esse pulcherrimum intelligi; ut cum aeterni ornatus sui species sensum intelligentiae omnis effugiat, opinionem tamen intelligentiae sensus non relinquat ornatus? Atque ita pulcherrimus Deus est confitendus: ut neque intra sententiam sit intelligendi, neque extra intelligentiam sentiendi.

8. *Deus intelligentiam excedens fide attingendus.*—His itaque piae opinionis atque doctrinae studiis animus imbutus, in secessu quodam ac specula pulcherrimae hujus sententiae requiescebat, non

things is measured by our minds, through a natural instinct — as happens in the case of certain kinds of birds and beasts — so that, while our speech falls below our thoughts, our mind, though it may understand, yet cannot express that very thing which, on the other hand, while all speech proceeds from thought, the understanding mind utters to itself; if this is so, must we not see that the Lord of this beauty is himself the most beautiful of all beautiful things? so that, while the form of His eternal adornment goes beyond the perception of all intelligence, yet that adornment does not withdraw itself from the view of the perception of intelligence. And thus we must confess God to be most beautiful, in such wise that He is neither within the comprehension of understanding, nor beyond the understanding of sense.

8. *God, surpassing all understanding, is to be reached by faith.*

My soul then, filled with attachment to this pious belief and doctrine, was resting in a sort of retirement and in contemplation of these ex-

sibi relictum quidquam aliud a natura sua intelligens, in quo majus officium praestare Conditori suo minusve posset, quam ut tantum eum esse intelligeret, quantus et intelligi non potest, et potest credi: dum intelligentiam et fides sibi necessariae religionis assumit, et infinitas aeternae potestatis excedit.

9. *In immortalitatis spem assurgit Hilarius. Hanc ratio ipsa ei suadet.* Suberat autem omnibus his naturalis adhuc sensus, ut pietatis professionem spes aliqua incorruptae beatitudinis aleret, quam sancta de Deo opinio et boni mores quodam victricis militiae stipendio mererentur. Neque enim fructus aliquis esset bene de Deo opinari: cum omnem sensum mors perimeret, et occasus quidam naturae deficientis aboleret. Porro autem non esse hoc dignum Deo ratio ipsa suadebat, deduxisse eum in hanc participem consilii prudentiaeque vitam hominem sub defectione vivendi et aeter-

cellent ideas, perceiving that nothing else was left to it by its own nature, in which it could offer to its Creator greater or less service, than that it should understand Him to be so great that His greatness cannot be understood, but can be believed; necessary religious faith taking understanding to itself, and the infinity of eternal power surpassing understanding.

9. *Hilarius rises to the hope of immortality. Reason itself persuades him of this.*

Now under all this lay the natural feeling that the profession of piety should be nourished by some hope of imperishable blessedness, to be earned, as pay is by successful military service, by holy views concerning God and by good morals. For there would be no profit in thinking rightly concerning God, if all feeling were to be done away with by death, and put an end to by the sinking of failing nature. Nay further, reason itself taught that it was not a thing worthy of God, to have brought man into this life, capable as it is of judgment and foresight, with the purpose that life

nitate moriendi; ut in id tantum non exsistens substitueretur, ne substitutus exisseret; cum constitutionis nostrae ea sola esse ratio intelligeretur, ut quod non esset esse coepisset, non ut quod coepisset esse non esset.

10. *Spem ac Dei notitiam auget Joannis Evangelium.*— Fatigabatur autem animus, partim suo, partim corporis metu. Qui cum et constantem sententiam suam pia de Deo professione retineret, et sollicitam de se atque hoc occasuro secum, ut putabat, habitaculo suo curam recepisset, post cognitionem legis ac prophetarum istius modi quoque doctrinae evangelicae atque apostolicae instituta cognoscit: *In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. Hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in eo, vita est, et vita erat lux hominum, et lux lucet in tene-*

should come to an end, and death last for ever; so that he would have been brought from non-existence into being, only that, when brought into being, he might cease to be. For we can understand that the sole purpose of our creation was, that that which was not should begin to be; not that that which had begun should cease to be.

10. *The Gospel of John increases his hope and his knowledge of God.*

My soul however was harassed by fears, partly for itself, partly for the body. But whilst—still holding steadily to its belief, and to a pious confession concerning God—it was anxiously concerned about itself, and about that its dwelling-place which, as it thought, was to perish with it; after becoming acquainted with the law and the prophets, it also became acquainted in this manner with the teachings of evangelical and apostolic doctrine:—'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and

bris, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Joannes. Hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Non erat ille lux, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. In mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. In sua venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, iis qui credunt in nomine ejus; qui non ex sanguine, neque ex voluntate viri, neque ex voluntate carnis, sed ex Deo nati sunt. Et Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis: et vidimus gloriam ejus, gloriam tamquam unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratia et Veritate (*Joan.* i. 1–14). Proficit mens ultra naturales sensus intelligentiam, et plus de Deo quam opinabatur edocetur. Creatorem enim suum Deum ex Deo discit: Verbum Deum, et apud Deum in principio

without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name; which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth' (John i. 1–14). The mind advances beyond the

esse audit. Mundi lumen in mundo manens et a mundo non recognitum intelligit. Venientem quoque in sua a suis non receptum; recipientes autem sub fidei suae merito in Dei filios profecisse cognoscit; non ex complexu carnis, neque ex conceptu sanguinis, neque ex corporum voluntate, sed ex Deo natos. Deinde (*supple.* cognoscit) Verbum carnem factum, et habitasse in nobis, et gloriam conspectam ejus, quae tamquam unici a patre, sit perfecta cum gratia et veritate.

perceptions of natural sense, and is taught more concerning God than it thought. It learns that its Creator is God of God; it hears that the Word is God, and was with God in the beginning; it perceives the Light of the world dwelling in the world, and not known by the world; coming to His own, and not received by His own; it learns that those who received Him were, through the merits of their faith, promoted to be the sons of God; born, not of a fleshly embrace, nor of conception by blood, nor of the will of the body, but of God. Furthermore it learns that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and that His glory was beheld, which, as being that of the only begotten of the Father, was perfected with grace and truth.

II. *Filius Dei Deus. Filios Dei fieri potestas est, non necessitas. Filius Dei factus homo, ut homo fieret filius Dei. Christus verus Deus et verus homo.*—Hic jam mens trepida et anxia plus spei invenit quam expectabat. Ac primum ad cognitionem Dei Patris imbuitur. Et quod antea de

II. *The Son of God is God. There is a power to become sons of God, not a necessity. The Son of God was made man, that man might be made the son of God. Christ is very God and very man.*

The alarmed and anxious mind finds now more hope than it looked for. And first it is taught to know God as a father. And what it formerly

Creatoris sui aeternitate et infinitate et specie naturali sensu opinabatur, hic nunc proprium esse etiam unigenito Deo accipit: non in deos fidem laxans, quia ex Deo Deum audit; non ad naturae diversitatem in Deum ex Deo decedens, quia plenum gratia et veritate Deum ex Deo discit; neque praeposterum ex Deo Deum sentiens, quia in principio apud Deum esse Deum comperit. Rarissimam deinde hujus salutaris cognitionis fidem esse, sed maximum praemium noscit: quia et sui non receperunt, et recipientes in filios Dei aucti sunt, non ortu carnis sed fidei. Esse autem filios Dei, non necessitatem esse sed potestatem: quia proposito universis Dei munere, non natura gignentium afferatur, sed voluntas praemium consequatur. Ac ne id ipsum, quod unicuique esse Dei filio fit potestas, in aliquo infirmitatem fidei trepidae impediret; quia per sui difficultatem aegerrime speretur, quod et

believed by natural sense concerning the eternity and infinity and beauty of its Creator, this it now receives as being the property also of the only begotten God. It does not widen its faith, so as to believe in more gods than one, because it hears of 'God from God;' it does not pass from God to God, as believing in a difference of nature, because it learns that 'God from God' is full of grace and truth; nor does it think of 'God from God' as earlier and later, because it finds that God was in the beginning with God. It next learns that the belief of this saving knowledge is very rare, but brings with it the highest reward; because, while He was not received by His own, those who did receive Him were advanced to be sons of God, not by the birth of flesh, but of faith. Further, there is a power, not a necessity, to become sons of God; since, while the gift of God is set before, it is not natural parentage which is concerned, but willingness obtains the reward. And lest the very fact that power is given to every man to be a son of God,

magis optatur et minus creditur: Verbum Deus caro factum est, ut per Deum Verbum carnem factum caro proficeret in Deum Verbum. Ac ne Verbum caro factum aut aliquid aliud esset quam Deus Verbum, aut non nostri corporis caro esset, habitavit in nobis: ut dum habitat, non alius quam Deus maneret; dum autem habitat in nobis, non aliud quam nostrae carnis Deus caro factus esset; per dignationem assumptae carnis non inops suorum, quia tamquam unigenitus a Patre plenus gratiae et veritatis, et in suis perfectus sit, et verus in nostris.

should hinder any one's weak and trembling faith—for on account of its difficulty we hope more feebly for that, which we at once desire the more, and believe the less—God the Word was made flesh, that, through God the Word made flesh, flesh might go forward to God the Word. And lest the Word made flesh should either be something else than God the Word, or not be flesh of our body, He dwelt among us; so that, as being a dweller, He should remain no other than God, and, as dwelling among us, He should be no other than God made flesh of our flesh; not deprived of what is His own, through His condescending to take flesh upon Him; since, as the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, He is both perfect in what is His own, and truly present in what is ours.

12. *Divina non capit nisi fides.* — Hanc itaque divini sacramenti doctrinam mens laeta suscepit, in Deum proficiens per carnem, et in novam nativitatem per fidem vocata, et ad coelestem regenerationem obtinendam potestati suae permissa, curam

12. *Divine things are apprehended only by faith.*

This doctrine of the divine mystery my mind joyfully adopted, going forward to God through the flesh, and being called to a new birth through faith, and committed to its own power that it might obtain a heavenly

in se parentis sui Creatorisque cognoscens non in nihilum redigendam se per eum existimans, per quem in hoc ipsum quod est, ex nihilo substitisset: et haec omnia ultra intelligentiae humanae metiens sensum, quia ratio communium opinionum consilii coelestis incapax, hoc solum putet in natura rerum esse, quod aut intra se intelligat, aut praestare possit ex sese. Dei autem virtutes secundum magnificentiam aeternae potestatis, non sensu, sed fidei infinitate pendebat: ut Deum in principio apud Deum esse, et Verbum carnem factum habitasse in nobis, non idcirco non crederet quia non intelligeret, sed idcirco se meminisset intelligere posse si crederet.

13. *Christi gesta non succumbunt naturalibus mentium sensibus.*—Ac ne in aliquo saecularis prudentiae tardaretur errore, ad piae confessionis

regeneration; recognising the care bestowed on it by its Father and Creator; and confident that it would not be reduced to nothingness by Him, by whom it had been brought out of nothingness to that which it now is. And in judging of all these things it passed the bounds of human intelligence, since ordinary reason, incapable of conceiving heavenly wisdom, thinks that those things alone exist in the nature of things, which it either perceives within itself, or can put forth out of itself. But my mind estimated the qualities of God according to the greatness of His eternal power, not by sense, but by the boundlessness of faith; and thus it did not disbelieve that God was in the beginning with God, and that the Word made flesh had dwelt among us, because it could not understand these things; but, on the contrary, it bore in mind that it could understand them only if it believed them.

13. *The actions of Christ do not submit themselves to the natural perceptions of our minds.*

And that my soul might not be impeded by any error

hujus absolutissimam fidem ita insuper per Apostolum divinis dictis edocetur: *Videte ne quis vos spoliet per philosophiam et inanem deceptionem, secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa mundi, et non secundum Christum: quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter, et istis in illo repleti, qui est caput omnis principatus et potestatis; in quo et circumcisi estis, circumcisione non manu facta in exspoliatione corporis carnis, sed circumcisione Christi, consepulti ei in baptismate, in quo et resurrexistis per fidem operationis Dei, qui excitavit eum a mortuis. Et vos, cum essetis mortui in delictis et praeputiatione carnis vestrae, vivificavit cum illo, donatis vobis omnibus delictis, delens quod adversum nos erat chirographum in sententiis, quod erat contrarium nobis! et ipsum tulit e medio affigens illud cruci, exutus carnem, et potestates ostentui fecit, triumphatis iis cum fiducia in semetipso* (*Coloss.* ii. 8, *et seqq.*). Respuit cap-

of worldly wisdom, it was further taught to have a most complete faith in this pious confession by the Apostle in his divine words:— 'Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in Him, which is the head of all principality and power; in whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ; buried with Him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with Him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised Him from the dead. And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh hath He quickened together with Him, having forgiven you all trespasses; blotting out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to His cross; and having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a show of

tiosas et inutiles philosophiae quaestiones fides constans, neque humanarum ineptiarum fallaciis succumbens, spolium se praebet veritas falsitati; non secundum sensum communis intelligentiae Deum retinens, neque de Christo secundum mundi elementa decernens, in quo divinitatis plenitudo corporaliter inhabitet: ut dum infinitas aeternae in eo est potestatis, omnem terrenae mentis amplexum potestas aeternae infinitatis excedat; qui nos ad divinitatis suae naturam trahens, non etiamnum corporali praeceptorum observatione distrinxerit, neque per legis umbram ad solemnia desecandae carnis (*id est*, circumcisionis) imbuerit; sed ut omnem naturalem corporis necessitatem circumcisus a vitiis spiritus criminum emundatione purgaret; cujus morti consepeliremur in baptismo, ut in aeternitatis vitam rediremus; dum regeneratio ad vitam mors esset ex vita, et morientes vitiis immortalitati

them openly, triumphing over them in it' (Coloss. ii. 8–15). A steady faith rejects the captious and useless questions of philosophy; nor does truth, yielding to the fallacies of human follies, offer itself as a spoil to falsehood. Faith does not hold God according to the apprehension of ordinary understanding, nor judge according to the elements of the world concerning Christ, in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; so that, while in Him is the infinity of eternal power, the power of His eternal infinity exceeds all grasp of the earthly mind. He, drawing us toward the nature of His own Godhead, has no longer bound us to the corporal observance of precepts, nor held us to the rite of the cutting off of the flesh; that is, of circumcision; but to this, that the spirit, circumcised from sin, should purify every natural necessity of the body by the cleansing away of offences. We are buried with Him in baptism, that we might come forth to the life of eternity; so that death from life might be a regeneration to life, and that we, dying to sin, might be born again to

renasceremur; ipso pro nobis ex immortalitate moriente, ut ad immortalitatem una cum eo excitaremur ex morte. Carnem enim peccati recepit, ut assumptione nostrae carnis delicta donaret, dum ejus fit particeps assumptione, non crimine; delens per mortem sententiam mortis, ut nova in se generis nostri creatione constitutionem decreti anterioris aboleret; cruci se figi permittens, ut maledicto crucis obliterata terrenae damnationis maledicta figeret omnia; ad ultimum in homine passus ut potestates dehonestaret: dum Deus secundum Scripturas moriturus et in his vincentis in se fiducia triumpharet; dum immortalis ipse, neque morte vincendus, pro morientium aeternitate moreretur. Haec itaque ultra naturae humanae intelligentiam a Deo gesta non succumbunt rursum naturalibus mentium sensibus; quia infinitae aeternitatis operatio infinitam metiendi exigat opinionem; ut cum Deus homo, cum immor-

immortality; He Himself dying for us out of immortality, that we might be raised together with Him out of death to immortality. For He took sinful flesh, that, by taking on Him our flesh, He might forgive our trespasses; becoming partaker of it by taking it on Him, not by any offence; blotting out through death the sentence of death, that, by a new creation of our race in Himself, He might do away with the establishment of the former ordinances; allowing Himself to be nailed to the cross, that by the curse of the cross He might blot out and nail to the cross all the curses of earthly condemnation; suffering to the uttermost as a man, that He might dishonour principalities and powers; that God, who according to the Scriptures was to die, might also triumph over these with the self-confidence of a conqueror; that He, though immortal Himself, and not to be conquered by death, might die on behalf of the eternal life of dying men. These things, thus done by God beyond the limits of human understanding, do not come under the

talis mortuus, cum aeternus sepultus est, non sit intelligentiae ratio, sed potestatis exceptio; ita rursum e contrario non sensus, sed virtutis modus sit, ut Deus ex homine, ut immortalis ex mortuo, ut aeternus sit ex sepulto. Coexcitamur ergo a Deo in Christo per mortem ejus. Sed dum in Christo plenitudo est divinitatis, habemus et significationem Dei patris nos coexcitantis in mortuo, et Christum Jesum non aliud quam Deum in divinitatis plenitudine confitendum.

natural perceptions of our minds, because the working of an infinite eternity requires an infinite power of thought to measure it; so that, when God is man, when the immortal One dies, when the eternal One is buried, it does not answer to rational understanding, but is a putting forth of power; and so again on the other hand, it does not depend on the measure of sense, but of strength, that He should be God from man, immortal from being dead, eternal from being buried. We are raised up together then by God in Christ through His death. But since in Christ is the fulness of the Godhead we both have God the Father pointed out to us as raising us up together in Him who died, and are taught that Christ Jesus must be confessed to be no other than God in the fulness of the Godhead.

14. *Christi fides et mortis metum et vitae tollit taedium.*— In hoc ergo conscio securitatis suae otio mens spebus suis laeta requieverat: intercessionem mortis hujus usque eo non metuens, ut etiam reputaret in vitam aeterni-

14. *Faith in Christ removes both fear of death and weariness of life.*

In this state of ease then and conscious security my mind had rested, rejoicing in its hopes, and so far from fearing the coming of death, that it even reckoned it as

tatis. Vitam autem hujus corporis sui non modo non molestam sibi aut aegram arbitrabatur, ut eam quod pueritiae litteras, quod aegris medicinam, quod naufragis natatum, quod adolescentibus disciplinam, quod militiam esse crederet imperaturis; rerum scilicet praesentium tolerantiam, ad praemium beatae immortalitatis proficientem. Quin etiam id, quod sibi credebat, tamen per ministerium impositi sacerdotii etiam caeteris praedicabat, munus suum ad officium publicae salutis extendens.

that of eternal life. And this its bodily life it not only did not consider as wearisome or disagreeable, but looked on as being what letters are to childhood, what medicine is to the sick, what swimming is to the shipwrecked, what learning is to young men, what military service is to those who are in future to command; an endurance, in fact, of the present state of things, profitable towards the reward of a blessed immortality. Furthermore, that which is believed for itself, it also preached to others in the ministry of the priesthood which had been laid on it, extending its own gift to the service of the general weal.

NOTE 16, p. 163.

Such was one of the reproaches of Celsus. Subjoined is Origen's reply to it, from his work against Celsus.

9. Μετὰ ταῦτα προτρέπει ἐπὶ τὸ λόγῳ κολουθοῦντας καὶ λογικῷ ὁδηγῷ, παραδέχεσθαι δόγματα· ὡς πάντως ἀπάτης γινομένης τῷ μὴ οὕτω συγκατατιθεμένῳ τισί· καὶ ἐξομοιοῖ τοὺς ἀλόγως πιστεύοντως Μητραγύρταις καὶ

Chap. ix. He next proceeds to recommend that in adopting opinions we should follow reason and a rational guide, since he who assents to opinions without following this course is very liable to be deceived. And he compares inconsiderate believers to

τερατοσκόποις, Μίθραις τε καὶ Σαββαδίοις, καὶ ὅτῳ τις προσέτυχεν, Ἑκάτης, ἢ ἄλλης δαίμονος ἢ δαιμόνων φάσμασιν. Ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις πολλάκις μοχθηροὶ ἄνθρωποι, ἐπιβαίνοντες τῇ ἰδιωτείᾳ τῶν εὐεξαπατήτων, ἄγουσιν αὐτοὺς ᾗ βούλονται· οὕτω φησὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς γίγνεσθαι. Φησὶ δέ τινας μηδὲ βουλομένους διδόναι ἢ λαμβάνειν λόγον περὶ ὧν πιστεύουσι, χρῆσθαι τῷ, Μὴ ἐξέταζε, ἀλλὰ πίστευσον· καὶ, Ἡ πίστις σου σώσει σε. Καί φησιν αὐτοὺς λέγειν· Κακὸν ἡ ἐν τῷ βίῳ σοφία, ἀγαθὸν δ' ἡ μωρία. Λεκτέον δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι εἰ μὲν οἷόν τε πάντας καταλιπόντας τὰ τοῦ βίου πράγματα σχολάζειν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἄλλην ὁδὸν οὐ μεταδιωκτέον οὐδενὶ ἢ ταύτην μόνην. Εὑρεθήσεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστιανισμῷ οὐκ ἐλάττων, ἵνα μὴ φορτικόν τι εἴπω, ἐξέτασις τῶν πεπιστευμένων, καὶ διήγησις τῶν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις αἰνιγμάτων, καὶ τῶν

Metragyrtae, and soothsayers, and Mithrae, and Sabbadians, and to anything else that one may fall in with, and to the phantoms of Hecate, or any other demon or demons. For as amongst such persons are frequently to be found wicked men who, taking advantage of the ignorance of those who are easily deceived, lead them away whither they will, so also, he says, is the case among Christians. And he asserts that certain persons who do not wish either to give or receive a reason for their belief, keep repeating, 'Do not examine but believe!' and, 'Your faith will save you!' And he alleges that such also say, 'The wisdom of this life is bad, but that foolishness is a good thing!' To which we have to answer, that if it were possible for all to leave the business of life and devote themselves to philosophy, no other method ought to be adopted by any one, but this alone. For in the Christian system also it will be found that there is, not to speak at all arrogantly, at least as much of investigation into articles of belief, and of explanation of dark sayings

ἐν τοῖς Εὐαγγελίοις παραβολῶν, καὶ ἄλλων μυρίων συμβολικῶς γεγενημένων ἢ νενομοθετημένων. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀμήχανον, πῆ μὲν διὰ τὰς τοῦ βίου ἀνάγκας, πῆ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσθένειαν, σφόδρα ὀλίγων ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀπτόντων· ποία ἂν ἄλλη βελτίων μέθοδος πρὸς τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς βοηθῆσαι εὑρεθείη τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῖς ἔθνεσι παραδοθείσης; Καὶ πυνθανόμεθά γε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πιστευόντων, τὴν πολλὴν χύσιν τῆς κακίας ἀποθεμένων, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον ἐκαλινδοῦντο· πότερον βέλτιόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἀλόγως πιστεύουσι κατεστάλθαι πως τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὠφελῆσθαι, διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν κολαζομένων ἐπὶ ἁμαρτίαις, καὶ τιμωμένων ἐπὶ ἔργοις χρηστοῖς πίστιν, ἢ μὴ προσιέσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν μετὰ ψιλῆς πίστεως, ἕως ἂν ἐπιδῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἐξετάσει λόγων; Φανερῶς γὰρ οἱ πάντες παρ' ἐλαχίστους οὐδὲ τοῦτο λήψονται, ὅπερ εἰλήφασιν, ἐκ τοῦ ἁπλῶς πεπι-

occurring in the prophetical writings, and of the parables in the Gospels, and of countless other things, which either were narrated or enacted with a symbolical signification, [as is the case with other systems]. But since the course alluded to is impossible, partly on account of the necessities of life, partly on account of the weakness of men, as only a very few individuals devote themselves earnestly to study, what better method could be devised with a view of assisting the multitude than that which was delivered by Jesus to the heathen? And let us inquire, with respect to the great multitude of believers who have washed away the mire of wickedness in which they formerly wallowed, whether it were better for them to believe without a reason, and [so] to have become reformed and improved in their habits, through the belief that men are chastised for sins and honoured for good works; or not to have allowed themselves to be converted on the strength of mere faith, but [to have waited] until they could give themselves to a thorough examination of the [necessary]

στευκέναι· ἀλλὰ μενοῦσιν ἐν κακίστῳ βίῳ. Εἴπερ οὖν ἄλλο τι κατασκευαστικόν ἐστι τοῦ, τὸ φιλάνθρωπον τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἀθεεὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιδεδημηκέναι· καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς συγκαταριθμητέον. Ὁ γὰρ εὐλαβὴς οὐδὲ σωμάτων ἰατρὸν, πολλοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον νοσοῦντας ἀγαγόντα, οἰήσεται ἀθεεὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἔθνεσιν ἐπιδημεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρηστὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀθεεὶ γίγνεται. Εἰ δὲ ὁ πολλῶν σώματα θεραπεύσας, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον προαγαγὼν οὐκ ἀθεεὶ θεραπεύει· πόσῳ πλέον ὁ πολλῶν ψυχὰς θεραπεύσας, καὶ ἐπιστρέψας, καὶ βελτιώσας, καὶ ἀπαρτήσας αὐτὰς θεοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι, καὶ διδάξας πᾶσαν πρᾶξιν ἀναφέρειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρέσκειαν, καὶ πάντ' ἐκκλίνειν, ὅσ' ἀπάρεστά ἐστι θεῷ, καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων ἢ καὶ εἰς ἐνθύμησιν ἐρχομένων;

reasons. For it is manifest that [on such a plan] all men, with very few exceptions, would not obtain this [amelioration of conduct] which they have obtained through a simple faith, but would continue to remain in the practice of a wicked life. Now whatever other evidence can be furnished of the fact, that it was not without divine intervention that the philanthropic scheme of Christianity was introduced among men, this also must be added. For a pious man will not believe that even a physician of the body, who restores the sick to better health, could take up his abode in any city or country without divine permission, since no good happens to men without the help of God. And if he who has cured the bodies of many, or restored them to better health, does not effect his cures without the help of God, how much more he who has healed the souls of many, and has turned them [to virtue] and improved their nature and attached them to God who is over all things, and taught them to refer every action to his good pleasure, and

10. Εἶτ', ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πίστεως θρυλλοῦσι, λεκτέον ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν παραλαμβάνοντες αὐτὴν ὡς χρήσιμον τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὁμολογοῦμεν διδάσκειν πιστεύειν καὶ ἀλόγως, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους πάντα καταλιπεῖν καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν ἐξετάσει λόγου· ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες, τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι. Τίς γὰρ προτραπεὶς ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἀποκληρωτικῶς ἐπί τινα αἵρεσιν ἑαυτὸν φιλοσόφων ῥίψας, ἢ τῷ εὐπορηκέναι τοιοῦδε διδασκάλου, ἄλλως ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔρχεται, ἢ τῷ πιστεύειν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκείνην κρείττονα εἶναι; Οὐ γὰρ περιμείνας ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς πάντων φιλοσόφων λόγους καὶ τῶν διαφόρων αἱρέσεων, καὶ τὴν ἀνατροπὴν μὲν τῶνδε, κατασκευὴν δὲ ἑτέρων, οὕτως αἱρεῖται ἤτοι Στωϊκὸς, ἢ Πλατωνικὸς, ἢ Περιπατητικὸς, ἢ Ἐπικούρειος εἶναι, ἢ ὁποιασδήποτε φιλοσόφων αἱρέσεως·

to shun all that is displeasing to him, even to the least of their words or deeds, or even of the thoughts of their hearts?

Chap. x. In the next place, since our opponents keep repeating those statements about faith, we must say that, considering it as a useful thing for the multitude, we admit that we teach those men to believe without reasons who are unable to abandon all other employments and give themselves to an examination of arguments; and our opponents, although they do not acknowledge it, yet practically do the same. For who is there that, on betaking himself to the study of philosophy, and throwing himself into the ranks of some sect, either by chance, or because he is provided with a teacher of that school, adopts such a course for any other reason except that he *believes* his particular sect to be superior to any other? For not waiting to hear the arguments of all the other philosophers, and of all the different sects, and the reasons for condemning one system and for supporting another, he in this way elects to become a Stoic, *e.g.*, or a

ἀλλ' ἀλόγῳ τινὶ, κἂν μὴ βούλωνται τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, φορᾷ ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσκῆσαι, φέρ' εἰπεῖν, τὸν Στωϊκὸν λόγον, καταλιπών τε τοὺς λοιποὺς· ἢ τὸν Πλατωνικὸν ὑπερφρονήσας, ὡς ταπεινότερον τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ τὸν Περιπατητικὸν, ὡς ἀνθρωπικώτερον, καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν λοιπῶν αἱρέσεων εὐγνωμόνως ὁμολογοῦντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθά. Καὶ ἀπὸ πρώτης δὲ προσβολῆς ταραχθέντες τινὲς εἰς τὸν περὶ προνοίας λόγον, ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς γενομένων φαύλοις καὶ σπουδαίοις, προπετέστερον συγκατέθεντο τῷ μηδαμῶς εἶναι πρόνοιαν, καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρου καὶ Κέλσου εἵλοντο λόγον.

Platonist, or a Peripatetic, or an Epicurean, or a follower of some other school, and is thus borne, although they will not admit it, by a kind of irrational impulse to the practice, say of Stoicism, to the disregard of the others; despising either Platonism, as being marked by greater humility than the others; or Peripateticism, as more human, and as admitting with more fairness than other systems the blessings of human life. And some also, alarmed at first sight about the doctrine of providence, from seeing what happens in the world to the vicious and to the virtuous, have rashly concluded that there is no divine providence at all, and have adopted the views of Epicurus and Celsus.

ΚΑ. Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ πιστεύειν, ὡς ὁ λόγος ἐδίδαξεν, ἑνί τινι τῶν αἱρέσεις εἰσηγησαμένων ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἢ βαρβάροις· πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, καὶ τῷ διδάσκοντι τοῦτον μόνον δεῖν σέβειν, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ, ἤτοι ὡς μὴ ὄντα, ἢ ὡς ὄντα μὲν καὶ τιμῆς ἄξια οὐ μὴν καὶ προσκυνή-

Chap. xi. Since then, as reason teaches, we must repose faith in some one of those who have been the introducers of sects among the Greeks or barbarians, why should we not rather believe in God who is over all things, and in Him who teaches that worship is due to God alone, and that other things are to be passed by

σεως καὶ σεβασμοῦ, παρορᾷν; Περὶ ὧν ὁ μὴ πιστεύων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγῳ θεωρῶν τὰ πράγματα, ἐρεῖ τὰς ὑποπιπτούσας αὐτῷ, καὶ εὑρισκομένας ἐκ τοῦ πάνυ ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις. Πῶς δ' οὐκ εὐλογώτερον πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πίστεως ἠρτημένων, ἐκείνων μᾶλλον πιστεύειν τῷ θεῷ; Τίς γὰρ πλεῖ, ἢ γαμεῖ, ἢ παιδοποιεῖται, ἢ ῥίπτει τὰ σπέρματα ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, μὴ τὰ κρείττονα πιστεύων ἀπαντήσεσθαι, δυνατοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντία γενέσθαι καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε γινομένου; Ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ περὶ τοῦ τὰ κρείττονα καὶ τὰ κατ' εὐχὴν ἀπαντήσεσθαι πίστις τολμᾷν πάντας ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδηλα καὶ δυνατὰ ἄλλως συμβῆναι. Εἰ δὲ συνέχει τὸν βίον ἐν πάσῃ πράξει ἀδήλῳ, ὅπως ἐκβήσεται, ἡ ἐλπὶς καὶ ἡ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων χρηστοτέρα πίστις· πῶς οὐ μᾶλλον αὕτη παραληφθήσεται εὐλόγως τῷ πιστεύοντι ὑπὲρ τὴν πλεομένην θάλασσαν, καὶ γῆν σπειρομένην, καὶ

either as non-existent, or as existing indeed, and worthy of honour, but not of worship and reverence? And respecting these things, he who not only believes, but who contemplates things with the eye of reason will state the demonstrations that occur to him, and which are the result of careful investigation. And why should it not be more reasonable, seeing all human things are dependent upon faith, to believe God rather than them? For who enters on a voyage, or contracts a marriage, or becomes the father of children, or casts seed into the ground, without believing that better things will result from so doing, although the contrary might and sometimes does happen? And yet the belief that better things, even agreeably to their wishes, will follow, makes all men venture upon uncertain enterprises, which may turn out differently from what they expect. And if the hope and belief of a better future be the support of life in every uncertain enterprise, why shall not this faith rather be rationally accepted by him who believes, on better

γυναῖκα γαμουμένην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις πράγματα, τῷ ταῦτα πάντα δημιουργήσαντι θεῷ, καὶ τῷ μετὰ ὑπερβαλλούσης μεγαλονοίας καὶ θείας μεγαλοφροσύνης τολμήσαντι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον παραστῆσαι τοῖς πανταχοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης, μετὰ μεγάλων κινδύνων καὶ θανάτου νομιζομένου ἀτίμου, ὃ ὑπέμεινεν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων· διδάξας καὶ τοὺς ὑπερετεῖσθαι τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ πεισθέντας, μετὰ πάντων κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀεὶ προσδοκωμένων θανάτων, τολμῆσαι ἀποδημῆσαι πανταχοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίας;

grounds than he who sails the sea, or tills the ground, or marries a wife, or engages in any other human pursuit, in the existence of a God who was the Creator of all these things, and in Him who with surpassing wisdom and divine greatness of mind dared to make known this doctrine to men in every part of the world at the cost of great danger, and of a death considered infamous, which He underwent for the sake of the human race; having also taught those who were persuaded to embrace His doctrines at the first, to proceed, under the peril of every danger and of ever impending death, to all quarters of the world to ensure the salvation of men?—*From the Ante-Nicene Christian Library*. T. and T. Clark, 1871.

NOTE 17, p. 179.

Luther's teaching on Faith has been so strangely misrepresented that it may be well to present the reader with an extract of some length from his most beautiful, and perhaps his most characteristic production—the Treatise *De Libertate Christianâ*. This work, which was written before the struggle with the Pope had become irretrievably embittered, expresses the very essence of the Reformer's mind, and a perusal of it would dissipate many misconceptions respecting him.

The most injurious of those misconceptions overlook the essential point in the teaching embodied in this Treatise. That point is that Faith is a response to the word and promise of God, and derives from that promise its whole justification and efficacy. Without that foundation, it would be baseless and unreal. But with that foundation, it holds an entirely different position. For instance, Dr. Mozley says (*Essays*, vol. i. p. 346), that Luther's Faith was 'a pure and abstract faculty of confidence.' But the Reformer himself says (p. 349, below) that Faith is 'wholly absorbed in the words of God,' and 'is saturated with all their virtue.' He is further represented as saying, 'Feel yourself safe; if you feel safe, you are safe.' It would rather appear, from these extracts, that he said the very opposite. Luther said, 'If you trust to your feelings you will always have reason to feel unsafe, and in danger of perdition. But God, through Christ and Christ's Church, promises you forgiveness and salvation. Believe that promise, and rest upon it in perfect confidence.' The developments of this principle led to a prolonged and difficult controversy, on which it would be out of place here to enter. But it would at least appear to be wholly different from the strange theory so often attributed to the Reformer. The Word of God, with the promise it conveys, is the vital element in the case, and Faith is merely its correlative. But it is better to let Luther speak for himself. The accompanying translation is that published by the Rev. H. Cole, 1826.

Facilis res multis est visa Christiana fides, quam et non pauci inter virtutes ceu socias numerant, quod faciunt, quia nullo experimento eam probaverunt, nec quantae sit virtutis unquam gustaverunt,

Christian faith has appeared to many an easy matter; of whom not a few have classed it among the moral virtues, nay, have made it merely a sort of attendant on virtue. And this they have done because they have never proved what it is in their own experience, nor internally tasted

cum fieri non possit, ut bene de ea scribat, aut recte scripta bene intelligat, qui non spiritum ejusdem, urgentibus tribulationibus, aliquando gustarit. Qui autem vel paululum gustavit, non potest unquam satis de eadem scribere, dicere, cogitare, audire. Fons enim vivus est saliens in vitam aeternam, ut Christus Johan. iv. appellat.

Ego autem quamquam de abundantia non glorier, sciamque, quam sit mihi curta supellex, spero tamen nonnullam guttam fidei magnis et variis agitatum tentationibus me consecutum, posseque si non elegantius, certe solidius de ea re dicere, quam literales illi et subtiles nimirum disputatores hactenus disseruerunt, sua ipsorum non intelligentes.

Quo autem faciliorem viam rudibus (nam iis solis servio) aperiam, duo haec themata

its power. Whereas no one can truly describe it himself, nor really understand it when truly described, unless he has at some time, under the fiery trial of pressing conflicts, tasted the spirit of it in his own soul. And he who has really tasted this, even in the smallest degree, can never write of it, speak of it, think of it, nor hear of it enough: for it is, as Christ calls it, 'a living fountain springing up into everlasting life' (St. John iv).

As to myself, though I may not boast of an abundant stock of this grace (for I deeply feel my straitened deficiency), yet I do trust that out of the great and various tribulations under which I have been exercised I have gotten of faith a certain drachm; and that I can therefore treat of it, if not more eloquently, yet certainly more substantially than any of those learned and subtle ones have hitherto done in all their laboured disputations; who, after they had done, knew not what they themselves had written upon the subject. But in order to open up this matter the more plainly to

praemitto, de libertate et servitute spiritus.

> Christianus homo omnium Dominus est liberrimus, nulli subjectus, Christianus homo omnium servus est officiosissimus, omnibus subjectus.

Haec quamquam pugnare videantur, tamen, ubi convenire inventa fuerint, pulchre facient ad institutum nostrum. Sunt enim ipsius Pauli utraque dicentis 1 Corinth. ix.: Cum liber essem, omnium me servum feci; Rom. xiii: Nemini quidquam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis. Amor vero natura sua officiosus est et obsequens ei, quod amatur. Sic et Christus, quamquam omnium Dominus, factus tamen ex muliere, factus est sub lege, simul liber et servus, simul in forma Dei et in forma servi.

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simple souls (since it is for them only I write) I lay down at the outset these two propositions concerning the bondage and liberty of the Spirit:

i. The Christian man is a most free lord of all, subject to none.

ii. The Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, subject to all.

Though these two things may seem to be contradictions, yet when they shall be found to harmonise, they will sweetly make for our present purpose. Both these propositions then are of Paul himself, who saith, 1 Cor. ix: 'For though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all.' Again, Rom. xiii: 'Owe no man anything, but to love one another.' For the nature of love is to be dutiful and affectionately obedient unto the object beloved. Thus Christ, though Lord of all, was yet 'made of a woman, made under the law;' at the same time free and a servant; at the same time in the form of God and in the form of a servant (Gal. iv.)

* * * *

Et ut omnia rejiciamus, etiam speculationes, meditationes, et quidquid per animae studia geri potest, nihil prodest; una re, eaque sola opus est ad vitam, justitiam, et libertatem Christianam, ea est sacrosanctum verbum Dei, evangelium Christi, sicut dicit Johan. xi: Ego sum resurrectio et vita, qui credit in me, non morietur in aeternum; item viii: Si Filius vos liberaverit, vere liberi eritis; et Matth. iv: Non in solo pane vivit homo, sed in omni verbo, quod procedit ab ore Dei.

Certum ergo habeamus ac firmiter positum, animam posse omnibus rebus carere, excepto verbo Dei, sine quo nullis prorsus rebus est illi consultum. Habens autem verbum dives est, nullius egens, cum sit verbum vitae, veritatis, lucis, pacis, justitiae, salutis, gaudii, libertatis, sapientiae, virtutis, gratiae,

In a word, to reject all things:—neither speculations, meditations, nor the greatest devotional efforts of which the human mind is capable, avail anything. One thing, and that only, can affect the life, the righteousness, and the liberty of a Christian—and that is, the most holy word of God, the Gospel of Jesus Christ: as he saith, John xi, 'I am the resurrection and the life, he that believeth in me shall never die.' Again, John viii, 'If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed.' And again, Matt. iv, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.'

This then we may consider as a fixed and absolute certainty, that the soul may endure the want of everything but the word of God. Deprived of this, it cannot receive benefit from any one thing; but having this, it is rich, wanting nothing: for it is the word of life, of truth, of light, of peace, of righteousness, of salvation, of joy, of liberty, of wisdom, of strength, of grace, of glory, of all good that passeth under-

gloriae, et omnis boni inaestimabiliter. Hoc est, quod propheta octonario toto, et multis aliis locis tot gemitibus et vocibus suspirat et invocat verbum Dei.

Rursus nec saevior plaga irae Dei, quam dum mittit famem auditus verbi sui, ut in Amos dicit: sicut nec major est gratia, quam si emittat verbum suum, ut Psal. civ: Misit verbum suum et sanavit eos, et eripuit eos de interitionibus eorum. Neque Christus ad aliud officium missus est, quam verbi, et apostolicus, episcopalis, universusque ordo clericorum non nisi in verbi ministerium vocatus et institutus est.

Quaeres autem: Quodnam est verbum hoc, aut qua arte utendum est eo, cum tam multa sint verba Dei? Respondeo: Paulus Apostolus Rom. i. id explicat, scilicet, evangelium Dei de Filio suo

standing! And this is the reason why the prophet, throughout the whole of his Octonary, and in many other places, sighs out so many prayers, cries, and groans, concerning the word of God!

And hence, as on the one hand no greater plague can be inflicted by the anger of God than when He sends a famine of hearing the word, as in Amos viii; so on the other, there can be no greater token of His favour than when He sends His word, as in Psalm cvii, 'He sent His word and healed them, and delivered them out of their destructions.' Nor was Christ sent unto any other office than that of the word. Nor was the apostolical, episcopal, nor the whole ministerial order, called and ordained to any other purpose than the ministry of the word.

But you will ask, Which word of God is this, and how must it be made use of, for there are so many words of God? I answer, the Apostle Paul, Rom. i, explains which it is. The Gospel of God concerning His Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who was incarnate, and crucified, and

incarnato, passo, resuscitato et glorificato per spiritum sanctificatorem: praedicasse enim Christum, hoc est, animam pavisse, justificasse, liberasse et salvam fecisse, si crediderit praedicationi. Fides enim sola est salutaris, et efficax usus verbi Dei, Rom. x: Si confitearis ore tuo, Jesum esse Dominum, et corde tuo credideris, quod Deus illum suscitavit a mortuis, salvus eris. Et iterum: Finis legis Christus ad justitiam omni credenti, et Rom. i: Justus ex fide sua vivet. Neque enim verbum Dei operibus ullis, sed sola fide suscipi et coli potest. Ideo clarum est, ut solo verbo anima opus habet ad vitam et justitiam, ita sola fide et nullis operibus justificatur. Si enim alio quopiam justificari posset, verbo non haberet opus, ac per hoc nec fide.

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Quaeris autem, qua ratione

who is risen again, and glorified by the Holy Ghost the Sanctifier. For the preaching of Christ, feeds, justifies, sets free, and saves the soul that believeth what is preached. For faith alone is the saving and effectual use of the word of God, as in Romans x, 'If thou shalt confess with thy mouth that Jesus is the Lord, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.' Again, 'Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth.' And again, Romans i, 'The just shall live by his faith.' Nor can the word of God be received and embraced by any works whatever, but by faith only. And therefore it is clear that, as the soul needs nothing but the word unto life and righteousness, it is justified, without any works, by faith only. For if it could be justified by anything else, it would have no need of the word, and consequently no need of faith.

* * * *

But you will ask, how can it be that faith alone justifies,

fiat, ut sola fides justificet, et sine operibus tantorum bonorum thesaurum praebeat, cum tam multa opera, ceremoniae, leges in Scripturis nobis praescripta sint? Respondeo: Ante omnia memor esto ejus, quod dictum est, solam fidem sine operibus justificare, liberare et salvare, id quod clarius infra faciemus.

and, without any works, brings in such an abundant treasure of all good, when so many works, ceremonies, and laws, are enjoined us in the Scriptures? I answer—before all things hold that in mind which I have just shewn; that faith alone, without any works, justifies, sets free, and saves; as shall be more plainly shewn hereafter.

Interim signandum, universam Scripturam Dei in duo partiri, praecepta et promissa. Praecepta docent quidem bona, sed non statim fiunt, quae docta sunt. Ostendunt enim, quid facere nos oporteat, sed virtutem faciendi non donant. In hoc autem sunt ordinata, ut hominem sibi ipsi ostendant, per quae suam impotentiam ad bonum cognoscat, et de suis viribus desperet. Qua causa et vetus Testamentum vocantur et sunt.

In the meantime I should set things distinctly before thee thus. The whole Scriptures of God are divided into two parts, precepts and promises. The precepts do indeed teach good things, but those good things which they teach are not at once performed; for though they shew us what we ought to do, they give us no power to perform the same. Therefore they were expressly ordained to this end, that they might shew man to himself; that by them he might be brought to know his utter inability to do that which is good, and to despair of all strength in himself: and therefore it is that they are called the Old Testament, which indeed they are.

Exempli causa, non concupisces, praeceptum est, quo nos omnes esse peccatores convincimur, cum nemo possit non concupiscere, quidquid contra molitus fuerit. Ut ergo non concupiscat et praeceptum impleat, cogitur de sese desperare, et alibi ac per alium quaerere auxilium, quod in se non invenit, sicut in Hosea dicit: Perditio tua, Israel, tantum in me auxilium tuum. Quod autem hoc uno praecepto agitur, idem omnibus agitur. Aeque enim sunt impossibilia nobis omnia.

Ubi vero per praecepta doctus fuerit impotentiam suam, et jam anxius factus, quo studio legi satisfaciat, cum legi satisfieri oporteat, ut ne iota quidem aut apex praetereat, alioquin sine ulla spe damnabitur: tum vere humiliatus et in nihilum redactus coram oculis suis non invenit in se ipso, quo justificetur et salvus fiat.

For example, 'Thou shalt not covet,' is a precept, by which we are all brought in guilty as sinners; for there is no one that can be free from coveting, how much soever he may strive against it. And therefore, in order that he may be brought not to covet, and to fulfil the law, he is driven to despair in himself and to seek that help elsewhere, and in another, which he finds not in himself: as it is said in Hosea xiii, 'O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, and thy only help is in me.' And the effect produced by this one commandment is produced by all the rest, for they are all alike impossible unto us.

When the man has been taught by the precepts his utter inability, and has become anxious to know in what way he can possibly satisfy the law (for the law must be satisfied, so that not one jot or tittle thereof fail, or he must be damned without hope), being then truly humbled and brought to nothing in his own eyes, he finds nothing in himself whereby he can become righteous in order to be saved.

Hic altera Scripturae pars adest, promissa Dei, quae annunciant gloriam Dei, et dicunt: Si vis legem implere, non concupiscere, sicut lex exigit, en tibi, crede in Christum, in quo promittuntur tibi, gratiam, justitiam, pacem, libertatem, et omnia, si credis, habebis, si non credis, carebis. Nam quod tibi impossibile est in universis operibus legis, quae multa sunt et tamen inutilia, facili compendio implebis per fidem: quia Deus Pater omnia in fide posuit, ut, quisquis hanc habuerit, omnia habeat, qui non habuerit, nihil habeat. Conclusit enim omnia sub incredulitate, ut omnium misereatur, Rom. xi. Sic promissa Dei hoc donant, quod praecepta exigunt, et implent, quod lex jubet, ut sint omnia solius Dei, tam praecepta et plenitudo eorum; ipse solus praecipit, solus quoque implet. Ideo promissa Dei pertinent

Then here comes in to his help the other part of the Scripture, the promises of God, which bring the glad tidings of the glory of God, and say, if thou wouldst fulfil the law and not covet, as the law requires, then hearken: Believe in Christ, in whom are promised unto thee grace, righteousness, peace, liberty, and all things. If thou believe, thou shalt have all things; if thou believe not, thou shalt have nothing. For all the commanded works of the law (which are impossible with thee, and which are innumerable, and after all of no avail unto salvation) thou shalt fulfil by this 'short consummate work'—by believing! For God the Father hath included all things in faith. So that he who hath this hath all things, and he who hath not this hath nothing. Because God hath included all things in unbelief, that He might have mercy upon all, Rom. xi. Thus the promises of God give freely all that the precepts exact, and fulfil all that the law commands, that all may be of God only, both the precepts and their fulfilment. God

ad novum Testamentum, imo sunt novum Testamentum.

Cum autem haec promissa Dei sint verba sancta, vera, justa, libera, pacata, et universa bonitate plena, fit, ut anima, quae firma fide illis adhaeret, sic eis uniatur, imo penitus absorbeatur, ut non modo participet, sed saturetur et inebrietur omni virtute eorum. Si enim tactus Christi sanabat, quanto magis hic tenerrimus in spiritu, imo absorptio verbi omnia, quae verbi sunt, animae communicat? Hoc igitur modo anima per fidem solam, sine operibus, e verbo Dei justificatur, sanctificatur, verificatur, pacificatur, liberatur et omni bono repletur, vereque filia Dei efficitur, sicut Johan. i. dicit: Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, iis qui credunt in nomine ejus.

Ex iis facile est intellectu,

alone commands and God alone fulfils. Therefore the promises belong to the New Testament, and the New Testament indeed they are.

And moreover, as these promises are the words of God, holy, true, righteous, free, peaceable, and full of all good, it comes to pass that the soul which cleaves to them with a steady faith is so united to them, yea wholly absorbed in them, that it not only partakes of, but is saturated and intoxicated with all their unctuous virtue. For if the touch of Christ healed, how much more shall the very absorbing of the unctuous spirit of the word into the tender soil of the soul communicate to the soul all the nature of that word! And it is in this manner that the soul, by faith alone, without any external works, is through the operation of the word of God, justified, sanctified, made true, settled in peace, set free, filled with all good, and made in reality the daughter of God, according to that saying, John i, 'To them gave He power to become the sons of God, even unto them that believe on His name.'

From these things it may

unde fides tantum possit, et cur nulla, nec omnia bona opera eam possint aequare: quia nullum opus adhaerere verbo Dei, nec in anima esse potest. Sola autem fides et verbum in ea regnant, quale est verbum, talis ab eo fit anima, ceu ferrum ignitum candet sicut ignis, propter unionem sui et ignis, ut clarum sit, homini Christiano suam fidem sufficere pro omnibus, nec operibus ei opus fore, ut justificetur. Quod si operibus non habet opus, nec lege opus habet, si lege non habet opus, certe liber est a lege, verumque est: Justo non est lex posita. Atque haec est Christiana illa libertas, fides nostra, quae facit, non ut otiosi simus, aut male vivamus, sed ne cuiquam opus sit lege aut operibus ad justitiam et salutem.

be plainly understood how it is that faith is of so much efficacy, and why no works, nor all good works together, are equal unto it. The reason is—no work can cleave to the word of God, nor have any indwelling in the soul. Faith and the word of God alone can have dominion there. And such as the word is in nature, into the same is the soul changed; as iron put into the fire becomes like fire, through the nature of the fire to which it is united.

It is clear therefore that the faith of a Christian man sufficeth for all things, and that he has no need of any works whatever unto justification. And then if he have no need of works, he has no need of the law; and if he have no need of the law he is certainly freed from the law; and therefore it is true that 'the law was not made for a righteous man,' 1 Tim. i. This then is that true Christian liberty, even our faith: which does not give us occasion to sit down at ease or live as we list, but is so ordained that no one might have any need of the law or of works unto righteousness and salvation.

Haec prima fidei virtus esto, alteram quoque videamus. Fidei enim et hoc officium est, ut eum, cui credit, omnium piissima et summa colat opinione, nempe, quod eum veracem et dignum habeat, cui credendum sit; neque enim alius est honor similis veritatis et justitiae opinioni, qua honoramus eum, cui credimus. Quid possumus tribuere ulli majus, quam veritatem et justitiam et absolutam prorsus bonitatem? E diverso summa contumelia est, opinione mendacii et iniquitatis quemquam celebrare, aut suspectum habere, quod facimus, dum non credimus ei.

Let this be considered as the first power of faith. We will now speak of the second. For this also belongs to faith, to have the most high and holy thoughts of him in whom it believeth; that is, to hold him as true and worthy to be trusted. Nor is there any honour equal unto that estimation of truth and justice in which we hold him in whom we fully confide. What can we ascribe unto any one more honourable than truth, justice, and complete and perfect goodness? On the other hand, it is the greatest of all reproaches to speak of any one as a liar, and dishonest, or even to suspect him; which we in reality do when we do not believe him.

Sic anima, dum firmiter credit promittenti Deo, veracem et justum eum habet, qua opinione nihil potest Deo praestantius tribuere. Hic summus cultus Dei est, dedisse ei veritatem, justitiam et quidquid tribui debet ei, cui creditur.

Thus the soul, while it stedfastly believes in God promising, holds Him to be true and just, than which opinion no greater homage can be paid Him. The highest worship of God is to ascribe unto Him truth, righteousness, and whatever we would ascribe unto one in whom we fully confide!

Hic paratam sese praebet in omnes voluntates ejus, hic sanctificat nomen ejus, et secum agi patitur, sicut placitum fuerit Deo. Quia promissis ejus inhaerens, non dubitat eum verum, justum, sapientem, omnia optime facturum, dispositurum, curaturum. At nonne talis anima, hac fide sua, per omnia obedientissima Deo est? Quod ergo praeceptum est reliquum, quod talis obedientia non abunde impleverit? Quae plenitudo plenior, quam omnimoda obedientia? At hanc non opera, sed sola fides praestat.

This worshipper is prepared to do all the will of God; he sanctifies His name; he submits himself to be dealt with as it shall seem pleasing unto God; because he leans entirely upon His promises, not doubting but that, as He is all truth, righteousness and wisdom, He will manage, order, and do all things for the best. And does not such a soul by this his faith yield obedience unto God in all things? What precept is there which such an obedience does not abundantly fulfil? What fulfilment can be more perfect than universal obedience? And this obedience is really yielded, not by works but by faith only.

Contra quae rebellio? quae impietas, quae contumelia Dei major, quam non credere promittenti? Quid enim aliud est, quam Deum aut mendacem facere, aut dubitare veracem esse? hoc est, sibi veritatem tribuere, Deo autem mendacium et vanitatem. In qua re nonne Deum negat, et se

On the other hand, what rebellion, what impiety must it be! What greater contempt can be put upon God than not to believe Him when He promises! What is it else but to hold Him a liar, or at least to doubt His truth!—That is, for a man to attribute truth unto himself, but lying and vanity unto God! In so doing does he not deny God altogether, and set up

ipsum sibi idolum in corde erigit? Quid ergo prosunt opera in hac impietate facta, etiamsi angelica et apostolica forent? Recte ergo Deus, non in ira aut libidine, sed in incredulitate omnia conclusit, ne qui castis et mansuetis operibus legis fingunt se implere legem (ut sunt politicae et humanae virtutes) salvos se futuros praesumant, cum in peccato incredulitatis comprehensi aut misericordiam quaerant, aut per justitiam damnentur.

Ubi autem Deus videt, veritatem sibi tribui et fide cordis nostri se honorari tanto honore, quo ipse dignus est: rursus et ipse nos honorat, tribuens et nobis veritatem et justitiam, propter hanc fidem. Fides enim facit veritatem et justitiam, reddens Deo suum, ideo rursus reddit Deus justitiae nostrae gloriam. Verum est enim et justum, Deum

himself in his heart for a self-worshipping idol? And what think ye works can avail done in this impious state of heart, be they never so evangelical and apostolical? Righteously therefore hath God included all, not in wrath, not in lust, but in *unbelief*, lest those who imagine that they fulfil the law by their chaste and kind works of the law (which are at best but moral or political virtues) should presume to expect that they should be therefore saved when they are all the while included under the sin of unbelief, and must either seek the mercy or be damned by the justice of God!

But when God sees that truth is ascribed unto Him, and that He is honoured by the faith of our heart with all that honour which is due unto Him; He in return honours us by imputing unto us truth and righteousness because of this faith only. For it is faith that makes truth and righteousness, by ascribing unto God His own; and in return God rewards that our righteousness with glory. For it is true and just to hold God true and just; and to ascribe this unto

esse veracem et justum, et hoc ei tribuere et confiteri, hoc est, esse veracem et justum. Sic 1 Reg. v: Quicunque honorificat me, glorificabo eum, qui vero contemnunt me, erunt ignobiles. Sic Paulus Rom. iv. Abrahae dicit, suam fidem esse reputatam in justitiam, quia per eam dedit plenissime gloriam Deo, et nobis eadem causa reputandam ad justitiam, si credideṙimus.

Him and confess it is to be true and just, according to 1 Sam. ii, 'Whosoever honoureth me, I will glorify him, but they that despise me shall be accounted nought.' So Paul, Rom. iv, saith of Abraham, that his faith was counted unto him for righteousness, because by it he gave glory to God; and it shall, for the same reason, be imputed unto us for righteousness also, if we believe.

Tertia fidei gratia incomparabilis est haec, quod animam copulat cum Christo, sicut sponsam cum sponso, quo Sacramento (ut apostolus docet) Christus et anima efficiuntur una caro. Quod si una caro sunt, verum inter eos matrimonium, imo omnium longe perfectissimum consummatur (cum humana matrimonia hujus unici figurae sint tenues); sequitur et omnia eorum communia fieri, tam bona quam mala, ut, quaecun-

The third power of this most precious faith is that which couples the soul to Christ as a spouse to her husband; by which sacred union, as Paul teacheth, Christ and the soul are made one flesh; and if they be one flesh, and there be a true marriage, yea by far the most perfect of all marriages, consummated between them (for all human marriages are but the faintest representation of this), then it follows that all which belongs to each, both good and evil, becomes common to both. So that whatever Christ possesses, the believing soul may lay claim

que Christus habet, de iis tanquam sui praesumere et gloriari possit fidelis anima, et, quaecunque animae sunt, ea sibi arroget Christus tanquam sua.

to and glory in as her own; and whatever belongs to the soul Christ takes upon Himself as His.

Conferamus ista, et videbimus inaestimabilia, Christus plenus est gratia, vita et salute, anima plena est peccatis, morte et damnatione. Intercedat jam fides, et fiet, ut Christi sint peccata, mors et infernus, animae vero gratia, vita et salus. Oportet enim eum, si sponsus est, ea simul, quae sponsa habet, acceptare, et ea, quae sua sunt, sponsae impartire. Qui enim corpus suum et se ipsum illi donat, quomodo non omnia sua donat? Et qui corpus sponsae accipit, quomodo non omnia, quae sponsae sunt, accipit?

Now let us only meditate on these things compared together, and we shall find them to be unspeakable. Christ is full of grace, life, and salvation; the soul is full of sin, death, and damnation. Here let faith come in between, and it shall come to pass that the sin, death and hell are laid upon Christ, and His grace, life and salvation made the portion of the soul. For He as the husband must take unto Himself, together with the spouse, all that she brings with her, and impart unto her all that He possesses. For He who freely gives her His body and Himself, how can He not give her all things that are His? And He who takes unto Himself the body of His spouse, how can He not take with her all things that are hers?

Hic jam dulcissimum spectaculum prodit, non solum communionis, sed salutaris

Here then is brought to light a most sweet view, not of communion only, but of a saving warfare, of victory, of

belli et victoriae et salutis et redemptionis. Cum enim Christus sit Deus et homo, eaque persona, quae nec peccavit nec moritur, nec damnatur, sed nec peccare, mori, damnari potest, ejusque justitia, vita, salus, insuperabilis, aeterna, omnipotens est: cum, inquam, talis persona peccata, mortem, infernum sponsae propter annulum fidei sibi communia, imo propria facit, et in iis non aliter se habet, quam si sua essent, ipseque peccasset, laborans, moriens, et ad infernum descendens, ut omnia superaret, peccatumque, mors et infernus eum absorbere non possent, necessario in ipso absorpta sunt stupendo duello. Nam justitia sua omnium peccatis superior, vita sua omni morte potentior, salus sua omni inferno invictior.

Ita fit anima fidelis, per arram fidei suae in Christo sponso suo, omnibus peccatis libera, a morte secura, et ab

salvation, and redemption. For since Christ is God and man, and such a person as never has sinned, never dies, nor is damned, nay never can sin, die, or be damned; and since His righteousness, life, and salvation are unconquerable, eternal, and omnipotent; since, I say, such a person has by the wedding ring of faith, made the sin, death, and hell of His spouse common to Himself, yea His own, and acts and suffers under them as if they were His own, and as if He Himself had sinned, labouring, dying, and descending into hell, that He may overcome them all; and since sin, death, and hell could not swallow up Him, it is of necessity certain that in the stupendous conflict they are all swallowed up by Him. For His righteousness is greater than all sin, His life is stronger than all death, His salvation more powerful than all hell.

Thus the believing soul, by the pledge of faith in Christ her spouse, becomes free from all sins, secure from death, safe from hell, and endowed

inferno tuta, donata aeterna justitia, vita, salute sponsi sui Christi. Sic exhibet sibi sponsam sine macula et ruga, gloriosam, mundans eam lavacro in verbo vitae, id est, per fidem verbi, vitae, justitiae et salutis. Sic sponsat eam sibi in fide, in misericordia et miserationibus, in justitia et judicio, ut Hos. ii. dicit.

Quis ergo has nuptias regales satis aestimet? Quis divitias gloriae gratiae hujus comprehendat? ubi dives et pius hic sponsus Christus ducit uxorem hanc pauperculam, impiam meretriculam, redimens eam ab omnibus illius malis, et ornans omnibus suis bonis. Jam enim impossibile est, ut peccata sua eam perdant, cum super Christum posita sint, et in ipso absorpta, habeatque ipsa eam justitiam in Christo sponso suo, de qua ut sua propria praesumat, et adversus

with the eternal righteousness, life, and salvation of her husband Christ. Thus Christ presents unto Himself a spouse without spot or wrinkle, and all glorious through His cleansing her with the washing in the word of life, that is by faith in the word of life, righteousness, and salvation. And thus He betroths her unto Himself in faith, in mercy, in loving-kindness, in righteousness, and in judgment, as Hosea saith (ch. ii).

Who then can fully enter into the greatness of this royal marriage? Who can comprehend the riches of the glory of this grace, where this rich and holy husband Christ takes unto wife this poor miserable, sinful harlot, redeeming her from all her evils and adorning her with all His saving benefits? It is impossible now that her sins should destroy her, for they have all been laid upon Christ, and swallowed up in Him; and she has that righteousness in Christ her husband which she may glory in as her own, and may with confidence set against all her sins, yea against death and hell, and say, If I have sinned, yet my Christ

omnia peccata sua, contra mortem et infernum, possit cum fiducia illam opponere et dicere: Si ego peccavi, at Christus meus non peccavit, in quem credo, cuius omnia mea sunt, et omnia mea illius, sicut in Canticis: Dilectus meus mihi, et ego illi, hoc est, quod Paulus dicit 1 Corinth. xv: Deo gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Jesum Christum, Dominum nostrum, victoriam autem peccati et mortis, sicut illic inducit: Peccatum stimulus mortis est, virtus vero peccati lex.

has not sinned, in whom I believe, all whose are mine and mine are His: as in the Canticles, 'My beloved is mine and I am His.' This is what Paul saith, 1 Cor. xv: 'Thanks be unto God, who giveth us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord;' that is, the victory over sin and death, as he there shews, 'The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law.'

Ex iis iterum intelligis, qua causa tantum tribuatur fidei, ut sola impleat legem, et sine ullis operibus justificet. Vides enim primum praeceptum, quo dicitur: Unum Deum coles, sola fide impleri. Si enim etiam ipse aliud non esses a planta pedis ad verticem, quam bona opera, non tamen justus

From these things you may again understand why it is that so much is attributed unto faith, that it alone fulfils the law and justifies without any works whatever. For you see that the first commandment, in which it is said, 'Thou shalt worship one God,' can be fulfilled only by faith. For if thou thyself wert nothing else but good works from the sole of the foot even unto the head, yet thou wouldst not be

esses, nec Deum coleres, nec primum praeceptum impleres, cum Deus coli non possit, nisi tribuatur ei veritas et universae bonitatis gloria, sicut vere tribuenda est. Hoc autem opera non faciunt, sed sola fides cordis. Non enim operando, sed credendo Deum glorificamus et veracem confitemur. Hoc nomine fides sola est justitia Christiani hominis, et omnium praeceptorum plenitudo. Qui enim primum implet, cetera omnia facili opera implet.

* * * *

Cujus enim cor haec audiens non totis medullis gaudeat et tanto solatio accepto non dulcescat in amorem Christi? ad quem amorem nullis unquam legibus aut operibus pervenire potest. Quis est, qui tali cordi nocere possit, aut ipsum pavefaciat? Si irruat conscientia peccati, aut horror mortis, paratum est spefare in

righteous, nor wouldst thou worship God nor fulfil the first commandment. For God cannot be worshipped unless there be ascribed unto Him truth and the glory of all goodness, as they ought to be ascribed; and this no works can do, but the faith of the heart only. For it is not by working but by believing that we glorify God and confess Him to be true. On this account it is that faith alone is the righteousness of a Christian man and the fulfilment of all the commandments; for he who fulfils this first commandment fulfils all the rest without any laborious working.

* * * *

And whose heart hearing these things is not all gladness within, and sweetened, under the enjoyed consolation, into the love of Christ? To which love he never can attain by any law of works. And who is there that can hurt such an heart or cause such an one to fear? If consciousness of sin or the horror of death should rush upon him, he is prepared to hope in the Lord; nor is he afraid nor

Domino, nec timet ab auditione ista mala, nec commovetur, donec despiciat inimicos suos. Credit enim justitiam Christi suam esse et peccatum suum jam non suum, sed Christi esse, at a facie justitiae Christi omne peccatum absorbeatur, necesse est propter fidem Christi, sicut superius dictum est, discitque cum apostolo morti et peccato insultare et dicere: Ubi est mors victoria tua? Ubi est mors stimulus tuus? Stimulus autem mortis peccatum est, virtus vero peccati lex. Deo autém gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Absorpta enim est mors in victoria, non tantum Christi, sed et nostra, quia per fidem nostram fit et in ipsa et nos vincimus.

moved at these evil tidings, 'until he see his desire upon his enemies,' Psalm cxii. For he believes that the righteousness of Christ is his, and that his sin is no longer his but Christ's. And all sin must be swallowed up before the face of the righteousness of Christ, by faith in Him, as we have before observed. Thus he learns with the Apostle to triumph over death and sin, and say, 'O grave, where is thy victory? O death, where is thy sting? The sting of death is sin and the strength of sin is the law; but thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord;' 1 Cor. xv, 'For death is swallowed up in victory;' not in the victory of Christ only, but ours also; for it becomes ours by faith, and in it we also conquer.

Haec dicta sint de interiore homine, de ejus libertate et de principe justitia fidei, quae nec

Suffice it to have spoken thus concerning the *inward man*, his liberty and his glorious righteousness by faith,

legibus nec operibus bonis indiget, quin noxia ei sunt, si quis per ea praesumat justificari.

Nunc ad alteram partem revertamur ad externum hominem. Hic enim respondebitur illis omnibus, qui verbo fidei et iis, quae dicta sunt, offensi dicunt; Si fides omnia facit, et sola ad justitiam satis est, cur ergo praecepta sunt bona opera? otiabimur ergo et nihil operabimur, fide contenti? Respondeo: Non sic, impii, non sic. Vere quidem sic haberet res ista, si penitus et perfecte interni et spirituales essemus, quod non fiet, nisi in novissimo die resurrectionis mortuorum; donec in carne vivimus, non nisi incipimus et proficimus, quod in futura vita perficietur; propter quod apostolus Rom. viii. appellat primitias spiritus, quod in hac vita habemus, accepturi scilicet decimas et

which needs neither laws nor good works; nay, they tend to the destruction of any one who should presume to be justified by them.

Now let us come to the other part of our subject, the *outward man*. Here an answer shall be given to all those who, being offended at the word faith, and all that is said to exalt it, say, 'If faith do all things, and alone suffice unto righteousness, why then are good works commanded? Contented with faith therefore let us be at rest and do no works at all.' I answer, 'Not so, ye ungodly, not so!' This would indeed be the case if we were renewed altogether, and perfectly and wholly spiritual. But this will not be till in the last day of the resurrection of the dead. As long as we live in the flesh, we only begin, and grow a little in that which is to be perfected in the life to come. And therefore it is that the Apostle, Rom. viii, calls that which we have in this life, 'the first-fruits of the Spirit,' intimating that we shall receive the tithes and fulness of the Spirit in the life which is to come.

plenitudinem spiritus in futuro. Ad hanc partem pertinet, quod supra positum est, Christianum esse omnium servum et omnibus subjectum. Qua enim parte liber est, nihil operatur, qua autem servus est, omnia operatur, quod qua ratione fiat, videamus.

Quamquam homo, ut dixi, intus secundum spiritum per fidem abunde satis justificetur, habens quidquid habere debet, nisi quod hanc ipsam fidem et opulentiam oportet de die in diem augescere, usque in futuram vitam, tamen manet in hac vita mortali super terram, in qua necesse est, ut corpus suum proprium regat, et cum hominibus conversetur. Hic jam incipiunt opera, hic non est otiandum, hic certe curandum, ut corpus jejuniis, vigiliis, laboribus aliisque disciplinis moderatis exerceatur, et spiritui subdatur, ut homini interiori et fidei obediat et

To this part of our subject therefore belongs that which we laid down at the beginning as our second proposition:— 'The Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, subject to all.' For as to his spirit, which is free, he worketh not; but as to his body, in which he is subject, he worketh all things; and how this is let us now consider.

Although the Christian man, as I have shewn, is inwardly as to his spirit, fully and abundantly justified by faith, having all that he needs to have (except that this abundantly filling faith itself must be increased day by day, even unto the life to come), yet he still remains in this mortal life upon earth, in which he must of necessity govern his own body and have intercourse with men. Now here begin good works. Here is no sitting down at ease. Here certainly begins a care that the body, by fastings, watchings, labourings, and other moderate discipline, be exercised and brought into subjection to the spirit; so that it may obey and be conformable to the inward man, and to faith, and may not rebel or hinder; which it

conformis sit, nec ei rebellet aut ipsum impediat, sicut est ingenium ejus, si coercitus non fuerit. Interior enim homo conformis Deo et ad imaginem Dei creatus per fidem et gaudet et jucundatur propter Christum, in quo tanta sibi collata sunt bona, unde et hoc solum negotii sibi habet, ut cum gaudio et gratis Deo serviat in libera caritate.

is its nature to do if it be not restrained. For the inner man being by faith created conformable to God and after the image of God, joys and takes pleasure in him through Christ, in whom such a treasure of all good is laid up for him; and therefore all his concern is that he may be enabled gladly and willingly to serve God in the freedom of love.

Hoc dum agit, ecce in carne propria offendit voluntatem contrariam, quae mundo servire et quaerere, quae sua sunt, nititur, id quod spiritus fidei ferre non potest neque valet, et aggreditur hilari studio ad opprimendam et coercendam eam, sicut Paulus dicit Rom. vii: Condelector legi Dei, secundum interiorem hominem; video autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me in legem peccati. Et alibi: Castigo corpus meum,

While he strives to do this, behold, he offends a contrary will in his own flesh, which lusts to serve the world and fulfil its own desires. And this the spirit of faith cannot endure and will not; and therefore it struggles with ardent desire to repress and restrain it; accordingly as Paul saith, Rom. vii, 'I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin in my members.' And so also in another place, 'But I keep under my body and bring it into subjection, lest after I have preached

et in servitutem redigo, ne forte aliis praedicans ipse reprobus efficiar: et Gal. v: Qui Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum concupiscentiis suis.

to others I myself should be a castaway.' And again, Gal. v, 'They who are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts.'

Verum ea opera oportet non ea fieri opinione, quo per ipsa coram Deo justificetur quisquam, hanc enim falsam opinionem fides non feret, quae sola est justitia coram Deo, sed solum ea opinione, ut corpus in servitutem redigatur, et purificetur a concupiscentiis suis malis, ita ut oculum non nisi vertat ad concupiscentias expurgandas. Cum enim anima per fidem purgata sit et amans Dei facta, vellet omnia pariter purgari, praecipue corpus proprium, ut omnia secum amarent et laudarent Deum. Ita fit, ut homo exigente corporis sui causa otiari non possit, cogaturque ob id multa bona operari, ut in servitutem redigat. Haec

But these works are not to be done with this opinion, that by them anyone may become righteous before God; for this false opinion faith will not endure, which alone is righteousness before God; but they are to be done with this view only, that the body might be brought into subjection and purified from its lusts, so that its eye might never be so much as turned but with a desire to shun concupiscence. For as the soul is purified by faith and made to love God, it would that all things were purified together with it, especially its own body, that all things might join with it in loving and praising God. Hence it is that the man, from the urgent necessity which he feels in his own body, can never be at ease, but is compelled on that account to do many good works in order to bring his body into subjection. And yet he

tamen opera ipsa non id sunt, quo justificetur coram Deo, sed gratuito amore ea faciat in obsequium Dei, nihil aliud intutus quam divinum beneplacitum, cui per omnia vellet obsequi officiosissime.

* * * *

Non ergo opera bona rejicimus, imo maxime amplectimur et docemus. Non enim propter ipsa, sed propter impium hoc additamentum et perversam opinionem quaerendae justitiae, ea damnamus. Qua fit, ut solum in specie appareant bona, cum revera bona non sint, quibus falluntur et fallunt, ceu lupi rapaces sub vestimentis ovium.

Hic autem Leviathan et perversa opinio in operibus insuperabilis est, ubi deest sincera fides. Abesse enim non potest a sanctis illis operariis, donec fides vastatrix ejus veniat et regnet in corde. Natura per se ipsam non po-

does not look upon these works as making him righteous before God, but he does them in the freedom of love in obedience to God, having nothing else in view but the divine good pleasure, to which he would be most dutifully conformed in all things.

* * * *

We do not therefore reject good works, but on the contrary we strenuously maintain and teach them; for we do not condemn the works for themselves, but for that impiously added false opinion of seeking righteousness by them, by which they are made to have the appearance of good only, when in reality they are not good; and thus by them men are deceived themselves and deceive others, as ravenous wolves in sheep's clothing.

And this devil, this perverse opinion concerning works, where there is no real faith, is insuperable; for it cannot be beaten out of those holy workmen until faith its destroyer come and plant its kingdom in the heart. Nature herself cannot drive it out, nor even know what it is; nay, she considers it to be a

test eam expellere, imo ne cognoscere quidem, quin eam ducit loco sanctissimae voluntatis. Ubi si consuetudo accesserit, et hanc naturae pravitatem roboraverit (sicuti factum est per impios magistros), incurabile malum est, et infinitos irrecuperabiliter seducit ac perdit. Quare etsi bonum est, de poenitentia, confessione, satisfactione praedicare et scribere, si tamen hic sistatur, et non ad fidem usque docendam procedatur, sine dubio deceptoriae et diabolicae sunt doctrinae. Sic enim Christus cum suo Johanne non solum dixit: Poenitentiam agite, sed addidit verbum fidei dicens: Appropinquabit regnum coelorum.

Non enim alterum tantum, sed utrumque verbum Dei praedicandum est, nova et vetera proferenda de thesauro, tam vox legis, quam verbum gratiae. Vocem legis proferri

most holy and obedient will. And where custom has long prevailed and confirmed this depravity of nature (as is the case under wicked teachers) it is an evil incurable and seduces and sends thousands to irremediable perdition. Wherefore although it is good to preach and write of repentance, confession, and satisfaction; yet, if there be a stopping here and no going on to teach faith, these doctrines are without doubt delusive and devilish. Hence Christ, together with His servant John, not only said, 'Repent ye,' but added the word of faith, saying, 'The kingdom of heaven is at hand.'

For not one part of God's word only, but both must be preached; new as well as old must be brought forth out of the treasure, the voice of the law as well as the word of grace. The voice of the law must be sounded forth that men may be alarmed and brought to a knowledge of their sins, and then converted unto repentance and newness of life. But there must not be a stopping here; for that would be to wound without binding up, to smite without

oportet, ut terreantur, et in suorum peccatorum notitiam reducantur, et inde ad poenitentiam et meliorem vitae rationem convertantur. Sed non hic sistendum, hoc enim esset solum vulnerare et non alligare, percutere et non sanare, occidere et non vivificare, deducere ad inferos et non reducere, humiliare et non exaltare. Ideo et verbum gratiae et promissae remissionis, ad docendam et erigendam fidem, praedicari debet, sine quo lex, contritio, poenitentia, et omnia alia frustra fiunt et docentur.

healing, to kill without making alive, to bring down to the gates of hell and not to raise up, to cast down without exalting. Therefore the word of grace and of the promise of remission of sins must be preached to teach and build up faith, without which the law, contrition, repentance, and everything else will be taught and wrought in vain.

Supersunt quidem adhuc praedicatores poenitentiae et gratiae, sed non explicant Dei legem et promissionem eo fine et spiritu, ut disci queat, unde poenitentia et gratia veniant. Poenitentia enim ex lege Dei, sed fides seu gratia ex promissione Dei provenit, sicut dicit Rom. x: Fides ex auditu,

There still remain, indeed, preachers of repentance and grace, but they do not set forth the law of God and the promise in that way, and with that spirit, that their hearers may learn whence repentance and grace come; for repentance comes by the law, but faith or grace by the promise of God; as the Apostle saith, Rom. x, 'Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the

auditus autem per verbum Christi, quo fit, ut homo per fidem divinae promissionis consoletur et exaltetur, qui per minas et timorem legis divinae humiliatus et in sui cognitionem perductus est. Sic Psal. xxix: Ad vesperum demorabitur fletus, et ad matutinum laetitia. Haec dicta sint de operibus in genere, et simul de iis, quae Christianus in proprium corpus exercet.

word of Christ.' Hence it is that the man who, by the threatenings and fear of the divine law, is brought low and cast down into the knowledge of himself, is comforted and raised up by faith in the divine promise, as in Psalm xxx, 'Weeping shall endure until the night, and joy until the morning.' So far have we spoken concerning works in general, and those also which the Christian works in his *own body*.

Ultimo et de iis dicemus, quae erga proximum suum operatur; non enim homo sibi vivit soli in corpore isto mortali ad operandum in eo, sed et omnibus hominibus in terra, imo solum aliis vivit et non sibi. In hoc enim corpus suum subjectum facit, quo sincerius et liberius queat aliis servire, sicut Paulus Rom. xiv. dicit: Nemo sibi vivit et nemo sibi moritur, qui enim vivit, Domino vivit, et qui moritur,

We will now in the last place speak of those works which he works towards *his neighbour*. For man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body, and to work in it only, but he lives for all men upon the earth; yea, he lives for others only and not for himself, for he brings his body into subjection to the very end that he may be able to serve others more sincerely and more freely, as Paul saith, Rom. xiv, 'None of us liveth unto himself, and no man dieth unto himself; for he that

Domino moritur. Ideo non potest fieri, ut sit otiosus in hac vita et absque opere erga proximos suos. Necesse est enim, ut loquatur, agat et conversetur cum hominibus, sicut Christus in similitudinem factus habitu inventus est ut homo, et conversatus cum hominibus, ut Baruch iii. dicit.

Nullo tamen horum opus ei est ad justitiam et salutem, ideo in omnibus operibus suis ea debet opinione esse formatus, et huc solum spectare, ut aliis serviat et prosit in omnibus, quaecunque fecerit, nihil ante oculos habens, nisi necessitatem et commoditatem proximi. Sic enim Apostolus jubet, ut manibus laboremus, quo demus necessitatem habenti, cum potuisset dicere, quo nos ipsos alamus, sed det, inquit, necessitatem habenti. Nam et in hoc ipsum corporis curam habere Christianum est, quo per ejus salutem et

liveth liveth unto the Lord, and he that dieth dieth unto the Lord.' And therefore it is impossible that he can live at ease in this life, and without doing works toward his neighbours; for he must of necessity converse, act, and have intercourse with men, even as Christ was made in our likeness, and found in fashion as a man, and had intercourse with man, as Baruch iii. saith.

But yet he has no need of these things unto righteousness and salvation. Therefore in all his works he ought to be in this mind, and to have only this view—that in all things whatever he does he serve and profit others, having nothing before his eyes but the necessity and profit of his neighbour. For thus the Apostle commands us to labour with our hands, 'that we may have to give to him that needeth.' Whereas he might have said, that we may have wherewith to nourish ourselves; but no: he saith also 'him that needeth.' For it is a part of Christianity to take care of the body for this very end, that by its health and powers we may

commoditatem laborare, res quaerere et servare possimus, in subsidium eorum, qui indigent, ut sic membrum robustum serviat membro infirmo, et simus filii Dei, alter pro altero sollicitus et laboriosus, invicem onera portantes, et sic legem Christi implentes.

Ecce, haec est vere Christiana vita, hic vere fides efficax est per dilectionem, hoc est, cum gaudio et dilectione prodit in opus servitutis liberrimae, qua alteri gratis et sponte servit, ipsa abunde satura fidei suae plenitudine et opulentia.

Sic Philippenses cum Paulus docuisset, quam divites facti essent per fidem Christi, in qua omnia obtinuissent, docet eos deinceps dicens: Si qua consolatio Christi, si quod solatium caritatis, si qua societas spiritus, implete gaudium meum, ut idem sapiatis, et eandem caritatem habentes

labour, earn, and lay up that which may supply the necessity of those who are in need; that thus the member that is strong may serve the member that is weak; that we may be the sons of God, feeling and labouring for each other, bearing each other's burdens and so fulfilling the law of Christ.

Behold, this is the true Christian life. Here is the true 'faith which worketh by love,' that is, which goes forth with joy and delight in the work of 'perfect freedom;' it serves its neighbours freely and spontaneously, because its own treasure is richly filled, with the overflowing abundance which it possesses by faith.

Hence Paul, when he had made it evident to the Philippians how rich they were by the faith of Christ, in which they had possession of all things, goes on to admonish them, saying, 'If therefore there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the spirit, fulfil ye my joy, that ye be like minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of

unanimes id ipsum sentientes, nihil per contentionem, neque inanem gloriam, sed in humilitate superiores invicem arbitrantes, non quae sua sunt singuli considerantes, sed ea, quae aliorum.

Hic clare videmus, vitam Christianorum ab Apostolo in hanc regulam esse positam, ut omnia opera nostra ad aliorum commoditatem ordinentur, cum per fidem quisque suam sic abundet, ut omnia alia opera, totaque vita ei superfluant, quibus proximo spontanea benevolentia serviat et benefaciat.

Ad hoc inducit Christum pro exemplo, dicens: Hoc sentite in vobis, quod et in Christo Jesu, qui, cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est, esse se aequalem Deo, sed exinanivit semet ipsum, formam servi accipiens in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut

one mind; doing nothing through contention or vain glory, but each in humble-mindedness esteeming other better than himself, and each considering not his own things but the things of another.' Here we see plainly that the Christian life is by the Apostle made to consist in this, directing all our works for the benefit of others; because each one so abounds by his faith that all his other works, yea, his life itself, are but superabounding blessings which he may devote with spontaneous benevolence to the service and benefit of his neighbour.

He then moreover brings forward Christ as an example, saying, 'Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus; who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Nevertheless He made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man He became obedient unto death.' This most healthful admonition has been obscured from us by those who, not at all understanding these

homo, factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Hoc enim verbum Apostoli saluberrimum nobis obscurarunt ii, qui vocabula apostolica, formam Dei, formam servi, habitum, similitudinem hominum, prorsus non intellexerunt, et ad naturas divinitatis et humanitatis transtulerunt, cum Paulus id velit, Christum, cum esset plenus forma Dei, et omnibus bonis abundans, ita ut nullo opere, nulla passione indiguerit, ut justus et salvus fieret, habebat enim haec omnia statim ab initio sui, non tamen iis inflabatur, nec super nos elevabatur, et quandam potentiam super nos sibi arrogabat, licet id jure potuisset. Sed contra sic egit laborans, operans, patiens, moriens, ut similis esset ceteris hominibus, et habitu et gestu non aliud quam homo, quasi iis omnibus egeret, et nihil haberet formarum Dei, quod tamen totum

apostolic terms, 'form of God,' 'form of a servant,' 'fashion,' and 'likeness of men,' have made this passage refer expressly to the divine and human natures. Whereas the Apostle's meaning is, that Christ, though He was full in His form of God, and abounding in all good, so that He wanted no work or suffering in order to His becoming righteous and saved (for He had all these things immediately from the beginning of Himself); yet was not puffed up with these, nor lifted up above us, nor did arrogate to Himself a certain power over us (although He might have done that by right); but that, on the contrary, He condescended so to labour, suffer, and die, that He might become like other men, and in form and fashion nothing more than a man, as though He had need of these things and had nothing of the form of God; and that He did all this for us, that He might serve us, and that all those things might become ours which He did in this form of a servant.

propter nos fecit, ut nobis serviret, et nostra fierent omnia, quae hac forma servi operaretur.

Ita Christianus, quemadmodum caput suum Christus, per fidem suam plenus et satur, contentus esse debet hac forma Dei, per fidem obtenta, nisi quod, ut dixi, ipsam hanc fidem augere debet, donec perficiatur. Haec enim vita, justitia, et salus ejus est, personam ipsam servans et gratam faciens, omniaque tribuens, quae Christus habet, ut supra dictum est, et Paulus Gal. i. confirmat, dicens: Quod autem in carne vivo, in fide filii Dei vivo. Et quamquam sic liber est ab omnibus operibus, debet tamen rursus se exinanire hac libertate, formam servi accipere, in similitudinem hominum fieri, et habuit inveniri ut homo, servire, adjuvare, et omnimodo cum proximo suo agere, sicut videt

So the Christian, being by his faith complete and full, like Christ his head, ought to be satisfied with this 'form of God' which he has obtained by faith (except that, as I have before observed, he ought to increase this same faith until it be perfected; for this faith is his life, his righteousness, his salvation; preserving his person and rendering it acceptable, and making him a partaker of all that Christ possesses; as we have shewn before, and as Paul affirms, Gal. i, saying, 'The life that I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God'); but yet, although he is thus free from all works, he ought nevertheless in this his liberty to make himself of no reputation, to take upon him the form of a servant, to be made in the likeness of men, to be found in fashion as a man, to serve, to help, and in all things to do unto his neighbour as he sees God has done, and still does, for Christ's sake, unto

secum actum et agi a Deo per Christum, et hoc ipsum gratis, nulloque respectu, nisi divini placiti, et ita cogitare :

En mihi indigno damnatoque homuncioni, citra omne meritum, mera gratuitaque misericordia, dedit Deus meus in Christo omnes divitias justitiae et salutis, ut amplius nulla re prorsus indigeam, nisi fide, quae credat, hoc se sic habere. Huic ergo tali Patri, qui me suis his inaestimabilibus divitiis obruit, cur non liberaliter, hilariter, toto corde spontaneoque studio omnia faciam, quaecunque sciero placita et grata coram illo esse? Dabo itaque me quendam Christum proximo meo, quemadmodum Christus sese praebuit mihi, nihil facturus in hac vita, nisi quod videro proximo meo necessarium, commodum et salutare fore, quandoquidem per fidem omnium bonorum in Christo abundans sum.

him; and that freely and without anything else in view than doing the good will of God. He ought to think thus with himself:—

Behold, here am I an unworthy and condemned wretch, and my God has, of his own pure and free mercy, without any deserving on my part, given unto me in Christ all the riches of righteousness and salvation, so that I want no one thing else whatever but faith to believe that this really is so. Unto such a Father therefore, who has more than filled me with these His inestimable riches, what shall I render? Shall I not freely, gladly, with all my heart, and with spontaneous desire, do whatever I know is acceptable and well-pleasing in His sight? Surely then I will give myself as a certain Christ to my neighbour, even as Christ has given Himself unto me. I will do nothing in this life but that which shall be to my neighbour's service, profit, or edification; and that, because by faith I possess an abundance of all good in Christ.

Ecce sic fluit ex fide caritas et gaudium in Domino, et ex caritate hilaris, libens, liber animus, ad sponte serviendum proximo, ita ut nullam habeat rationem gratitudinis, ingratitudinis, laudis ac vituperii, lucri aut damni. Neque enim agit hoc, ut homines sibi demereatur, nec inter amicos inimicosque discernit, nec gratos nec ingratos suspicit, sed liberrime, libentissimeque dispergit se et sua, sive ea perdat in ingratis, sive mereatur. Sic enim et pater ejus facit, omnibus omnia distribuens abundanter et liberrime, faciens solem suum oriri super bonos et malos. Ita filius nihil, nisi gratuito gaudio, quo in Deo per Christum delectatur, tantarum rerum largitore, facit et patitur.

Vides ergo, si cognoscimus ea, quae nobis data sunt, maxima et pretiosa, ut Petrus ait, mox per spiritum diffundi in

Thus you see, from faith flow love and gladness in the Lord; and from love a happy, willing, and free spirit to serve a neighbour spontaneously; and that, without any regard to gratitude or ingratitude, praise or blame, gain or loss. Nor in what it does has it any eye to gaining the favour of men, nor does it make any distinction between friends and enemies, nor has it any respect to the grateful or ungrateful; but with the utmost freedom and willingness it devotes both itself and its property, whether they prove to be lost upon the ungrateful or given to the deserving. And even as the Father of this free son does, distributing freely and abundantly all things to all, 'causing his sun to shine upon the just and upon the unjust;' so the son does nothing and suffers nothing but with that free gladness in which he delights through Christ in God, who has freely given him such exceedingly great things.

You see therefore that when we once know those exceedingly great and precious things (as Peter saith) which are freely given unto us, love is there-

cordibus nostris caritatem, qua liberi, hilares, omnipotentes, operatores, et omnium tribulationum victores, proximorum servi, nihilominus tamen omnium domini sumus. Qui vere non cognoscunt donata sibi per Christum, iis Christus frustra natus est, per opera illi incedunt, ad istarum rerum gustum et sensum nunquam perventuri. Igitur sicut proximus noster necessitatem habet et nostra abundantia indiget, ita et nos coram Deo necessitatem habuimus et misericordia ejus indiguimus. Ideo sicut Pater coelestis nobis in Christo gratis auxiliatus est, ita et nos debemus gratis per corpus et opera ejus proximo nostro auxiliari, et unusquisque alteri Christus quidam fieri, ut simus mutuum Christi, et Christus idem in omnibus, hoc est, vere Christiani.

upon largely shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost; under the influence of which we are free and happy, all-affecting workmen, overcomers of all tribulation, the servants of our neighbours and yet nevertheless lords of all things. Whereas those who know not these things as freely given unto them through Christ, to them Christ is born in vain; these wander in the ways of working and shall never attain unto a knowledge and taste of these things. As therefore our neighbour has necessity, and stands in need of our abundance; so we once had necessity before God and stood in need of His mercy. As our Heavenly Father has freely supplied our necessities in Christ, so we ought by our body and its industry freely to supply the necessity of our neighbour, and each to become to the other a certain Christ, that we may be all as one in Christ and Christ one in us all; that is, that we may be true Christians.

Quis ergo comprehendere

Who then can comprehend

queat divitias et gloriam Christianae vitae? quae omnia potest et habet, et nullius indiget, peccati, mortis, inferni domina, simul tamen omnibus serva et obsequiosa et utilis.

the riches and the glory of the Christian life? It possesses and can do all things, wanting nothing itself; the royal conqueress of sin, death, and hell, and yet at the same time a handmaid humbly subservient and profitable to all.

NOTE 18, p. 181.

The following is the commencement of Bradwardine's Preface:—

'Magnorum et multorum petitionibus atque repetitionibus cumulatis incessanter sollicitor, ut quae nuper de causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, in castris scholasticis militando, voce transeunte deprompseram, scripturae mancipem remanenti. Verum haud dubio, sicut Dei amici in causa Dei postulare me provocant et confortant, ita et amici Pelagii, super numerum plures istis, me revocant et deterrent. Ecce enim (quod non nisi tactus dolore cordis intrinsecus refero) sicut olim contra unicum Dei Prophetam octingenti et quinquaginta Prophetae Baal, et similes sunt reperti, quibus et innumerabilis populus adhaerebat; ita et hodie in hac causa; quot, Domine, hodie cum Pelagio, pro Libero Arbitrio, contra gratuitam gratiam tuam pugnant, et contra Paulum pugilem gratiae spiritualem? Quot etiam hodie gratuitam gratiam tuam fastidiunt, solumque liberum arbitrium ad salutem sufficere stomachantur? Aut si gratia utantur, vel perfunctorie necessariam eam simulant, ipsamque se jactant liberi sui arbitrii viribus promereri, ut sic saltem nequaquam gratuita, sed vendita videatur? Quot etiam, Deus omnipotens, impotentes de sui potestate arbitrii praesumentes, tuae cooperationis auxilium in operationibus suis recusant, dicendo cum impiis, recede a nobis? Quot insuper, Domine, sui libertatem arbitrii

extollentes, tuam refugiunt servitutem? Vel si te cooperari cum eis saltem labiis fateantur, cum illis superbis et odibilibus civibus tuis quondam, te super eos regnare diffugiunt; imo et superbiores Lucifero aequalitate tui nequaquam contenti, super te, Rex regum, impudentissime gestiunt se regnare? Non enim verentur astruere suam voluntatem in actione communi praeire ut dominam, tuam subsequi ut ancillam; se praeire ut Dominos, te subsequi sicut servum; se velut reges praecipere, te tanquam subditum obedire. Quinimo et voluntati suae in contingenter futuris omnimodam tribuunt libertatem in tantum, ut etiam contra vocem Propheticam a tua subjectione exemptionem praetendant, et voluntatem tuam liberrimam, omnipotentissimam et immutabilissimam cum haec advenerint in praeteritum velabantur de summa arce libertatis antiquae dejicere, et novellae necessitatis irreperabili servituti subjicere moliuntur. O Domine Deus meus, non nisi gemebundus recogito, quot et quanti judices seleges Pelagianos, olim damnatos, et a totius Ecclesiae finibus relegatos absolvere et reconciliare sollicite machinantur! Quot turgidi advocati pro eis vociferantur! Quot improbabiles procuratores partem eorum procurant! Quot insuper, Domine, argumenta artificialia non habentes, ad inartificialia se convertunt, et ut partem Pelagianorum extollant saltem clamoribus, horribilibus probris, conviciis, risu, et gestu, partem tuam deprimere annituntur! Et quot et quam innumerabiles eis favent! Totus etenim paene mundus post Pelagium abiit in errorem. Exurge igitur, Domine, judica causam tuam, et sustinentem te sustine, protege, robora, consolare. Scis enim quod nusquam virtute mea, sed tua confisus, tantillus aggredior tantam causam.'—BRADWARDINE, *De Causa Dei*, &c., ed. Savile, 1618.

NOTE 19, p. 181.

See the fourth of Archbishop Laurence's *Bampton Lectures*, and the Notes upon it. The following extract is from Note 1 to that Sermon:—

'It was the universal sentiment of the Schools, that fallen man is both capable of preparing himself for the reception of grace, and of deserving it by his own virtue: "Quod homo possit se praeparare ad gratiam sine novo dono habituali, sibi divinitus infuso, *omnes concedunt.*" Durandus a Sanct. Porc. In Sentent. lib. ii. distinct. 28, quaest. 3. "Hoc supposito, dicendum est, quod ad merendum solum de congruo non est necessarium ponere id nobis gratiam vel caritatem habitualem, quod patet, quia, *secundum omnes*, peccator carens gratia *poenitendo meretur de congruo gratiam justificantem.*"' Id. lib. i. dist. 16, quaest. 2.

In what sense the scholastical grace, or charity, was deemed requisite to render merit complete, or convert that which before was 'meritum de congruo' into 'meritum de condigno,' the writings of Luther abundantly shew, 'Principium fidei illorum capitale est hujusmodi, *Hominem posse ex naturalibus viribus, faciendo quod in se est, implere omnia mandata Dei.*

'Ex quo capite, quae membra pendeant, vide. Primum, quod gratia Dei hominibus non est necessaria *ex parte facientis, neque ex parte faciendorum*, (quod etiam rotundis verbis impudenter habent eorum libri,) *sed ex parte exactoris Dei*, ut qui mandata sua impleri non est contentus, nisi *in gratia* impleantur. Ex quo ulterius sequitur coelum esse clausum, et infernum paratum homini summa iniquitate Dei, nempe non propter peccata hominis, neque propter non impleta mandata Dei, sed propter tyrannicam et arbitrariam exactionem Dei . . .

'Breviter, quicquid Christus est, et in Christo nobis donatum est, superfluum et non necessarium est, si nos est naturalia nostra spectes, sed necessarium solum; si Dei exactionem spectes . . .

'*Christum plane non necessarium* facitis, et ex parte nostra. Ideo aperte negatis ipsum esse Jesum, id est, *Salvatorem hominum.* Asseritis autem, potius *Satisfactorem exactionis iniqui Dei.* Nec liberavit nos a peccatis, quae nulla sunt, si liberum arbitrium velit facere, quod est in se, sed ab exactione ultra

peccata et mandata in homines saeviente. Ecce corpus sacrae theologiae Parrhisiensis, et Papistarum ex latere uno.

'Ex alio latere, aliud principium fidei, *Hominem posse, faciendo quod est in se, infallibiliter et necessario mereri gratiam de congruo.*

'Nonne sic docetis Almae facultates? Docetis ergo per hac posse nos satisfacere *ex nobis* etiam iniquae Dei tyrannidi, ut misero et superfluo Christo non reliquus sit saltem blasphemissimus ille honor, quo non Salvator hominum, seu Jesus, sed satisfactor divini tyranni et exactoris diceretur. Jam enim *nos ipsi* gratiam possumus *absque Mediatore* impetrare. Ac si jam *bis* superfluus est Christus, *nec necessarius etiam ex parte Dei exactoris.*

'Vereor autem ne lector pius non credat haec horrendis horribiliora doceri in Academiis. Quapropter te oro, Christiane frater, vera me credas loqui; *testes invoco eorum libros extantes*, et conscientias tum ipsorummet, tum omnium qui legerunt eorum libros.'—Opera Lutheri, vol. ii. fol. 265.

NOTE 20, p. 185.

A similar principle to that of the Royal Supremacy was, in fact, involved in Luther's appeal 'To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, concerning the Reformation of the Christian Estate.' At the very moment when Eck was returning to Germany with the bull of excommunication, Luther was completing this treatise. It is described by the editor of the Erlangen edition as 'the work by which he won all hearts, and paralysed the influence of the bull with the thoughtful and unprejudiced portion of the nation.' It appeared in August, 1520, and by the 18th of that month more than 4000 copies had been already dispersed—a prodigious circulation, considering the state of literature at that day. Its purport is sufficiently described in its opening paragraph. 'The Romanists,' he says, 'have with great adroitness surrounded themselves with three walls, with which they have

hitherto secured themselves so that no one should reform them, whereby the whole of Christendom has been grievously injured. In the first place, when they are pressed by the temporal power, they declare that "the temporal power has no authority over the spiritual; but, on the contrary, that the spiritual power is above the temporal." In the second place, when men rebuke them with the Holy Scripture, they contend "that the office of interpreting the Scripture belongs to no one except to the Pope." In the third place, when threatened with a Council, they then devise "that no one can call a Council except the Pope."'

These three walls Luther endeavours to demolish, as he expresses it, with the sound of his trumpet. He then proceeds to depict in the sequel with extraordinary vigour and boldness the corruptions of the Church, and his breach from Rome was from the moment of this publication irreparable. He appealed, in a word, to the Government and the lay authorities of the German nation to take into their own hands the reformation which was needed. Some abuses, as being within their own control, he calls on them to abolish at once. For the removal of others he begs them to summon a General Council, and, when it is summoned, to protect the freedom of its deliberations.

It is a characteristic circumstance that, while these principles found their boldest expression in Germany, they received their most practical application in England.

NOTE 21, p. 187.

The following is the text of this passage. It occurs in the *Resolutiones Disputationum de Indulgentiarum Virtute*, under *Conclusio LVIII:*—

Theologus crucis (id est, de Deo crucifixo et abscondito loquens) poenas, cruces, mortem docet esse thesaurum omnium pretiosissimum et reliquias sacratissimas, quas ipsemet dominus hujus theologiae consecravit, benedixitque, non solum tactu

suae sanctissimae carnis, sed et amplexu suae supersanctae et divinae voluntatis, easque hic reliquit vere osculandas, quaerendas, amplexandas. Quin beatus et benedictus, qui dignus fuerit Deo visus, ut ei donentur hi thesauri reliquiarum Christi, imo qui intelligat sibi donari. Nam cui non offeruntur? Sicut B. Jacobus: Omne gaudium existimate fratres, cum in tentationes varias incideritis. Non est enim omnium haec gratia et gloria, ut hos accipiant thesauros, sed electissimorum filiorum Dei.

Multi peregrinantur Romam aliaque sancta loca, ut tunicam Christi, ossa martyrum, loca et vestigia sanctorum videant (quod non damnamus quidem), sed hoc gemimus, quod veras reliquias, scilicet passiones et cruces, quae sanctificaverunt ossa et reliquias martyrum, et tanta veneratione fecerunt digna. Ita nescimus, ut non solum non acceptemus oblatas domi, sed summis viribus repellamus, et persequamur de loco in locum, cum deberemus summa siti et jugibus lacrimis id apud Deum postulare, ut darentur nobis tam pretiosae reliquiae Christi omnium sacratissimae, tanquam donum electorum Dei filiorum.

* * * * * * * *

Quin tam sanctae sunt ejusmodi reliquiae et tam pretiosi thesauri, ut cum aliae possint servari in terra, aut ut honorificentissime in auro, argento, gemmis, serico, hae non possunt servari nisi in coelestibus, vivis, rationalibus, immortalibus, puris, sanctis servaculis, id est, cordibus fidelium, omni auro et gemma inaestimabilitur pretiosioribus.—LUTHERI *Opera Latina ad Reformationis historiam imprimis pertinentia.* Frankfort, 1865. Vol. II. pp. 270, 271.

NOTE 22, p. 188.

The text is subjoined from the *Resolutiones Disputationum*:—

CONCLUSIO XCII.

Valeant itaque omnes illi prophetae, qui dicunt populo Christi: Pax, pax, et non est pax.

Conclusio XCIII.

Bene agant omnes illi prophetae, qui dicunt populo Christi: Crux, crux, et non est crux.

Conclusio XCIV.

Exhortandi sunt Christiani, ut caput suum Christum per poenas mortes infernosque sequi studeant.

Conclusio XCV.

Ac sic magis per multas tribulationes intrare coelum, quam per securitatem pacis confidant.

Satis supra de cruce et poenis dictum est, hodie rarus sermo.—Lutheri *Opera* (*ut supra*), p. 293.

NOTE 23, p. 205.

This subject is sufficiently illustrated by the letter which Dr. Döllinger addressed on the 28th of March, 1871, to the Archbishop of Munich and Freising, in explanation of his position with respect to the decree of Papal Infallibility. The following translation is extracted from *The Guardian* of April 5, 1871:—

'Your Excellency has asked me in two letters to explain my position with respect to the Romish Resolutions of July 18th, 1870, which have been published by you.

'It has transpired in the circle of your Cathedral Chapter that it is your intention to proceed against me with such penal measures as are used only against such priests as have been guilty of gross moral crimes, and even but seldom against these. This is to occur if I do not, within a certain period, submit myself to the two new articles of faith, as to the universal (*Allgewalt*) power and infallibility of the Pope.

'I learn at the same time that a council-meeting of German Bishops is to take place shortly at Fulda.

'In the year 1848, when a meeting of all the German Bishops was held at Würzburg, the honour of an invitation

was extended to myself, and I took part in the proceedings. Your Excellency might perhaps arrange that I might be allowed in the meeting which is about to take place, not this time to take part in the proceedings, but to have an audience for a few hours.

'For I am prepared to prove before this meeting the following theses, which are of decisive importance for the present situation of the German Church, as well as for my personal position.

'Firstly, the new articles of faith are based upon the texts in the Holy Scriptures, St. Matt. xvi. 18 and St. John xxi. 17, and, as far as Infallibility is concerned, upon the text, St. Luke xxii. 32, with which the same, biblically considered, must stand or fall. But we are bound by a solemn oath, which I myself have twice sworn, to "accept and to explain the Holy Scriptures, not otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers." The Fathers of the Church have all, without exception, explained the texts in question as bearing a totally different meaning to the new decrees, and especially in the text St. Luke xxii. 32 have found anything but an infallibility given to the Pope. Therefore, were I to accept with the decrees this explanation, without which every biblical basis to the same is wanting, I should commit a perjury. And, as I have said, I am prepared to prove this to the Bishops in council.

'Secondly, in several Episcopal pastorals and notices which have lately appeared, the assertion has been made, or the historical proof sought, that the new doctrine now proceeding from Rome as to the universal power of the Pope over every single Christian, and as to the Papal Infallibility in decisions in the Church on matters of faith from the beginning, through all time and for ever, has been generally, or at least nearly generally, believed and taught. I am ready to prove that this assertion is based upon an entire misconception of the traditions of the Church for the first thousand years, and upon an entire distortion of her history. It is in direct contradiction to the plainest facts and testimonies.

'Thirdly, I am ready to prove that the Bishops of the Latin countries, Spain, Italy, South America, France, who formed the immense majority at Rome, were, with their clergy, already led astray by the class-books from which they took their ideas during their seminary education; since the proofs given in these books are for the most part false, invented, or distorted. I shall prove this, firstly, with the two principal and favourite works of modern theological schools and seminaries, *The Moral Philosophy of St. Alphonsus Liguori* (and especially as regards the treatise contained therein concerning the Pope), and with *The Theology of the Jesuit Peroni;* further, with the writings of the Archbishop Cardoni, and of Bishop Ghilardi, which were distributed in Rome during the Council; and finally, with *The Theology of the Viennese Theologian Schwetz.*

'Fourthly, I appeal to the fact, which I am ready to prove in public, that two General Councils and several Popes have already decided in the fifteenth century by solemn decrees, issued by the Councils, repeatedly confirmed by the Popes, the question as to the extent of the Pope's power, and as to his infallibility, and that the decrees of the 18th of July, 1870, are in the most glaring contradiction to these resolutions, and therefore cannot possibly be considered as binding.

'Fifthly, I believe that I shall be able to prove that the new decrees are simply incompatible with the Constitutions of the States of Europe, and especially with that of Bavaria; and that I find it impossible for me, who am bound by oath to this Constitution, which I have lately sworn on my admission to the Chamber of the Councillors of State, to accept the new decrees, and as their necessary consequence, the Bulls "Unam Sanctam" and "Cum ex Apostolatus officio," the Syllabus of Pius IX, with so many other Papal declarations and laws, which are now to be accepted as infallible decisions, and are in irreconcilable antagonism to the laws of the country. I appeal on this subject to the opinion given by the Legal Faculty in Munich, and am ready to abide by the arbitration

of any German Legal Faculty which your Excellency may be pleased to name.

'I only ask two conditions for the Conference which I have proposed, or rather prayed for; the first, that my assertions, together with any counter-assertions, shall be recorded, with a view to their subsequent publication; the second, that a man of scientific culture, to be chosen by me, shall be allowed to be present at the Conference.

'Should this be unattainable before the German bishops in Fulda, I venture most respectfully to proffer another request, that it may please your Excellency to form, out of the members of your Cathedral Chapter, a committee, before which I may plead my cause in the way above-mentioned. Several of these venerable gentlemen are Doctors, and were formerly Professors of Theology, and at the same time my former scholars. I may hope that it would be more agreeable to them to treat with me in quiet argument, to confute me, if possible, with reasons and facts, than to draw up, upon the seat of judgment, criminal sentences against me, and to submit the same to your Excellency, to be fulminated, as the saying is. If your Excellency will consent to preside at this Conference, and will condescend to correct any errors into which I may have fallen in the citation and explanation of testimonies and facts, I shall count it as a great honour, and the cause of truth can only profit thereby. And when you place before me the prospect of the exercise of your pastoral power, I may still hope that you will prefer to employ, in the first place, towards me, the finest, most noble, most benevolent, and most Christ-like attribute of this power—namely, the teacher's office. Should I be convinced by testimonies and facts, I engage myself to revoke publicly all that I have written in this matter, and to confute myself. In any case the results must be advantageous to the Church, and the peace of spirits. For it is not myself alone who am concerned; thousands of the clergy, hundreds of thousands of the laity think as I do, and find it impossible to accept the new articles of faith.

'Up to this day not a single one, even of those who have signed a declaration of submission, has said to me that he is really convinced of the truth of these theses. All my friends and acquaintances confirm me in this experience; "not a single person believes in it," is what I hear day by day from all lips. A Conference such as I have proposed, and the publication of the proceedings, will in any case afford that deeper insight which so many long for.

'Perhaps your Excellency will refer me to the Pastoral issued recently by yourself, as a source from which I can draw sufficient instruction and correction of my opinions; but I must confess that it has had exactly the opposite effect upon me, and I am ready to prove that there is there a long list of misunderstood, distorted, mutilated, or invented testimonies, which, taken together with the suppression of the most important facts and counter-proofs, form a most unreal picture of the true tradition. It is certain that the person to whom your Excellency entrusted this task did not invent these falsifications, but has borrowed them in good faith from others (Cardoni, for instance), but were it his desire to defend his work at the proposed Conference, he would find me ready to prove my assertion in a few hours, or, should I not succeed in doing so, to make public apology to him. I would only ask for one condition in consideration of the importance of the matter—viz. that the Government be requested to allow a statesman, learned in historical and ecclesiastical matters, to attend the Conference. As the case is one of the highest importance for all Governments, it may be assumed that this request would not be refused.

'There is no want of precedents in the past history of the Church, which show that my proposal is in accordance with the principles as well as with the practice of the Church. In the year 411, a Conference of 286 Catholic and 279 Donatist Bishops held three sessions under the presidency of the Imperial officer of State, Marcellinus, and the disputed doctrine was discussed, upon which the latter decided in favour of the Catholic Bishops. In the year 1433 Bohemian

Calixtines appeared at the Council of Basel, and a decree which had been issued eighteen years before by the Synod of Constance, as to the Communion in one kind, was now submitted to new discussion and examination, the result being that compromise (also acknowledged by the Papal chair) which was a most important and fundamental concession to the Bohemians, and one differing widely from the older decree. A still greater similarity with the transaction proposed by myself is to be found in the Conference, so celebrated in French history, between the Bishop Du Perron, of Evreux, and the Protestant statesman and *savant*, Du Plessis-Mornay, which took place in the year 1600, at Fontainebleau, under the auspices of King Henry IV. Here it was a question as to the proof that Mornay had falsified or incorrectly quoted a considerable number of authorities in his book upon the Eucharist. Henry himself presided, and the most eminent men of both Churches were present as witnesses. The Conference was interrupted after a few days, and after a number of Mornay's quotations had been examined, by the illness of the latter, but caused, nevertheless, a remarkably favourable effect for the Catholic cause, in the excited minds of that period.

'Most venerable Archbishop, I leave entirely to your own judgment which form you will give to a Conference so much desired by myself, and certainly so welcome to multitudes of German Catholics, and what persons you will invite to attend, or oppose to me; in your diocese there is certainly no want of professional theologians who will be glad to accept your invitation. The practice of the Church proves that a question of faith is just as much an affair of the laity as of the clergy, and that the former may take part in the scientific examination and establishment of the tradition, a fact which both Popes and theologians have acknowledged. And in this case, which is a matter for historical proof, I am gladly ready to submit to the verdict of the most eminent historians of the German nation and of the Catholic faith. Such men as Ficker, Reumont, Höfler, Arneth, Kampschulte, Cornelius,

Lorenz, Wegele, Aschbach, may judge whether my proofs be critically and historically right or not.

'Your Excellency was pleased formerly to honour my book on the First Ages of the Church Apostolical with your approval, and it was generally considered among German Catholics to be a true picture of the time of foundation: even the Jesuitic-Ultramontane party let it pass without censure. But if the new decrees contain the truth, then I have laid myself open to the reproach of having entirely misrepresented the history of the Apostles. That entire section of my book which concerns the constitution of the earlier Church, my description of the relation in which Paul and the other Apostles stood to Peter—all is fundamentally wrong, and I ought to condemn my own book, and confess that I have neither understood Luke's Acts of the Apostles nor their own Epistles.

'The new doctrine of the Vatican invests the Pope with entire plenary power (*totam plenitudinem potestatis*) over the whole Church, as well as over every single layman, priest, or Bishop; a power which is to represent at the same time the truly Episcopal, and again the specifically Papal power—which is to include in itself everything concerning faith, morals, duty, discipline, which shall reach every one from the monarch to the day-labourer, and can punish, command, and forbid him. The wording is so carefully arranged, that no other position and authority remains for the Bishops than that of Papal commissaries or delegates. And in this manner, as every one acquainted with Church history and with the Fathers will confess, the Episcopacy of the early Church is essentially dissolved, and an Apostolical institution to which, according to the judgment of the Fathers, the highest importance and authority in the Church is due, is subtilised to a bodiless shadow.

'For no one will think it possible that there should exist two Bishops in the same diocese, one of whom is at the same time Pope, the other being simply a Bishop—and a Papal vicar or diocesan commissary is not a Bishop, is no successor

of the Apostles; he may, through the powers conceded to him from Rome, be very mighty, so long as his principal allows him to rule, just in the same way as a Jesuit or mendicant friar to whom the Pope has granted abundance of privileges also possesses great power: and I well know that such an extension of their powers has been held out in prospect to the Bishops in Rome; that they have been told, "The more irresistible the Pope, the stronger shall ye be, for the rays of the abundance of his power shall fall also on you." The Bishops of the minority have penetrated the delusion of these promises; they understood clearly, as the "Analytical Synopsis" shows, that as soon as the universal Episcopacy of the Pope should be established, they might indeed continue to be dignitaries of the Church, but no longer true Bishops. You yourself, venerable Sir, took part in the deputation which made such urgent counter-representations to the Pope, on the 15th of July, 1870—representations which Bishop von Ketteler (Mayence) sought to emphasise by prostration! We know that these representations were fruitless. The sole consolation given to the Bishops mourning the loss of their ecclesiastical dignity was confined to the declaration in the decree that the Episcopal power is an "ordinary" one—(*i. e.* a "potestas ordinaria subdelegata," as the Romish canonists are accustomed to express it), and that the Pope considers it to be his duty to support them, this being vouched by a mutilated saying of Gregory the Great, by a passage which, if it with others had been quoted in its entirety, would indeed have proved to the world that this Pope of the seventh century put away from himself with the deepest horror such a universal Episcopacy as has now been established, considering it a blasphemous usurpation.

'Nor has there been any lack of prayers, representations, and warnings, before and during the Council. You yourself, venerable Sir, took part in the same by your signature. The Bishops of the minority have declared in an address to the Pope, on the 12th of January, signed by yourself, that "the declarations and acts of the Fathers of the Church, the *true*

documents of history, the Catholic educational system itself, presented the most serious difficulties in opposition to the proclamation of the doctrine of Infallibility"—they were, as they themselves said, afraid even to discuss these difficulties, and prayed the Pope to relieve them from the necessity of such a discussion—*i. e.* to relinquish his infallibility. But when the Pope insisted that the Council should occupy itself therewith, the German Bishops demanded on the 11th of March exhaustive conferences on the question of Infallibility, to be conducted by deputations chosen from both sides. These were not granted, and they had to content themselves with speeches in the Aula, where any regular discussion was an impossibility.

'As to the indispensability and urgent need of such conferences, I would only quote here *one* instance. A considerable number of Italian Bishops demanded in a since-printed address that Papal Infallibility should be raised to a dogma of faith, because two men, both Italians and both the pride of their nation, Thomas Aquinas and Alphonsus Liguori, these shining lights of the Church, had thus taught. Now, it was well known and proved by me, as well as by Gratry, that Thomas had been deceived by a long series of invented testimonies, as indeed he bases his teaching in this instance almost exclusively upon such falsifications, and never upon genuine passages of the Fathers or Councils. And as to Liguori, a single glance at his writings is sufficient to convince any practised theologian that his dealings with falsified passages are still worse than those of Thomas. My exposure of the fraud to which the latter had succumbed had created great sensation in Rome. The author of a pamphlet published there, and directed against myself, says that a great cry had been raised on the subject round about him. It ought therefore to have been indispensably necessary to examine closely into the matter. It is true that such an examination, carefully and thoroughly begun, would have led very far; it would have resulted in the proof that the theory of Papal Infallibility had been introduced into the Church solely by a series of calculated inventions and falsifications, and had then

been spread and maintained by force, by the suppression of older teaching, and by the many means and artifices which are at the disposal of the ruling power.

'All exertions, representations, and petitions, then, were fruitless: nothing was conceded, and yet the example of the so often quoted Council of Florence was before their eyes, when the assertion of the Greeks, that falsified passages of the Fathers were laid before them, led to examinations and discussions lasting many months, and carried on with the greatest care. It is assuredly known to your Excellency that the most careful and ripe consideration of tradition has invariably been required of any true Œcumenical Council about to issue dogmatic resolutions. How great the contrast in this respect between Trent and that which occurred in Rome in 1870! Certainly the treatise of Archbishop Cardoni, which was accepted at once by the Preparatory Committee, and which was to be considered by the assembled Bishops as a proof, could not have supported examination for one single hour.

'In the whole history of the Church I only know of one General Council in which, as in this last, those in power prevented any thorough discussion of the tradition, and this was the Second of Ephesus in the year 449; there, in the so-called Synod of Thieves (Räubersynode), this was done by force and by tumultuous tyranny. In the Vatican Council the order of proceeding imposed on the assembly, the Papal Committee, and the will of the majority, suffered no regular and critical examination to be made. Such an examination would assuredly have brought to the light many awkward and unpleasant matters, but it would have preserved the Church from a state of confusion which must appear pitiable to yourself. If you notwithstanding assert that the Vatican assembly was entirely free, you take the word "free" in a sense which theological circles do not generally attach to it. A Council is only then theologically free when free examination and discussion of all objections and difficulties has taken place, when exceptions have been admitted, and examined in accordance with the rules for ascertaining the tradition. That not even the most

modest beginning was made in this direction, that indeed the immense majority of the Bishops from Latin countries wanted either the will or the power to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong, is proved by the pamphlets which appeared in Italy and were distributed in Rome,—for instance, those of the Dominican Bishop of Mondori, Ghilardi; and further, by the fact that hundreds of these Bishops could without blushing rest their case upon the unassailable authority of Alphonsus Liguori.

'It is well known that the Jesuits, when they had conceived the plan of establishing Papal absolutism in Church and State, in education and administration, as a dogma, invented the so-called "Sacrificio dell' intelletto," and assured their adherents and disciples—yes, even persuaded many, and among them many Bishops—that the most beautiful act of adoration of the Almighty and the most noble Christian heroism consist in this—that man, renouncing his own spiritual light of self-gained understanding and discernment, should throw himself with blind faith into the arms of our unerring Papal magistracy, as the sole sure source of religious knowledge. And this religious order has indeed had great success in raising in the eyes of numbers intellectual indolence to the dignity of a religious sacrifice full of merit, and has even moved men, whose culture would have enabled them to enter upon an historical examination, to abandon the same. But as far as we may judge from their Pastorals, the German Bishops have not yet descended to this point of delusion. They still concede to human knowledge, to human search and examination, a right to exist and a sphere of activity. They themselves appeal to history, as does the Pastoral which has appeared under your name.

'In a Pastoral Letter which has just been sent to me, Bishop Lothar von Kübel in Freiburg says on p. 9—"Does the Pope receive new revelations? Can he *create new articles of faith?* Certainly not. He can only declare that a doctrine is contained in the Holy Scriptures, and in tradition, therefore is revealed by God, and must be believed of all." I do not doubt that

your Excellency, and all other German Bishops, are fully agreed with these words. But the question is, then, in the present confused state of the Church, simply an historical one, which is to be treated and decided upon according to the means in our power, and to the rules which are applicable to every historic search, to every discovery of past facts—that is to say, of such as belong to history. There are in this case no special or secret sources of which the Popes alone have the right or power to avail themselves. Both Pope and Bishops must in this case necessarily, if I may use the expression, place themselves under the common law—*i. e.* if their resolutions are to endure, they must adopt that course, must initiate that examination of witnesses with the requisite sifting and critical proof of evidence, which alone in the judgment of all men of capacity in historical matters is able to give us truth and certainty. There were therefore, and remain yet, two questions to be answered, in accordance with this course. Firstly, is it the truth that the three sayings of Christ respecting Peter were understood from the beginning through all centuries in the whole Church in the sense which is now given to them—namely, that of an infallibility and boundlessly universal power granted thereby to the Popes? Secondly, is it true that the ecclesiastical tradition of all time in the writings of the Fathers, and the facts of history, prove the general acknowledgment of this double right of the Pope?

'If these questions must be answered in the negative, it is not permissible to appeal, as Bishop von Kübel and others do, to the assistance of the Holy Ghost, as promised to the Pope, and to the obedience of faith due on this account to him: for what we are to examine into historically is just whether this assistance has been promised to him. And where has this been done? Not in the Council, for there, as Cardoni's principal treatise proves, even falsifications were not shunned, and an entirely unreal picture of tradition has been given, with a suppression of the most striking facts and counter-testimonies. And it is precisely this which I am ready to prove.

'And here I beg your Excellency to consider that the doctrine which we are now to adopt forms by its own nature, and by the declaration of the Pope himself, by the confession of all infallibilists, a *fundamental article of faith*—that it is a question of the *regula fidei*, of the rule which must decide what is to be believed and what is not. In future every Catholic Christian could only answer the query why he believes this or that, as follows :—"I believe, or deny it, because the infallible Pope has commanded me to believe, or to deny it." Nor can this first principle of faith, as the Holy Scriptures necessarily should most clearly shew, ever have been doubtful in the Church—it must at every date and among every people have governed the whole Church like a brightly shining star, must have been placed in the front of all instruction ;—and we all wait for an explanation, how it is to be cleared up that only after 1830 years the Church has started the idea of making an article of faith of a doctrine which the Pope calls, in a letter addressed to your Excellency on the 28th of October, "ipsum fundamentale principium Catholicae fidei ac doctrinae." How can it have been possible that the Popes should have, during centuries past, exempted whole countries, whole schools of theology, from belief in this "fundamental article of faith?" And—may I add?—how is it that your Excellency yourself strove so long and so persistently against the enunciation of this dogma? Because it was not opportune, you say. But can it ever have been "inopportune" to give to believers the key of the whole temple of faith, to announce to them the fundamental article on which all the rest depend? We stand all of us giddy before a chasm which opened before us on the 18th of July last.

'He who wishes to measure the immense range of these resolutions may be urgently recommended to compare thoroughly the third chapter of the decrees in Council with the fourth, and to realise for himself what a system of universal government and spiritual dictation stands here before us. It is the plenary power over the whole Church as over each separate member, such as the Popes have claimed for them-

selves since Gregory VII, such as is pronounced in the numerous Bulls since the Bull "Unam sanctam," which is from henceforth to be believed and acknowledged in his life by every Catholic. This power is boundless, incalculable: it can, as Innocent III said, strike at sin everywhere; can punish every man, allows of no appeal, is sovereign and arbitrary, for, according to Bonifacius VIII, the Pope "carries all rights in the shrine of his bosom." As he has now become infallible, he can in one moment, with the one little word "orbi" (that is, that he addresses himself to the whole Church), make every thesis, every doctrine, every demand, an unerring and irrefragable article of faith. Against him there can be maintained no right, no personal or corporate freedom—or, as the canonists say, the tribunal of God and that of the Pope are one and the same. This system bears its Romish origin on its forehead, and will never be able to penetrate in Germanic countries. *As a Christian, as a theologian, as an historian, as a citizen, I cannot accept this doctrine.* Not as a Christian, for it is irreconcilable with the spirit of the Gospel, and with the plain words of Christ and of the Apostles: it purposes just that establishment of the kingdom of this world which Christ rejected, it claims that rule over all communions which Peter forbids to all and to himself. Not as theologian—for the whole true tradition of the Church is in irreconcilable opposition to it. Not as historian can I accept it, for as such I know that the persistent endeavour to realise this theory of a kingdom of the world has cost Europe rivers of blood, has confounded and degraded whole countries, has shaken the beautiful organic architecture of the elder Church, and has begotten, fed, and sustained the worst abuses in the Church.

'Finally, as a citizen, I must put it away from me, because by its claims on the submission of States and monarchs, and of the whole political order under the Papal power, and by the exceptional position which it claims for the clergy, it lays the foundation of endless, ruinous dispute between State and Church, between clergy and laity. For I cannot conceal from myself that this doctrine, the results of which were the ruin

of the old German Kingdom, would, if governing the Catholic part of the German nation, at once lay the seed of incurable decay in the new kingdom which has just been built up[a].—
Accept, &c., (Signed) I. VON DÖLLINGER.
'Munich, 28 March, 1871.'

In the next number of *The Guardian* (April 12, 1871) we read (p. 428) that, 'in consequence of the declaration of Dr. Döllinger, the Archbishop of Munich has published a Pastoral Letter, in which he attempts to refute him by setting up against him the following propositions:—

'1. That there was no question at all at issue, for the question has been decided by an Œcumenical Council regularly called together, assembled freely, and directed by the Head of the Catholic Church.

'2. That historical criticism cannot be placed above the authority of the Church.

'3. The assertion that the decisions of the Council are incompatible with the constitution of European States and detrimental to the German Empire is repudiated as an erroneous supposition, and protested against as a false accusation.'

On the 18th of April, Dr. Döllinger was excommunicated.

NOTE 24, p. 221.

A striking example of this spirit is afforded by the following passage from Archbishop Bramhall, and it expresses sentiments with which it is very congenial to the author to close the present volume.

'No man can justly blame me for honouring my spiritual mother, the Church of England, in whose womb I was con-

[a] 'I have just read in the official organ of the Roman Curia and of the Jesuits—in the *Civilta* of the 18th of March, 1870, "The Pope is chief judge of all civil law. In him are combined the spiritual and worldly powers, joining in him as in a point, for he is the Vicegerent of Christ, who is not only the Eternal Priest, but also King of kings and Lord of lords;" and immediately following this, "The Pope is, by his high dignity, at the head of both powers."'

ceived, at whose breasts I was nourished, and in whose bosom I hope to die. Bees, by the instinct of nature, do love their hives, and birds their nests. But, God is my witness, that, according to my uttermost talent and poor understanding, I have endeavoured to set down the naked truth impartially, without either favour or prejudice, the two capital enemies of right judgment. The one of which, like a false mirror, doth represent things fairer and straighter than they are; the other like the tongue infected with choler makes the sweetest meats to taste bitter. My desire hath been to have Truth for my chiefest friend, and no enemy but error. If I have had any bias, it hath been my desire of peace, which our common Saviour left as a legacy to His Church, that I might live to see the re-union of Christendom, for which I shall always bow the knees of my heart to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. It is not impossible but that this desire of unity may have produced some unwilling error of love, but certainly I am most free from the wilful love of error. In questions of an inferior nature, Christ regards a charitable intention much more than a right opinion.

'Howsoever it be, I submit myself and my poor endeavours, first to the judgment of the Catholic Œcumenical essential Church, which if some of late days have endeavoured to hiss out of the schools as a fancy, I cannot help it. From the beginning it was not so. And if I should mistake the right Catholic Church out of human frailty or ignorance (which, for my part, I have no reason in the world to suspect, yet it is not impossible when the Romanists themselves are divided into five or six several opinions, what this Catholic Church, or what their infallible Judge is), I do implicitly and in the preparation of my mind submit myself to the true Catholic Church, the Spouse of Christ, the Mother of the Saints, the Pillar of Truth. And seeing my adherence is firmer to the Infallible Rule of Faith, that is, the Holy Scriptures interpreted by the Catholic Church, than to mine own private judgment or opinions, although I should unwittingly fall into an error, yet this cordial submission is an implicit retractation

thereof, and I am confident will be so accepted by the Father of Mercies, both from me and all others who seriously and sincerely do seek after peace and truth.

'Likewise I submit myself to the Representative Church, that is, a free General Council, or so General as can be procured; and until then to the Church of England, wherein I was baptized, or to a National English Synod. To the determination of all which, and each of these respectively, according to the distinct degree of their authority, I yield a conformity and compliance, or at the least and to the lowest of them, an acquiescence.'—ARCHBISHOP BRAMHALL'S *Works*, fol. p. 141, or in the edition contained in the *Anglo-Catholic Library*, vol. ii, p. 21.

THE END.

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